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Abstract  
 
Are non-proliferation regimes effective? If so, under which circumstances? Existing 
theoretical and empirical studies fall short of providing consistent indications of the 
constraining power of security institutions and non-proliferation regimes on state 
decisions.  
On the one hand, proponents of regimes highlight the overall capacity of institutions 
to contain the number of proliferators. On the other hand, detractors maintain that 
regimes have little or no effect on state decision to pursue specific weapons. The 
empirical associations between framework conventions and the non-proliferation of 
the weapons under provisions has proved unsatisfactory and weak. 
Moving from a broader idea of regimes in relations to a complex/graded notion of 
effectiveness, this research work develops a theoretical argument about the 
importance of networks of individual institutions across issue-areas (nested and 
overlapping institutions) in regime analysis. 
I argue that complex-regime  level data can drastically enhance our capacity to explain 
actual regime effectiveness, and possibly the link between specific institutional 
features and non-proliferation outcomes. I do so by introducing a new dataset, which 
includes information on the institutions parts of the biological non-proliferation 
regime complex. I then illustrate the use of the new dataset by developing measures 
of state exposure to the regime-complex in terms of overall “embeddedness”. 
 
Relevance, research questions and elements of innovation 
 
The global chronicle of the Cold War demised and the great level of stability it assured 
extinguished, the world has witnessed the turnaround of the relative importance of 
regional issues over global ones, the unprecedented impossibility to reliably predict 
upcoming political events, the recurrent failure of multilateral and unilateral attempts 
to respond to emerging security challenges (intruded by inconsistent and sporadic 
accomplishments), and the increased incidence of terrorist acts. Since the 1970s, it 
also became apparent that new scientific and technological developments outpaced 
the capacity of international institutions to grant full oversight and management. 
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More specifically, notwithstanding the multiplication of institutional efforts aimed at 
controlling the possession and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 
the resulting regimes do not seem very well equipped to respond to the current 
challenges menacing their role and influence. Non-proliferation treaties tend to be 
characterized by indeterminate language, contradictory norms on possession and use, 
modest compliance and verification measures, lack of enforcement tools and review 
processes that are barely able to satisfy the international community call and to 
accommodate the amplitude of ongoing changes. If on the one side, our 
understanding of how treaties influence world politics has increased tremendously in 
the last years.1 On the other side, scholars still lack a full understanding of whether or 
not these treaties work (do they constrain state policies or merely reflects pre-existing 
preferences?).2 Besides, some of the mechanisms through which they are expected to 
constrain states policies remain elusive and are still waiting empirical validation. 
Because of their specific nature (natural living agents existing in nature), biological 
weapons represent a particular challenge to policy makers committed to their 
governance. 
 
Under this perspective, this work represents an effort aimed at (1) offering a more 
complete and comprehensive understanding of the Biological Weapons (BW) non-
proliferation regime; (2) describing the diachronic variance in its configurational 
structure and the evolution of its main features; (3) advance hypothesis concerning 
the BW regime effectiveness. Concerning the latter point, it is worth anticipating here 
that the this work address the concept of effectiveness by disaggregating its substance 
into three discrete dimensions: outputs (consent/embeddedness), outcomes 
(compliance/obedience), and impact (true effectiveness).  
 
This research may theoretically confirm existing findings, provide some new insights 
and possibly open lines for further inquiry with regards to two key fields of 
                                                        
1 Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior”; Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights; Sikkink, The Justice 
Cascade; Lutz and Sikkink, “International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America”; Von Stein, “Do 
Treaties Constrain or Screen?”; Ritter and Wolford, “Bargaining and the Effectiveness of International Criminal 
Regimes”; Conrad and Ritter, “Treaties, Tenure, and Torture”; Lupu, “Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of 
International Human Rights Agreements.” 
2 Lupu, “Why Do States Join Some Universal Treaties but Not Others?” 
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investigation in contemporary International Relations. (1) The one addressing non-
proliferation regime effectiveness which sees, on the one side optimists - who believe 
in the capacity of institutions to constrain the number of proliferators and on the other 
side regimes pessimists who believe institutions are epiphenomenal (and only mirror 
underlying preferences). (2) And the one concerned with understanding international 
support to multilateral treaties and cooperation in general focusing on a  particular 
pattern of them, the one of Biological Weapons governance (including formal and 
informal arrangements and networks) 
 
Although building on a now-50-years-old theory of International Relations, namely 
Regime Theory, the present study de facto dialogues with most recent publications 
from non-proliferations studies and international organization literature. It displays 
elements of originality and innovations that are more comprehensively detailed in the 
introductory section. Interalia the following are worth recalling: 
1) The work tries to refresh regime theory by exploring where and how room exists 
for further integration with social-related accounts. 
2) Furthermore, without challenging the idea that regimes are partial order, the 
present research, by proceeding from the problem which informed the regime 
creation in the first place (the proliferation of BW) has decided to address the full 
set of initiatives which contribute to its solution (nested and overlapping 
institutions operating across issue-areas).  
3) The large majority of proliferation studies have focused on nuclear weapons and 
have only marginally covered the problem of biological weapons possession, 
development and circulation. Vice-versa Biological Weapons are the main focus of 
the present work.  
4) Much of proliferation literature (whose focus is on the factors prompting or 
hampering proliferation) and international cooperation theory (when not directly 
ignoring the non-proliferation realm) have dealt with framework conventions or 
international organizations. This present work, on the contrary, starts from 
observing that much of non-proliferation activities do not fall under that rubric 
anymore. For this reason the present work scrutinizes the plethora of more or less 
formal initiatives besides the regime’s framework convention (BTWC). 
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5) Under this perspective, the inclusion of practitioners from the early stages of the 
research also represents a novel approach aimed at granting a sound empirical 
basis and more grounded findings. 
6) Little attempt has been made to compare these additional cooperative 
endeavours supplementing and complementing the core BW treaties. 
7) Although the Biological Weapons regime is 100 years old, to date there has been 
no major comprehensive study on its evolution and impact. Under this perspective 
this research represents  a systematic, inclusive, multi-year, and multinational 
study. 
8) Empirical studies on effectiveness have focused  mainly on whether and how 
states reach agreements and comply with its provisions once the agreement is in 
place. This work proposes that effectiveness can be measured both in terms of 
process (insofar important elements  of non-proliferation effort also involve the 
construction and expansion of the cooperative arrangements) and results. 
Nonetheless, and maybe just because of that, even when the latter is the case, this 
study believes that effectiveness should be accounted for in terms of  a  complex 
of outputs, outcomes and impacts. 
 
Introduction  
 
In the minds of scholars, the question of international regimes has inspired 
considerable attention since the early 1970s. During that period, the policy dilemmas 
created by the rapid growth in international interdependence fostered new forms of 
cooperation, coordination and organization among state and non-state actors that 
uneasily fit into the then-dominant realist conceptual framework. Born to fill this 
lacuna, Regime Theory (RT) represented a substantive effort to produce an 
investigative paradigm that could make the emerging context more comprehensible 
and understandable to academics and policy-makers.  
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Since the publication of the well-known 1982 special issue of International 
Organization on the subject,3 regime analysis established as an enduring research 
program and an honoured subfield of International Relations (IR) scholarship.4 
During the last five decades, research efforts in this field pointed attention to distinct 
aspects of international institutions. At the very beginning, the bulk of regime analysis 
concentrated primarily on the process of regime formation and on describing regime 
attributes. Assessments mainly focused on the conditions that accounted for the rise 
of international regimes as instruments for managing or resolving conflicts over 
international problems and on the characteristics that different forms of cooperation 
were displaying. Later on, the interest of scholars began to shift towards a better 
understanding of regime consequences and researchers restored the core question of 
whether international regimes, once created, actually make a difference in the 
international system and for the international society.5 Since then, regime 
effectiveness has become a “driving force in the analysis of international relations”.6 
All major schools within International Relations (IR) discipline (realism, neo-liberalism, 
and constructivism) have provided their own contribution to the study of International 
Regimes. The major difference among the three schools of thought is the explanatory 
variable that these identify as playing the most important role in explaining regimes’ 
formation, and justifying its characteristics and functioning. Along these lines, theories 
of international regimes have been classified as interest-based 
(functionalism/institutionalism/neoliberalism), power-based (realism), and 
knowledge-based (which include, although are not limited to constructivist 
approaches).7 A second difference among the three schools’ perspectives is the 
degree of effectiveness they are able to accept when it comes to evaluate regime 
consequences; in other words, the scholars would disagree on the amount of 
“institutionalism” regimes would display in the very end (simply put, on how much 
                                                        
3 International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring, 1982 
4 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, “Integrating Theories of International Regimes,” 5.  
5 Haas, “Do Regimes Matter?” 
6 Zürn, “The Rise of International Environmental Politics”; Martin and Simmons, “Theories and 
Empirical Studies of International Institutions.” 
7 Haas, Institutions for the Earth; Young and Osherenko, Polar Politics; Hasenclever, Mayer, and 
Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 1997.  
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institutions matter and are resilient to external change).8 If on the one side, none of 
the exponents of the three schools, totally rejects the idea that international regimes 
exist or have some impact on world politics, they vary indeed considerably in the 
“institutionalism” they are available to concede. 
Both realism and neoliberalism build on a shared rationalist grounding and 
acknowledge rationalist assumptions, however they have then developed 
independently within Regime Theory. On the one side, realists have been inclined to 
downsize the role that regimes actually play in influencing international behaviours. 
They tend to acknowledge regimes just as institutions mirroring the underlying 
power/capacity distribution of actors with very limited capability to change 
behavioural outcomes. Consistently, some of realist scholars have come to label 
regimes as totally irrelevant elements in the international system (nothing more than 
a siren song of false promises).9 
On the other side, neoliberals believe that regimes can fruitfully change the 
cost/benefit calculus in transactions among actors which want to maximise/increase 
their utilities (with actors’ preferences being essentially given/fixed). According to this 
stream, by changing the strategic environment in which rational decisions are taken, 
regimes can, in certain conditions, drive divergent actors to cooperate when doing so 
is not immediately in their interest.  
Finally, knowledge-based theorists (strong and weak cognitivists) have attempted to 
draw attention on the potential endogenous changes that regimes can produce in the 
normative characteristics and properties of actors. These scholars have tried to issue 
warning against treating states’ preferences as given and ignoring states’ identities (as 
realists and neoliberals do). Inheriting much of the epistemology of sociology and 
sociological institutionalism, cognitivists have introduced into the structure-
constrained realm of international relations notions like appropriateness, learning, 
intersubjective meaning, interpretation, and socialization.  
Prevailing IR literature has distinguished two strands within cognitivism. Weak 
cognitivism focuses on the role of causal beliefs in regime formation and change. 
                                                        
8 Krasner, International Regimes; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, “Interorganizational Collaboration 
and the Locus of Innovation.” 
9 Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 1994. 
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Weak cognitivists admit that states can engage in learning activities (simple and 
complex - respectively referred to behavioural changes in means and ends) and have 
studied the condition of governmental learning (including epistemic communities). 
Strong cognitivists (also called “reflectivists” and “constructivists” emphasize the role 
of “social” knowledge and reject the idea of states as “rational actors” (this is not the 
case for weak cognitivists) and describe them as “role players”. 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger have explored and reasoned on the possibilities 
for the three schools of thought to provide a synergetic contribution to the study of 
international regimes by pooling together selected items of their conceptual and 
theoretical resources. In their view, realist and neoliberals approaches to international 
regimes can be profitably reconciled and reorganized by specifying the condition of 
validity of each; for example by making explicit the contexts in which related 
predictions apply (a priori specification).10 The same way, these scholars have shown 
that the weak variant of cognitivism can, on its turn, fruitfully supplement realism and 
neoliberalism accounts without violating the rationalist core of these approaches. 
Integrating weakly cognitivists arguments with rationalist accounts is indeed possible 
but the  process appears to be more effective when cognitivist variables are placed in 
a single causal chains with rationalist ones (with cognitivist variables either causally 
preceding or following rationalist ones).11 The optimism toward a grand synthesis 
however has stopped vis-à-vis the contribution of “strong cognitivism”. In fact, 
because of epistemological and ontological issues a universal disciplinary agreement 
seems unlikely.12 
 
Whilst much of the research structured around regimes’ formation and properties has 
been undertaken with profit and has led to satisfactory results reaching a full maturity, 
the same cannot be said regarding regimes’ functioning. More precisely, the 
understanding of how regimes work is still far from looking complete implying certain 
serious repercussions when it comes to draw conclusions about regimes’ effectiveness 
and/or elaborate on the determinants of regimes’ success and/or failures. 
                                                        
10 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, “Integrating Theories of International Regimes.”  
11 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 27. 
12 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 30–32.  
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Notwithstanding the fact that impressive steps forward have been made in specific 
issue areas, as international political economy and, more recently, in the 
environmental field,13  effectiveness still represents a challenging issue within 
contemporary IR research agendas. Along with effectiveness, some of its main related 
themes, such as compliance and implementation, have also been investigated with 
regards to specific variants of international regimes (international binding treaties 
and/or international organizations) backing mixed-results.1415  
 
All the above is especially true and consequential when it comes to the study of 
security regimes. Robert Jervis has represented one of the first exception to this 
dearth of commitment. Nonetheless, the author suggests that the limited interest 
devoted to the study of security institutions (and the modest and controversial results 
back-then collected) was not random neither it was the result of neglect but rather 
inherent to the very nature of sates’ relations when performed in the security realm.16 
Prevailing literature describes regimes as intervening variables standing between 
causal forces (most prominently power, interests, and “ideas”) on the one hand, and 
outcomes and behaviours, on the other hand.17 It follows that the more indirect and 
mediated the connections between causal factors and behaviours are, the larger is the 
room for institutions to restrain and regulate behaviours. What research, both in 
security and non-security areas, has demonstrated is that those connections (between 
power/interests/ideas and outcomes) are far more direct in the security arena than in 
                                                        
13 Breitmeir et al., The International Regimes Database as a Tool for the Study of International 
Cooperation; Helm and Sprinz, “Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Regimes”; Hovi, Sprinz, and Underdal, “Regime Effectiveness and the Oslo-Potsdam Solution,” 2003; 
Breitmeier, Underdal, and Young, “The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes”; 
Weaver, “The Politics of Performance Evaluation”; Young, “Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Regimes”; Elsig, “The World Trade Organization at Work.” 
14 Chayes and Chayes, “On Compliance”; Victor, The Implementation and Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Commitments; Jacobson and Weiss, “Strengthening Compliance with 
International Environmental Accords”; Helm and Sprinz, “Measuring the Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Regimes”; Underdal, “The Concept of Regime `Effectiveness’.” 
15 Dai, “Information Systems in Treaty Regimes,” December 12, 2002. 
16 Jervis, “Security Regimes,” 1982; Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” January 1978; 
Jervis, “From Balance to Concert.” 
17 Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences.”  
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others, as well as it is more intense, within states’ security-relevant bargaining, the 
sensitivity to relative gains over absolute ones.18 
Under this perspective, security regimes are challenging precisely because they are 
designed to govern behaviours and manage problems of international life that are 
considered to be inimical to successful collaborative arrangements (either cooperative 
or coordinative in nature)19. Specific features make regimes establishment, 
persistence and functioning more problematic in the security realm than it is for other 
issue-areas.20  Such typical, or at least typically prominent characteristics, include 
“security dilemma” and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), inherently competitive cast of 
security concerns, similarity between actions driven by offensive and defensive 
postures, high stakes, unforgiving nature of the confrontation, uncertainty about 
others’ intentions, subjective nature of actors’ security needs and a sense of “fear for 
the future evolution” of the international setting (“shadow of the future”). Finally, 
evidences and empirical analysis demonstrated that decision-makers usually act and 
react first and foremost by relying on unilaterally informed behaviours when 
operating in the security domain rather than by going for cooperative solutions.21 
In the light of the above mentioned research perspectives, security regimes have been 
described precisely as “hard cases” within regime analysis 22 and accepted as 
“irregularities” within contemporary international relations theory. 23  
At the same time, security regimes de facto did arise and flourished over the last 
decades. 
Jervis himself presented a substantial contribution in explaining the logic behind 
security regimes formation.24 Based on the assumption that (in most cases) states 
display the capability to reciprocate their counterparts’ actions and that such 
                                                        
18 Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,” 1988; Grieco, “The Maastricht Treaty, Economic 
and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme,” 1995. 
19 Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration”; Stein, Why Nations Cooperate.  
20 Czempiel, Internationale Politik; Efinger and Zürn, “Explaining Conflict Management in East-West 
Relations: A Quantitative Test of Problem-Structural Typologies”; Zürn, Interessen Und Institutionem 
in Der Internationalen Politik: Grundlegung Und Anwendung Des Situationsstrukturellen Ansatzes. 
21 Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” January 1978. 
22 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 123; King and Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” 
December 2001, 209–10.  
23 Smith, “Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime.” 
24 Jervis, “Security Regimes,” 1982.  
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reciprocity changes the calculus of preferences finally leading to regime formation, he 
(and others with him) proved able to identify some conditions that contribute to 
creating propitious settings for security regimes’ establishment. 25   The same way, the 
“relative gains” related impact on perspective cooperative efforts have been 
mitigated by accounts supplementing the very first contributions.26 Regarding regimes 
working mechanisms, steps forward have also been made in our understanding of 
security regimes’ working mechanisms (interalia regimes increase transparency; 
reduce uncertainty about others’ behaviours, capability and intentions; increase the 
cost of cheating etc..) .27 However research over effectiveness (despite fierce debate) 
has been fractional and unable to offer generalizable conclusions.28 
 
A specific category of security regimes is represented by arms control arrangements, 
whose ultimate goal is to enhance national and international security by a restrain 
upon armaments (usually but not necessarily towards a reduction of them). More 
specifically, among scholars and researchers, the type of arms control arrangements 
that have generated the greatest interest are disarmament and non-proliferation 
regimes. These are regimes that aim at reducing or abolishing armaments 
(disarmament) or curbing their growth and propagation (vertical and horizontal 
proliferation, respectively). In theory, the prohibitions these arrangements entail 
could be associated to many different actions and non-actions and weapons’ 
categories. However, since when strategists and analysts first co-opted the term 
‘proliferation’ from bioscience and shuffled it into international politics, “non-
                                                        
25 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy”; Axelrod, “Robert Axelrod. 1986. ‘An 
Evolutionary Approach to Norms.’ ‘American Political Science Review’ 80 (December).” 
26 Snidal, “Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma”; Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of 
International Cooperation.”  
27 On the one side, we know that regimes enhance cooperation/coordination acting as (1) utility 
modifiers; (2) collective action problems moderators (interests-based perspective) (3) bestowers of 
authority and power/providers of authoritative comparative standards (power-based perspective); (4) 
learning facilitators and socializer (knowledge-based perspective). On the other, it has been 
demonstrated that regimes’ action can be accelerated or deterred by factors both exogenous and 
endogenous to the regime. Exogenous factors include (a) distribution of power and influence, (b) 
nature of the issue, (c) patterns of interest and linkages.  Building on the first part of the chapter, this 
section also explores the potential implication that the studies on the socialization’s microprocesses 
have over our understanding of regime consequences. Endogenous factors include institutional 
design and programmatic activities 
28 Fuhrmann and Lupu, “Do Arms Control Treaties Work?” 
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proliferation” has been associated to a specific subset of weapons, namely non-
conventional weapons (nuclear first, and then radiological, chemical and biological 
weapons known as “CBRN weapons”) and acknowledged in many accounts in terms 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).29 Understanding the implications and 
problems derived by this linkage, is preliminary to any discussion over non-
proliferation.  
Traditionally IR thinking on strategic assets’ proliferation – and inevitably the one on 
the complementary non-proliferation efforts – has been dominated by rationalist 
perspectives (especially realism), according to which WMD (nuclear, in particular) are 
extremely valuable to states. According to these scholars, in fact non-proliferation 
regimes are bound to have very limited (if not any) independent function in modifying 
states’ behaviours unless they impose very high costs to defectors. Consequently, the 
idea has prevailed that only regimes envisaging strong supply-side measures can stop 
states’ natural tendencies toward “rampant” proliferation.30 Realist/institutionalist 
intuitions seemed to have worked quite well in describing the realities of the first wave 
of non-proliferation arrangements produced within the Cold War framework (bipolar 
world). In fact, since 1955 onwards and more prominently after the Cuban missile 
crisis, the world witnessed the multiplication of a series of international arrangements 
trying to limit the use and spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Antarctic 
Treaty, OST, NPT, BWC and later on the CWC).31  These agreements have been 
informed by and indeed displayed characteristics consistent with rationalist 
assumptions according to which only formal tools entailing binding norms and rules 
may play actual role in restraining the proliferation of highly destructive/disruptive 
weapons  dominated by PD-like dynamics. Inevitably, the modern image of  non-
proliferation and disarmament became the one of arms control formal treaties; 
                                                        
29 Carus, “Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction.”  
30 Hymans, “Theories of Nuclear Proliferation.” 
31 Arms control theory and practice developed in a very specific time frame. The 1955 Geneva summit 
along with Eisenhower’s Open Skies proposal has been described as the turning point towards a new 
vision of military strategy (neither arms race, nor disarmament). In Larsen’s view the 1958 Surprise 
Attack Conference is key. The following years (1960s) were the most productive for the definition of 
an arms control community and the proliferation of the related debate with the publication, in 1961, 
of three crucial works on “traditional” arms control theory: Schelling and Halperin, Strategy and Arms 
Control, 1985; Bull, The Control of the Arms Race; Donald G. Brennan, Arms Control Disarmament And 
National Security. 
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preventing the use, development and possession of WMD (nuclear, chemical and 
biological); multilaterally negotiated; nearly universal in their membership; developed 
within a specific institution that is international law (of which regimes became a 
crucial part of); including specific norms and rules, and equipped with measure to 
ensure the treaty is observed (form bland incentives to inspections). The flip side of 
this encroachment was that there would have not remained much room for 
disarmament and non-proliferation outside arms control and no arms control outside 
formal treaties. 
Consistently and unsurprisingly, the discussion on non-proliferation “regimes” ended 
up being dominated by contributions developed within the field of International Law 
(IL), with a major impact on the way the issue of non-proliferation was received and 
framed by the academia. Matters of universalization, implementation, compliance, 
rights to the development of nuclear/bio/chemical civil technologies, institutional 
design have directed the discussion at a great length with the following 
marginalization of broader reflections on the evolution of international cooperation, 
coordination and collaboration beyond IL (which actually did occur) or delayed a full 
understanding of the limits of rationalist accounts. Scholars, have gradually come up 
against situations of cooperation where none of the existing explanations seemed to 
hold. Situations where actors’ behavioural changes towards cooperative attitudes 
could not be explained by exclusively referring to realist structure constraints nor to 
cost-benefit shifting equilibria.32  
Additionally, the non-proliferation discussion, as it was formulated at its foundation, 
implied a second problem. It produced a superficial look over the different 
characteristics which distinguished and still distinguish the three weapons (nuclear, 
chemical, and biological). International Law, because of its focus on the normative side 
of the non-proliferation equation, have often overlooked the dangers of dealing with 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons jointly. A similar approach has for instance, 
overemphasised the distance between the group (WMD) and conventional 
armaments, and - on the other hand - inevitably had underestimated the difference 
                                                        
32 Johnston, Social States, 2008.  
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existing among each of them.33 Under this perspective, the peculiar nature of 
bioweapons (living agents, self-reproducing, existing in nature, and responsible for 
endemic infectious diseases) would require a specific approach that inevitably 
develops at the cross-road of many different fields (security, health and environment). 
 
For these reasons, the present work tries to bring back the discussion on non-
proliferation regimes under the flag of International Relations studies. The task implies 
the need to examine and harmonize at least three bodies of literature that rarely have 
talked to each other and that cover the following topics: International Regimes (plus 
International Organization and Governance), WMD’s disarmament and non-
proliferation, and Human Security. However, it has to be noticed that, especially in 
recent times, International Law has indeed offered a lucid overview of and a sound 
reasoning on emerging forms of international coordination. These contributions go 
well beyond a mere analysis of legal aspects of customary and treaty law, and 
consequently will not be left aside for the sole purpose of maintaining a separate 
agenda for IR and IL. 34 
 
  
                                                        
33 Mauroni, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2016.  
34 Dunoff and Pollack, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations.  
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Structure and methods 
 
For the last fifty years, International Regimes have been a major focus of research in 
International Relations. Three major schools of thoughts (realism, neoliberalism, and 
cognitivism) have shaped the debate within International Regime Theory (IRT). The 
first chapter provides a synthetic overview of their assessments of the way power, 
interests and knowledge explain the origins, operating mechanisms, and design 
features of international regimes. I investigate the relationship between the three 
approaches and argue that there is substantial scope (and demand) for progress 
towards an inter-paradigmatic synthesis among the three and with global governance 
studies. Within the discussion which addresses interest-based approaches to 
international regimes, a particular relevance is assigned to the contribution provided 
by problem-structuralists, including those scholars who consider the nature of the 
problem at stake, the issue-area involved and/or the object of conflict as key elements 
in determining an institution’s development and performance.  Additionally, a specific 
attention is devoted, within the chapter’s section dedicated to cognitivism, to the 
insights’ offered by the so-called “sociological turn” in international relations. Under 
this perspective, the paragraph delves into the “microprocess” of learning (mimicking, 
persuasion, and social influence) and explores whether and how these can contribute 
to regime analysis.  
The second half of the chapter focuses on regime consequences. The section examines 
how the topic of effectiveness has been addressed in IR literature, offers a general 
conceptualization of the notion, introduces existing theoretical analytic tools, and 
explains the trade-offs associated with each measurement’s choice. I then review 
regime literature searching for references concerning determinants of effectiveness 
intended as those characteristics believed to be associated with regime successful 
outcomes. In conclusion, I enlist and comment on the persisting challenges haunting 
the study of regime effectiveness (especially when it happens to be applied to regime-
complexes in the field of security and non-proliferation studies) and I, finally, present 
the way in which effectiveness is to be evaluated in the present research work. Our 
current understanding of institutional effectiveness and its determinants is informed 
by at least three bodies of literature whose main contents and findings are reported 
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in this paragraph. The first contribution comes from a rationalist-institutionalist 
literature that emphasizes the importance of endogenous and exogenous factors in 
the analysis of regime consequences and explains regime “outcomes” as a function of 
specific institutional designs, underlying cooperation problems, and distribution of 
power. A second relevant contribution is developed within the framework of 
environmental policy discourse. It addresses the issue of “regime effectiveness” by 
exploring more in details the very notion of effectiveness (as distinct from 
implementation and compliance) and speculates on how to measure its variation. 
Least but not last, and not less important, is the contribution offered by scholars who 
focus on International Organizations (IOs) and IOs performance.  
The first half of Chapter two focuses on the properties and peculiarity of regimes that 
operate in the security realm (vis-à-vis other issue areas) and the role they may play 
in shaping political military decisions. It describes the types of problems that usually 
pertain security (coordination, collaboration, suasion and assurance), as well the types 
of arrangements that can be settled to increase each actor’s individual security 
(Security Regimes, Security Communities, Collective Defence, Collective Security 
Arrangements; Mere Alliances/Defence Communities). Finally, I examine those 
arrangements that better fits with a restriction on the spread of specific weapons and 
military capabilities (WMDS) making use of the what elaborated in Chapter 1. 
The second half of chapter two introduces the case study: the biological weapons 
regime. The analysis explains how the extensive adoption of securitization models that 
widen the notion of security (human security, environmental security etc..), has 
resulted in the present need for a redefinition and re-conceptualization of the notion 
of biosecurity, biological risk, and inevitably of biological weapons regime. It critically 
examines how specific matters have become removed from a low-politics process and 
discourse to enter the security agenda. The section aims at presenting a new two-level 
taxonomy of biological threats. The first level of analysis identifies the type of actors 
responsible for posing the threats: states; non-state actors and nature. The second 
level of analysis addresses who is at risk from these biological threats:  states, 
individual, community or society. This framework allows to better distinguish between 
the following categories: biowarfare, biological terrorism, biocrimes, pandemics. 
Finally, the chapter focuses on the existing links between health and security at the 
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theoretical and practical level (sharing the results from a research effort conducted at 
the premises of the World Health Organization). By developing the notion of health-
security interface, the chapter emphasizes the need for scholars to address the issue 
of biological agents’ development and proliferation across multiple issue areas today 
involved in the practice of biological agents’ management. 
Chapters 3 starts exactly by describing the international complex framework of 
coordination and cooperation developed around the key security-concerns described 
in previous paragraphs. This is represented by those institutions that deal with non-
proliferation of biological weapons, spread of infectious diseases, the conservation of 
biological diversity, technology transfer, and patent protection (among others). I 
illustrate the mechanisms through which the individual components of the regime 
come to light and the institutional provisions interact, overlap or compete in 
governing the use, development, conservation and proliferation of biological agents. 
the paragraph explores the emerging features of those regulatory instruments that 
characterize a unique and complex international order (soft law, networks, NGO, IO). 
Finally, the section explains how the increased density of international norms and 
institutions creates both conflict and cooperation across different legal sources and 
diverse issue areas in international politics. 
 
In the study of international regimes qualitative contributions enlighten causal forces 
at work in specific situations, but prove unable to produce results that are easy to 
generalize; quantitative procedures generate interesting measure of associations, but 
display limited capacity in terms of revealing the causal mechanisms underlying the 
relationship identified; mixed-methods like Qualitative Comparative Analysis capture 
causal conjunctions (combination of necessary and sufficient conditions) but have 
very stringent inclusion criteria (e.g. only applicable to small-to-intermediate causal 
situations). For these reasons, this work has implemented diverse methodologies to 
answer different questions. Each chapter includes a detailed description of the 
methodology that has informed its production. Under this perspective, Chapter 4 
represent a preliminary spin-off of the preceding work insofar tries to complement its 
result by testing assumptions and conclusions about the biological agents’ regime 
complex from 1945 to 2000 by means of a new dataset.  
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The last chapter presents few preliminary results organized around three aspects: (1) 
the nature of any state’s support for (or antagonism /ambivalence  towards) the BW 
regime-complex in terms of “embeddedness” in the regime complex; (2) the 
determinants external/internal and political/legal that affect states’ support 
(“embeddedness”) to the regime (which is supposed to work as predictors of regime’s 
commitment preferences); (3)  the compliance tools developed within the regime and 
across issue areas and states’ related returns rate; (4) the regime impact on any state’s 
proliferation choices (BW possession as dependent variable).  
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Chapter 1: Theories of International Regimes (a critical analysis) 
 
Definitions and operationalization 
Defining regimes remains a difficult task and it is fair to say that the concept is still 
“essentially contested” (in the four-decades-old-words used by Helen Milner in 
1993).35 Nonetheless, since when Regime Theory established as a field of research, 
International Relations scholars have fostered many definitions of international 
regimes throughout the years (for a selection of them see Table 1.1). It proved difficult 
however difficult to define and identify with consistency the regimes of international 
society. Even when scholars have sought to address this problem by devising tighter 
definitions and applying them more rigorously, different understandings and diverse 
lists of regimes have proliferated as it has been the case also with the similar (but not 
identical) notion of institutions.36 
When John Ruggie introduced the notion of international regimes into international 
politics literature in 1975, he defined regimes as “set of mutual expectations, rules 
and regulations, plans, organisational energies and financial commitments which have 
been accepted by a group of states.”37  A couple of years later, Hedley Bull made 
reference to the importance of institutions and rules in any international society 
writing in the following terms: “in international society, as in other societies, the sense 
of common interest in elementary goals of social life does not itself provide precise 
guidance as to what behaviour is consistent to these goals; to do this is the function 
of rules. These rules may have the status of international law, of moral rules, of custom 
or established practice, or they may be merely operational rules or “rules of the game” 
worked out with formal agreement or even without verbal communication. It is not 
uncommon for a rule to emerge first as an operational rule, then to become 
established practice, then to attain the status of moral principle and finally to be 
incorporated in a legal convention; this appears to have been the genesis for example, 
of many of the rules now embodied in multilateral treaties or conventions concerning 
                                                        
35 Milner, “International Regimes and World Politics: Comments on the Articles by Smouts, de 
Senarclens and Jönsson,” 493–4.  
36 Wilson, “The English School Meets the Chicago School.”  
37 Ruggie, “International Responses to Technology.” 
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the laws of war, diplomatic and consular status, and the law of the sea.”38 In 1980 
Haas wrote on this matter labelling a regime as encompassing “a mutually coherent 
set of procedures, rules and norms.”39 
There is a general agreement that the English School (ES), of which Hedely Bull is one 
of the major exponents, and Regime Theory overlap at several points as far as their 
approach to institutions is concerned. Nonetheless some essential differences exist 
especially between ES and rational streams of RT and are well summarized by Barry 
Buzan in his essay “The Primary Institutions of International Society” (for a synthesis 
see Table 1.2).40  
In 1982, Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins claimed that “a regime exists in every 
substantive issue-area in international relations where there is discernibly patterned 
behaviour. Whenever there is regularity in behaviour, some kinds of principles, norms 
or rules must exist to account for it. Such patterned behaviour may reflect the 
dominance of a powerful actor or oligarchy rather than voluntary consensus among 
participants. But a regime is present.”41 Providing one of the most 
comprehensive/inclusive definition of regimes, the authors attach five typical features 
to the notion of regime with respect to previous elaborations.  First, they define 
regimes as attitudinal phenomena. According to them, regimes themselves are indeed 
subjective, in other words they exist primarily as participants’ understandings, 
expectations or convictions about legitimate, appropriate or moral behaviour. Second, 
international regimes shall include tenets concerning appropriate procedures for 
making decisions. Third, a description of regime must include a characterization of the 
major principles it upholds. Fourth, each regime is supposed to have a set of elites 
who are the practical actors within it. Finally, a regime exists in every substantive 
issue-area in international relations where there is discernibly patterned behaviour. 
Wherever there is regularity in behaviour some kinds of principles, norms or rules 
must exist to account for it. Such patterned behaviour may reflect the dominance of 
a powerful actor or oligarchy rather than a totally voluntary consensus among all 
                                                        
38 Bull, The Anarchical Society. 
39 Haas, “Technological Self-Reliance for Latin America.” 
40 Buzan, “From International System to International Society.”  
41 Puchala and Hopkins, “International Regimes,” 1982. 
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participants. But a regime is present. The risk of associating regimes closely with 
patterned practices is the one of limiting their explanatory because it is precisely the 
impact of them on practice that needs to be explained. For this reason the “explanans” 
should be kept separate from the “explanandum”, although in practice stipulative 
definitions failed to meet the test. Under this perspective, the normative element  
(principles, norms, and rules) “on the top of” the recurrence is, indeed, essential to 
properly differentiate regimes from regularized patterned behaviours.42 
Building on these first attempts to grasp/describe the then-emerging new form of 
international interactions, Stephen Krasner, in the introductory essay of the 1982 
International Organization special editions on regimes, provided what became to be 
known as the “consensus definition”, which reads as follows: “[regimes are] sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions 
or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for 
making and implementing collective choice.”43 Such a definition accrued many 
benefits. First, as illustrated by the author, this usage was compatible/might 
accommodate many formulations, like the other ones included in the many essays of 
the volume, from here the attribute “consensus”. Second, the definition, which is also 
referred to as a “complex definition” encompassed a hierarchy of several elements: 
principles, norms, rules and procedures – that becomes crucial when it comes to 
assess regime’s resilience, adaptation, or change. The hierarchy of regimes 
components presented in the consensus definition had enabled Krasner to categorize 
regime change as follows: “if a change in the principles and norms occurs, we assist to 
a change of the regime itself. All other changes in regime content (rules and 
procedures) are changes within a regime (adaptation)”. A third (noncontroversial) 
advantage the definition implies, is that it processes the relationship between 
regimes, institutions and international organizations. On the one side, it becomes 
                                                        
42 Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty. 
43 Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences.” 
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clear that regimes are international institutions (possibly a special case of), and should 
be approached and studied as such.44 On the contrary, the terms “international 
regimes” and “international organisations” have distinct meaning with the first (being 
a set of principles, rules, and procedures accepted by states) which do not have the 
capacity to act that which instead the international organizations do have. Under this 
perspective, institutional analysis requires indeed a clear distinction between regimes 
and regimes’ participants: the first are social structures guiding the behaviours of 
stakeholders but possess no independent ability to act, and the latter (states, IGOs 
and NGOs) which are the ones that make decisions and drive policy developments, 
thereby creating and upholding social structures. Therefore, as pointed out by Selin, 
regime analysis should always carefully distinguish between structures and agents as 
well as empirically explore their relationship.45  
Finally, Krasner’s consensus definition provided practitioners with a functional 
analytic tool and with a non-arbitrary point of departure to further studies. The 
definition has been used in practical terms to explain/describe existing regimes, this 
have been the case, for example, of the nuclear non-proliferation regime46 and the 
biological non-proliferation regime47 with mixed-results. Notwithstanding the clear 
benefits the consensus definition brought and still brings to scholars, dissatisfaction 
with its letter has also been expressed now and again by commentators of regime 
analysis. In 1983 Susan Strange prompted a torrent of criticism against the concept of 
international regimes as formulated by Krasner, which she taxed with “imprecision” 
and “woolliness”: “people mean different things when they use it.”48 
In a review article, Oran Young also criticized Krasner’s definition of the term 
“international regimes” essentially on three grounds arguing that: 1) the definition is 
“really only a list of elements that are hard to differentiate conceptually and that often 
overlap in real world situations”; 2) it exhibits a disconcerting elasticity when applied 
                                                        
44 Keohane, After Hegemony, 1984; Young, “International Regimes.” 
45 Selin, Global Governance of Hazardous Chemicals, 22. 
46 Müller, “Regimeanalyse Und Sicherheitspolitik: Das Beispiel Nonproliferation”; Müller, Fischer, and 
Kötter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order; Smith, “Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime.” 
47 Kelle, “Strengthening the Effectiveness of the BTW Control Regime – Feasibility and Options,” April 
2003. 
48 Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones.” 
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to real world of international relations”; 3) It is “conceptually thin” in that it fails to 
“tie the concept into... [some] larger system of ideas that would help to solve the 
ambiguities.., and that would offer guidance in formulating key questions and 
hypotheses regarding international regimes.”49 Broadly speaking, there are at least 
two major reasons why critics have attacked the consensus definition. One criticism 
points out the difficulty in differentiating the four components of the regimes (Young’s 
first objection): despite the diligence with which the components of the regime are 
described, the distinctions among principles, norms and rule lack intersubjective 
meaning. “Principles” tend to shade off into “norms” and norms, in turn are difficult 
to distinguish from “rules.”50 The second, more substantial, arises from the letter 
“around which actors’ expectations converge” and deals with the vagueness of the 
concept which brings about the problem of knowing regimes when we actually see 
them (how can we recognize convergent expectations before they materialize or 
when they do not materialize – being there anyhow). According to this critique, most 
of the definitional vagueness of the definition lays in the empirical difficulty of 
recognising regimes, rather than describing them in talks and discussions. 
Some ideas for operationalizing the consensus definition have been put forward, as it 
will be described below. According to some scholars, it could have been useful to 
concentrate on explicit rules or injunctions (with an embodiment independent of the 
actors). Another approach suggests adding an element of observable behaviour to the 
definition.  
These considerations made, some authors have even suggested dropping the 
consensus definition altogether and replace it by more straightforward formulations 
which focus on the explicit dimension of rules and norms. Along these lines, Robert 
Keohane defined regimes as: “institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by 
governments that pertain to particular set of issues in international relations”51. This 
is often referred to as a lean definition of international regimes.52 When he proposed 
                                                        
49 Young, “International Regimes.” 
50 Kratochwil, “The Force of Prescriptions.” 
51 Keohane, “Neoliberal Institutionalism,” in International Institutions and and State Power: Essays in 
International Relation. 
52 Keohane, “Neoliberal Institutionalism.” 
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this formal approach, Keohane believed it would have been still crucial to distinguish 
neatly between international regimes, on the one hand, and mere ad hoc substantive 
agreements, on the other. For this reason, the author ad a specific to the previous 
wording clarifying that: “regimes, facilitate the making of substantive agreements by 
providing a framework of rules, norms, principles, and procedures for negotiation.”53 
Notwithstanding the pragmatic gains its use implies, in terms of simplification, the 
lean definition (even supplied with the adequate specifics) involves costs that should 
not be overlooked. For example, the abandoning of the hierarchy of regime 
components precludes the possibility to use the regime-change model described 
above and the exaggerate the focus on formal/binding agreements over other 
arrangements. For a summary, see Table 1.3  
The limits of the formal definition have been widely recognised and there is today a 
widespread preference for consensus-type definition.54  
At the same time, efforts to actually improve on it have been marginal.55 
An exception to this general trend is Levy’s attempt. He described regimes as “social 
institutions consisting of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules procedures, and 
programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas.”56 
The reading of such endeavour, reveals the idea that the empirical phenomena 
covered by regime definitions must keep broad and should range from formal rules 
codified in a treaty, to patterns of convergent behaviour, to ideational structures 
consisting of share understandings, intersubjective meanings, and reciprocal 
expectations (see Table 1.4). 57  
 
The discussion regarding the use of a complex-like definition instead of its lean 
substitute has gone hand in hand with the parallel speculation on the diverse ways 
through which the concept of regime should be brought into operation 
(operationalized). As very well summarized by A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer and V. 
                                                        
53 Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes.” 
54 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, “Interests, Power, Knowledge.” 
55 LEVY, YOUNG, and ZÜRN, “The Study of International Regimes.” 
56 LEVY, YOUNG, and ZÜRN. 
57 Dimitrov et al., “International Nonregimes,” 2007.  
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 28 
Rittberger, the debate concerning the criteria that should pilot operationalization has 
led to three distinct positions known as (1) behavioural; (2) cognitive; and (3) formal 
approaches.58 
These approaches are relevant to our discussion since they display a very different 
interpretation of regime effectiveness and of the role it has to play in regime 
identification. Authors who belong to the “behavioural” stream tend to consider social 
institutions as “practices consisting of recognized roles linked together by clusters of 
rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles”59 and 
opt for an “empirical identification of the regimes”. This understanding of the notion 
of institutions in general and regimes in particular, has two corollaries. First, a rule 
that does not shape, at least in part, the behaviour of its addressees cannot be 
described as the element of some regime. Under this perspective, Mark Zacher 
highlights that “effectiveness of behavioural guidelines” is not a merely contingent 
characteristic of regimes, but it is part of their very nature. He also contends that the 
actual behaviour of states is a decisive factor for establishing the existence of a 
regime.60 By that, he does not mean that compliance (which he apparently considers 
as necessary to effectiveness) must be perfect. A social practice can indeed tolerate a 
considerable measure of deviation (that is not per se an indicator of the absence of a 
rule-governed behaviour). However at least some degree of compliance (alignment 
with the normative content of the regime) is crucial: “We must doubt the 
effectiveness of behavioural guidelines if glaring violations are allowed to persist or if 
states tend to violate norms and rules on those few occasions when they would 
benefit from doing so.”61  On the same wavelength, Michael Zürn has recommended 
elaborating further on the consensus definition in order to include an element of rule-
effectiveness as a necessary term.62 
                                                        
58 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, “Interests, Power, Knowledge”; Hasenclever, Mayer, and 
Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 1997. 
59 Young, “The Politics of International Regime Formation.” 
60 Zacher, “Trade Gaps, Analytical Gaps.” 
61 Zacher. 
62 Rittberger and Zürn, “Rittberger, V. and Zürn, M. Regime Theory.” 
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The second corollary to the behavioural approach relates to the fact that there is no 
need, for the rules that govern practices, to be formally stated. Consequently, implicit 
regimes are admitted.  
As far as the “cognitive” approach, the major contribution comes from Kratochwil and 
Ruggie, who both rejected the focus on compliance in assessing the existence of 
regimes and instead emphasize the coordination of expectations that regimes should 
embody and produce: “international regimes are commonly defined as social 
institutions around which expectations converge in international issue-areas. The 
emphasis on convergent expectations as the constitutive basis of regimes gives 
regimes an inexplicable intersubjective quality. It follows that we know regime by their 
principal and sharing understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social 
behaviour.”63 After shifting the accent from “effective behaviour” to “intersubjective 
assessment”, what it becomes relevant for regimes identification is the interpretation 
given by the regime members in the case of a state’s violation (and not the violation 
per se). In this framework the communicative action, in terms of reproaching, 
justifications or punishment, adopted by the community of states becomes crucial. 
Finally, Keohane who championed the formal conceptualization of regimes, sharply 
criticizes the approaches above presented underlining the prominence of formality as 
a necessary criterion for the identification and operationalization of regimes.64 
He rejected the notion of implicit regimes for two main reason. The first one refers to 
the potential fallacy deriving from the identifying of “regimes on the basis of observed 
behaviour and then …[using] them to ‘explain’ observed behaviour”.65 Secondly, he 
noticed that a behavioural-based model precludes explanation, in regime terms, of 
the observable regularity in behaviours. 
The point made against the cognitive approach is again a methodological one and 
deals with the difficulty, if not impossibility, to determine “principled and shared 
understandings”. By the same taken, he decided to conceptualize regime primarily (if 
not exclusively) as explicit rules that are agreed upon by actors and are incorporated 
in treaties or other documents. It has been largely demonstrated that a purely formal 
                                                        
63 Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International Organization,” 1986. 
64 Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy. 
65 Goldstein and Keohane. 
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conceptualization has its disadvantages (for instance it leaves aside social institutions 
and tend to focus on treaty agreements). Keohane himself has partially modified such 
a strictly formal interpretation and revised the definition in an effort explicitly aimed 
at bridging the behavioural and formal streams. However, the matter of finding an 
efficient way to operationalize the notion of regime is far from being solved and it is 
obviously still connected to the no-longer-so-new debate regarding the relationship 
between international law and international relations.  
 
This premise made, it is clear that the discipline has been characterized by a general 
acceptance of thick definitions. However, at the same time, regime analysis has also 
displayed a theoretical tolerance for diverse operationalizing procedures with a 
tendency to emphasize the role of formalized rules at the expenses of broader 
transnational interactions and less explicit norms.66  
Consistently, Levy, Young and Zürn have contended that all-inclusive/thick definitions 
should be used only if, and so long as, “individual analysts are careful to state clearly 
the universe of cases they are referring to”, inviting scholars, in a certain way, to walk 
the path of compromise between intellectual completeness and research 
practicality.67 Approach that has been sponsored also by those interested in the study 
of non-regimes.68 
To escape this conceptual tangle, most empirical investigations actually embrace a 
dual approach to the study of international regimes: on the one side they champion 
broad/consensus definitions that leave room for various intellectual orientations, then 
elaborate working (but still stipulative) definitions (that grow more sophisticated and 
detailed according to their ultimate scope), and finally operationalize the notion by 
applying the working definitions to their research interests (in most cases, current 
investigations focus on binding treaties or formal policy agreements among state-
governments and leave out other types of multilateral governance).69 What above has 
                                                        
66 Stokke, “Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Shaming, and International Regime Effectiveness,” May 
2007. 
67 Levy, Young, and Zürn, “The Study of International Regimes.”  
68 Dimitrov et al., “International Nonregimes.”Dimitrov et al., “International Nonregimes,” 2007.  
69 Krasner, “`Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’”; 
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somehow legitimated the use of international treaties/formal policy agreements 
among governments as “substitutes” for regime. 
Summarizing, until today the conceptual breadth of the regime definition has been 
left in deep contrast to the narrower ways in which the notion has usually 
operationalized.70 
 
This study revisits the persistent lack of a universal disciplinary agreement on regimes’ 
definitions and operationalization. However, although aware of the need for a 
“concrete” and “usable” notion, the present research refuses to yield to the 
drawbacks of stipulative definitions and too restrictive operationalization’s 
procedures.  
This is not only in the interest of comprehensiveness, but also a necessary step to 
produce acceptable inferences when it comes to study regime consequences.  
Whether we conceptualize regimes as interstate regulatory frameworks, non-state 
government mechanisms, or patterns of behaviours conditioned by sharing 
understanding, this changes the objects we intend to analyse and may dramatically 
impact on the conclusions we draw about how well regimes function. More 
specifically, I argue that the prevailing focus on formal treaties is not only overly 
narrow but can be inappropriate when it comes to the study of regime effectiveness.  
A reconsideration of the way in which the notion of regimes has been traditionally 
defined and, above all, operationalized is thus necessary. 
Gathering prevailing criticisms to current definitions and operationalization 
procedures and the building on an interpretive “insider” approach inspired by Chicago 
School Sociology, I would define regimes as:  
 
deliberately agreed/constructed principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedure and programs on 
which converge members’ behavioural expectation and their derived patterned practices that 
eventually facilitate the accomplishment of precise goals by organizing members’ interactions in or 
across specific/traditional issue-areas. 
                                                        
“The Rational Design of International Institutions,” October 1, 2001; Miles et al., Environmental 
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 Most importantly, I operationalize such broad definition as to encompass very diverse 
phenomena: 1) internationally legally binding treaties and protocols; 2) networks of 
states that have succeeded to endorse formal policy agreements and non-binding 
policy initiative; 3) multilateral forums of discussion and other informal channels 
producing explicit actions to address specific issues around which states have raised 
concerns.  
It is clear that such a broad operationalization still requires further specifications 
regarding: (1) the problem(s) to which the regime constitutes a response and its 
related aspect, (2) the external boundaries of the regime, as such regimes have 
temporal boundaries in the sense of starting point and, in some cases, ends point (3) 
the discrete internal components of the regime.71 
The definition and operationalization above proposed builds on the following 
considerations: 
(a) Regimes principles, norms, rules and procedures do not need (in principle) to be 
equipped with prescriptions that are integrated into formal treaties to be understood 
as regimes. International norms managing problems over international coexistence 
have been not formalized for a long time. Nevertheless, these same norms have been 
respected under ius gentium (in the case of early western system) and customary 
international law (more recently) long before the very existence of states as we know 
them, and certainly before United Nations started its longstanding effort to codify 
norms and rules within the framework provided by the international Law of Treaties/ 
Public International Law. 
Even today, discussing regime effectiveness only with reference to single international 
treaties exclude from the scope of the analysis “softer form of legalized international 
governance and those intermediate blends of obligation, precision and delegation.”72 
This obviously represents a severe limitation since, as pointed out by Abbot et al., not 
only most international law is soft in distinct ways, but also softer forms of legalization 
are not necessarily/only a way station to hard legalization; in fact international actors 
                                                        
71 LEVY, YOUNG, and ZÜRN, “The Study of International Regimes.” 
72 Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” June 2000.  
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often deliberately choose softer forms of legalization as superior institutional 
arrangements because they can be more acceptable or more efficacious in different 
circumstances (for example under uncertainty; a typical characteristic of current 
international system). 
Consistent with this discourse is the argument supported by Randall Stone according 
to which powerful states make large use of informal means to control formal existing 
multilateral institutions.73 
Excluding informal networks also overlooks the role (both as initiators and 
implementers) of non-state actors,74 the one of epistemic communities,75 NGOs and 
private actors,76 as well as the one of dyadic diplomacy,77 that vice-versa largely 
account for regimes’ outcomes. Under this perspective it is interesting to see how 
Verdier uses the precisely the NPT regime to illustrate the idea that dyadic diplomacy 
is not incompatible with the building of multilateral regime, but an efficient and 
necessary component thereof. 78  
(b) A broader and grounded operationalization of the term also avoids the 
counterproductive multiplication of vocabulary and concepts that is gaining foothold 
within regime theory, and at the same time it will enable scholars to keep pace with 
present international setting and events. Whether we return to the tradition language 
of “institutions,”79or champion more recent descriptions as “policy coordination”80 or 
“governance,”81 the object of analysis remain the same: rules-based cooperation. 
Under this perspective a very interesting insight is provided by Keohane labelled 
notion of “Contested Multilateralism” born de facto to explain how regimes can 
                                                        
73 Stone, Controlling Institutions.  
74 Breitmeier, The Legitimacy of International Regimes. 
75 Haas, “Do Regimes Matter?”; Adler and Haas, “Conclusion”; Haas, “When Does Power Listen to 
Truth?”  
76 Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” 2000; Abbott and Snidal, 
“International Regulation without International Government”; Thompson and Snidal, “International 
Organization”; Vabulas and Snidal, “Organization without Delegation.”  
77 Dimitrov et al., “International Nonregimes,” 2007, 235.  
78 Verdier, “Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime.” 
79 Milner, “International Regimes and World Politics: Comments on the Articles by Smouts, de 
Senarclens and Jönsson.” 
80 Haas, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination. 
81 Young, International Governance, 1994; Biersteker, “Targeted Sanctions and Individual Human 
Rights.” 
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change as a consequence of their internal components’ bargaining processes: “The 
NPT has been supplemented by more or less informal institutions such as the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group or the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, which shifted the 
effects of the nuclear proliferation policy in the direction favoured by the United 
States and other established nuclear power.”82  
(c) Furthermore, a more inclusive and grounded operationalization of regime is better 
positioned to unlock the dialogue between traditional IR theories and the rapidly 
growing sub-stream (e.g.  “International Practices”83 and “Human Security”84) 
(d) Finally (and partially linked to the latter point), the joint appeal to a boarder 
definition of regime and a theory which ground interpretations in practitioners 
understanding has made apparent that many “objects” that used to be confined to a 
single domain are nowadays governed by elements that belong to diverse issue-areas 
and highlighted very clearly the need for an inter-paradigmatic approach. 
 
Regime building, functions and persistence 
 
As anticipated in the introduction, RT has attracted and welcomed contributions from 
all the three major schools of mainstream IR. With regards to international regimes, 
the realism, neoliberalism and constructivism differ (1) for the specific explanatory 
variable (interests, power, and knowledge)  they champion to account for regimes 
formation (and attributes) and (2) for the diverse degree of “institutionalization” they 
accept. Neoliberalism (also referred to as “functionalism”) embodies an “interest-
based” approach to regimes’ study and has been extremely influential in RT. If it is 
true that structural realists (both defensive and offensive) have devoted little 
attention to regimes and international institutions,85 some others “post-classical” or 
                                                        
82 Morse and Keohane, “Contested Multilateralism,” March 23, 2014. 
83 Adler and Pouliot, International Practices. 
84 Bajpai, Human Security; King and Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” December 2001; Martin 
and Owen, “The Second Generation of Human Security.”  
85 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International 
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“modified structural” realists see in the distribution of material capabilities a powerful 
trigger for cooperation (as it is for discord) among nations.86 
Knowledge-based theorists (especially strong cognitivists) proceed from the 
constructivist claim that social interaction in international relations can affect actors’ 
interests by inducing endogenous changes in the normative characteristics and 
properties of actors involved in the relationship.  
Neoliberal and realist theories are both committed to rationalism/utilitarian and 
embrace shared assumptions.  Rationalism is a meta-theoretical orientation which 
recognizes in nation states the key actors in the international arena and describes 
them as atomistic, self-interested and goal-seeking players that set their behaviour in 
order to further their individual utilities.87 States’ calculations are informed by their 
utility functions which in turn build on fairly stable preferences concerning final 
outcomes. Neorealists and neoliberal perspectives focus on how structures affect the 
instrumental rationality of actors.  Consistently, foreign policies (including the decision 
to participate in a regime) result from the calculations of advantages made by states 
in line with their preferences. If the first (policies) can change as time passes by (on 
the basis of external structural conditions), the latter (preferences) are fairly stable 
over time.88 Structural constraints may include the distribution of capabilities among 
states,89 the nature of technology and warfare,90 the degree of the institutionalization 
of the international system,91 or other issues. Within rationalism, strongly systemic 
                                                        
86 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power”; 
Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations.  
87 As it will become clearer later in the chapter, as far as utility calculations are concerned, neoliberals 
and neorealist approaches diverge. According to a neoliberal-institutionalist perspective states are 
essentially egoist in the sense that their utility function are independent one another and they do not 
gain or lose utility depending other states’ gain and losses. In other words, states are interested in 
absolute gains. This is not the case for realists whose interests in relative gains, make them sensitive 
to how well others perform. This element is all but inconsequential in the sense that for 
institutionalists interactions (including cooperation under a regime umbrella) does not affect utility 
functions challenging the very foundation of what an international society is indeed. 
88 This is better understood as an epistemologically motivated rule of theory construction, see 
Rittberger, 1997 p.24. The strongest forms of rationalism even assume that preferences are not only 
maintained over time but also across actors. This is because preferences are believed to vary 
according to the decisional environment and the external constraints exercised on players’ actions 
(strong systemic theories). 
89 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
90 Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory.” 
91 Keohane, “Neoliberal Institutionalism,” 1–20. 
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theories are committed to the view that preferences are not only stable over time, 
but also across actors. In these understandings, variation in individual and collective 
behaviours can only lie in the decisional environment of “like units” (external 
constraints) since “the internal attributes of actors are given by assumptions rather 
than treated as variables.”92  This vision implies that domestic politics is unimportant, 
at least when it comes to explaining that “small number of big and important things” 
in international life.93 This is not the case for weak rationalists.94 What is indeed a 
typical feature of both systemic theories (weak and strong) is that in interaction 
(including the one generated from and produced within a regime) preferences, along 
with other internal attributes of states, are given by assumption rather than treated 
as variables95 and  interactions (that happen when preferences permit) do not have 
any  feedback effect on actors’ utility functions (nor identities).  
Consistently, neoliberals and realists share the convincement that actors’ perceptions 
(or causal belief) need not to be addressed as troublesome and there is no need to 
problematize actors’ perceptions. When they admit the role of uncertainty in 
accounting for international politics outcomes, they tend to interpret uncertainty as 
an objective attribute of the system, associated mainly with the anarchy of the 
international arena and not with individual actors’ disposition or lack of knowledge 
(as cognitivists do). 
In summary both neorealists and neoliberalists accept a paradigm which suggest a 
three steps approach to the study of international regimes: (1) First there is the 
specification of a set of constraints; (2) then a set of actors who are assumed to have 
certain kinds of interests; (3) finally, there is the behaviour of the actors which is 
related to those constraining conditions in which the actors find themselves. For a 
summary of the assumptions and main features of three schools see Tables 1.5 and 
1.6. 
                                                        
92 Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realisms and Beyond.” 
93 Walt, “‘A Few Big and Important Things’: The Enduring Legacy of Kenneth Waltz.” 
94 a weakly theory in this sense is Moravcsik’s version of neoliberalism, for an enhanced analysis see 
also Stein (1990) 
95 Keohane, International Institutions and State Power. 
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Interest-based theories 
As anticipated in the previous paragraph, neoliberals describe states as rational-
egoist-utility maximizers, concerned only with their own (absolute) gains and losses 
(also known as negative altruists). One of the pioneer of the approach was Robert 
Keohane who departed from realist premises to arrive at liberal institutionalist 
conclusions. 
Under this approach to international relations, regimes are analysed as strictly 
interests-driven phenomena with interests that are accounted for from the 
perspective of mutually indifferent actors. According to neoliberalists, states’ 
references are obviously strongly influenced by configurations of power, but cannot 
not be reduced to them. In particular, states which operate in particular issue-areas 
may share common interests which they can realize only through cooperation aimed 
at maximizing their utilities. In situations where shared interests exist, however, 
cooperation is not automatically generated. Institutions play a role in helping states 
realizing their interests. 
 
Functional theories of international regime 
Robert Keohane is the author of one of the most influential theory of international 
regimes. Relying heavily on modern economic theories of institutions, the author 
developed a functional argument (contractualism) to explain the creation and 
maintenance of international regimes in situations of mixed-motives game resembling 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). A second pool of contributions designed within the 
functionalist framework (as a sort of expansion of Keohane’s core argument) are those 
provided by situation-structuralists (SS). These scholars expanded Keohane’s 
perspective over PD-like situations by taking into account the whole spectrum of 
mixed-motive game interaction (not only collaboration, but also coordination, 
assurance, and suasion games). They have analysed the implication of different 
patterns of interests for the likelihood of regime formation as well as for explaining 
the institutional shape regimes take. 
An additional approach, which enriches the functionalist analysis, is the problem-
structuralism model. Problem structuralists simply add an element to the structuralist 
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paradigm which values the nature of the issue at stake (in other words, the issue-area 
within which regime is bound to operate). The nature of the issue becomes an 
important variable affecting the likelihood and ease of regime formation in conflict 
situations (with insightful consequences). 
Finally, Oran Young elaborated a model of institutional bargaining typically classified  
within the ranks of neoliberalism although displaying some peculiar characteristics 
with respect to core rationalist assumptions. If on the one side, the author 
acknowledges the critical roles that interests play in regimes’ formation and 
maintenance, at the same time he detaches from rationalists in mitigating the 
structure-over-process framework they sponsor and for accepting a pervasive role to 
institutions (which is more similar to the one championed by cognitivists). 
 
Functionalism after hegemony. Keohane’s major study of regimes is found in his book 
“After Hegemony”. In Keohane’s view states are atomist, rational and egoist 
protagonists of the international stage, nonetheless contrary to dominant realist 
assumptions, states’ egoism is considered “pure” by the author in terms of not 
influenced by other players’ concurrent and/or perspective success or failure.  
 
“Rationality means that [actors] have consistent ordered preferences and that they calculate costs and 
benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximize their utility in view of those preferences. 
Egoism means that their utility functions are independent of one another: they do not gain or lose 
utility simply because of the gains or losses of others.”96  
 
In Keohane’s approach, states preferences are treated as exogenously given. 
Consequently, he doesn’t question how actors define and understand their interests 
and the effects that learning and ideas may have on that understanding.97 The fact 
that states’ interests (otherwise said, utility functions) are not explained within the 
theory is the major reason why Keohane himself consider his contribution as 
incomplete inviting additional research activities aimed at better comprehending how 
actors understand and evolve their interests. 
                                                        
96 Keohane, After Hegemony, 1984, 27. 
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Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 39 
Contractualists, including Keohane, propose a functional theory of regimes that 
“accounts for causes in term of their effects”, where the functional argument explains 
both regimes’ formation and persistence. A functional explanation implies that we 
observe a phenomenon (regime) and only afterwards, we rationalize its existence.  
 
“Rational choice theory, as applied to social institutions, assumes that institutions can be accounted for 
by examining the incentives facing the actors who create them and maintain them. Institutions exist 
because they could have reasonably been expected to increase the welfare of their creators.”98  
 
Keohane identifies as a necessary  (although not sufficient) condition for regimes’ 
formation and functioning the one where actor-states have a mixture of 
complementary and conflicted interests that can realize through cooperation (mix-
motives situations).99 
Keohane withholds that states in many situations do have mutual interests and 
international politics is not a zero-sum game; according to the author, a mixed-
motives pattern sets out more often than the realists think it does. As anticipated, 
although the existence of some common interests represents a necessary premise, it 
is not a sufficient condition for cooperation: it cannot be taken for granted that states 
with a common interest also decide to cooperate. If common interests are there, 
cooperation only occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or 
anticipated preferences of the others.100 In Keohane’s view, the Prisoner Dilemma 
game impeccably captures the essence of this collective action problem and the 
related impasse – which indeed also identifies the space for regimes intercession. 
Two-persons prisoner dilemma (PD) is a symmetrical game, where each player prefers 
mutual cooperation to mutual defection, yet is better off when, while defeating, can 
benefit from the unrequited cooperation of the partner. On the other hand, ending 
up as the one who behaves cooperatively with the other doing the opposite is the 
outcome which is last desirable form either player’s point of view. It follows that 
defection is the dominant strategy: each adopts the strategy of not cooperating, of 
                                                        
98 Keohane, 80. 
99 Keohane, 6. 
100 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” 226. 
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not choosing the course of action, which puts his partner in a position to achieve its 
best option (see Figure 1.1) 
It is clear that cooperation (C) under a single PD shot is very unlikely because each 
player will find rationale to guard themselves from the risk of incurring in his worst 
outcome (CD). As a result, both players will do worse than they could have done had 
they chosen a concurrent cooperative course of action (CC). The paradox is obvious, 
the players have common interest in achieving the (CC) outcome, which at the same 
time they are unlikely to realize. Defection would seem perfectly rationale because it 
secures the player a higher pay off no matter what the other decides. 
The situation is complicated by the fact that it is not enough that the actors become 
aware of their situation and agree that they both should cooperate, since each actor 
– under a mere utilitarian drive - would continue to prefer his own exploitation of his 
partner’s cooperative attitude (DC) to mutual cooperation (CC). If both defect the 
result is inefficient, nonetheless mutual defection (DD) is the only equilibrium 
outcome possible.101 However, the two players still have a common interest in 
preferring a CC outcome over a CD one. According to neoliberals means/tools do exist 
that can help players (states in our metaphor) to realize such common interest. 
Consistently, the most general proposition of functionalist theory – that focuses on a 
specific one among these instruments -  is exactly that regimes can facilitate 
international cooperation. To do so they do not need to change actors’ interests 
(utility functions), values or the overall structure of the system (the PD game maintains 
as well as the payoff structure), on the contrary regimes operate by altering the 
strategic environment where the decisions are taken. Regimes change “the 
calculations of advantages that governments make.”102 Speaking the game-theory 
language, regimes do make a strategy (different from the dominant one) more 
rational for the actor, without altering the pay-off structure.  
For states locked in a PD situation, cooperation (CC) becomes a viable option also for 
egoistic utility-maximizers players (which might be happier with a CD outcome but are 
better off with a CC outcome than a DD one, the only equilibrium possible if the 
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regimes wouldn’t come into play). This approach is very useful for the discourse of this 
work because it allows to discern conceptually between regimes (the cause) and the 
cooperation (the effect) including the potential manifestations/materializations 
regimes can bring about (ad hoc agreements). Regimes facilitate the making of 
substantive agreements by providing a framework of rules, norms, principles and 
procedure for negotiation. The main problem actors embedded in a Prisoner Dilemma 
situation face relates to uncertainty. In the international arena as well, states are 
uncertain about what their partners are planning to do in present and in future 
situations. Consequently, states are often inclined to opt-out cooperation for fearing 
of being cheated and double-crossed (resulting in a CD scenario with which they would 
be worse off than a DD one). Regimes intervene in this process by reducing uncertainty 
in three ways: First, regimes provide states with information which they would not 
have otherwise access. Secondly, they reduce the information costs. Lastly, they 
generate reputational costs in case of cheating. More and cheaper information reduce 
the risks of defection, as it does the risk to  pay a price for a deceitful behaviour. The 
information mechanism work in the sense that it increases the probability of being 
caught. 
Reputational effects do exist in the sense that that regimes provide standards of 
behaviour against which performance can be measured by linking these standards of 
behaviour to specific issues and by providing a forum - often through international 
organisations - in which these evaluations can be made and discussed. Reputation 
matters particularly because regimes end up being nested one another and 
consequently the violation of a particular agreement by a state has backlashes beyond 
that particular issue and over that particular time and then to influence that cheater 
perspective negotiations in the future (linkage). Linkage does not only connect diverse 
issue areas but also distance time. Regimes stretch the “shadow of the future” to 
discourage immediate defection because it could undermine future gains. It follows 
that, provided that the decision to cooperate may be reversed if someone discovers 
to be “exploited” or not “reciprocated”, actors can always stop current cooperation 
and its sufferance will end quickly. 
The significance of this argument is also very well explained by the work of Robert 
Axelrod. Axelrod has shown that in a reiterated PD game, played over and over again 
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by the same (egoistic) players, cooperation can be maintained by a reciprocal strategy 
even in the absence of a central enforcement agency. Tit for tat provides that future 
gains and losses are not too heavily discounted by the actors.103 Axelrod found that in 
these sequential bargaining situations, “tit for tat” strategy is the most successful. In 
this strategy, one player begins with a cooperative move and thereafter responds in 
kind to each action of the other. If the first cooperative move is reciprocated the 
original player will continue cooperating until the partner defects. Then swift 
punishment follows. In other words, good is to be turned for good bad for bad. 
Hopefully the defector will go back to a cooperation pattern.104 For Axelrod, through 
“reciprocity” cooperation is made stable. Along these lines, regimes improve the 
conditions of application of the reciprocity strategy.105 The reputational argument is 
important in Keohane’s analysis because it allows the author to mitigate the use of 
“tit-for-tat” strategies in real world situations, especially as far as sanctioning is 
concerned which represent in itself a collective action problem (someone has to bear 
the costs of defectors’ identification and punishment).  
Since Keohane applies the functional perspective to explain regime formation, and 
regimes are created because they bring advantages principally enabling actors to 
cooperate, it follows that states are more likely to create a regime if the set of 
potential mutually beneficial agreements in the issue area is large or in Keohane’s 
words “the policy space is relatively dense”.106 
Regime maintenance is linked to the transactional costs that the creation of regimes 
themselves implies for state-actors. Functionalists hold that regimes frequently 
persist even after the conditions that have led to their creation have disappeared 
exactly because creating a regime is so difficult in the first place and their dismissal is 
not free for those who want to quit. 
 
“Ironically if regimes were costless to build there would be little point in constructing them. In this case, 
agreements would also be costless. Under these circumstances governments, could wait until specific 
                                                        
103 Keohane, 76. 
104 Even though this approach would imply a sort of “learning capability”, which is not exactly 
respondent to the interests-based approach assumptions. 
105 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” 250. 
106 Keohane, After Hegemony, 1984, 79–90. 
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problems arose, then make agreements to deal with them; they would have no need to construct 
international regimes to facilitate agreements. It is precisely the costliness of agreements and of 
regimes themselves that make them important. The high costs of regimes building help existing regimes 
to persist.”107 
 
In 1997 Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger offered a critical examination of the 
contractualist theory which highlighted the following aspects.108 First they observed, 
as Keohane himself had done already, that to the extent that contractualist stances 
have entered into empirical research they have produced mixed results. A second 
observation they raise concerning the argumentative structure of functional regime 
theory regards the post hoc propter hoc fallacy which seems to apply to Keohane’s 
reasoning in that he assumes that actors are rational (without showing it). A third issue 
regards the existing but confused relationship existing between the concepts of 
cooperation and regimes and between regimes and ad-hoc substantive agreements 
and their empirical implication for the study of compliance).  Partially linked to the 
previous point is the fact that by arguing that states create regimes to enable them-
selves to conclude agreements (with regimes that must be regarded as regimes 
themselves), the argument suffers from a fundamental circularity.109 
 
The situational-structural approach (a game theoretic extension of functional regime 
theory). To this stream belong, interalia, Arthur Stein, Duncan Snidal, Kenneth Oye, 
Michael Zürn and Lisa Martin. These scholars assume that interactive situations in 
international relations among states cannot be reduced to Prisoner Dilemma-like 
settings because the game does not always reflect real world situations for at least 
two interconnected reasons.  
On the one side, Duncan Snidal shows that PD related main assumptions need  to be 
relaxed across several dimensions: number of strategies available, numbers of players, 
the distribution of power among them, and number of iterations of the game. 110  The 
                                                        
107 Keohane, 103. 
108 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 1997, 39–44.  
109 Oye and Studies, Cooperation under Anarchy, 20f. 
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author explains (1) how the fact that states face only a dichotomous choice is a 
“drastic simplification of the wider menu of choices typically available” and the need 
is there for a “graduated” variant of the Prisoner Dilemma. (2) Along these lines, an 
extension of the two-actor PD to the n-actor situation is also required and must 
incorporate careful consideration about the impact of asymmetry within the group of 
states. (3) Finally, as already pointed out in the previous paragraph, traditional PD-like 
approaches are inherently static while iteration in the real world is often repeated. 
The relaxation of states’ traditional 2X2 PD model’s assumptions has several 
implications over cooperative outcomes (see Table 1.7). 
On the other side, and partially linked to the previous point, the “Dilemma of Common 
Interests” (which is the name Stein assigns to PD bargaining) although crucial, does 
not exhaust all the strategic situations where individual and collective rationality 
comes at odds. For this reason, PD-like situations should be addressed as only one 
type out of many collective action problems potentially requiring the beneficial 
interloping of international regimes. More precisely, situation structuralists expect 
that different situations require to be “managed” by different kind of regimes.  
In coordination games, several pareto-efficient equilibria exist and actors face the 
problem of picking one of them collectively. 111  As long as the actors are indifferent 
about which equilibrium to pick (pure coordination), they do not face a real collective 
action problem, which instead arises whenever actors favour different coordination 
outcomes (battle of sex) (see Figure 1.2). This is the case of a couple who would like 
to spend an evening together (not separate), but have different preferences 
concerning how to spend their time with their beloved one (for example between 
watching a movie or going to the opera). Two pareto optimal equilibria exist and they 
are both preferred by a situation of not coordination (each going to its favourite place 
alone). Cooperating in this case means to allow the other to make the choice of the 
venue. However, since both points are equilibria, the coordination, if successful, is 
expected to be stable.  
                                                        
111 A Nash equilibrium is an out come from which no actor can depart unilaterally without suffering a 
loss of utility. 
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Some authors, like Stein accept only these two types of situations as those in which 
states may find in their interest to cope. According to other “voices”, in particular Zürn 
and Martin two further types of situational structures may be at stake: assurance (stag 
hunt) and suasion (Rambo) games. Since the “assurance” and “suasion” strategic 
interactions are particularly suitable to explain security-issue scenarios, their analysis 
is indeed endorsed in the following chapter. 
According to the structural-functionalist’s point of view, regimes have the same 
function already settled by Keohane: they facilitate cooperation mainly by enhancing 
communication/transparency among actors. 
Moreover situation-structuralists argue that distinct collective actions pose very 
different problems and consequently appropriate institutional solutions (=regimes) 
can be/should be very different, as well.  For this reason, in the following chapter, I 
will comment the main individual features of the regime-types that are born to 
respond to different collective-action problems typically emerging in the security 
domain where the non-proliferation of biological weapons should be located. Such 
analysis will be crucial for understanding compliance measures required in order to 
make regimes work properly. 
The problem-structural approach. Michael Zürn, Klaus Dieter Wolf, and Manfred 
Efinger are the main authors ascribable to this stream. Their contribution develops 
from the assumption that regimes are “partial orders” and pertain to specific issue-
areas, for example trade, money, arms control. Since in a rational/functionalist 
framework neither the attributes of the actors nor the characteristics of the 
international system, as a whole, can account for the variation of the behavioural 
patterns across issue-areas or for the empirical discontinuity in regime formation 
across them, these scholars assume that it is the very nature of the issue area to play 
a major role. Notwithstanding the assumption is not very distant from the one of 
situational structuralism - if we admit that different issue areas can broadcast diverse 
interactive strategic situations (and mirror diverse collective action problems) – they 
have been considered as fitting uneasily in the interest-based school of regime theory. 
According to Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger this was mainly due  to the fact that 
1) problem structuralists themselves have not clearly established a link with the other 
interest-based approaches; 2) their propositions cannot simply subsumed under 
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neoliberal theories (e.g. in that they admit that “sometimes” states are sensitive to 
relative gains and in that they assign key role to issue-areas). Actually, although the 
very concept of “issue-area” is explicitly expressed in the consensus definition of 
regime by Krasner, nonetheless it can hardly be seen as completely detached by states 
perceptions about specific issue-areas boundaries. The concept of issue-area has not 
been object of any special interest with detrimental repercussion on the analysis of 
those regimes that do not exhaust their substance in a single treaty. In other words, 
when it is not possible to equate regimes with specific treaties, room is there for other 
agreements (possibly belonging to other issue-areas) to intervene. A second example 
is the literature over non-regime which have championed the idea that non-regimes 
are issue-areas in which states failed to establish an institution (without being clear 
about what issue-areas are).  
Proponents of a structural problem approach, have described the notion of issue area 
as follows:  
 
“Issue areas […] consist of one or more, in the perception of the actors, inseparably connected objects 
of contention and of the behaviour directed to them. The boundaries of issue-area are determined by 
the perception of the participating actors.”112 
 
As noticed by Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, however, the perception-
dependency of issue areas deserves to be highlighted because implies that issues areas 
can indeed “change without any corresponding change taking place in the objective 
facts to which policy makers make reference.”113 What matters here is not only that 
issue areas have boundaries that can change over time (without the objective facts 
beneath to change), but that the way issue-areas are generated, even within the same 
period of time, is itself a highly political process. If derived by a perceptive process 
states undertake, the pool of objects belonging to a specific issue area again cannot 
be taken as granted. To those that have lamented the fact that the letter “objects of 
contention”, in the issue-area definition reported above, turns regime cooperation 
                                                        
112 Efinger and Zürn, “Explaining Conflict Management in East-West Relations: A Quantitative Test of 
Problem-Structural Typologies.” 
113 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 1997, 61. 
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into a sort of conflict management (and thus draws the approach away from 
Keohane’s one), it seems preferable the position of those who understand the term 
as implying a notion of positionsdifferenzen,114 that means different position (not 
necessarily conflictual). This would be an interpretation closer and better aligned with 
the mixed motives settlements existing in PD like situations.115 
As the situational functionalists do, the problem structuralists assume the existence 
of an empirical relationship between conflict’s typologies and the forms of behaviour 
they give rise to.  
Ernst Otto Czempiel has provided a simple typology to classify issues areas of 
international politics on the basis of their propensity to resolve conflicts that may arise 
through cooperation or rather self-help strategies.116 He pinpoints three policy 
domains: security, economic well-being, and system of rules. He holds that policy 
domains under which regimes happen to develop, influence the propensity to the 
cooperation development.  
Czempiel suggests that economic issues display a greater propensity to cooperative 
management than the other two domains since divisible gains rather than indivisible 
ones characterize them. 
Efinger and Zürn have enriched the analysis with a further classification on the basis 
of the “object of conflict / “Positionsdifferenzen”.117 Again, the idea is that inherent 
properties of the “object of contention” account for at least part of observable conflict 
management settlement. These scholars distinguish four types of conflicts: conflicts 
about values, about means, about relative-interests (that tend to be assessed 
relatively) and about absolute-interests (that tend to be assessed absolutely). The 
object-conflict typologies can be prioritized according to their regime-conduciveness 
as follows: (1) conflicts on absolutely assessed goods (high conduciveness to regime 
                                                        
114 By this criterion, problem structuralism is not easily subsumed under interest based theorizing.  
According to neoliberals, states are rational egoists who are indifferent to how well others do. 
115 As pointed out by HMR, what (if anything) distinguish the two positions is the emphasize on 
common interests in one case and contention in the other: In Keohane’s view common interests are 
the basis for cooperation, problem structuralists highlight the conflictual background of regime 
based-cooperation. 
116 Czempiel, Internationale Politik. 
117 Efinger and Zürn, “Explaining Conflict Management in East-West Relations: A Quantitative Test of 
Problem-Structural Typologies.” 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 48 
formation), (2) conflicts on means (medium conduciveness), (3) conflicts on relatively 
assessed goods (low conduciveness), (4) conflicts on value (very low conduciveness). 
Such an analysis is, in the end, not so much different from the one depicted by 
situationalists. It might be argued indeed that “situation-structure” (PD, Battle of sex, 
stag hunt, etc..) are just another way of classifying “issue areas” and/or the “type of 
conflicts” that dominate them and what really distinguishes problem-structure 
scholars from situation structuralists approach are the specific tools (game theory) 
that the latter use. 
 
Institutional Bargaining: Oran R. Young Model. Oran R. Young is one of the most 
prolific and valuable scholar in the field of regime analysis and, without any doubt, 
one of the pioneer of the subject. According to Young’s definition of regimes, already 
reported above, regimes are agreements.118 Such a definition implies that regimes do 
not need to be explained by referring to their function (which is to provide the 
permissive environment for agreements (or cooperation)), like the functionalists 
would do. On the contrary, the author is closer to formal approaches. Young 
contribution to international regimes literature is wide-ranging, here it is considered 
only his “institutional bargaining” model of regime formation since this gives fruitful 
insights for the objectives of this work.119 The model stresses the importance of the 
bargaining process which is meant to result in a “constitutional contract” that would 
specify the content of a regime for the issue area in question.120 The author uses the 
term “institutional bargaining” as a shorthand for “bargaining with the objective of 
creating an institution” and he focuses the analysis on what he calls “negotiated 
regimes”.121 Under a descriptive point of view the model seeks to outline the essential 
circumstances under which collective efforts to form regimes habitually take place. 
                                                        
118 Keohane explains regimes in term of the agreements they facilitate, this is not possible for Oran 
Young according to whom explaining regimes is only explaining a kind of agreements (for which Young 
uses the term “constitutional contract”. 
119 Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation,” 282. 
120 Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation.” 
121 Juxtaposed with “spontaneous” and “imposed regimes”, see also Oran R. Young “Regime Dynamics: 
The Rise and Fall of International Regimes” in ed. Stephen D. Krasner “Structural causes and regime 
consequences: regimes as intervening variables” in International Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, p. 93-113. 
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The theory is interest-based in the sense that actors are considered as selfish players 
who confront with both the possibility of achieving joint benefits and the difficulty of 
setting upon a specific set of norms and rules for the purpose. However, Young’s 
model also settles a critic of mainstream rationalists’ “bargaining environment,”122  
which he sees as overoptimistic and not realistic.123 His view is more contingent and 
the author argues that in real world situations actors are usually uncertain about the 
strategies the counterpart may employ or about the strategies available to themselves 
at all. Often state-actors are only vaguely aware of the outcomes they may get, and 
not sure about how the outcomes related to their interests. Nonetheless, according 
to Young it is exactly the initial absence of a specified and commonly known comfort-
zone of agreement that, in real world situations, allows the parties to come to a final 
agreement: “once uncertainties are recognized, they produce a disposition in the 
actor to engage in integrative (rather than distributive) bargaining.”124 
In Young’s model uncertainty is a structural condition, which enables actors to form 
regimes 
From an analytical perspective, Young’s model identifies a number of factors that are 
critical for the success of states when it comes to design formal agreements.125 These 
features are also critical for the understanding of compliance issues (see later in the 
chapter). Factors encouraging and promoting the success of integrative bargaining are 
(1) contractual environment blurring the zone of agreement and veiling the future 
distribution of benefits; (2) exogenous shock crisis; (3) availability of equitable 
solutions (unanimity solution); (4) existence of a salient solution, which derives from 
simplicity and clarity;126 (5) availability of clear cut and effective compliance 
mechanisms; (6) Mixture of entrepreneurial, structural, and intellectual leadership. 
                                                        
122 Young, “The Politics of International Regime Formation.” 
123 Young, 358. 
124 Keohane’s theory of regime formation also gives a central role to uncertainty, but (differently from 
Oran Young) he refers to actors’ uncertainty about what their partner will do. For example: will they 
keep their promises? In Keohane’s account uncertainty motivates state to create regimes that reduce 
uncertainty. 
125 Young, “The Politics of International Regime Formation,” 349–52. 
126 Salience as here expressed it is not incompatible with the veil of uncertainty since: “while a salient 
solution must be formulated in a simple manner that it is easy for everyone to grasp and remember, its 
very simplicity may also cause ambiguous and uncertainty, leaving much to be resolved after the regime 
is in place”.  
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Power-based theories  
“Power-based” theories, like their interest-based counterpart, espouse rationalist 
assumptions concerning the international system and the nature of state actors in it: 
states are considered atomistic and selfish utility maximizers acting as main characters 
in the anarchic system. However, realists also differ from neoliberals in many respects. 
First, realist theories of international regimes emphasize power capabilities (and not 
interests) as the central explanatory variable accounting for the formation, normative 
content and the perspective impact of regimes. Second, they stress states’ sensitivity 
to relative gains and distributional aspects of cooperation, insisting on the fact that 
the utility functions of states are (at least partially) interdependent with important 
consequences for international regimes, one above all the fact that the gains achieved 
by partners through mutual cooperation may diminish considerably the utility of those 
states are less rewarded by participation (and consistently their willingness to 
cooperate in the first place). A third distinctive element of realism, linked to the latter 
argument (emphasis on relative over absolute gains) is that realists tend to regard the 
effectiveness and the robustness of regimes as more narrowly circumscribed than 
functionalists do. 
As anticipated in the introduction structural realists have in general deserved little 
attention to international regimes which they see as affecting international politics 
only on the margin. However three formulations, which are self-consciously realists, 
and yet take into great account international regimes, are useful for the present 
analysis: Gilpin’s (theory of hegemonic stability), Krasner and Grieco. 
Gilpin: theory of hegemonic stability (HST). The theory of hegemonic stability is a 
classic example of a power-based theory of IR. The theory links the existence of 
effective international institutions to a particular kind of power distribution (unipolar) 
in the issue-area in question.  
Once the unipolar power structure that underlines a given regime dissolves, however, 
the regime itself is bound to collapse or turn into an ineffective cluster of norms and 
rules which are violated whenever the states perceive it is in their best interest to do 
it. 
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In other words, Gilpin believes that actors that have predominant sources of power in 
a specific issue area only provide for regimes should they take advantage by that 
cooperation and that those regimes are bound to decline (that means they lose their 
robustness and effectiveness) when that power comes to be more equally distributed 
among regimes’ participants.127 
The theory has its origin from the work by Charles Kindleberger on the Great 
Depression128 (in turn strongly inspired by Olson’s theory of collective action (oriented 
to the provision of public goods)). The main idea informing this contribution is that 
public goods are characterized by the fact that the exclusion of any member of a group 
from the consumption of the good is not necessarily economically/practically feasible. 
The impossibility of exclusion has negative repercussions on the incentives states have 
in conforming to others’ behaviour, de facto providing room for free riding strategies 
to take floor. The free-riding problem has devastating consequences on large groups, 
vice-versa small group are slightly privileged by the fact that at least one member of 
the group has usually a sufficiently strong interest in the good to make it rational to 
provide the good even though no one else shares in the cost.129 
Kindleberger has applied these reflections to international politics and in essence has 
stated that only the presence of an exceptional economic and political power, which 
has the capacity and the willingness to lead other states, can “credit” the group by 
supplying and supporting the infrastructure that permits regime’s sustenance and 
comparatively smooth and mutually beneficial exchange to take place.  
Kindleberger believed that great powers power cooperation’s could not substitute for 
one state shouldering the burden of leadership, and consequently he regards the 
relative decline of the U.S. starting in the late 1960 with some concern.  
 
“The danger we face is not too much power but too little, not an excess of domination but a superfluity 
of would-be-free riders unwilling to mind the store and waiting for storekeeper to appear”130.  
 
                                                        
127 Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes 
1967-1977.” 
128 Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, 305. 
129 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. 
130 Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy.” 
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As far as cooperation is concerned, it is clear that the HST implicitly denies the ability 
of states to engage in large scale collective action: no regime emerges in an issue area, 
unless a preponderance of power exists in the group so that the collective good can 
be supplied by independent action. Consistently, the regime would wane or stop 
existing when power distribution changes. 
This vision belies a certain scepticism about international cooperation and sanctions 
the impossibility of a second order cooperation in the domains of rule-making and rule 
enforcement, since the costs implied in such activities would not be shared by some 
states but entirely borne by one (the hegemon).131  
Snidal, in its critic to HST, identifies two types of hegemons and two variants of 
hegemonic theory.132 In the first one, the “benevolent hegemonic state” provides the 
collective good (in this case an international regime) all by itself while the other states 
are basically free from the responsibility of maintaining the regime (smaller actors 
actually receive rents due to the hegemon’s action). The second variant, which Snidal 
calls the “coercive leadership” models and which he finds best represented in Gilpin’s 
approach, assumes that a dominant state is required to produce the international 
public good. In this case the asymmetric size of the actors in the issue area implies 
that the hegemon can and does use its superior power to force other to contribute as 
well. The two settings are not logically incompatible and we can and a combination of 
coercion and benevolence is absolutely possible.133 
Krasner. According to Stephen Krasner the “basic issue in [in the policy] of regime 
formation is where state will end up on the Pareto Frontier, not how to reach the 
frontier in the first place”.134 In other words, according to the author, what is 
interesting to understand and anticipate in regime analysis, are the outcomes that 
regimes mediate: “who gets what?”. In his view, this dynamic is nicely captured by the 
                                                        
131 First order cooperation takes place whenever states adjust their policies with regard to certain 
substantive issues in a multilateral beneficial way. Usually, such cooperation is aided or structured by 
agreed-upon rules of conduct or regimes. What the concept of first order cooperation leaves open is 
how the rules of cooperation come about and why they are observed by self-interested actors, who 
sometimes must sacrifice grater short-term gains in order to act in accordance with regime. This is 
where the notion of second order cooperation comes in. Both rule making and rule enforcement 
involve costs. When several actors share these costs, we do speak of second order cooperation. 
132 Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory.” 
133 Snidal, 590. 
134 Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power,” 336–66. 
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battle of sex model (and not by the PD which provide for a single cooperative 
outcome): states often have unambiguous preferences for coordinating their activities 
in an issue-area and mutual unilateralism is their “common aversion”, however they 
clash in that they favour different institutional arrangements (for example different 
points of coordination).135 
For this reason, Krasner believes that the coordination games are heuristically more 
fruitful points of departure in the analysis of international regimes. The first 
implication of recurring to coordination situations for explaining international 
relations is admitting that cooperation (coordination in this case) is not achieved by 
mutual adjustment (like it is the case of the PD/collaboration), but by one partner 
adjusting to the other. Consequently, the distributional bargaining (and not cheating) 
represents the problem the regime should and can address. 
Cheating does any longer appears as a key factor hampering efforts to cooperate for 
mutual advantage, because changing one’s mind unilaterally involves a loss of utility 
for the cheater as well.  
This means that intelligence and a guarantee of adequate information is devalued as 
a mean of solving the cooperation problem.136 By converse, since the cooperation 
problem regards mainly the distributional bargaining, power becomes the mean of 
deciding such conflicts during the process of regime formation.  
Krasner specifies three ways in which power can be deployed to solve collective action 
problem in situation similar to the battle of sex: (1) First, power may be used to 
determine who can play the game in the very first place. In international relations, less 
powerful actors are often never invited to the table of bargaining; (2) Power can be 
used to dictate the rules of the game (for instance who gets to move first); in the 
game, the player who moves first can decree the outcome, provided that the other 
player is convinced the first player strategy is irrevocable. (3) Finally, power may be 
used to change pay-off matrix.137 These statements (especially the latter) appear to 
be quite in contrast with the ones incorporated into situation-structuralist 
approaches. Nonetheless, he departs from a similar background analysis: the basic 
                                                        
135 Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration,” 115–41. 
136 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” 231. 
137 Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power,” 340. 
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unit of analysis of situations-structuralism - the distribution of interests - is not here 
strictly prior to power politics and in part it is a function of the distribution of 
capabilities itself. Thus, a state with more abundant resources (military, economic or 
otherwise described) may manipulate the other’s preference ordering, by means of 
threats and promises, and tactical issue-linkage. Consequently, the powerful state 
becomes able to transform a pure coordination game into one in which there is only 
one pareto-efficient solution left: the one favoured by the more powerful actor.138 It 
is worth noting that bargaining leverage may also be derive from unequal opportunity 
costs of change: the actor less in need of cooperation can get his way by credibly 
threatening to leave the table, if the other side fails to be more forthcoming.139  
As anticipated, within this framework, asymmetrical information stops being a critical 
element and the contribution regimes can provide in increasing transparency is 
lowered by the direct connection existing between capabilities and outcomes. 
Regimes relevance is inevitably decreased by an “analysis [that] seeks to explain 
outcomes in term of interests and relative capabilities rather than in terms of 
institutions designed to promote pareto optimality.”140  
Nonetheless, the author maintains that regimes are necessary for at least two 
reasons: because of the “common aversion” to uncoordinated actions and to 
“establish stability”.141 What’s more they can be a source of power themselves. Thus, 
even structurally weak states can sometimes exert a modicum influence on the 
collective policies in an issue area due to membership and voting rules of the 
international organisations that often rise within the regime: “If regimes did not have 
significant distributional consequences, actors would not so often continue to be 
fought even after the establishment of an institution.”142 
Grieco: Modern Realism’s Theory of Cooperation among Nations 
In a series of publications on the topic, Joseph Grieco has qualified the claim that 
international institutions play an important role in states’ cooperative ventures. His 
                                                        
138 Krasner, 340f. 
139 Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” 28. 
140 Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power.” 
141 Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones,” 397. 
142 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 1997, 108. 
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interpretation of the realist theory of international cooperation does have interesting 
positive implications for the study of international institutions.143 What we observe, 
in real world situation is that, even in a “realist” world, states have incentives to create 
international institutions, which in turn help them to manage the risks of cooperation. 
With the objective of providing evidence to this statement, Grieco offers a more 
detailed explanation of two typical realist features: states attributes and anarchy. 
As far as state attributes are concerned, the author is the one who have first described 
states as utility maximizers (and not simply rational egoists) implying that relative gain 
counts. Under this perspective, the he goes even a step further when he combines this 
aspect with some situationalist/problem structuralism flavour by specifying that 
relative gains count in diverse measure depending on the issue area where the 
interaction takes place. In other words, the actors’ sensitivity to relative gains (k) 
change across issue-areas U = V-k (W-V). Where V and W are relative advantages of 
the two players, and U the Utility of one of them. 
Concerning anarchy, Grieco focuses on the fact that the absence in the international 
system of an agency that enforces promises, and even more important that 
guarantees states they survival as independent units of the system, is highly 
consequential for regime studies.144 Anarchy poses not only a problem in term of 
short-term survival (each unit bears exclusive responsibility for safeguarding its own 
endurance and independence) as other scholars had already pointed out, but also a 
problem of long-term existence (not to be only understood in terms of relative and 
absolute declines). It is not necessary that states are in immediate danger to worry 
about regimes today because the uncertainty inherent in the anarchical international 
system causes further concerns about states’ relative positions in the future;145 In 
other words, state have to worry not only about their current bargaining power but 
also about their (and the others’) future one.146 
                                                        
143 Grieco, “The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research 
Programme,” 1995. 
144 Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,” 1988, 497. 
145 Grieco, 500. 
146 Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations, 24. 
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The fact that in international politics the gains of another do detract from one’s own 
level satisfaction, does not rule out that sometimes state may decide to cooperate to 
further common objective and according to the author: international institutions can 
still be instrumental in many ways. Not only regime can mitigate cheating problems 
but also can affect the variables that determine the severity of relative gains concerns 
over states policy decisions, as for example the sensitivity of actors to relative losses. 
As to actors’ intolerance for relative loss, Grieco speculates on the possibility of 
institutions promoting a norm of reciprocity which, to the extent it is regarded as 
effective, makes it easier for states to accept relative losses in one period on one issue 
as they expected to be compensated in a later period or on another issue since 
regimes increment connections between issue areas. 
Conclusive remarks over contractualist approaches 
Although avoiding the term socialization, contractual institutionalism acknowledges 
the possibility that extended social interactions in institutions can alter actors’ 
behaviours by changing the strategic environment in which actors are called to take 
action. However, institutionalists still give little or none importance to actors’ 
preference change. According to them, actors generally emerge from interaction 
inside institutions with the same identity with which they entered into them. Likewise, 
actor’s characteristics are not able to affect the attributes of the institution itself. 
According to contractualism, an efficient institution should only reflect, in principle, 
the nature of the cooperation problem it was born to solve and not the nature of the 
actors involved that, in turn, do not change because of the institution.147 As explained 
above, Institutions elicit pro-group behaviour in basically three ways: information, 
reputation, and issue-linkage. According to a strict contractualist perspective, the 
three mechanisms only affect beliefs about the strategic environment in which the 
                                                        
147 To be more precise, according to some institutionalists (Wallander, 1999) actors’ preferences do 
change, however these scholars do not charge institutions with being responsible for such variation. 
Johnston also reports that other contractualists claim to the contrary that preferences can be 
modified exactly by participation to international institutions through a mechanism called complex 
learning (Keohane, 1984). Still the process, as described by Nye (Nye 1987), does not, in my opinion, 
belong purely to an institutionalist vision, rather than it straddles both institutionalism and 
constructivism. Complex learning indicates a process in which new information alters prior beliefs 
about the world; this results in new priorities and trade-offs. However, this information does not 
work by reducing uncertainty, like in traditional institutionalist approaches, but it seems to induce a 
cognitive change hitting preferences and not only beliefs. 
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actor is operating, leaving preferences fixed.  Pro-social and cooperative behaviour in 
institutions are positively related to the degree of transparency in the strategic 
environment and of material and/or reputational side payments or sanctions provided 
by institutions or other actors within the institutions.  
A main problem related with this approach is the alleged automatism by which 
information (the same discourse applies to issue-linkage and reputation, as well) 
seems able to change the strategic environment reducing for example the uncertainty 
of international scene and consequently facilitating cooperation.148 The point is, 
according to Johnston, that in the process of sharing new information, interpretation 
should matter a great deal more than nothing. Empirically we know that the same 
information can be perceived differently depending on whether it comes from people 
“like us” or a devalued “other”. Institutionalist scholars have responded to this type 
of critiques by recurring to Bayesian signalling games (also called up-date beliefs), in 
which the credibility of the signals in conveying information depends in many 
instances on prior social relationship and interests formed from this. However, as 
Johnston points out, much of signalling literature only partially replies to the critique 
since it focuses on how the context of information alters beliefs about the credibility 
of the information and not identities.  
Johnston instead underlines, relaying on tests performed by Alker, that a string of 
cooperative interactions can lead players to take the same information – e.g. a 
defection by the counterpart – and to reinterpret it as a mistake or as a consequence 
of the situation rather than of the other’s player disposition.149 
However, institutionalists do not rule definitively out changes in preferences and 
there is no reason why the new information cannot also lead to a redefinition of 
interests. But to date, if preferences do change, institutionalists have tended to look 
for a change in distribution of power among national political/elite decision makers 
leading to a picture of “new interests reflecting new coalitions”. In Katzenstein’s 
words, in adopting economic styles of analysis, [institutionalists] often misunderstand 
concept as prestige and reputation, which they view as “force effects rather than 
                                                        
148 Johnston, Social States, 2008. 
149 Alker, Rediscoveries and Reformulations, 303–31. 
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social attributions”.150 As Johnston observes, the indifference institutionalists ascribe 
to socialization is somewhat surprising, though. Given the prominence of coordination 
games and focal points,151 in institutionalist theorizing about social norms, habits and 
customs, one might expect more curiosity about the social-historical origins of focal 
points, that this scholarship by the way acknowledge as products of shared culture 
and experience. 
Knowledge-based theories: ideas, identities and socialization  
Knowledge-based theories of international regimes stress the importance of ideas, 
knowledge, and identities as explanatory variables for states behaviour. Cognitivists 
are broadly critics of rationalist stances, which they consider, at best, incomplete. 
Interests and distribution of power should be, in their view, at least supplemented by 
“distribution of knowledge” (weak cognitivists) if not directly challenged (strong 
cognitivists). Cognitivists (weak and strong) contest the idea that states’ interests exist 
by themselves (ready to be discovered by self-interested actors). On the contrary, in 
their view, interests are constructed through a process of social interaction.  The 
theory proceeds by asking (1) what happen if (in contrast to realism) the milieu (the 
structure) where states take action wouldn’t be determined only by the material 
capabilities of states? And (2) what if, institutions can have impacts, beyond interests 
(as neoliberals already think) on identities of states? In other words, and merging the 
two points: what if scholars should care about the cultural-institutional context of 
states acting in a system/society and not only of the strategic environment where 
decisions are taken?152 
Knowledge-based theorists (strong and weak cognitivists) have indeed tried to issue 
warning against treating states’ preferences and identities as given, and have 
attempted to draw attention on potential endogenous changes in the normative 
characteristics and properties of actors involved in international relationships. 
Inheriting much of the epistemology of sociology, these scholars have introduced into 
the structure-constrained realm of international relations, notions like intersubjective 
                                                        
150 Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, 1996; Harriman, Post-Realism. 
151 Schelling, “The Strategy of Conflict Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory.” 
152 Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security, 1996, 17. 
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meaning, interpretation, appropriateness, learning and more recently, socialization. 
They believe that a special consideration needs to be given to the study of those 
processes that produces state-identities and the objectives which states want to 
pursue in their foreign policies, with important implications for the study of 
international regimes. In fact, if these processes are outlined by the normative and 
causal belief of the decision makers, they are subject to change  
Cognitivists are grouped in two sub-groups: weak and strong. 
According to weak cognitivists, the demand of regimes in the international arena 
depends on the actors’ perceptions of international problems. These perceptions are, 
in part, produced by the material environment where they are sited (e.g. distribution 
of power and interests) and partially ascribable to knowledge and ideas. Weak 
cognitivists contribution can be interpreted as a complementary one to mainstream 
rationalists’ accounts for regimes since provide a further (with respect to distribution 
of power and interests) reason for preferences assembling. Weak cognitivists indeed 
accept the idea of states as rational utility maximizers, however assuming that 
perception of utility is influenced also by knowledge and that such knowledge is not 
attributable to material structure only. Knowledge is understood as an autonomous 
variable. These authors want to illuminate the process of preferences’ formation prior 
to rational decision-making proceeding when strategic situations occur. Under this 
perspective, the contribution can be accepted as supplement to mainstream 
rationalist accounts (realism and institutionalism).  On the contrary, strong cognitivists 
argue that knowledge operates at a more fundamental level constituting states and 
afterwards enabling them to engage in power games and/or cooperative 
undertakings. They posit the existence of an international society, which is structured 
by institutions, and thus provide for an real alternative theory of regimes to rationalist 
approaches. In other words, if international institutions must be regarded as 
embodying the cognitive structures that underpin international society, they 
obviously can’t be considered problem-solving devices and their role cannot be 
limited to an instrumental logic as it happens with neoliberalism and realisms 
approaches. 
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Although the two approaches are profoundly different from one another, and only 
strong cognitivists are linked to the so-called sociological turn in international 
relations, they both restore the role of not-fixed preferences and states’ identity. 
 
Weak cognitivism  
Weak Cognitivists undertake three central assumptions that actually serve to 
answering a unique question, which they see as the critical problem of regime 
analysis: “How convergent expectations among independent actors in an 
international issue area” can be possible?”153 
(1) The first assumption, which is widely held among cognitivists, regards the 
importance of intersubjectively shared meaning:   
 
“Before states can agree on whether and how to deal collectively with specific problem, they must 
reach some consensus about the nature and the scope of the problem and also about the manner in 
which problem relates to other concerns in the same and additional issue areas”.154 
 
(2) Second, weak cognitivists emphasize the role of interpretation as a standing 
variable between international structure and human volition: “Before choices 
involving cooperation can be made circumstances must be assessed and interests 
identified.”155 Since interpretation is shaped by the body of knowledge  that actors 
hold at a given time and place, at the same time preferences cannot be treated as 
simply given but analytically as contingent on how actors understand themselves, the 
natural and social world. 
(3) The third proposition weak cognitivists champion, refers to the growing demand, 
on the part of decision makers, for scientific information and other supposedly reliable 
knowledge. Technological innovation devalues traditional strategies and redefines 
political priorities:  
 
                                                        
153 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 1997, 140. 
154 Haas, “Introduction,” 29. 
155 Adler and Haas, “Conclusion,” 101–46. 
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“in order to make clever choices in unfamiliar situations, decision makers need and often demand high 
quality information and expert advice. In other words, scientists and other experts are often in a 
position to reduce the uncertainty decision makers feel about what is in their interest.”156 
Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, are among the first to gather evidences 
justifying the need to go beyond the rationalist mode of analysis and have investigated 
the impact of ideas on foreign policy.157 
After assessing that a rationalist approach (null hypothesis)158 has sometime proved 
ill-equipped to provide convincing explanations about state behaviours, cognitivists 
have argued that changes in behaviour, to some extent, can be explained by variations 
in principled or causal beliefs.159 At least in those periods of time when power 
relations are in flux, and interests and strategies are unclear, new thinking may have 
a considerable impact on the course of international politics. According to the authors, 
ideas/beliefs works through three causal pathways. First, belief may serve as road 
map defining goals and means of states action. Second, they may serve as focal points, 
which help define acceptable solutions to collective action problems thus facilitating 
coordination.160. Third, once incorporated into institutional frameworks, ideas and 
causal beliefs start constraining public policy as long as they are not effectively 
undermined by new scientific discoveries and knowledge.161 
If knowledge is considered as an autonomous variable, it is clear that changes in 
beliefs may induce behavioural change. When it happens, the process is called 
learning.162 In his work dedicated to the US-Soviet Security Regimes published in 1987, 
Joseph Nye extensively investigates the relationship existing between regime and 
learning. More specifically along a continuum of ends-means, the author identifies 
                                                        
156 Note that weak cognitivist uncertainty is more similar to Oran Young’s one and doesn’t’ really match 
with Keohane’s uncertainty regarding lack of reliable information about the behaviour and intentions 
of other states. 
157 Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, 3–30. 
158 The “null hypothesis” presumes “that the actions described can be understood on the basis of 
egoistic interests in the context of power realities: that variations of interests are not accounted for by 
variations in the character of the ideas that people have”.  
159 Principal Beliefs consist of “normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong 
and just from unjust” causal beliefs are “beliefs about cause-effect relationships”. 
160 Ideas as focal points have the same coordinating function in processes of regime formation that 
Krasner’s power oriented research program attributes to power. 
161 The notion that institution may prolong the impact of ideas corresponds to what Krasner referred 
as the tectonic plates version of the theory of hegemonic stability. 
162 Nye, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.–Soviet Security Regimes,” 2–6. 
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two forms of learning. In the case of simple learning, new understandings of the social 
and political environment may prompt decision makers to alter their strategies to 
achieve basically the same goals. This is also called adaptation. When new knowledge 
redefines the very content of national interests so that some new goals are selected, 
it is complex learning that takes place. This reasoning implies that states can 
sometimes redefine their interests (and alter their preferences) without a shift in the 
distribution of power and wealth. Nye finds remarkable instances of complex learning 
in the bilateral relationships of the post-war superpowers in the area of arms control 
and nuclear non-proliferation. 
What is very interesting and innovative about the weak cognitivist approach is that 
they consider regimes as a “bidirectional” intervening variable (between causal forces 
and behaviours). Not only regimes modify outcomes/behaviours but also can act back 
to actors’ belief by helping to lock in and to further develop the learning that had 
prompted their creation.163 This feedback effect operates also in the case of new 
beliefs, but with the opposite result of destabilizing existing patterns of 
cooperation.164 
It is important to point out that for knowledge to have an impact on regime formation, 
it must be widely shared by key policy makers. There must be a common 
understanding of both the nature of the problem to be solved and appropriated 
means to attain the valued ends. Peter Haas argues that epistemic communities are 
crucial channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as 
well as from country to country. See Figure 1.5 for a scheme of the weak-cognitivist 
ontology. 
Strong Cognitivism: the sociological turn  
The authors belonging to this stream questioned the appropriateness of the rationalist 
perspective as such for studying international regimes. In a nutshell, strong 
cognitivists (also referred to as constructivists) argue that rationalist approaches, due 
to their positivist epistemology and an ontology that gives actor priority over 
principles/rules/norms, are unable to grasp essential features of rule-governed 
                                                        
163 Nye, 385. 
164 Nye, 379. 
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cooperation under anarchy. Strong cognitivists believe that there is no rationality 
before sociality.  
They reject states as utility-maximizers that only implement a utilitarian logic of 
consequentiality and rather consider states as role-players responding to a logic of 
appropriateness. According this view, states will act evaluating behaviours on the 
basis of how different actions are appropriate for them, as occupants of a specific 
position in the context where they position themselves. They subscribe a relational 
model, which emphasize the dependency of state identities and cognition on 
international institutions and links the formation and maintenance of particular 
international regimes to these pre-established identities. “A shadow of institutions” 
comes to join force with the “shadow of the future” in producing cooperation.165 As a 
consequence, states are not as spontaneous and free to ignore international 
commitments. Under this analysis, social institutions and corresponding practices 
become a “condition of the possibility” of individual choices and without them rational 
behaviour would be unthinkable: “institutions constitute state actors as subjects of 
international life in the sense that they make meaningful interaction by the latter 
possible.”166  For this reason, institutions definitely cannot be reduced to mere devices 
for problem solving.167 According to this ontology, strong cognitivists stress the 
intersubjective quality of regimes which is referred to in the consensus definition in 
terms of  “convergent expectations”.168  Along these lines of reasoning regimes not 
only prescribe certain actions  or affect utility calculations of rational actors but also 
are used as point of reference for the determination and assessment  of individual 
behaviours. To illustrate both the regulative and constitutive dimension of regimes, 
strong cognitivists sometimes draws an analogy between the working of normative 
                                                        
165 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 1997, 157. 
166 Duvall and Wendt, “Institutions and International Order,” 51–73. 
167 Rationalists seem to have come to accept the tenet concerning the dependence of state actors on 
fundamental social structures; nevertheless, they maintain that the creation and maintenance of 
international regimes can be perfectly explained in terms of utility- maximization. They separate the 
constitution of states as central actors in international politics from issue-are specific institutional 
choices. “International cooperation does not necessarily depend on altruism, idealism, personal 
honour, common purpose, internalized norms or shared beliefs in a set of values embedded in a culture. 
At various times and places any of these factors of human motivation may indeed play a role in process 
of international cooperation: but cooperation can be understood without reference to any of them”.  
168 Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International Organization,” 1986. 
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institutions in world politics and the rule of games such as football. Such rules cannot 
be interpreted as causing particular moves within the play but, by defining the 
admissible behaviour, they enable the actors to play in the first place.169 
The ascription to regimes of a constitutive dimension, however, blurs the distinction 
between cause and effect (which was carried through by the Krasner’s consensus 
definition). In fact, regimes do not make states act in a particular way (by influencing 
them) but they make it possible for them acting at first, pursuing whatever purpose 
they would chose.170 See Figure 1.6 for a scheme of a prospectus. 
Needless to say, for strong cognitivists/constructivists socialization is the central 
concept. 
As Johnston rightly remarks, when it comes to defining socialization, political scientists 
have not wandered far from borrowing the work already prepared by colleagues 
belonging to different branches of social sciences. Social scientists generally 
understand socialization as the process by which “social interaction leads novices to 
endorse expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting”.171 Sigel, for example, 
describes political socialization as a process “by which people learn to adopt the 
norms, values, attitudes and behaviours accepted and practiced by the on-going 
system.”172  
The constructivist ontology focuses on a notion of appropriateness according to which 
pro-norm behaviours are so deeply internalized as to become unquestioned, 
automatic, and “taken for granted”. The term socialization, implies a change in the 
degree of convergence of expectations regarding actors’ behaviour before and after 
entering into an institution. The process is due to the interaction/s among agents that 
occur inside the institution.173 An important contribution within constructivist 
theorizing is the one covering “teaching”, a reflection inaugurated by Finnemore.174 
                                                        
169 Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?,” 1989; “Norms Versus Numbers. 
Multilateralism and the Rationalist and Reflexist Approaches to Institutions – A Unilateral Plea for 
Communicative Rationality,” 449f. 
170 Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International Organization.” 
171 Johnston, “Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations 
Theory,” 115. 
172 Cited in Johnston, Social States, 2008, 22. 
173 Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International Organization,” 1986. 
174 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society. 
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Nonetheless, Johnston in his book “Social States” has recently supplemented this 
contribution which he considered incomplete for stopping at the point where 
institutions (at the international level) deliver norm-based lessons to rather passive 
students (national recipients/states)175. In general terms the Johnston believes that 
not sufficient attention is paid to the process by which units or unit level actors 
understand, process, interpret, resist, and /or act upon “these lessons”. That is, it is 
unclear how exactly pro-normative behaviour are displayed, communicate to and 
absorbed by agents at the unit level. Put it visually we might refer to the picture 
represented in Figure 1.7; Until the late years 2000, argues Johnston in his book,  
constructivists empirical work has focused mainly on the first step/stage of the 
“teaching/learning” process and has skipped over the second, drawing unproblematic 
correlations between norms taught by institutions and content of states practice on 
the other. According to Johnston, we should not overlook the role the second stage 
plays in influencing both, the direct impact on national policies and practices on the 
one hand, and the feed-back on international normative structures, on the other 
hand.  
A second critique some authors including Johnston have lamented against current 
cognitivists approaches, is that even when attempt are made to look at the micro-
processes of socialization and to the constitutive effects of social interaction, they 
mainly target one of them: persuasion. Actually, persuasion is what really 
distinguishes constructivism from neorealists and contractualists, but, as Johnston’s 
underlines, with their almost exclusive focus on persuasion, constructivists  have 
discounted other important micro-processes (mimicking and social influence) that 
help explain pro-normative behaviour. 
In Johnston’s words, mimicking is a microprocess whereby a novice initially copies the 
behavioural norms of the group in order to navigate through an uncertain 
environment. It explains pro-group behaviour as a function of borrowing the language, 
habits, and ways of acting as a safe, first reaction to a novel environment: “I will do 
“X” because everyone seems to be doing X and surviving. So, until I know better, “X” 
is what I will do”. Basically, mimicking results from the desire to survive in a novel 
                                                        
175 Johnston, Social States. 
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social environment: it is, in a sense, a safety response.176 It cannot be assimilated to a 
rational search for successful exemplars (so-called emulation), neither it is a 
mechanism that motivate (like social influence and persuasion are).  
If we look at how this microprocess operates within an institutional context, we get 
that when actors (in particular novices)177 start mimicking, no considerations of 
punishments and rewards have succeeded yet, vice versa there are other features 
leading to path dependent lock-in.  
Johnston tells us that lock-in can occur in at least three ways. One way is the 
organizational and institutional development. Usually participation in an international 
institution functionally requires the creation of national specialized organizations and 
expertise to handle policy towards the international institution and to continue 
interaction with it possibly premised in organizational culture.178 Johnston, rightly, 
complains about how little has been written on the consequences of this process over 
knowledge development of state-level actors who, after all, populate the institution 
itself.  
A second way in which mere participation in institutions can lead to lock-in, is through 
the reception of procedures and norms of behaviours of the group.179 The domestic 
organization of actors who actually participate requires the adoption of standard 
operating procedures so as the state can retain, at least, a position within the 
institution. To take just few example, indicators of this mechanism can be the 
changing frequency with which diplomats submit working papers and statements 
prepared for consideration within institutional meeting, or the changing frequency 
with which research and analysis on issues relevant to the institution are ordered and 
produced at the national level.  
                                                        
176 Johnston, Social States, 2008, 46. 
177 Although Johnston does, I would not link the notion of mimicking exclusively to novices. It seems 
to me that this approach excessively restricts the sphere of analysis. It is reasonable to think that 
mimicking comes about every time actors within institutions are faced with challenges and 
behaviours taken by a leading group on issues they do not know as much, although they might have 
already been deeply involved in institutional activities on many other fronts. 
178 Johnston, Social States, 2008, 52. 
179 Johnston, 64. 
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A third and related mechanism justifying mimicking lock-in effect tested by Johnston, 
refers to the constraining effects of discursive practices.180 The assumption is that 
there are accepted forms of argumentation, expression and interaction that exclude 
other forms. Consequently, linguistic practices within an institution can inhibit the 
articulation of arguments that run counter the ideology of the institution.  
Whether the three mimicking-related lock-in mechanisms lead to internalization for 
example by facilitating the activation of other microprocesses (described below), 
might absolutely be the case. However, mimicking seems, in Johnston’s account, to 
be self-sufficient in inducing a minimal degree of  independent “substantiality”. In 
other words, repetition of pro-social behaviours may actually lead to a certain degree 
of retention of intersubjective norms of the group governing basic communication.  
Instead of “retention” the author makes use of the term “internalization” tout-
court.181 Mimicking is evidently the least “social” of the socialization processes that 
the author describes in his book “Social States”: no motivation develops and no full 
internalization takes place. However, the process is not completely asocial indeed it 
requires a group to copy (the more is uniform the behaviour of the group, the more 
the mechanism works) and a degree of pre-identification (necessary to choose which 
group to mimic or at least necessary to elaborate a satisfying decision about survival 
strategies in an unfamiliar environment).  
Although, according to Johnston, mimicking is rather akin to the logic of consequences 
and not far from realism homogenizations,182 the substantial difference I see between 
the two lays in that mimicking, unlike realism imitation and selection, should involve 
behaviours of different kinds, and not only realpolitik/power oriented. 
 
Social Influence is a microprocess whereby a novice’s behaviour is judged by the in-
group members and rewarded with backpatting (or other similar status markers) and 
punished with opprobrium (or other status devaluation features). One could ask 
                                                        
180 Johnston, 67. 
181 I disagree with Johnston when he accepts that mimicking can on its own guarantee a degree of 
internalization. I am afraid that a separation between internalization and simple retention is necessary 
if we do not want to lose the content-specific import of mimicking towards adaptation (social influence) 
and learning (persuasion). 
182 Johnston, Social States, 2008, 72.
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where lays the difference with reputational patterns accepted by contractualist 
institutionalism.  
Contractualists indeed do not deny that rewards and punishments, by changing the 
strategic environment, can also belong to the social sphere and under this perspective 
a specific non-material mechanism based on reputational effects has been largely 
described by this scholarship: a player with a reputation of former co-operator 
brought to a stag hunt game, for example, can reassure other players that actors 
genuinely prefer a (C; C) outcome. This can stabilize the Nash Equilibrium. Thus, it is 
in the interest of actors with common preferences to first acquire a cooperative 
reputation, particularly from situation in which cooperation can be quite costly.183 And 
here lays the difference between contractualists and cognitivists, for institutionalists 
intend reputation in terms of “concern for contractual reputation” within reiterated 
games. Now, this reputation-driven process has nothing to do with Johnston’s 
backpatting/opprobrium mechanism, which deals instead with social image. So much 
so that, the appropriate reference in-group and the degree to which certain 
backpatting and opprobrium signals are valued depending on an a priori identity 
construction (which is not a necessary condition for the contractualist-reputation 
discourse).  Johnston’s rewards might include psychological well-being derived from 
conformity with role expectations and a sense of belonging. Punishments might 
include shaming, shunning, exclusion and dissonance derived from actions 
inconsistent with role and identity. Backpatting and opprobrium are “societal” exactly 
because only groups can provide them (and I would say only groups integrated at a 
societal level).  
That said, Johnston acknowledges that, from international actors’ standpoint, status 
and social value are ends in and of themselves, along with other factors like relative 
power. Consequently, states display a common desire to maximize status (as well as 
power) that motivate their action .184   
                                                        
183 Johnston, 7. 
184 It is important to remember that, as Johnston underlines, actions that aim at maximizing status 
and relative power are not necessarily compatible, and actors have often to make trade-off between 
these desires especially in an era in which participation in international institutions that embody 
sovereignty-restraining norms has become one marker of status (Chayes and Chayes, 1996). 
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The accumulation of status markers becomes a drive towards pro-social behaviours. 
Quoting Johnston, “social influence therefore can be interpreted as a function of prior 
identification plus the desire to optimize the social rewards and minimize the social 
punishments bestowed by the group in the context of a relative fixed and 
unquestioned self-categorization and preferences.” Full internalization is not required 
for social influence to work, as Festinger summarizes when he describes the kind of 
compliance due to social pressure as: “public conformity without private 
acceptance”.185 Johnston calls “social influence” this second-order microprocess 
since, although existent interests (or preferences) maintain, these interests may 
become linked in ways they were not in the past and new means are put into practice 
to achieve that goals. Johnston offers a thorough analysis of social influence in his 
book, which is impossible to condense in few pages.  
Nevertheless, it is worth outlining social influence’s main features in order to clear out 
Johnston’s outstanding contribution to the study of regimes’ effectiveness. As Figures 
1.8 and 1.9 show, backpatting and opprobrium change cost-benefit calculus in a very 
different way from contractualist side payments and sanctions. The latter, whether 
provided by institutions or key players, have a constant effect on actor’s utility 
regardless of how many members cooperate, participate, “backpat” or shame.186 Vice 
versa backpatting and shaming have cumulative effect that depend precisely on how 
many others cooperate on the one hand, and backpat or shame, on the other hand. 
Backpatting is a benefit incurred from being seen as a co-operator or an active pro-
social member of a group. Thus, for every additional member of the institution, a 
potential defector receives a certain added payoff from backpatting as long as he 
cooperates. 
That is, side payments/punishments are not a social effect of the institution, so the 
audience size is irrelevant to them. On the contrary, backpatting and opprobrium are 
social effects only, and would not exist without the presence of, and interaction with 
the social group (which requires a-priori identity constructions); consequently, 
backpatting and opprobrium lose their impact outside a social group. 
                                                        
185 Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. 
186 Johnston 2008: 93 
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A broad theoretical implication of social influence is for collective action. Traditionally, 
scholars have argued that a critical solution to free riding is to offer 
material/reputational side payments and sanctions to make collective action pay for 
the individual. The conundrum has been, however, that offering side payments is itself 
a collective action problem. 
Usually hegemons or activists are reluctant to take the burden because of the well-
known danger of overstretching (especially when the group Is large, the collective 
good is joint, and verification of compliance unfeasible). According to Johnston, social 
rewards and punishments represent a particularly interesting kind of incentive 
precisely because they overcome collective inaction. They are relatively cheap to 
create (backpatting, after all, is nothing else that a mutual, virtuous circle of bestowing 
and receiving social cheers), but are often infused with a great deal of value.187 
 
Johnston cleverly notices that it is probably the widespread tendency to link 
internalization and socialization that have pushed constructivists to focus on 
persuasion over other microprocesses. Besides, persuasion is what really distinguishes 
(strong) cognitivists from neorealists and contractualists insofar represents the 
process of internalization of group norms and values that is largely built on the 
cognitive practices of argumentation, reflection, and acceptance of the “oughtness” 
of particular norms. Accordingly, persuasion is a microprocess whereby novices are 
convinced through a process of cognition that particular norms, values and causal 
understanding are correct and ought to be included in their own behaviour.188 It has 
to do with cognition and active assessment of the content of a particular message 
leading to common knowledge, epistemic conventions or to the homogenization of 
interests so that, in the end, the distance between actor’s basic causal understandings 
closes as a result of successful persuasion. It is considered the purest form of 
socialization, the more lasting and resistant, certainly the one which implies full 
internalization. How persuasion works is a focus of a great deal of research in 
communication theory, social psychology, and sociology.  
                                                        
187 Johnston, Social States, 2008, 152. 
188 Johnston, 25. 
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Based on all these contributions, Johnston derives that actors may be persuaded in 
three ways.  
First, actors can engage in a high intensity process of cognition, reflection and 
argumentation about the content of the new information. This is known as the central 
route to persuasion: the actor weighs evidence, puzzles through counter-attitudinal 
arguments and comes to conclusions different from those he/she began with. That is, 
the merits of the arguments are persuasive, given internalized standards for 
evaluating truth claims.189 From the work of Sniderman, Gibson and others, Johnston 
infers that the probability of some change in attitudes through cognition increases in 
an iterated, cognition-rich-environment (where there is a lot of new information that 
cues linkages to other attitudes and interests). Vice versa probability decreases if the 
initial attitudes are already linked to a larger, internally consistent “network of 
supportive beliefs”, particularly if these beliefs are about a high-threat group.  
Second, an actor is persuaded because of his/her relationship to the persuader; 
sometime this is called peripheral route. The persuadee looks for cues about the 
nature of his relationship to judge the legitimacy of counter-attitudinal arguments. 
Thus, information from in-groups is more convincing than that from out-groups’ 
informers. It is very interesting also to point out, as Johnston does too, that this line 
of reasoning might be used to support the idea that information coming from 
culturally recognized authorities (scientists, doctors, religious leaders) is more 
convincing than that coming from less authoritative sources.   
Third, the persuasiveness of a message may be a function of characteristics of the 
persuadee her/himself. This can refer to a range of variables from cognitive processing 
abilities, to the strength of existing attitudes, to what appears to be a deeply 
internalized desire to avoid appearing inconsistent, to the degree of independence an 
agent might have in relation to a principal.190 A focus on the characteristics of the 
persuadee means looking at the individual features that can either retard or propel 
persuasion. All this means that actors while entering a social interaction bring with 
them particular prior traits that, interacting with the features of the social 
                                                        
189 Johnston 2008: 156   
190 Johnston 2008:157 
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environment and other actors, lead to variation in the degree of attitudinal change. 
According to Johnston, what such theories seem to overlook (or to easily assume) is 
the empirical frequency with which social variables are indeed primary cues that 
people use to determine the degree of knowledge and trustworthiness of a persuader. 
Therefore, what we should ask ourselves according to the author is: is perceived 
identity between persuadee and persuader more likely to be used by the persuadee 
as an authoritative measure of the persuader’s knowledge and trustworthiness that 
other kinds of cues (e.g. external forces)?191 
Lupia and McCubbins found that external forces (instead of identity and ideology), at 
national level, are relevant in clarifying beliefs about knowledge and trustworthiness 
of persuaders. However, the answer might not be so determinative, if translated to 
the international context, since national political environments are rarely ones where 
persuaders and persuadees interact face to face over long periods of time: the 
familiarity/personal interaction route beliefs, about the persuader’s knowledge and 
trustworthiness tends to be less common, since messages from politicians are aimed 
at masses of voters.192 
This is not necessarily true at the level of social interaction in international institutions 
among diplomats, specialists and analysts. Here the first route – due to familiarity, 
iterated face to face encounters - may be definitively more common. Hence effects 
based on identity, culture and ideology may be more critical for persuasion than 
external forces and costly signals. Institutions, that are “light” in terms of external 
forces, nonetheless may be able to create conditions conducive to persuasion and 
convergence around group norms even though there are few material incentives for 
the persuader to deceive and few material costs for the persuadee to defect from the 
group.  
 
The study of regime consequences 
Our current understanding of regime “impacts” and its determinants is informed by 
at least three bodies of literature whose main contents and findings guide the 
                                                        
191 External forces are those conditions that make it difficult or costly for the persuader to hide 
knowledge (or the lack thereof) and trustworthiness. 
192 Lupia and McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma. 
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following section. (1) A first theoretical contribution to the study of regime effects, 
comes evidently from within Regime Theory where the topic has been traditionally 
framed in terms of “regime consequences”. On the one side, the rationalist-
institutionalist stream of RT has emphasized the importance of “exogenous” and 
“endogenous” factors in accounting for regime “outcomes”. While exogenous factors 
to international regimes encompass the distribution of power, the underlying 
cooperation problems (strategic dynamics, issue-areas, type of conflicts), and the 
institutional bargaining process; endogenous ones make reference to the institutional 
design and the programmatic activities promoted by the regime. On the other side of 
the RT spectrum, cognitivists have focused their attention on the way regimes modify 
states’ interpretations and identities with a special emphasis on those social 
mechanisms described in terms of learning and internalization (weak and strong 
variant of cognitivism respectively). These scholars have indeed supplemented 
rational factors (both exogenous and endogenous) with additional variables (ideas, 
knowledge, and identity).   
(2) A second relevant contribution given to the (also empirical) study of regimes 
consequences has been developed within specific issue-areas of IR studies, like for 
example environmental policy discourses. Mainstream environmental scholarship 
address “regime consequences” in terms of “regime effectiveness”.  Scholars from the 
field have devoted great attention to definitional and conceptual issues linked to the 
notion of effectiveness (especially with regards to the similar but not identical 
concepts of implementation and compliance) and they have a great deal speculated 
on how to measure effectiveness’ variation also by assembling extensive dataset (e.g. 
IRD Dataset, OSLO project). Throughout the last 15 years, these scholars researches 
have improved significantly their understanding of effectiveness, measurement 
opportunities and have made significant progresses by testing several hypotheses.193  
It is no coincidence that the majority of initial empirical studies published on the topic 
                                                        
193 Breitmeir et al., The International Regimes Database as a Tool for the Study of International 
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of regime effectiveness have examined treaties that regulate environmental 
problems. A first reason is linked to the dramatic increase in the number of 
environmental treaties of the past twenty years, that has indeed generated passionate 
interest among practitioners as well as academics. The proliferation of environmental 
treaties, would be consistent with the idea that insofar environment is a domain 
where sensitivity to relative gains-sensitivity is low, the related issue-area is conducive 
to copious and inclusive forms of international coordination. A second reason for the 
prolific production of works about environmental regimes’ effectiveness is an 
opportunistic one. Many of the most prominent environmental treaties are 
particularly appropriate for investigations over outcomes because it is relatively easy 
to identify clear-cut indicator for their success.  For example, emissions’ reductions 
(e.g. greenhouse gases, CFCs, SO2, or NO2), that follow more or less directly from the 
political consequence of treaties controlling emissions, are perfect effectiveness 
indicators because they are deterministically or at least probabilistically related to 
environmental and measurable impacts.194 
If on the one hand, this very special circumstance makes the study of a treaty’s 
consequences particularly unproblematic. On the other hand, any straightforward and 
explicit connection between a single treaty and the overall problem’s mitigation is far 
from being the general rule. For this reason, parallelisms between environmental and 
other types of treaties can’t be taken lightly.  
(3) Finally, a last but not less important theoretical and empirical contribution is the 
one offered by scholars who deal with International Law and International 
Organization’s performance at large (including institutional design; formal/informal 
organizations; hard/soft law; legalization and its components (Obligation; Precision; 
and Delegation))195. As already made clear elsewhere in the chapter, International Law 
and IOs (whether informal or formal) do not exhaust all possible regime-types, 
however conclusions holding for them are, with some precautions, reasonably 
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applicable to other forms of regimes (of which, anyway, International Treaties and IOs 
can constitute one of the major expression). Empirically, an ever-increasing number 
of cases have shown that at the centre of regimes there is usually a formal treaty – 
some time more than one - that becomes the heart of the cooperative regime itself (a 
framework convention). Treaty-regimes vary widely in subject matter, scope, number 
of parties and degree of specificity. They can be umbrella agreements for consensus 
building, or little more than statement of purposes. Some others may even contain 
detailed prescriptions for behaviour in a defined field (rules and decision-making 
procedures). 
The interest surrounding these tools is justified by the fact that they represent, at the 
least, some constitutive element of the regimes, if not the regimes in themselves, and 
are easier to identify compared to abstract (although more inclusive) approaches.196 
Furthermore, since the legal quality of regimes rules incorporated in treaties ends up 
being one critical source of regime variation and functioning, the use of law to 
structure regimes is believed to impact on their “work” as intervening variable 
operating between interests (however determined) and outcomes. 
Reflecting the centrality of these treaties, most discussions have focused on those 
instruments and their associated organizations especially when it came to the study 
of regime effects of states behaviours: law and compliance are conceptually linked 
because law explicitly aims to produce compliance legal rules should set the standard 
by which compliance is gauged.  
Implementation, compliance and effectiveness 
Although all linked to the study of regime consequences, effectiveness, compliance, 
and implementation are indeed very diverse phenomena.197  
“Implementation” is the process of putting international commitments into practice: 
the passage of legislation, creation of bodies (both domestic and international) and 
enforcement of rules. It corresponds to regime output.	
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“Compliance” has been defined as a state of conformity or identity between an actor’s 
behaviour and a specific rule.198 Implementation may be a critical step towards 
compliance but the latter can occur without implementation. This quasi paradoxical 
scenario materializes when governments or any regulated agency do not need to 
supplement any additional efforts to conform to specific norms. If an international 
commitment matches current practice, for instance, compliance is automatic and 
implementation superfluous. A slightly different example of a situation when 
compliance occurred because of reasons completely exogenous to the agreement is 
described by Raustiala and Slaughter. The authors show how Russia has produced 
perfect but coincidental compliance with many environment agreements after the 
Soviet Union collapsed only because a redefinition of borders vis-à-vis emission quota. 
Nonetheless, even if implementation is conceptually neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for compliance, in practice it can be potentially critical.  
“Effectiveness” has been defined in several ways. In Keohane’s words it is “the degree 
to which a rule induces changes in behaviour that further the rule’s goal.”199 According 
to Oran Young it is the capability to “channel behaviour [of states] in such a way to 
eliminate or substantially ameliorate the problem and achieve the policy objective of 
the treaty in question.”200 
In short, “effectiveness has to do with the contributions institutions make to solving 
the problems that motivate actor to create them.”201 While it is clear that all these 
definitions broadcast the idea that international regimes commonly emerge in 
response to particular problems (such as environmental deterioration, escalating 
tariffs, arms proliferation etc), operationalizing the concept is less straightforward as 
Aril Underdal has explained: 
 
“What precisely constitutes the object to be evaluated? Against which standard is the object to be 
evaluated? How do we operationally go about comparing the object to our standards; in other words, 
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what kind of measurement operations do we perform in order to attribute a certain score of 
effectiveness to a certain object (regime)?”202 
 
Scholars who have studied regime consequences have come to accept that there is 
more than one way to think about effectiveness.203 
(1) Less ambitious conceptions of effectiveness direct attention to what are often 
referred to as regime outputs that are regulations or infrastructure created to move a 
regime (for example and international treaty) from paper to practice. The problem 
with this strategy, that surely enhance a straightforward account, is that it ignores 
non-contractual consequences and tells little about problem solving.  
(2) A second approach is the one that would operationalize effectiveness in terms of 
outcomes (behaviours). These are changes in the political behaviours of actors 
relevant to the problem at hand (compliance-dependent notion derived from 
international law contributions).  
This approach would account for a legal definition and a political definition. The first 
holds that the measure of success (effectiveness) is the degree to which conflicts 
become regulated by the rule of law (implementation-like) and to which contractual 
obligations are met.  
For its part, a political definition directs attention to behaviours and behavioural 
changes. Effective regimes cause changes in the behaviour of actors and in pattern of 
interaction among them in ways that contribute to the management of the targeted 
problems. The strength of this approach is its firm connection to the real world 
through its emphasis on observable behaviour. Among its drawbacks the tendency to 
lose sight of the overall goal regimes are established to achieve. 
(3) More ambitious conceptions of effectiveness seek to assess regimes performance; 
basically, these approaches want to grasp the extent to which the regime solves or 
mitigates the problems that motivates its creation.  
Under this perspective, performance can be assessed both in relative terms (relatively 
to the probable course of events in the absence of the that treaty, that is the no regime 
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counterfactuals), and in absolute terms (with regards to a collective optimum).  One 
of the most appreciated operationalization of effectiveness/performance develops as 
it follows: 
 
 
 
 
AP = Actual Performance;  
NR = No-regime counterfactual and  
CO = collective optimum (204). 
The many advantages derived from the use of this formula and in particular from the 
“sensitivity of effectiveness score” (that is the derivative of effectiveness score with 
respect of actual performance) are well illustrated by Helm and Sprinz.205 However, 
evaluating effectiveness in term of problem solving also imply some criticalities.  
(1) The first and probably more intuitive reason why a “problem-solving” - based 
understanding of effectiveness can hardly reach empirical utility is the fact that 
regimes (even when formalized in one single international treaty) are complex 
endeavours with multiple objectives and gaols. Under this perspective, they can be 
performant in one direction but not in others (or event they can produce negative 
externalities that negatively impact on the overall objective). 
(2) Secondly, because most international problems, which are severe enough to lead 
to the creation of regimes, usually motivate actors to pursue solutions through 
multiple instruments, so that their solution may be provided by one or more of these 
collateral efforts. This makes it difficult to isolate the net effect of a single component 
(unless the hiatus between outputs/outcomes on the one side and impacts on the 
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other is very limited). Consequently what may seem an effective tool may be only an 
irrelevant sideshow.  
(3) The problem is made more acute by the fact that regimes (whether single treaty 
or complex networks of institutions) are by definition valued by issue-area. However, 
in real world, issue-areas are not neatly separated and  regimes “broader 
consequences” anything but uncommon. As pointed out by Levy, Young and Zurn, 
development in one issue are often have consequences for other issue areas that were 
not envisaged or intended by those who have commissioned or designed, in the first 
place, the regimes producing such effects. Equally important these scholars notice, 
regimes focus on specific issue areas affect not only other issue areas but also the 
broader or deeper structure of the international society as a whole because regime 
are linked by definition to the constitutive principles of international society (e.g. state 
sovereignty).206 
It is clear that if on the one hand regimes have broader effects than the ones envisaged 
by their architects (on other issue-areas, on inter-state relations and on the 
international society) and on the other hand problems can be solved by contributions 
produced by regimes regulating diverse issue issue-area, isolating the effect of a single 
regime with regards to the problem he was born to tackle become a challenging task. 
It would require specialists with a sufficient technical knowledge to move easily across 
the diverse issue areas potentially impacting on that problem. As well, new variables 
need to be developed to account for regimes broader effects (that can have synergic 
or detractive effects) on the problem under investigation or a common dependent 
variable to be used in formulating generalizable statements. That said, the growing 
functional differentiation in international society and interactive complexities may 
have made impossible (as one strand of social theory maintains) for policy-makers and 
analysts to confront the interconnected networks of effects produced by the 
concurrent  operation of specific regimes. 
(4) A third element of concern is that since all definitions of effectiveness imply some 
causal connections between the institution and the relevant change (legal, 
behavioural, or systemic – (problem solving)). Measuring regimes effectiveness 
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implies a comparison between what it is and what would have happened if the regime 
had never existed. 
 
“This would necessary require a demonstration of the causal links between the operation of the 
institution and the behaviour of the relevant actors. A regime that fares poorly in terms of simple 
before-and-after comparisons may look more successful when causal links and counterfactual are taken 
into account.”207  
 
The method of counterfactual has proven to be fruitful but questionable.208 The 
approach is based on a rigorous effort to reconstruct the flow of events, as it would 
have unfolded in the absence of the regime. The key of success in such endeavour 
involves framing counterfactuals as precisely as possible and delving deeply into 
behaviours of key actors at critical junctures. Under this perspective this research has 
tried to include a wide and thorough historical review in order to specify exactly what 
the initial conditions were, to look at decision-making process within regime 
members, to focus on important branching points where events might have taken a 
different course and to individuate if a different and how different path would have 
been followed if the regime had not existed. History matters because only by a 
thorough and complete analysis is possible to distinguish cases in which institutions 
made a difference from those in which it merely allowed external events to take their 
course.  
 
A final consideration concerning the relationship among the three concepts 
(effectiveness, compliance, and implementation). On the one side, case studies have 
shown that high political outputs do not necessarily lead to countries’ behavioural 
changes because rules may prove to be inadequate or simply be neglected. The same 
way, success under both previous quoted conditions (outputs and behaviours) does 
not guarantee progresses in solving the problem relevant to the regime. If an 
international commitment matches current practices, degree of implementation is 
high and compliance automatic, but effectiveness can still be very This is the case with 
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many international agreements that reflect modest goals and ambitions low (as it will 
soon become clearer).209 See Figure 1.10 for a prospectus. 
Rationalist and cognitivist perspectives on regime functioning and implications for 
the study of regime compliance and effectiveness 
 
In the late 1960s, Louis Henkin first published his notorious book “How nations 
behave: law and foreign policy.”210 He argued that nations behave largely in 
compliance with international law and treaties: “it is probably the case that almost all 
nations observe almost all principles of international law in almost all their obligations 
almost all the time.”211 
Henkin suggested that policy decisions respect for law structure in myriad ways that 
often escape attention because they are nearly “routine”. According to him this 
produces a selection bias that causes critics to focus on the rare case of non-
compliance rather than the overwhelming cases of compliance. Once acquired such 
an assumption of a general propensity of states to comply with rules, a question 
immediately springs to mind: why do states comply? 
 
A rationalist perspective 
 
 “A prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, where such fidelity would damage him, and 
when such fidelity would damage him, and when the reasons that made him promise are no longer 
relevant.”212 
 
While nowadays neorealists have come to recognize that states do not stop observing 
treaties obligations every time it stops being in their close interest to do so, the 
sentence quoted above broadcasts the “utilitarian” drive of rationalist justifications 
for Regime Compliance. Rationalists maintain that both states’ interest in reciprocal 
observation of a treaty’s norms motivated by material and reputational concerns are 
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to be counted in the trade-offs of costs and benefits on which cooperative decisions 
are based. 
Nonetheless, rationalists privilege methodological individualism and consequentialist 
choice in their studies.  Notwithstanding important differences between power-based 
and interest-based approaches, the arguments they raise to explain compliant 
behaviours build on common assumptions.  According to these scholars, states nature 
won’t be altered by the interaction occurring within the regime. 
 
“compliance is most often a game of altering strategies and behaviour only, with agents leaving a 
regime (or its institutional home) as they entered it. The underlying ontology is decidedly 
individualist.”213  
 
Consistently, rationalists envisage a cost-choice consequentialist mechanism for 
compliance to occur. Agents weigh up their actions in response to putative regime 
benefits or to threat of sanctions. Even in those instances where analysts concede that 
states interests are potentially changing (signalling/update beliefs variants) they argue 
that the change occurs slowly and as a function of new incentives structures the 
agents face (with states’ identities kept constant) 
These two assumptions contributed to erect a black box around the interaction 
context from which decisions about compliance emerge and to depict the role of 
language and communication in purely informational terms. 
It is true that the “institutional bargaining” addendum, which we analysed as 
borderline to rationalism, has always granted a central role to interaction. However, 
the interaction that leads to compliance is again understood as strategic exchange 
among egoistic and self-interested actors. Faced with material brute facts, bargaining 
agents make decisions around compliance on the basis of cost/benefit calculations.  
For rationalists, states’ compliance stems from: (1) instrumental calculations of 
interests214 (always), (2) coercion (sometimes), and (3) incentives, usually material but 
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possibly reputational as well – with the latter two basically acting upon the first (utility 
calculation). 
In line with the above, a state’s decision whether or not to conform to a treaty-regime 
is the result of the mere calculation of costs and benefit the implication is that non-
compliance is premeditated and deliberate violation of treaty obligation. 
 
A cognitivist perspective 
The first wave of cognitivists have focused on the later stages of compliance which 
come into play when the interaction with and internalization of norms was nearly 
complete. According to these scholars, at that late-stage of the process, compliance 
did not represent an issue of choice anymore and states’ behaviour was governed by 
a logic of appropriateness. 215  Scholars have then devoted their attention to specific 
mechanisms through which states comply with norms, namely social learning and 
social mobilization. And more recently,  studies have also started investigating how 
the normative message is internalized by states through the so-called microprocesses 
of socialization. 
Strong Cognitivism 
According to strong cognitivists regimes enjoy a constitutive dimension (and not only 
a regulative one). If the assumption holds true, it also poses a problem in term of 
“compliance”, because effectiveness cannot be assessed in term of overt compliance 
alone.216 Bringing the attention to the under researched precondition of constitutive 
role of regimes, strong cognitivists approach international cooperation problem by 
asking “how is cooperation between state possible?” and only later on “why do state 
cooperate?”. 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger have organized the contribution of strong 
cognitivists into 4 group. Contributions overlap here and there but are kept distinct 
according to the variable they consider as prominent in accounting for states 
compliance to regimes. 
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Some scholars call upon the power of “legitimacy”, some others refer to the power of 
“arguments”, and some more bank upon the power of “identity”. A last group mention 
“history”. The first three will be considered below. 
The power of legitimacy 
The first group of scholars, which include Thomas Franck and Andrew Hurrell as major 
proponents, rely on the notion that, at a fundamental level, states are dependent on 
the existence of a rule-governed international society.217 
They suggest that the degree of correspondence between the specific norms that 
constitute regimes and the broader normative structures underlying the international 
society strongly affects cooperative ventures among states (legitimacy). This group of 
scholars had indeed pull for renewing the focus on a normative foundation of 
international society, characteristically belonging to the so call English school.  
Strong Cognitivists, elaborating on the power of legitimacy in international relations, 
have taken the solidarity of states as a fact and assume a sense of we-ness,218 which 
would motivate governments to respect the fundamental principles and norms of 
international system/society. They argue that states all share a primitive and common 
interest in the survival of the society where the leave in. Such interest to large extent 
matches with self-interests, even though the latter cannot be reduced to the first. The 
interest in the system/society is justified by the fact that the pursuit of one’s individual 
interest as defined by rationalist theory presupposes statehood and statehood 
depends on membership in a functioning community of states.219 Since the breach of 
legitimate norms and rules is a potential threat to “the fabric of the community’s rule 
system as a whole”, the violation of such norms is conflicting with the interest of state 
in preserving the system/society itself. This unleashes a “sense of obligation” and a 
“compliance pull” for norms and rules .220 In other words, states would tend to comply 
even with temporarily inconvenient norms and rules (if legitimate) because acting 
                                                        
217 T.M. Franck, The power of Legitimacy Among Nations, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990 and 
A. Hurrell, “International Society and the Study of Regimes”, in Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and 
International Relations, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
218 B. Buzan, “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime 
Theory Meet the English School”, International Organisation, n. 47, 1993, p. 335. 
219 The stance is in sharp contradiction with Kenneth Waltz, who vigorously denies an interest of states 
in the system. 
220 T.M. Franck, The power of Legitimacy Among Nations, cit. 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 85 
opportunistically would involve the risk of undermining their own existence in that 
system/society in the long run. 
 
“ [..] states that need an international society have to respect the needs of this society. Among these 
needs, “pacta sunt servanda” is a key obligation because “no society can exist without the generalized 
confidence that obligations incurred its members are honoured”.221  
 
Ignoring this sense of obligation as an independent source of compliance, as realists 
do, produce a distorted picture of international relations.222 
Under this perspective not all the norms potentially inserted into a regime display an 
equal strength in terms of the compliance pull they raise with only norms and rules 
which are perceived by state actors as legitimate can be attributed a compliance pull 
on their own.223 Under this perspective regimes, which encompass rules that are 
considered as illegitimate, can be upheld only if positive or negative sanctions are 
attached. Legitimacy can be thus conceptualized in terms of a quality of prescriptions 
that make state actors abide by them voluntarily. This quality varies across norms and 
rules and, according to Frank, is dependent on four dimensions, which he refers to as 
determinacy, symbolic validation coherence and adherence. The concept of 
coherence refers to the interconnectedness of individual’s rules through higher order 
principles. Symbolic validation refers to the rituals of recognition that express the 
extent to which a given rule has taken root in the tradition of international society. 
Determinacy refers to textual clarity with which the content of a rule is communicated 
A rule has the property of adherence when it is validated by an infrastructure of rules 
that defines how rule are to be made interpreted and applied.224 
A legitimacy-based approach is illuminating when dealing with compliance issues but 
it shows a main problem that concerns empirical research: how is it possible to decide 
whether an observable tendency for states to comply agreed upon international rules 
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result from the working of a sense of obligation rather than from utilitarian 
calculations involving considerations of sunk costs or reputation? 
The power of arguments: the communicative approach 
This second group include comments and contributions from scholars as Kratochwil, 
Ruggie and Müller, interalia. 
The focus of the analysis is placed on the importance of the intersubjective meanings 
which characterize international cooperation. These scholars have investigated the 
communicative dynamics of rule-interpretation and rules-application practices which 
they regard as inseparable from international regimes. For scholars belonging to the 
“communicative-action” strand of strong cognitivism, regimes fundamentally depend 
on the success of practical discourse among states. 225 They hold that that 
communication in international relations serves to produce and maintain the 
convergence in expectations that regimes live by. 
Building on Jürgen Habermas thoughts and reflections, Kratochwil226 and Müller make 
a fundamental distinction between strategic action and communicative action as 
alternative mechanisms of social coordination. Strategic action is success oriented 
(consequentialist) and can be defined as a selection of means to control, in an efficient 
way, the social environment of actors so that they are induced to respect normative 
arrangements.  In a regime context, strategic action can take place and aims at keeping 
the behaviour of others in line with agreed upon norms and rules by establishing a 
system of positive and negative incentives. This is basically how rationalist analyse 
regimes. 
On the contrary, communicative action is oriented to mutual understanding and it 
aims at coordinating social behaviour by persuasive arguments. In this case behaviour 
is not coordinated by external incentives but by those common understandings of 
what a given situation requires social actors to do: “the only force that should prevail 
in such a discourse is the force of “better argument.”227 The objective of 
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communicative discourses is to convince the other participants of some position and 
to make them see things as one sees them by producing a common interpretation. 
Thus, strong cognitivists assume that in situation of power inefficiency and when 
complex issues are at stake, persuasion tends to replace compulsion as the medium 
policy of coordination.  
This line of reasoning has important implication in compliance’s studies. “Taking the 
power of arguments seriously sheds new light on the phenomenon that states often 
put up with apparent violations of agreed upon norms and rules, without engaging in 
sanctioning behaviour.”228 Confronting a prima-facie defection, states habitually ask 
the offender to provide reasons for having left up with its obligations. Subsequently, 
they evaluate the reasons that are offered by the violator in the light of principled and 
shared understanding of what regimes under consideration requires its members to 
do under certain circumstances.  The process may even lead the “surveyors” to accept 
that conforming to a particular injunction would have been unduly hard for the 
offender and that it could not be reasonably expected to comply in this situation.229  
On other occasions of apparent non-compliance, states may come to the conclusion 
that the rules under question need reformulating to continue to be in accordance with 
the original purpose of the regime.230 And on other situations, they may, on the 
contrary, reject justifications proffered and engage in some sort of sanctioning. 
Basically, this variety of reactions to instance of formal non-compliance with norms 
and rules indicates that: “what constitutes a breach of an obligation undertaken 
within a regime is not simply an “objective” description of a fact, but an intersubjective 
appraisal.”231 
Traditionally, the different responses to non-compliance are explained in two ways: 
on the one side, there may be no sufficient capabilities of the would-be regime 
defenders to take action against the violator or no sufficient willingness so that no 
actor wants to bear the costs of sanctioning (typical collective action problem).  
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Strong cognitivists instead offer new tools for analysis. Because states do not retaliate, 
it doesn’t mean they do nothing: a variety of possible reactions may be deployed as 
alternatives because what constitute a breach of an obligation undertaken within a 
regime is not simply an objective description but an intersubjective appraisal. So, 
principled and shared understandings, underpinning the norms and the rules at issue, 
are of paramount importance for the evaluation of actions. In a certain sense 
distinction between compliance and non-compliance turns out to be a communicative 
phenomenon.  According to these authors, international regimes are not objectively 
given set of principles norms and rules and procedures but are “the product of an on-
going process of community self-interpretation and self-definition in response to 
change context.”232 This makes normative arrangements essentially dynamic 
phenomena, which depend on evolving international discourses. 
In explaining success and failure of international discourses, these scholars underline 
the importance of two factors, one formal and one material. (1) The formal refers to 
a set of basic norms, which are considered constitutive features of the practice 
argumentations and have to be respected by the parties; (2) the material element 
instead, is the one that “links the success in practical discourse to the embeddedness 
of particular arguments in a framework of uncontested background knowledge 
concerning the right conduct of states in international relations.”233 
In other words, to engage in a communicative action as a mode of policy coordination 
requires that the parties respect certain basic norms of social interaction. Whenever 
they enter into the practice of arguments, they have to recognize each other as equal 
and they have to respect the binding nature of agreements based on good reasons. 
Under the condition that constitutive norms are respected, discourse between states 
can be described as an iterative process involving interpretation and evaluation of 
particular actions. Arguments are put forward to classify a move in a rule-governed 
context and claims are made concerning the legitimacy of this move.234 The more 
explicitly and the more clearly formulated the rules of international conduct in an 
issue-area, the easier is an intersubjectively shared specification of behaviour. 
                                                        
232 Neufeld, “Interpretation and the ‘Science’ of International Relations,” 55. 
233 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, 1997, 180. 
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According to Kratochwil, clarity enhances the compliance pull of rules, because “actors 
can no longer use ambiguities in formulations of rules to mask the regime adverse 
character of their behaviour.”235 The problem, however, is that a further specification 
of norms entails considerable costs. Overregulation seriously hamper smooth rule 
management.236 
These considerations lead theorists to conclude that agreed-upon dispute settle 
mechanism which operate on the basis of commonly accepted principles can be 
important safeguard the compliance pull.  
Müller has made a further and notable contribution to the communicative 
approach.237 He focused on the politics of compliance with inconvenient regime 
injunctions in three security cases: the challenge to the ABM treaty as a part of the 
strategic weapons nuclear control regime posed by the US government’s strategic 
defence initiative (SDI); the Soviet Union deployment of early radar in Krasnoyarsk; 
and the West Germany’s nuclear export control policies which was incompatible with 
the non-proliferation regime. 
In each case the government, influential parts of the administration or the military 
sought to implement measures or pursued policies, which would have violated or 
actually did violate central regime norms. Müller finds that regime proved to be a 
critical resource to those domestic groups, which wanted to oppose such measures by 
enabling them to get the upper hand in the subsequent controversy. And Müller 
concludes that “regimes exert pressure on governments, even on those with 
reservations about the regime: the sheer existence of regime puts an extra burden of 
proof to regime opponents”.  
In brief, three of Müller’s results are particularly noteworthy. First, he noticed that 
regimes themselves provide substantial barriers to non-compliance by virtue of their 
connection with both international and domestic law. Secondly, not only the regime 
defenders but also the proponents of policy change do not deny that the obligation to 
                                                        
235 Kratochwil, “Contract and Regimes: Do Issue Specificity and Variations of Formality Matters,” 84–
93. 
236 Chayes and Chayes, “On Compliance,” 1993, 189. 
237 Müller, “The Internalization of Principles, Norms and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security 
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keep treaties (pacta sunt servanda) exist and is strong. Finally, he shows that branches 
of a particular agreements are regarded as acceptable by the community of states 
provided that they can be justified with reference to shared higher-order principles 
which would be violated if the particular agreements were implemented. 
The power of identity: constructivism 
This perspective is provided for by Wendt and emphasizes the role of states 
identities.238 
In Wendt’s formulation, identities, are defined as “role-specific understanding and 
expectations about self”. Identities are at the same time constitutive of rational 
choices and shaped by the normative patterns of international politics.239 Needless to 
say, how much this interpretation may impact on compliance analysis of regimes. 
According to Wendt, actors’ conception of “self” and of the “others” as well as the 
actors’ understanding of their reciprocal goals are always in process during 
interaction. So, identities and interests can never be taken for granted. Scholars and 
practitioners need to constantly interrogate about their origins. 
In Wendt’s view identities cannot be defined in substantive terms and indeed are 
inherently relational. Thus it makes a great deal of difference for interaction whether 
an actor-state considers itself as a friend or a foe of its counterpart. Elaborating on 
this difference, Wendt develops two opposing ideal types which form the poles of a 
continuum ranging from positive to negative identification with the welfare and the 
security of other actors.   On the one hand, identities can be “collective”. Collective 
identities are “other-regarding” and the “other” is seen as a cognitive extension of the 
“self”. Under this perspective, actors respect each other as members of the same 
community. At the other opposite side of the continuum, identities are described as 
“egoistic”: “alter” is detached and separate by the “self”, becoming an object to be 
manipulated for the gratification of “self”. This second conception of identity 
underlines the rationalist interpretation. It is worth noting that Wendt do not deny 
cooperation among egoists but adds that an evolution of cooperation might lead to 
an evolution of community. Egoistic motivations may play an important role in early 
                                                        
238 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” 1992, 391–425; Wendt, “Collective Identity 
Formation and the International State,” 181–85. 
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stages of regime building but over time and with the proliferation of cooperation 
institutions in world politics the parties acquire a more “collective identity”: a process 
which “discourages free-riding by increasing diffuse reciprocity and the willingness to 
bear costs without selective incentives.”240 
To illustrate this “self-stabilisation hypothesis” of cooperation developed under 
anarchy, Wendt referred to the active discussion about European security institutions. 
After decades of cooperation the Western European states form a sort of “Deutschean 
pluralistic security community” (see next chapter for a deeper analysis). 
Wendt, Kratochwil and Koslowski derive the “self-stabilisation” hypothesis of 
international cooperation from a more encompassing theoretical framework that is 
constructivism.241 
Constructivism adopts a “systemic communitarian perspective” on international 
relations and focuses on social construction of world politics and state identities.242  
International behaviour is interpreted both as a consequence of knowledge (action 
presupposes knowledge) and as a modifier of knowledge (action create new situations 
which lead to a re-evaluation of traditional cognition). In other words, action and 
knowledge are mutually constitutive.243 
Behaviour is thus dependent on what the world appears to be (actors’ perceptions) 
and how individual states conceive their own role in this world (actors’ self-
understanding). These meanings are organised in overarching intersubjective 
structures which consist of the “shared understandings, expectations, and social 
knowledge embedded in international institutions”244 which embody them. At the 
same time interests are dependent on these structures. 
While socialization into intersubjective structures constitutes actors and form 
identities, at the same time it may happen that changes in these identities might (at 
least in the long run) transform structures and thereby modify international practices.  
                                                        
240 Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 386. 
241 The central tenet of this stream is that international reality, as well as the self-understanding of 
states and states’ international behaviours, is constituted by intersubjective knowledge.  
242 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” 1992, 393. 
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Such reorientation may drive the disappearance of interests related to the former 
structures and the emergence of new ones. To account for this process of 
transformation, Wendt argues that the distribution of knowledge which forms the 
basic structure of the international system basically depends for its existence on its 
reproduction in the practice of states. Only as long as this structure actually shapes 
international behaviours, can it be considered to be in existence. In this sense Wendt 
talks about the ontological dependence of structure over processes.  
Under this perspective, micro behaviours can change macrostructures.  
The emergency of collective identities strengthens the readiness of the actors to 
cooperate even in case where the dominant strategy of a self-interested actor is to 
defect. Additionally, the interplay of cooperation and identity formation might also 
trigger a sort of positive echo effect, which may even culminate in structural 
transformation.245 
Until recent, rationalist (especially functionalist) theories have prevailed in empirical 
regime analysis and cognitivists contributions have been used mostly as 
supplements/complementary addenda to interest-based approaches. Nonetheless, 
recent constructive analysis over microprocesses, like the one performed by Johnston, 
can have important implications for the study of regime compliance and effectiveness 
also from an empirical side. Functionalist tend to consider an efficient institution one 
that reflects the nature of the cooperation problem that determined regime’s 
formation in first instance. This thesis, as anticipated and better analysed further still, 
produces strong implications in term of institutional design (endogenous factors). For 
example, a PD-type problem requires information (monitoring) and sanctions. An 
assurance problem primarily requires reassurance information. The danger of these 
approaches lays in approaches that tend to identify inefficient institutional design the 
same way. 
Social theories introduce relevant (and sometime contradictory) insights to 
institutional design, especially when we look at the microprocesses through which the 
internalization reach completion. 
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Mimicking for example suggests that institutions where many members acting 
uniformly make the participation of novices (in the form of an initial non-conscious 
level) easier and simpler. Social Influence, as outlined above, suggests that backpatting 
and opprobrium are more likely to be at work when membership is large and franchise 
is equally allocated (so that there is no obvious source of information). This findings 
counter contractualist principles according to which, ceteris paribus, more actors 
make cooperation more difficult (collective action problems, problems of monitoring 
and punishment of defectors etc.). Additionally, social influence’s analysis suggests 
that majoritarian rules might be more functional since actor’s behaviour and 
consistency is on record, thus reinforcing backpatting and opprobrium. On the 
contrary, under a persuasion perspective, social environments particularly conducive 
for persuasiveness should share the following characteristics: First, novel 
environments, where actors are highly cognitively motivated to analyse counter 
attitudinal information, are extremely conducive ones. Persuasion is also extremely 
powerful when (1) persuaders are highly authoritative members of a small intimate, 
high-affect in-group to which the persuadee also wants to belong, (2) when the 
persudee has few prior ingrained attitudes that are inconsistent with the counter-
attitudinal message and when she/he is exposed to counter attitudinal information 
repeatedly over time. Consequently, when decision rules are based on consensus and 
an institution mandate is deliberative (triggering more cognitive evaluation) and when 
the issue is narrow or technical (authoritative role of members) persuasion is expected 
to be more effective. 
We see that social influence and persuasion mechanisms prompt different and even 
opposing indications regarding an efficient institutional design and, under this 
perspective, Johnston’s research raises more questions that the answers it provides 
us with. Other criticalities also emerge, from the need of a new definition of 
socialization that really fit International Relations framework to a deeper 
understanding of the mutual links between microprocesses (and between each of 
them and internalization). For a summary see Table 1.8 
Still Johnston gives an important message to scholars involved in international regime 
analysis: explanatory tests that ignore social context and social motivations in political 
behaviours are incomplete. The IR field needs to consider including sociological and 
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social psychological arguments about actors’ motivation and motivational change in 
the standard list of independent variables used for explaining regime effectiveness.  
The managerial approach 
A dated” but crucial contribution to the research on compliance and effectiveness is 
the one elaborated by Chayes and Chayes in between 1991 and 1995.246 The two 
scholars introduce a descriptive method, to which they add prescriptive overtone. 
They start from a propensity-to-compliance assumption (in line with Henkin’s 
statement) and argue that states have a “propensity to comply” with their 
international commitments. Foreign policy practitioners, as well, operate under this 
convincement. According to the authors, it would not be reasonable for decision-
makers to devote so many energies to treaty drafting, monitoring and negotiation 
unless they expect they (and especially others) will then feel constrained. 
In Chayes’ view, states’ propensity to comply stems from three factors: interests, 
norms, and efficiency. Regarding interests, the most basic principle of international 
law is that states cannot be legally bound except with their own consent. There is no 
need for states to enter in a treaty which does not conform its interest. Moreover 
important treaties do not present the state with a simply binary alternative, to sign or 
not to sign - long negotiation process can take years to complete, states can always 
introduce reservations, some of which really substantially change the content of the 
treaty provisions for those states (the concept is not dissimilar from Snidal’s 
“graduation” of the 2X2 PD-like situation). Accordingly, the process by which 
international agreements are formulated and concluded is designed to ensure that 
the final result will represent, to some degree, an accommodation of the interests of 
the negotiations states.247 Surely not all actors will be satisfied to the same extent and 
at the same time, maybe they won’t get gains in the same issue area (or at the same 
time) but certainly the states signing the treaty will have some benefits in 
participating. The authors here wed a functionalist models accepting that issue and 
time-linkages can change the utility calculations of state-actors. 
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Nonetheless the Chayes maintain that the structure of international system heavily 
affects negotiations accepting a neorealist framework as equally worthwhile. In their 
view, it is no secret that some states are more powerful than others and that “power 
let the United States to get its way most of the time in the negotiations over the post 
War II economic structure”. On the other hand, they admit that multilateral forum 
provides opportunities for weaker states to form coalitions and organize blocking 
position 
Finally they welcome the (weak) cognitivist supplement when they describe modern 
treaty making as a creative process through which the parties may also explore, 
redefine and sometimes discover their interests. It is at its best a learning process in 
which not only national positions but also conceptions of national interest evolve and 
change principally by creating the conditions for diverse national agencies and teams 
to work together and, more recently, by involving the greater public. Putnam has 
described the process on a two-level basis, making reference to the fact that starting 
from the end of the 1960s, negotiation processes tend to go on not only at the 
international level but more and more within each state involved.248. Such two level-
game in which the negotiations with foreign parties must eventuate in a treaty that is 
acceptable to interest domestic constituencies, is supposed to give some assurance 
that the treaty is based on considered and well-developed conceptions of national 
interest. Such an “optimistic” understanding of treaty-bargaining process has at least 
one main implication in terms of compliance and effectiveness.  
Compliance problems and enforcement issues should be likely to be manageable if 
the process leading to the treaty had been comprehensive, long and articulated with 
a practical eye to probable patterns of conduct and infractions. In other words, if 
issues of non-compliances are endemic the real problem is likely to be sought in the 
negotiation process itself maybe it didn’t succeed in incorporating a broad enough 
range of parties’ interests’ rather than wilful disobedience.249 
                                                        
248 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 427. 
249 Some have argued that states’ incentives (and interests) at the treaty negotiating stages may be 
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Probably crossing the ontological boundaries between rationalists and strong 
cognitivists, Chayes and Chayes maintain that interests can change over time, not only 
when the international system changes or the distribution of power of capacities and 
power changes. In their view, treaties must be able to adapt. Adjustment maybe 
accomplished by formal amendments or by adding a protocol (that are usually 
cumbersome processes) or by vesting the power to interpret the agreement in some 
organ established by the treaty.  A number of treaties establish authority to make 
regulations on technical matters by vote of the parties, usually by a special majority 
which are then binding on all, though often with the right to opt out. In other words, 
treaties characteristically contain self-adjusting mechanism by which can be and in 
practice are commonly adapted to responding to shifting interests of the parties. 
Chayes and Chayes place the second determinant of compliance in “norms” about 
which they align to constructivists’ stances. 
The third “propensity-to-compliance” element included in the analysis by Chayes’ is 
“efficiency” - which they describe in terms of “recalculation costs”. Since 
organisational decision-making is costly and actors seek to conserve resources for the 
most urgent and pressing matters, in the absence of convincing elements that 
circumstances have changed since the original decision, withdrawal from a treaty is 
not worthwhile. The alternative to recalculation is to follow the established rules. 
Compliance saves transactional costs and it is “efficient” from an internal, decisional 
perspective.  
Considerations about non-compliance 
In Chayes’ model compliance is not treated as “on-off” phenomenon. The example 
they make to explain the matter is  high way speed limit. Most communities are 
perfectly comfortable with situations in which the average speed in the interstate 
highways is perhaps ten miles above the limit. These limited and random violations do 
not threat the rule’s existence and validity.  As for national law enforcement with 
regards to speed limits violations, the problem with international norms is to agree on 
an acceptable level of compliance. The threshold cannot be seen as an invariant 
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standard. It may change over time and depend on different factors, for example the 
significance and the cost of the reliance that members place on other performances. 
Under this perspective, we expect treaties implicating national security commitments 
to demand the stricter compliance of participants because of high stakes and 
unforgiving nature of security consequences. The U.S emphasis on the importance of 
verifications of arms control agreement during the cold war is consistent with what 
above reported.  
According to the authors, it is verisimilar that treaty-regimes are subject to a “critical 
mass phenomenon” so that only when defection reaches a certain level, or in face of 
a particularly egregious violation by a major player the regime might collapse. Either 
the particular character of violation or the identity of violator may pose different 
threats to the regime and evoke different demand of compliances. 250   
According to Charles Lindblom, sine compliance is determined by state-interests 
which in turn are the result of an ongoing political process, they can also change the 
level of compliance accepted (which usually rise over the life of a treaty).251  
Formal organisation may serve as a focus for mobilizing the political impetus for higher 
level of compliance and as a forum for continuing negotiation among the parties about 
acceptable level of it. A strong secretariat can sometimes exert compliance pressure, 
as I already pointed out. 
Starting from a general propensity to compliance and from the assumption that a 
treaty-regime may tolerate a certain degree of non-compliance without its survival 
being menaced, it remains to be seen why state should decide to “not” comply with 
regime rules. 
According to rationalists, non-compliance is always intentional. Chayes and Chayes 
drawing from different sources identify four roots of “non-compliance behaviour” or 
“defences” (under lawyer’s perspective).  
Ambiguity. Treaties, like other canonical statement of legal rules frequently do not 
provide determinate answers to specific questions and treaty language may come in 
varying degree of specificity.252 The broader the language is, the wider the ambit of 
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permissible interpretation it gives rise. It is worth noting that exist many reasons to 
choose for a more general formulation over a precise regulation (political consensus) 
with perilous implications in terms of compliance: “the very meaning of a line in the 
law is that you intentionally may come as close to it as you can if you don’t pass it.”253 
Capability. Capacity consideration usually rise when the treaty involves 
active/affirmative obligations. By signing a treaty-regime the state should rapidly 
implement decree or legislations in order to prevent the single citizen to trespass, but 
establishing the proper legislation and (especially) enforcing a full blown domestic 
regime to secure the compliance is not an immediate, neither direct process for 
advanced nations with significant resources and can become an impossible task for a 
fragile and/or developing country which of course would necessitate accommodation 
because of already existing large deficit in financial technical and bureaucratic 
apparatus. 
The temporal dimension. Treaty-regimes are legal instruments regulating state 
behaviour for managing a major international problem area over time.254 Significant 
changes in social or economic systems mandated by regulatory treaties take time to 
accomplish.  If the regime is bound to persist over time indeed, adaptation to changing 
conditions and underlying circumstances requires a shifting mix of regulatory 
instruments to which state and individual behaviour cannot instantaneously respond. 
Often, the original treaty is only the first one in a series of agreements addressing the 
issue area.  
Not surprisingly the managerial school, to which Chayes and Chayes belong, takes a 
dim view of formal and even informal enforcement measures. Punishment is 
considered inappropriate because of the absence of any exploitative intent but it is 
also related to as too costly, too political and too coercive.  
 
“Retaliatory non-compliance often proves unlikely because the costs of any individual violation may 
not warrant a response and it cannot be specifically targeted, imposing costs on those that have 
consistently complied without hurting the targeted violator enough to change its behaviour.”255  
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This is the reason why according to Oran Young “arrangements featuring enforcement 
as means of eliciting compliance are not of much use in international society.”256 Since 
sanctions are more often successful against economically and political weak countries 
and unilateral sanctions can be imposed only by the major powers their legitimacy, as 
device for treaty enforcement, is deeply suspect.257 A recent publication on UN 
targeted sanctions (which covers 23 sanctions since 1991) seem to confirm this insight 
concluding that UN’s targeted sanctions are effective, on average, 22% of the time. 
When broken into the three types of mechanism they activate, researchers have 
observed that sanctions are much more effective by constraining (27%) and signalling 
(27%) than coercing (10%).258  
Chayes and Chayes also issue warning on the retaliation’s option because of the 
possible future costs it may entail: it may be dangerous to prejudice the possibility of 
support from the violator at some point in time in the future, when it may be needed. 
Managerial models address non-compliance as problems to be solved rather than 
violations that have to be punished. According to Chayes:  
 
“as in other managerial situations the dominant atmosphere is that of actors engaged in a cooperative 
venture, in which performance that seems for some reason unsatisfactory represents a problem to be 
solved by mutual consultation analysis, rather than an offense to be punished. Persuasion and 
argument are the principal motors of this process.”259 
 
The process works because modern states are bound in a tightly woven fabric of 
international agreements, organisations and institutions that shape their relations 
with each other and penetrate deeply into their economics and politics. “For all but a 
few self-isolated nations, sovereignty no longer consist in the freedom to act 
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independently following their perceived self-interest, but in membership and in 
reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of international 
life”. To be a player, the state must submit to the pressure that international 
regulations enacts. 
According to Chayes and Chayes, policy makers interested in increasing compliance 
level should concentrate their resources on: (1) improving dispute resolution 
procedures; (2) technical and financial assistance; and (3) increasing transparency. The 
latter is especially important “for a party deliberately contemplating violation, the 
high probability to be discovered reduces the expected benefits rather than increasing 
the costs and would thus deter violation regardless of the prospect of sanctions.”260 
 
Review of hypothesis over regime compliance and effectiveness 
This final paragraph attempts an appraisal of what make regimes more or less 
effective according to what reported above 
 As far as the ways regime work as intervening variables, diverse school have 
suggested, privileged and supported different mechanisms: 
 
Endogenous/exogenous factor contributing to regime consequences 
The theoretical debate over regime effectiveness has produced several hypothesis 
about the behavioural causal mechanisms through which regime reach their scope. 
Most of them, specified deductively and then elaborated through empirical 
investigations have been summarized before in the chapter. There is a general 
agreement on the fact that regimes achieve effectiveness by carrying out 3 central 
tasks (Haas’ Three Cs): (1) improving the contractual environment; (2) increasing 
concern; (3) increasing the capacity of governments.261 Nonetheless I have shown as 
different schools and diverse authorship have sponsored different mechanisms 
describing regime as (1) enhancer of cooperation (mitigation of collective action 
problems); (2) utility modifiers (issue-linkage); (3) bestowers of authority; (4) learning 
facilitators; (5) role definers (constitutive level) (6) agents of internal realignment.  
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When these mechanisms operate effectively, regime make use of endogenous facts 
(norms, rules, and procedures) to alter exogenous facts (pattern of influence and 
interests and behaviours of actors). As showed in the previous paragraphs much of 
the earlier contributions to the study of regime effectiveness had focused on 
exogenous factors. In a rationalist perspective, exogenous factors comprehend (1) the 
distribution of influence among participants; (2) the pattern of interests; (3) and 
structural constrains. Distribution of influence. There is a line of inquiry that examines 
how the distribution of influence among the participants affects the ability of an 
institution to succeed at its task. Generally speaking a concentration of power in the 
hands of one state acting as regime advocate is a desirable circumstance and tend to 
positively impact on regime consequences for at least two reasons. As I anticipated in 
a previous section, according to some scholars, the presence of a concentration of 
coercive power in a state that supports institutional goals is a condition a virtually 
necessary condition for institutional success.262 This conclusion is based on the 
argument that in situations characterised by mixed-motives, enforcement is required 
to prevent free-riding. According to other scholars a concentration of influence is 
required for institutions to be successful, but less coercive forms of enforcement are 
envisaged. This soft enforcement takes the form of a “leadership.”263  
Pattern of interests. The behavioural changes that international regimes seek to 
promote almost always have negative consequences for some sets of interests 
independently by the objectives the regime prosecutes. The configuration of those 
interests that end up being negatively affected by the institution can constraints the 
ability of international institutions to affect behaviour.  
Nature of the issue (benign and malicious contexts). Some institutions may do better 
than others because they operate in a relatively benign issue area. It is the case of 
those international problems marked by unambiguous shock and crises. Regarding 
arms control it is worth noting how the Cuban crisis opened up of a path towards non-
proliferation commitments. Similarly, even if the connection is not as direct as in the 
nuclear case, the widespread use of herbicides and defoliants in Vietnam War raised 
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the international demand for a biological and chemical weapons conventions.  
Another factor that can influence effectiveness positively is the availability to monitor 
the behaviour of relevant actors. Where such ability is high (and it is not the case of 
biological weapons), actors will be more willing to engage in mutual self-restraint, 
knowing that they will be able to detect violations on the part of others and respond 
accordingly. 
In a “strong cognitivist” ontology distribution of influence is still relevant although 
from a different perspective (leadership) and the presence of collective identities 
(versus self-oriented ones) assumes greater importance. 
 
Endogenous factors regard treaty-texts, and for this reason they impinge on 
effectiveness entirely through the way and in so far, they affect compliance. 
The search of endogenous factor is based on the assumption that there are good and 
bad ways of structuring international institutions formally and there are good and bad 
ways to administer them operationally. Getting the rules right, engaging energetic and 
creative secretariats, and initiating the right kind of programmatic activities may be 
crucial determinants of effectiveness. It is important to underline that according to 
Levy endogenous factors are “derivative” from interests and power capabilities of 
relevant actors (exogenous factors). Building on earlier empirical researches on 
effectiveness pertaining to environmental regimes (see Table 1.9), Levy et. al. classify 
endogenous factors in design features and programmatic activities on the other hand. 
(a) Design features. Scholars as Elinor Ostrom, Chayes and Chayes, Ronald Mitchell 
have all come to support the idea that an institution’s form shapes its destiny. They 
have identified factors as “ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language”264, “lack 
of participation provisions”265, “lack of monitoring and verification measures”266 and 
“lack of dispute resolution provisions”267 as main reasons of non-effectiveness. 
A number of authors interested in effectiveness have also emphasized the importance 
of the ways in which scientific and technical advice is institutionalised. Among them, 
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Edward A. Parson found that the design of the Montreal Protocol’s scientific and 
technical committees fostered the development of productive scientific consensus, 
creative problem solving, and lowered political posturing. Anyway, it is a widespread 
opinion that effective institution responses require organisational designs giving 
agenda-setting power to individuals who share a common, scientific approach to 
knowledge and problem solving.  
(2) Programmatic activities. Kay and Jacobson, Mitchell, Chayes and Chayes and many 
others list a number of operational factors that contribute to organisational success 
and, by the way, crucial (since missing) as far as the BWC discourse is concerned. 
These factors, which are expected to make far more effective regimes, include 
adaptability and flexibility, performance reviews, mixture of binding and non-binding 
instruments, professionalism (the absence of cronyism, patronage and corruption), 
and secretariat activities (including submitting questionnaires prompting specific 
government officials to provide the required information). More recently studies on 
rational design of international institutions have broadcast conjectures that highlight 
five key main dimensions of institutions: membership, scope, centralization, control, 
and flexibility (See Table 1.10).268 
 
Conclusions  
 
The first chapter has shown that the concept of international regimes has survived the 
passage of time and is today a central tenet of key schools of thought within 
mainstream IR devoting their attention to international cooperation (especially for 
those who have sought to undertake a more sociological direction). 
Yet, after diving into the burgeoning literature which cover regime definitional and 
conceptual issues, the chapter has also made clear that, notwithstanding several 
contributions and some improvement with respect to original definitions and 
operationalization procedures, the general approach remains worryingly vague and 
unstable. To escape conceptual tangles, most empirical investigations has sought to 
solve the issue by devising tighter definitions, drawn from an extremely abstract 
theoretical literature. In most cases, this has meant the use of stipulative taxonomy 
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and working approaches which still fail to broadcast social reality and unveil  
important limitations (limited attention devoted to soft law, informal networks and 
non-state actors; marginalization of nested regimes and contested multilateralism; 
downgrading of international practices and  inter-paradigmatic matters). Under this 
perspective, the present research has suggested to embrace a more grounded stance, 
firmly  committed to the social reality of practitioners’ intersubjective understandings 
and experience (in sociological parlance to the “participants’ standpoint”). Therefore, 
the analysis has made the case for a “grounded theory” of international regimes 
inspired by Chicago School of Sociology which will indeed inform the inclusion criteria 
for the regime’s individual components under consideration in chapter three. 
Consistently, the present approach builds on a broader definition of regimes that can 
accommodate diverse phenomena 1) internationally legally binding treaties and 
protocols; 2) networks of states that have succeeded to endorse formal policy 
agreements and non-binding policy initiatives; 3) multilateral forums of discussion and 
other informal channels producing explicit actions to address specific issues around 
which states have raised concerns.  
 
The second section of the first chapter has taken into exam the three main schools of 
thought that have shaped the theoretical and empirical research around international 
regimes (namely power/interest/knowledge- based models). Building on a solid and 
prolific literature on the topic, the chapter has investigated the metatheoretical 
orientation of the three schools and thus framed their contributions within 
mainstream IR theories (neoliberalism, neorealism, and constructivism).  The 
differences among power, interest and knowledge-based approaches has been 
measured across multiple dimensions (key explanatory variable, epistemology, 
ontology, behavioural models of players, specific requisites and working mechanism 
for regime formation, regimes’ prospective effectiveness and resilience). Besides 
mainstream contributions, other precious addenda are included in the analysis 
(institutional bargaining, epistemic communities, socialization microprocesses). The 
main advantages, limitations and enduring problems of existing stances (especially 
linked to their value for empirical investigations) are also considered and scrutinized 
in this section as the effort to formulate an inter-paradigmatic synthesis has also been 
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described. The analysis has shown that power and interests-based approaches can be 
valuably integrated by “contextualized-rationalist theory”. According to this 
perspective, context accounts for variables (both at the systems and unit level of 
analysis) that influence the strategic environment where decisions are taken (strength 
of relative gains over absolute ones).  The analysis has also demonstrated that 
rationalist models can benefit from incorporating weak-cognitivism variables, namely 
“ideas” and “knowledge” either causally prior or posterior to rationalist ones. Along 
the same lines, recent contributions aimed at investigating the microprocesses of 
socialisation, the so-called “strong” variant of cognitivism, seem able to incorporate 
also typically social mechanisms (mimicking and social influence) without calling into 
play processes of full internalization that would be incompatible with rational models. 
By refusing the positivist theory, which informs realist and neoliberal approaches, and 
by making totally different assumptions regarding the actors and their 
interrelationships than the ones rationalists make, strong cognitivist adopt 
epistemologies and ontologies that are de facto intrinsically diverse from rationalists. 
Nonetheless, as it is the case for International Relations as a discipline,269  Regime 
Theory would hardly benefit from “academic sectarianism” that most probably fuel 
self-affirming research and wage unfruitful debates. The critical analysis of pros and 
cons of the three main approaches and their corollaries have rather shown that no 
one earn “hegemony” and all variables deserve attentions.  Thus, the present works 
weds a communicative dialogue with the three schools within Regime Theory. 
Diversities of theory and methods seems necessary at this stage of intellectual 
development, not only to get to contingent and mid-level explanations for specific 
phenomena, but also to reach a better understanding of real problems of world 
politics. 
 
The conclusive part of the chapter is dedicate to regime consequences. The section 
tries to provide some guidance for reasoning on regime effectiveness and its 
determinants in general and analytical terms building on three bodies of literature (RT, 
Environmental Policy, International Law/Governance). It offers an inclusive 
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conceptualization of the notion (as separate although almost probably influenced by 
implementation and compliance), examines how the topic of effectiveness has been 
addressed in IR literature and beyond, introduces several analytic tools (output, 
outcomes, impact, vs. process performance), and explains the trade-offs associated 
with each measurement’s choice. More specifically the analysis sees in the broader 
(and cross-issue areas) effects of regimes and in the interactive complexities of current 
international relations what makes a full assessment of effectiveness (in terms of 
problem-solving) inevitably deceptive. Under this perspective, this work privileges’ a 
multi-layered/complex definition of effectiveness.  Finally, the chapter has 
investigated the causal bases of effectiveness and review main hypothesis about the 
behavioural mechanisms through which regimes operate. A special consideration has 
been assigned to constructivist accounts and to the microprocesses of socialization, 
especially because recent empirical studies on microprocesses have been developed 
with regards to security institutions. The section finally tries to isolate and organize, 
from within the dense scholarly production on the topic, those determinants of 
effectiveness believed to be associated with positive/negative regime outcomes 
(exogenous, endogenous, and dynamic factors). 
Persistent challenges haunt the study of regime effectiveness and the road ahead is 
long especially if researchers aspire to move beyond structured and focused case 
studies towards more generalizable findings. 
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Chapter 2: Non-proliferation regimes and the Securitization of Health 
 
“Cooperation under the security dilemma” 
 
Main problems of state interaction in security-driven  contexts 
The lack of any authority which can successfully uphold the claim of a legitimate use 
of material forces has several implications for states’ behavioural outcomes in the 
international arena.270 In the international system, the term anarchy is employed 
precisely to describe the absence of one (or more) central agencies which can 
guarantee the correct circulation of truthful information, ensure the enforcement of 
promises and provide protection when the later are betrayed. International anarchy 
not only permits war to occur (working both as a permissive factor and/or a positive 
and independent induce)271 but more in general “makes it difficult for states to 
achieve the goals that they recognize as being in their common interest.”272 The latter 
(and undesirable) situational outcome often takes place even when external 
conditions seem favourable to mutual collaboration, or when states are satisfied with 
the status quo, or even when attempts are made to stabilize and arrange possibly 
existing coordinative/cooperative drives. Jervis is clear in catching the dilemma which 
lies behind international cooperation: “Because there are no institutions or 
authorities that can make and enforce international laws, the policies of cooperation 
that will bring mutual rewards if others cooperate may bring disaster if they do not.”273  
Anarchy by generating what international relations scholars often referred to as the 
two (interrelated) problems of “commitment” and “private information” can induce 
states to overstate their (or others’) claims and/or resolve making the development 
of reciprocity-driven dynamic more difficult. 
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Unrequited cooperation is particularly “frightening” in the realm of national security 
because stakes are higher (up to the very existence of states/players) than in other 
issue areas with potentially dreadful consequences in case of miscalculation.  
This chapter addresses exactly the problem of international cooperation in relation to 
security studies and, more specifically, tries to figure out whether and in which way 
the concept of regime can be applied with acceptable reward to issues of national 
security, as well it speculates on the analytical framework that can provide the more 
insightful contribution.  
 
As explained in the previous chapter, three schools of thought have traditionally 
characterized regime theory (interest, power, and knowledge-based approaches). 
These schools depart from different assumptions over regimes’ formation and 
attributes, and reach diverse conclusions concerning regime effectiveness. 
Nonetheless, as already explained consensus exist on the fact that regimes (however 
defined) work as “intervening variable standing between causal forces (interests, 
power, ideas – depending on the approach) on the one hand, and outcomes and 
behaviours, on the other hand.”274 When connections between outcomes and causal 
forces (which inform states’ preferences) are indirect, some room exist for institutions 
to restrain and regulate states’ behaviour. Research (deductive/inductive/empirical) 
in both security and non-security areas have shown that these connections (between 
power/interests/ideas and outcomes) are more direct in the security arena than they 
are in other issue-areas, implying that the room for manoeuvre which security regimes 
do enjoy, in order to influence states behaviours, is a very restricted one. This outcome 
can be explained by the fact the two typical problems linked to anarchy in the 
international system become more acute. 
Normally the problem of private information develops because, in the absence of an 
international authority to force states to reveal their true capabilities, intensions, and 
preferences, states have all the incentives to overstate their resolve and capabilities 
during a diplomatic or military crisis.  Likewise, due to the absence of a protection 
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provider states must fear that any diplomatic agreement they reach with a 
counterpart (for example to stave off a war) might be violated at some point in the 
future when the counterpart is in a position to be deadlier or more demanding 
(problem of commitment). 
Scholars have identified a set of typical, or at least typically prominent, features that 
are responsible for making the problem of private information and commitment more 
acute and consequential in the security realm and for making 
cooperative/coordinative outcomes so difficult to be achieved and maintained in the 
security arena: (1) Relative gains dominated strategic situations and related 
interaction model; (2) Security Dilemma; (3) High Stakes 
(1) Relative gains thinking can inhibit cooperation in two ways: by limiting the range 
of viable cooperative agreements (because states will disregard deals that provide 
greater benefits to others) and by changing states’ incentives. The impact of relative 
gains over states decision has been widely studied. What is relevant to point out here, 
however, is that when dealing with security concerns, states tend to show higher 
sensitivity to relative gains. According to Grieco’s interpretation of political realism, 
which was introduced in the previous chapter, a states’ utility function should 
incorporate two distinct terms: a payoff “V” which reflects absolute gains motivations, 
a term integrating both a state’s individual payoff and the partner’s pay off “W”, and 
a coefficient of sensitivity to gaps in payoffs (either to its disadvantage or advantage). 
One function he finds useful to describe this realist understanding of state utility  is U 
= V-k (W-V), in contrast with neoliberal theory compatible function of  U = V. 275 
Since military power meets its test when states engage with each other, security-
related issues have been  considered substantively “relative” in nature so that security 
considerations themselves are bound to lose much of their relevance when measured 
in absolute terms. 
Security policies tend to frankly modify the distribution of power among states and, 
for reasons that are easily understandable they involve a greater and more direct 
competitiveness than other relationships which sates can enjoy in the international 
settings (for example economic or the environment related). In a trade regime, if a 
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state decides to free-ride (or cheats) leave the others worse-off than they would have 
been in the case mutual cooperation had occurred (no cheating). But those “worse-
off” states can nonetheless achieved some good profits (higher than the ones they 
would have made if cooperation, even if unrequited, had not occurred at all). In other 
words, in economics, the fact that a state in the group cheats on its commitments 
does not automatically make the others regret their decision to cooperate.  
On the contrary, in the security realm, “one’s gains are the others’ losses.”276 In other 
words, in the security arena, there would be no room for the type of egoist/negative 
altruist states that are described by Keohane. Negative altruists’ only aim is the one 
of maximizing their absolute gains and they are mutually uninterested and insensitive 
to another player’s performance. Grieco translates these understandings by 
envisaging a coefficient accounting for a state’s sensitivity to relative gains (k) when 
he contends that: 
 
“the level of K will be greater if the issue involve security rather than economic well-being; if the if the 
issue involves security rather than economic well-being; if the state's relative power has been on the 
decline rather than on the rise; if payoffs in the particular issue-area are more rather than less easily 
converted into capabilities within that issue-area; or if these capabilities and the influence associated 
with them are more rather than less readily transferred to other issue-areas” and again “k will increase 
as a state transit from relationships in what Karl Deutsch termed a ‘pluralistic security community’ to 
those approximating a state of war."277 
 
It is worth here to make a couple of very important qualifications. On the one side, it 
need to be underlined that the relative gains hypothesis applies also to economy as 
well as security (although less directly). Snidal is clear in explaining why. In part, he 
writes, this is because economic gains can ultimately be transformed into security 
gains, so that in the long run, security and economics are inseparable. In part because 
there are domains (pure mercantilism and economies of scales) that present states 
with incentives to interfere in other states activities; in these situations, relative gains 
thinking would occurs directly in economics (independently of security 
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considerations). On the other side, although relative gains-related problems make 
cooperation more difficult with regards to security concerns, they do not totally 
prevent the possibility of its development (as it has been explained in the previous 
chapter and will be further detailed below).  
 
(2) A second key feature hampering security cooperation/coordination is represented 
by the “security dilemma”. The concept was first proposed by John Hertz in the 1950s 
and describes how self-help strategies - which guide the behaviours of states acting 
under a condition of anarchy - can fuel conflict and, in particular, boost arm race.278 
The “security dilemma” statement assumes that many of the policies adopted by 
states in order to increase their own security automatically and accidentally decrease 
the security of others. The situation is clearly very different in the domestic arena. In 
practical terms, within national boundaries, there are various ways to increase the 
safety of one’s person and property without endangering others’ possession. As Jervis 
explains, if one wants to feel more secure, he/she can simply move to a safer 
neighbourhood or put bars on the window. These measures may not be convenient 
nor cheap, but no one, save criminals, need to be alarmed if a person relocates. In 
international politics, however, “one state’s gains in security often inadvertently 
threatens others”.279 One of the examples that Jervis brought about to elucidate this 
specific condition, is the British policy on naval disarmament during the inter-war 
period (especially in the 30s). United Kingdom made the Japanese feel apprehensive 
and anxious concerning the British’s intentions, even though Ramsey MacDonald 
expressively said that “nobody wanted Japan to be insecure”. China and South Est Asia 
makes a contemporary case. Many countries identify China as a powerful state rising 
to  a great power status. China on its side, sees the US as the most powerful state, and 
a one that may be willing to diminish China’s regional influence also throughout its 
allies in the area. In this context, Japan that is technologically more advanced than 
China and a country with which China shares a history of enduring conflict, as well as 
many South East Asian states, conspicuously increased their defence spending  (in 
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particular Singapore and Thailand). Under this perspective, for China the 
modernization of  its military capability is a prudent and defensive step given the 
uncertainty of its region, however is a move that makes its neighbours nervous and 
more prone to prepare for conflict. 
When it comes to security-related decisions, a state may seek arms to threaten other 
actors, not only if aims at changing the system in its favour (and actually engage 
warship) but also in those cases where the only wants to ensure that the status quo is 
not altered to its detriment (defensive realism). Although having nothing but the best 
intentions, the decision to increase military expenditures and arms production may 
be in any case perceived as an aggressive one in fact oriented to an active 
pronouncement towards status quo overturning. The problem appears less severe in 
non-security matters, where states may prepare for the danger that others will seek 
to take advantage of its restraints, without automatically impacting on others’ affairs.  
States may get protection in ways that not necessarily threaten or menace others, for 
example by purchasing of insurance.  
(2.1) The offence-defence theory by Jervis helps deciding over the intensity of the 
“security dilemma”.280 Indeed the problem becomes more or less acute according to 
how defensive and offensive security measures are characterized. More specifically, 
the issue mainly depends on (a) whether (and to what extent) offensive measures 
differ from defensive ones, (b) the capacity which states’ intelligences and secret 
services have to appreciate such differences (intelligence and technology), and (c) the 
relative might of offensive and defensive tools.  If defensive measures are both distinct 
and powerful, individualistic security policies will be relatively less threatening for 
others states and consequently cheap, safe and effective. When offensive and 
defensive weapons and policies are indistinguishable, and when attacking is more 
effective than defending (which, I want to anticipate, is exactly the case of 
bioweapons), the security dilemma is more intense and there is a great need of 
cooperation inducers/catalyser like regimes for the cooperation to be successful. 
According to Jervis, the technical capability of a state and its geographical position are 
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two essential factors in deciding whether offensive and defensive actions are more or 
less advantageous.  
(2.2) Even when offensive and defensive strategies greatly differ one another, 
uncertainty around other intentions survive. Detecting what other states are doing 
and measuring one’s own security are difficult skills. In other issue-areas this is not 
necessarily the case: it is not essentially problematic to evaluate tariff increases, 
monetary manipulation or illegal fishing. Of course, also these activities can be 
disguised, but they are in general more transparent than military laboratories. This 
reasoning also applies to the effect produced by specific state behaviours; while in 
non-security areas, outcomes may not be completely clear they are usually clearer 
than analogous military activities. Under this perspective, according to some scholars, 
security issues pose a further problem linked to the fact that they enjoy a very 
subjective dimension. No states can predict how much security other states require 
to satisfy their own needs or can hardly predict how much other players are 
predisposed to see others as adversaries or potential allies. Decision-makers act in 
term of the vulnerability they feel, which can differ from the actual situation. This line 
of reasoning involves two dimensions. First, even if states agree about the objective 
situation (and it is not frequent), they may probably differ about how much security 
they desire – or about the price they are prepared to pay in order to gain increments 
of security. The second dimension refers to the acuity of threats that the states 
perceive, this is the estimate of whether the other will cooperate.281 
 
(3) A third peculiar element of security interactions (compared to non-security ones) 
is that they imply higher stakes when cooperation is left unrequited. This is due to a 
combination of factors.  
(3.1) On the one hand, security is understood as a prerequisite for “so many other 
things” that it is indeed valued as a primary/pilot objective in itself. Consistently, Bull 
identifies three goals for his international society that are elementary and primary: 
(1a) preservation of the system and the society; (1b) independence of individual 
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states; (1c) peace, which is, however subordinate, to society and system preservation. 
With reference to the second one  (independence or external sovereignty) he 
articulates:  
 
“from the perspective of any particular state what it chiefly hopes to gain from participation in the 
society of states is recognition of its independence of outside authority, and in particular its supreme 
jurisdiction over its subjects and territory. The chief price it has to pay is recognition of like rights to 
independence and sovereignty on the part of other states”. 282 
 
Interestingly enough, the freshly nominated Prime Minister Winston Churchill shortly 
before his country entered the Second World War spoke in the following terms:  
 
“You ask, what is our policy? I will say: it is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with 
all the strength that God give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark 
and lamentable catalogue of human crimes. That is our policy. You ask what is our aim? I can answer in 
one word: Victory. Victory at all costs - Victory in spite of all terror – Victory, however long and hard 
the road maybe, for without victory there is no survival”.283 
 
(3.2) On the other hand, stakes are high with regards to security issues because of the 
“unforgiving nature” of the security arena. “Temporarily falling behind others may 
produce permanent harm”.284 Indeed even if the other problems above discussed 
were solved in a specific moment, in security relations, incentives to defect tend to 
survive extant cooperation, because the temporal dimension violently intrudes (in 
terms of a fear for the future evolution of inter-states relationships).  Even if states 
can accommodate their divergences in a specific moment, it is hard to predict how 
they world would look like in the future rendering it difficult for states to bind 
themselves (and their successors) to the same fixed path.  
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In conclusion, empirical evidence has shown that decision makers usually act and react 
first and foremost by unilaterally driven behaviour rather than by going for 
cooperative solutions when they confront security relevant challenges:  
 
“usually statesmen think that they should play it safe by building a position of own strength without 
seriously considering that such a policy will increase the risk of war instead that lessening it (e.g. arms 
race).”285  
 
Regardless of what inform security decisions (states unawareness of security 
dynamics or misperceptions of other behaviour), the latter usually fuel insecurity 
dilemmas and of course reinforce the reliance on unilateral solution rather than 
cooperative arrangements. 
 
Perspective for cooperation 
Notwithstanding the dismal picture unveiled, the twentieth century was marked by 
the proliferation of security regimes of any type. This paragraph tries to explain why 
by summarizing the major contributions pertinent to the present discussion. 
The fact that cooperation in the security realm have become possible (and even a 
valuable alternative to self-help strategy) was already under examination when Jervis 
published his “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” in 1978. The basic idea 
informing the article was the fact that states are not as vulnerable as human beings 
are in the Hobbesian state of nature. 
(1) In other words,  since international life is not as “nasty, brutish and short” as human 
life is, the cost of being exploited may be tolerated by states temporarily, without their 
immediate annihilation.286 This substantial resilience implies that, even in PD-like 
situations, if an actor cheats the play, the game is not necessarily finished with that 
move. Consequently, in a condition of uncertainty, Jervis noted that each actor in the 
system did not have necessarily to immediately defect out of fear that the other will, 
but can wait and see what the other will do. 
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In a human-led stag hunt (see below), the failure to eat that day means that the player 
will starve. Consequently, the poor guy will be likely to defect even if he really like 
stags (over hare/rabbits) and even if he has a high level of trust in his colleagues. By 
contrast, states do not starve in one day, and consequently they can afford to take a 
less dramatic view of threats. Even the ultimate and greater cost of CD (loss of 
sovereignty) can be mitigated when the adversary is a state with compatible 
ideologies and the two are ethically similar.287  
A relatively acceptable cost of being exploited (cost of CD) has the effect of 
transforming the game from one in which both players make their choice 
simultaneously to one in which an actor can make his choice after the other has moved 
– in other words bring reciprocity in. The opportunity to reciprocate that changes the 
calculus of preferences. The “relatively tolerable” costs of CD buy states an amount of 
time and space where regimes can intervene and make some stable cooperation still 
possible. Interestingly enough, this analysis brings in a salient consequence: the less a 
state is (or perceives itself) as vulnerable, the more it will be prone to take the risk of 
cooperation.  
Because individualistic actions are not only costly but also dangerous, regimes could 
be an exceptionally valuable tool in the security arena. According to Jervis cooperation 
is possible in either of those cases in which the costs of risk of individualistic security 
policies are great enough to provide status quo powers with incentives to seek 
security through cooperative means, and the dangers of being taken by surprise by an 
aggressor are not so great as to discourage the states from reliance on joint measure. 
(2) If on the one side the study international cooperation (problem of commitment) 
in general and of political institutions, in particular was beneficially influenced by the 
PD game model, scholars rapidly realised that in factual world scenarios there were 
limits to its applicability. Already in the previous chapter, it has been explained - by 
using Snidal account - how the problem of relative gains is mitigated in the case of real 
problems (versus heuristics like a pure PD-like game)  in particulars with regards to 
the occurrence of (1) multidimensional and complex preferences (graduation);  (2) 
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multiple players (or asymmetries among players), (3) reiterated interaction (discount 
rate).288  
(3) Furthermore, beyond cooperation under a PD-scheme also called, in Snidal’s 
terminology, the problem of assistance, other collective action problems can be 
identified in the security realm which are potentially more prone to cooperative 
outcomes: coordination, suasion, and assurance.289 It was already clear back in the 
early ‘80s that different histories, contexts, underlying strategic situations could vary 
at a great length (especially across issue areas). Nonetheless the impact of such 
differences, in terms of regime variation they implied, was generally less understood. 
As Snidal noticed in 1984, this “delay” was attributable to the fact that a particular 
model of interaction (the Prisoner’s Dilemma indeed) come to be treated as “the” 
problem of collective action.290  
Actually, two years before in 1982, Stein had structured cooperation issues in two 
macro categories: (1) The “dilemma of common interest”, which included PD-like 
situations, where independent rational decision making lead to suboptimal outcomes 
(this is what the author properly defines as a “collaboration problem”, for example 
the provision of collective goods and/or non-proliferation efforts). (2) And, secondly, 
the “dilemma of common aversions”, that occurs when actors have interest in 
avoiding a particular outcome (which are de facto “coordination problems”). Such 
coordination problems were then classified in those in which players have no 
preference between coordination points, and those in which players have divergent 
preferences between coordination points.291 Building on this first insight, Snidal 
analysed the great diversity of problems of international cooperation and the 
institutional (regime) variation which is likely to result from there. He described the 
different strategic structures (in particular PD versus Coordination) and the different 
contextual variation (graduation, multiple players, asymmetries, time) within strategic 
structures as well as the important consequences for regime characteristics the 
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differences imply. In his view, there is no ontological difference between the two 
problems apart from those pouring from the relaxation of the relative gains 
hypothesis.  
In prisoner’s dilemma, the rational pursuit of self-interests leads to a solution that is 
not pareto-optimal. States benefit by setting up institutions and rules to control the 
competition among them. However, even when cooperation is established, the risk of 
cheating does always exist since the best option for each player corresponds to a “DC” 
outcome (defeating while the other cooperate). In brief, there is no solution that is in 
the best interests of all participants: there are offensive and defensive incentives to 
defect from the coalition with the others and the fear of being exploited (that is the 
cost of “CD”) most strongly drives the security dilemma (see Figure 1.1). 
The incentives for establishing such a regime, and the obstacles to so doing are 
especially great in the security arena because of the “security dilemma” (as explained 
in the first paragraph of the present chapter). 
According to a functionalist perspective, Prisoner’s Dilemma-like situations which 
involve security dynamics, in order to be successfully addressed, require the 
collaboration to be mediated by very specific regimes which define proper standards 
of cooperation (e.g. clear-cut injunctions that specify/clarify behaviours that are 
illegitimate under the regime are compulsory). Furthermore, high degree of 
formalization is a desirable attribute of these types of regimes. They should involve 
international organizations to collect and disseminate information, to reassure the 
partners about other actors’ compliance with the central provision of the regime and 
provide a way of ensuring that cheating is visible and some punishment dispensed. 
Coordination (battle of sex) regimes have sometimes been considered less useful (if 
compared with more confrontational approaches) in order to explain security 
dynamics. This perspective has been challenged by Knopf, with specific reference to 
non-proliferation regimes (see chapter three).292 Notwithstanding the fact that 
treaties to control WMD have been frequently addressed as cases of collaboration 
(PD-like situations),293 the author argues that both the NPT and the other nuclear arms 
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control treaties of the Cold War seem to better fit under the rubric of coordination-
games models. Nonetheless, Knopf maintains that albeit departing from within a 
coordinative framework, non-proliferation regimes are moving towards higher degree 
of collaboration among their members. 
Knopf recalls Stein’s taxonomy according to which coordination would be required 
when states want to avoid a particular bad outcome (including not spending the night 
together in the battle of sex or the car crash outcome in a game of chicken), but do 
not need to jointly settle their actions beyond that. Collaborations games, in contrast, 
materialize when states have to specify more concretely that they will take joint 
actions to ensure a particular good outcome to materialize (such as how to achieve 
the CC payoff in the PD). Under this perspective, Knopf argues that non-proliferation 
agreements, by requiring states to act separately to align their policies around a 
common objective seem closer to coordination, as the dictionary would define the 
term, than to collaborative efforts, which would indeed require states to act side by 
side in a shared endeavour (although he observes a tendency to move in that 
direction). 
In coordination games, cooperative solutions tend to be stable once reached and 
consequently self-enforcing (this is because solutions represent pareto-equilibria, dee 
Figure 1.2).  Since there is no problem of cheating, coordination regimes do not need 
as many compliances mechanisms as PD-like regimes do. Consequently, coordination 
regimes tend to be less formalized and less centralized than cooperative ones. 
Likewise, organizations may be relevant particularly in the pre-regime stage thus 
providing a negotiation forum but they are no more indispensable in the regime stage.  
The stag hunt is a typical game that describes a conflict between safety and social 
cooperation, the problem is also known as “assurance game” and “trust dilemma”. 
This approach is particularly relevant because Robert Jervis himself has analysed the 
security dilemma in terms of assurance situations.294 The game, he points out, fits very 
well when dealing with arms proliferation in general (and I would say biological 
weapons in particular).  
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Robert Jervis makes use of the man in the Rousseau’s “Stag Hunt” specifically to 
explain the reasons why anarchy may encourage behaviours that leave all actors 
worse off than they could be, even in the extreme cases in which all states desire to 
freeze the status quo. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau describes a situation in which five individuals go out on a hunt. 
Each hunter can individually choose to chase a stag or a hare (as usual, each player 
must choose without knowing the choice of the others). The stag is what all them 
would like to eat but the success with the stag may be reached only by a joint action 
of the hunters.  
Players can still get some food if they haunt individually, but they can only get a hare 
by means of individual actions; the animal nonetheless is worth less than a stag. The 
difference with Prisoner’s dilemma is that here there are two Nash equilibria: when 
all players cooperate or all players defect.295 In other words if they cooperate to trap 
the stag, they will eat, but if one person defects to go for the rabbit none of the other 
will get anything. Thus, all actors have the same preference order: (1) Cooperate and 
trap the stag; (2) chase a rabbit while others remain at their posts; (3) all chase rabbit 
(4) stay at the original position where another chase a rabbit. Jervis applied this 
pattern to cooperation and disarmament. The preferences will come out as follows: 
(1) cooperation and disarmament; (2) maintain a high level of arms while other are 
disarmed; (3) arms competition and high risks of war; (4) being disarmed while other 
are armed (figure 1.3) 
The main point is that although actors may know that they all seek a common goal, 
they may not be able to reach it. 
In summary, assurance game is quite similar to battle of sex in that the game shows 
two equilibria outcomes. The crucial difference is that only one of the two (mutual 
cooperation) is pareto-efficient and consequently preferred by both/all actors. Even if 
it does not seem a problem of collective action, it becomes such in two cases.  
First when at least one actor fears erroneously that the other’s preference ordering is 
not really “assurance” but a PD-like. Second, when at least one actor doubts that the 
other can be trusted to act rationally on the given issue. In both situations, it may be 
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reasonable to opt for defection especially when stakes are high and uncertainty is 
pronounced. Indeed, defection in assurance game is the only possible way for actors 
to avoid (unilaterally acting) ending up with their worst possible outcome (CD). In 
other words, “assurance” poses collective action problems because under specific 
circumstances choosing the maximin strategy may be individually rational, even 
though bound to a collectively sub optimal result. In the case of a stag hunt situation, 
Zürn and Martin argue that regimes may help to solve assurance problems by 
facilitating communication among states especially when the assurances are treated 
as if they were PD-like games.296  
A last category of games that structuralists usually take into consideration in 
describing security relevant situations, are suasion games known colloquially as 
Rambo games (see figure 1.4) 
The typical feature of a suasion game is a single equilibrium outcome, which leaves 
only one actor satisfied while the other is aggrieved. This implies that one actor 
receives the most preferred outcome and the other one does less well. Unrequited 
cooperation is the only possible outcome. Rambo games include two variants. In the 
first one, one actor has a dominant strategy to cooperate, which the other can exploit. 
In the second variant, one actor has a dominant strategy to defect, while the other 
must cooperate in order to avoid an even worse outcome, here the privileged player 
has to be persuaded to cooperate.297  
In term of security studies the most relevant scenario is the second one. What can the 
“dissatisfied actor” do to convince the privileged one to cooperate? He can try to 
manipulate the preferences of the privileged one by making menaces: for example, by 
threatening to act irrationally in order to decrease the other utility of defection. 
Alternatively, he may make promises in order to increase the other the utility in 
cooperation.  The use of threats always poses a problem of credibility, and even when 
we take credibility for granted, the “threats-trick” will work only if the privileged actor 
has not a dominant strategy not to cooperate. Regimes in suasion games may help 
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states to organize their threat and promises in “side-payments” to secure the 
cooperation of the actors that are privileged by the situation. 
Regimes and international organisations can also help states to correspond the side 
payments necessary to secure cooperation of the actor that are privileged by the 
situation. Likewise, through their principle and norms they may institutionalize the 
issue-linkage on which cooperation depends. Since incentive to defect continue to 
exist on the part of the “persuaded” actors, suasion regimes may display some 
features of the collaboration regimes (especially monitoring capacities).298 
Lisa Martin suggests that suasion-games related regimes are often sponsored by a 
hegemonic power. The first argument she uses to defend her position is that a 
dissatisfied actor, if also a hegemon, will be more probably able to put in place threats 
and promises in order to elicit cooperation from their partners.  The second argument 
is that asymmetry between players is what characterize suasion-game situations, 
likewise asymmetry is what hegemonic relations, par excellence, display.299  
Finally, it is worth noting that in all the situations analysed, functional equivalents to 
regimes (but less costly substitutes) may exist in concrete real-world scenarios. In 
some case “the mutual transparency that comes with democratic domestic 
institutions may be sufficient for assuring states of the nature of the game at hand 
(and for the appreciation of this nature by their partners)”.300 
 
Rational  determinants of security regimes 
 
Among scholars of international regimes who have been more productive in assessing, 
describing and discussing security institutions are neoliberals (functionalists) and 
cognitivists (both weak and strong variants), despite some relevant exceptions in the 
ranks of realism exist (Krasner and Grieco, in particular).  As anticipated in chapter 1, 
neoliberal perspectives focus on how structures can affect the instrumental rationality 
of actors. More specifically, functionalists do believe that international conflicts – 
including the ones that involve security relevant issues – can be ameliorated through 
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collective management and institutions.301 Institutions, including regimes, play a role 
in security relations mainly because they mitigate the private information problem, by 
reducing uncertainty, and the problem of commitment by decentralising cooperation. 
Because states’ choices are the result of both what they desire, and what they believe 
other states desire, governments may find it worthwhile to pay some pre-emptive cost 
to get information and gain a better understanding of others’ intentions ex-ante in 
order to design strategies that will better fit real case situations. Under this 
perspective, institutions “reduce uncertainty by providing credible information”.302 
If uncertainty is the main cross-sectoral and fundamental problem of international 
relationships, as seen in the previous paragraph, collective action problems can be 
created by different specific situations: collaboration, coordination, suasion, and 
assurance.303  
Structure-functionalists argue that diverse collective actions problems account for 
different regimes. In other words, these scholars envisage a link between the function 
and the institutional form that the regime exhibits and provide that the basis for 
explaining the variation in the institutional form is to be found exactly in the function 
these institutions absolve insofar individual features characterize regimes across types 
of situational structure.  
As far as the likelihood of regime formation is concerned, functionalist’s analysis turns 
up to be an instrumental one: the benefit regimes provide is sufficient to account for 
their very formation and maintenance. Moreover, functionalists have derived 
hypothesis about the varying likelihood of regime formation on the assumption that 
the creation of a regime is more likely the less demanding the interaction problem is. 
It is reasonable to believe that cooperation is more difficult (and less performing) 
when incentives to defect persist even after actors have decided to cooperate and 
also when actors disagree on how and whether to cooperate. 
Zürn ranks the “situational” propensity for regime formation in a continuum from high 
probability to lowest: “assurance situations” (high probability); “coordination” 
                                                        
301 Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy”; Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy; 
Young, International Governance, 1994. 
302 Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallender, Imperfect Unions, 4. 
303 Martin, “Institutions and Cooperation.” 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 124 
(medium-high); “collaboration” (medium-low); “suasion” (low probability).304  The 
author has suggested to refine his regime classification by the use of secondary 
variables: (1) the expected frequency of interaction through time, (2) the density of 
interaction, (3) the type of foreign policy that is parasitized by the actors, (4) the 
distribution of issue-specific resources, (5) the presence or absence of salient 
solutions; (6) the number of actors in the issue area, (7) the state of overall 
relationship of the actors involved. Zürn has stressed the relevance and the precise 
effect of individual secondary variables (relative weight) with regard to the prospect 
of regime formation vary across types of situation structures.  
Thus, for example, he has argued that the distribution of resources among actors is 
not relevant for assurance situations whilst it is for the other three situations. 
 
Based on the assumptions detailed in the previous paragraph, Jervis identified some 
additional conditions (with respect to the underlying “context” (collective action 
problems, issue-area, typology of conflict)) that can contribute to create a propitious 
setting for the establishment of security regimes. His reasoning supplement 
functionalist variables accounting for security regime formation and effectiveness, 
nonetheless partially transcending rationalist boundaries.  
(1) First, great powers must want to support their creation. Key actors in the system 
must prefer a more regulated environment in a specific area, to one where all states 
behave individualistically.  
(2) Second, the actors in the system must also believe that the others share the same 
value they assign to mutual security and cooperation. In practice, this is not an easy 
task and probably decision makers tend to overestimate (instead of underestimate) 
other states’ aggressiveness. 
(3) Third, even if all major actors would settle for the status quo, security regimes 
cannot form if one (or more) actor(s) believes that security is best provided for by 
aggression.   
                                                        
304 Zürn, Michael, Interessen Und Institutionen in Der Internationalen Politik: Grundlegung Und 
Anwendungen Des Situationsstrukturellen Ansatzes. 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 125 
(4) Fourth and concerning the offensive-defence balance; a condition favourable to 
regime formation is one in which offensive and defensive weapons and policies are 
distinguishable but the former are cheaper and more effective than the latter, or in 
which they cannot be told apart but it is easier to defend than attack (again this is not 
the case of biological weapons, which do not satisfy this requisite and on the contrary 
show opposite characteristics). 
(5) Fifth, the belief that individualistic pursuit of security war is a costly option also 
represents a relevant regime inducer. On the contrary, if states believe that war is 
good in itself, they will not be motivated to form a regime to prevent it. If they believe 
that building arms is something to be welcomed (e.g. because it funds domestic 
industries), cooperation won’t be pursued. Likewise, if states think that arms 
procurement and security policies can be designed carefully enough to reduce the 
chance of unnecessary wars, then a major reason to avoid individualistic policies 
disappears. And finally, if hostility in security area is not believed to spill over into 
hostility in other issue-areas like the economic one, another important motivation to 
cooperation will be absent (for a summary see Table 2.1) 
 
As far as security regimes’ demise is concerned, Jervis identifies three reasons that 
may have intervened in a specific case (the “Concert of Europe” existed in Central 
Europe from 1815 to 1823 - which he describes as a best example of a security 
regime): (1) the reduced salience of the contention, the faded memories of the events 
that brought to regime formation; (2) states’ exhaustion, as time moves, each state is 
most sharply aware of the sacrifice it makes than it is of others restraints; (3) change 
in the structure of the system  
 
“since world politics did not seem so dangerous, pushing harder seemed sensible to individual states. 
The structure seemed stable enough to permit states to impose a greater strain on it. But seeking 
individualistic gains raised doubts in others’ minds as to whether moderation and reciprocation would 
last, thus giving all states greater incentives to take a narrower and shorter-run perspective.”305 
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Social determinants of security regimes 
 
Social theories of security regimes maintain that both mainstreams and critical 
theories have proved unable to explain the dramatic changes the world has witnessed 
starting in the second half of the 80s. 
More specifically and with regard to functionalism, cognitivists believe that neoliberal 
theories have devoted too much of their attention to the conditions that shape 
whether or not cooperation is possible (“if”), but less about the factors and processes 
involved in the bringing about cooperation in practice (“how”).306 In fact, 
functionalists, especially in early times, were concerned particularly on demonstrating 
the possibility of cooperation in an anarchic system. Once demonstrated that the 
possibility for regime creation was there, institutions would have come into existence 
because of their utility and service. So, as we have seen, leading works from this 
stream have focused on studying the conditions/situations that made/make security 
cooperation possible, the underlying collective action problems that regimes are 
expected to address, and the consistent type of institutions that will result from those 
problems. Functionalists also posit that a rational self-interest for states to engage in 
cooperation does exist because of the interdependence which characterize 
international life. When states are interdependent, non-mediated behaviours can 
leave all states with suboptimal outcomes and this represent the first incentive to 
establish cooperative links. Under this perspective, a second critique to neoliberals 
builds exactly on the idea that interests cannot be left unproblematized because they 
are themselves constructed by a process of social interaction. The opening, in 
constructivists’ account, comes not by denying that “people often behave rationally, 
but by trying to understand how people’s beliefs enable them to concert their 
expectations and reach solutions to problems where no game theoretic equilibria 
exist.”307 
A part from scholarly divides, however, variants of neoliberalism and to some extents 
realism have acknowledged in many ways the importance of social facts. Interalia, 
Gilpin’s distinction between revisionist and status quo power – which requires some 
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concept of identify; Walt’s recognition of threats over power, Keohane’s reasoning on 
“how people and organizations’ define self-interest,”308 Krasner’s account of 
sovereignty which relies heavily on the concept of punctuated equilibrium and 
historical path-dependence.309 
Nonetheless social determinants never acquired center stage in power and interest-
based approaches to security regimes, being instead the core of knowledge theories. 
The latter made the cultural-institutional context of policy, on the one hand, and the 
constructed identity of states, on the other hand, important determinants of national-
security related policies.310 
 
Learning  
Even if national interest is usually ascribable to considerations of power’s distribution, 
in the view of cognitivists, it cannot be reduced to that. In line with the knowledge-
based tradition of regime theory reviewed in the previous chapter, Nye argues that 
even in the security arena, under which considerations of military capabilities tend 
usually to prevail, states perception of self-interest cannot be reduced to systemic 
and/or power-based concerns and fixed interests. 
National interest may change because of several factors. It can be redefined after a 
domestic shift in power, because of a normative or a cognitive change. This latter 
option is particularly relevant in dealing with arms control regimes.311 Nye describes 
cognitive change as a sort of “learning”. In this sense, to learn is “to develop 
knowledge by study or experience.” New information alters prior beliefs about the 
world. Nye uses the term “simple learning” when new information are used to adapt 
means, without changing the ultimate goals. He describes “complex learning” as the 
process which lead to new priorities and trade-offs.  
Nye finds remarkable instances of “complex learning” in the bilateral relationship of 
the post-war superpowers. He believes that only after the United States and Soviet-
Union had changed their initial beliefs about the usability of atomic weapons and their 
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mechanism of nuclear deterrence, a cooperation in highly-sensitive issue areas (such 
as strategic arms control and nuclear non-proliferation) became possible. 
In the early 1960s the two Superpowers became aware of the destructive power of 
nuclear arms and the impossibility of protecting one’s population unilaterally from the 
horrors of an all-out nuclear war. They “understood” that nuclear proliferation might 
disrupt the precarious balance of threat (which granted stability to the overall 
international system) and increase the likelihood of a nuclear war. They “learned” the 
need for crisis management to minimize the danger of escalation and for robust 
command and control systems to help central decision makers-control the risk of such 
an escalation. In the same period a (new) common knowledge, has developed with 
regard to the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries. The consensual 
knowledge that both side had acquired, over time led them to accept that nuclear 
risks could be managed by a change from “purely” unilateral to “more” cooperative 
security strategies. In other words, new information, which did not affect the 
distribution of power among actors, contributed to transform a zero-sum game into a 
mixed-motive one, in which both actors could gain security through cooperation. In 
this perspective, the NTP/SALT/ABM regime for the control of nuclear armament 
could be developed to solve the remaining “collective action” problems thus resting 
on the emergence of a new contextual knowledge.  
Learning has been particularly impressive in informing efforts to slow the spread of 
nuclear weapons to new countries (horizontal proliferation). Although it seems that 
this objective would have obviously been a common interest for the two superpowers, 
Nye highlights that it took nearly a decade to appreciate it as such. It is not they had 
not enforced unilateral initiatives supporting restrictions before attempting a joint 
venture. Only when these unilateral efforts - in mid-1950s and early 1960s - did fail, 
the two sides turned to exploring cooperative solutions and developed international 
institutions to slow the spread of nuclear weapons. Nye’s perspective has relevant 
consequences for our understanding of regime performance. Within rationalist 
accounts, security regimes have been treated as cooperation “enzymes”, factors able 
to facilitate and accelerate the cooperation process. If learning lead to the creation of 
security regimes, in turn regimes may promote further learning. In other words, 
regime can have feed-back power. Krasner himself attributes a similar role to regimes 
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when he refers to the “feed-back” effects they produce on actors’ beliefs (update 
belief variant of contractualism).  
This effect may take place by helping to “lock in” states and to further develop the 
learning that had prompt regimes’ creation. By stabilizing actors’ mutual expectations 
in an issue-area, regimes can reshape their perceived self-interests.312  
More specifically, the institutionalisation of regimes can: 1) change standard 
operating procedures for national bureaucracies; 2) present new coalition 
opportunities for subnational actors and improved access to third parties; 3) change 
participants’ attitudes through contacts within the framework of institutions; and 4) 
provide means to dissociate a particular issue from changes in the overall political 
relationship by regular, formal meetings.313 
 
Epistemic Communities in international Security Regimes  
If knowledge is  autonomous variable shaping national interest,314 if new information 
and learning can lead to regime formation and if regimes themselves may promote 
further learning,315 it is obvious that knowledge managers must play a role in the 
creation of security regimes (as well as they do in other kinds of regimes). 
Epistemic communities are defined as a “network of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy 
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue are.”316 
The members of such communities are expected to share a common understanding 
of particular problems in their field of research as well as awareness and preferences 
for a set of technical solutions. Most importantly, they are not satisfied with a passive 
role of “information providers” – who only speak out at the request of decision 
makers. Through the benefits of modern communications system, epistemic 
communities often operate transnationally. Peter Haas has established three central 
requirements for knowledge as provided by scientists and other experts to have an 
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impact on processes of international cooperation and regime formation and 
effectiveness: (1) first, a high degree of uncertainty among policy-makers; (2) a high 
degree of consensus among scientists; (3) a high degree of institutionalisation of the 
scientific advice enhanced is, as well, very important. If these requirements are 
satisfied, “epistemic” coordination is likely to occur and it is exerted in four phases: 
innovation, diffusion, selection and policy persistence. 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, with regard to policy innovation maintain that 
epistemic communities can influence the framing of issues for collective debate. 
Subsequent negotiations are then conditioned by the information initially provided by 
the epistemic community. Furthermore, in situations of pronounced uncertainty, 
“epistemic communities may not only succeed in exerting strong influence on debate, 
but also help states identify their very first interests in a particular situation”.317 
Epistemic communities are also important as agents of policy diffusion, experts can 
communicate new ideas and policy innovations to their colleagues in other countries 
who in turn influence their government. Adler has traced this process of policy 
diffusion in the case of nuclear arms control.318 He found that American epistemic 
communities played a key role in creating the international shared understanding and 
practice of nuclear arms control. The members of the community were able to 
influence not only the U.S. Government but also, through their Soviet counterparts 
the Soviet government to the extent that their ideas were finally embodied in the ABM 
treaty. As it will be clear from the next chapters, the civil society was also key in 
leveraging UK and US political establishment to Biological Warfare’s renunciation. 
By contrast, the impact of an epistemic communities on policy selection is very difficult 
to assess. Still there is some evidence that epistemic communities can exert 
considerable influence at this stage, particularly when they provide integrative 
formulas in complex negotiations.319 
Finally, epistemic communities may operate as effective advocates of established 
regimes by defending them as best-suited means to eliminate the problems which 
have prompted their creation. 
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Security regimes vs. security cooperation (security communities, collective security, 
alliances, security complexes) 
 
Robert Jervis describes  “security regimes” as “principles, rules and norms that permit 
nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that other would 
reciprocate.”320 The definition is relatively broad and still consistent with those 
adopted by scholars who  work with reference to different issue areas of international 
relations (for example economics or environmental protection). Nonetheless, in his 
definition, the author assigns (and rightly so) a special emphasize to the reciprocity 
requirement, in consideration of the highly consequential outcomes that unrequited 
cooperation broadcasts in security-driven relationships. Furthermore, in Jervis’ 
perspective, in line with IR mainstream approaches, the term “regime” does not apply 
to all the norms and expectations that facilitate interaction in general (as a simple 
transaction would do), but refers only to those cooperative relations which go well 
beyond the pursue/satisfaction of a very short-run and incidental interest. 
Consequently, unless a more complex and deeper dimension exists around and 
beneath a specific arrangement, this won’t be considered, from Jervis’ standpoint, a 
proper regime, even if some other regimes-related criteria are satisfied (for example 
repetition and convergence of expectations).321 Jervis makes a couple of very clear 
examples to explain the drawbacks of excessively formal and simplistic approaches:  
 
“to comply with a robber’s demand to surround money is not participate in a regime even if the 
interaction occurs repeatedly and all participants have the same expectations [over the outcome of the 
interaction]” 
 
and – with reference to the Cold War bipolar system –  
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“the fact that neither superpower attack the other is a form of cooperation, but not a regime. The link 
between restraint and their immediate self-interest are to direct and unproblematic to involve the 
concept.”322  
 
In fact, in the original volume on International Regimes (1982), Jervis was very 
tentative in his assessment on the possibility that security regimes have ever existed 
since 1945. The author suggested caution in drawing conclusive assessments over 
security regimes and wondered which form of cooperation could be creditably 
considered a regime  in the security domain.  In a later essay, the author revamped his 
suspicious on the actual possibility for relatively high levels of cooperation (between 
states confronting a security dilemma) to rise and consolidate in international 
politics.323 
 
These reflections bring to the floor one of the most relevant, and too often 
overlooked, aspect in the study of international security regimes which is the one of 
distinguishing security regimes from other forms of cooperation in the security realm. 
On the subject, Amitav Acharya - in the first chapter of his book dedicated to the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),324 provides some helpful insights. 
Acharya’s objective is to study regional security communities. His contribution, 
however, becomes useful to the present analysis since the author starts his essay by 
defining and describing what make security communities different from other similar 
forms of security cooperation (including security regimes). It is my opinion that any 
attempt aimed at reaching a fully consistent taxonomy and to get to precise 
categories, (although necessary for providing heuristics and analytical tools) is bound 
to be inconclusive.  First of all, many features which are critical in distinguishing 
institutions are de facto common to all the categories in question; to the point that 
sometimes the boundaries blur between them - especially when a category is seen as 
                                                        
322 Jervis, “Security Regimes,” 1982, 357. 
323 Jervis, “From Balance to Concert.” 
324 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. 
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an intermediate step to reach another category; 325 second, states often display 
overlapping memberships so that multiple network of institutions develop and 
interlock one another making it hard to isolate patterns; third and most important, 
practitioners - and sometimes even scholars, tend to use the terms interchangeably 
making academic debate of modest utility. Finally and pouring from the above, even 
if a precise categorization could ever be achieved, it may not be clear - in the end - if 
participants that belong to multiple institutions would act under the flag of one or 
another security arrangement they belong to. 
Nonetheless, based on existing literature, it is still possible to identify (at least in 
theory) some peculiar elements which characterize security cooperation, for a 
summary see Table 2.2.326  
As explained in the previous paragraphs, in security regimes, a group of states 
cooperate to manage their disputes on specific issues. Through regimes, states try to 
mitigate the problems of private information and commitment (for example by muting 
the security dilemma) in order to subtract that policy area from mere self-help 
strategies. For example, in the case of non-proliferation regimes, what it is expected 
to be “silenced” is “arm race” – a typical manifestation of the security dilemma. As a 
consequence of the many mechanisms through which they operate, we expect 
regimes to raise the security profile of its participants. 327 
The latter doesn’t mean that war stops being an option among a security regime’s 
members, neither that participants stop preparing for a possible material conflict that 
could erupt between/among them. Consistently, some kind of arms’ acquisition and 
contingency planning for a possible confrontation continues.  
Another typical feature of security regimes (versus other forms of security 
cooperation) relates to the fact that regimes tend to cope more often with risks than 
                                                        
325 This could exactly be the case between international regimes (referred to as “no-war 
communities” in Deutsch’s classification) that have been seen and described as a step towards 
security community.  
326 From here to the end of the paragraph, references include: Keohane, 1999; Daase 1992; Herz 
1951; Jervis 1978; Wolfers 1962; Fearon, 1994; Powell 1996. 
327 depending on the IR school standpoint adopted, regimes are believed to intervene between states 
preferences and outcomes in diverse ways – as it has been explained in the first chapter 
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with threats.328 The difference is crucial because threats, which are usually associated 
with collaboration problems, can’t be controlled; threats can only be answered to 
when they materialize. On the other side risks, which typically characterize 
coordination or coordination-like situations can be mitigated. As it is exemplified in 
the formula below, government can potentially deal with  risks by lowering their 
countries vulnerability or their overall impact/consequences (by means of 
countermeasure and response).  
 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘	 = 𝑃	(𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙	𝑜𝑓	𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 	 
 
Under this perspective , security regimes tend to be inclusive, to involve all states that 
can pose a risk, and inevitably embrace countries where some adversarial 
relationships survive (outside the area that is expected to be governed).329  
Although building upon some common interests (mixed motives) a sense of “we”- 
feeling among participants doesn’t need to pre-exist when security regimes develop 
(in the first instance).330  
Security regimes do not even require that participants enjoy some previous degree of 
cooperation, interdependence, or integration.331 In most regimes’ accounts, 
interdependence (states’ system) seems to be a sufficient requirement to create the 
conditions for a regime to develop. It is exactly the fact that each regime member is 
willing to avoid a specific outcome, blind of others’ intensions, that creates the 
possibility for regime development. Consistently, it is often the case that security 
regimes are equipped with some sort of written norms and tend to display medium to 
high degree of institutionalization (a treaty is usually the baseline, often linked to 
                                                        
328 Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallender, Imperfect Unions, 24–27; Keohane, Power and Governance 
in a Partially Globalized World, 88–89. 
329 A security regime may indeed develop within otherwise adversarial relationship where the use of 
force is inhibited by the existence of a balance of power of a situation of mutual deterrence (Concert 
of Europe or the Non-proliferation regime championed by the US and the Soviet Union in the 60s with 
regard to nuclear and biological weapons. 
330 Usually the interests of actors are neither “wholly compatible nor wholly competitive”, Stein 1985. 
331 For this reason, the Concert of Europe and the CSCE have been taken as examples of security 
regimes in Haftendorn, 1999. 
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some security management arrangements and organizations). As explained in the first 
chapter, explicit norms are not (by definition) a requirement for security regimes in 
order to be considered as such, and some security regimes appear in minimally 
institutionalized forms (e.g. diplomatic conferences) (see Table 2.3). Nonetheless, it is 
very likely (and in the view of some scholars, it is inevitable) that regimes will produce, 
as the time goes by, a convergence of interests, ideas and identities among its 
members . Finally, regimes are characterized by high degree of commonality and 
functional differentiation and mixed degrees of specificity. Examples of security 
regimes in past and present times include the Concert of Europe, the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Non-proliferation regimes.332 
Although possibly an intermediate step towards them, security regimes shall not be 
treated as Security communities (in Deutsch understanding).333 Security communities 
are indeed characterized by strict and observed norms concerning the non-use of 
material force so that the peaceful resolution of conflicts rising among between and 
among members is granted. Security Communities’ main focus is war-risk 
management. More specifically the participants of a security community display a pre-
existent sense of community and rule out  war which stops being an option (within 
the community). Arm race (or the set-up of contingency planning  or war oriented 
mobilization against other actors in the community) does not take place; The 
reasonable certainty exist (within and outside the community) that all members share 
a common belief in the undesirability of war (harmony-like situation) and there is a 
long-term perspective of war avoidance. Formal or informal institutions and processes 
for the pacific settlement of disputes can usually be identified with reference to a 
specific security community. Security Communities are exclusive in the sense that 
usually develop on a geographical basis as in the case of pluralistic regional security 
communities. Commonality is obviously very high as it is specificity. On the contrary, 
                                                        
332 Commonality refers to the degree to which expectations about appropriate behaviors are shared 
by members. Specificity refers to the degree to which specific and enduring rules exist, governing the 
practice of officials, obligations of states, and legitimate procedures (grater specificity is usually 
reflected in more detailed and demanding primary rules). Functional differentiation refers to the 
extent to which the institution assigns different roles to different members (different participants -> 
different functions within the institution). 
333 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities. 
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functional differentiation is low. Existing examples of Security Communities are the 
European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council.  
Security regimes are also not comparable to collective security arrangements. The 
mechanism employed by the collective security arrangements to achieve their 
objective (which is, as in the case of security community, war deterrence/avoidance) 
is a very specific one. A collective security system usually deters the threat of war 
within a group of states by threatening to punish any act of aggression by a member 
against the others (although the aggressor in not pre-identified, as it is often the case 
with alliances). The sanctioning element is one of the two features that really 
distinguishes collective security from a regime. While in collective security, the focus 
is on the reaction to a violation or a possible violation, in the security regimes -  as 
seen above - the accent is to be placed on the principles and norms embodied by the 
regime to the point that perfect compliance can become of secondary importance into 
the whole framework and often it is left unpunished. On the contrary, the credibility 
of the collective security institution itself builds on the credibility of its punishment 
mechanism so that war against an intramural aggressor remains a legitimate 
instrument in a collective security system. A second element of distinction between 
security regimes and collective security arrangements is that the latter are legalistic 
devices which do not require cooperation, interdependence, or shared norms (the we-
feeling is modest and restricted to general considerations of peace and security). 
Collective security claims a “peace role” (vs. a security role) aimed at controlling the 
forceful settlement of conflicts among its own members through its peace-keeping 
machinery and diplomatic techniques. Collective security implies the use of force 
(through a collective enforcement action) to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.  Commonality and functional differentiation are low, specificity can vary. 
Well-known examples of these types of arrangement are the United Nation and the 
League of Nations before them.  
Finally, security regimes are not collective-defence tools (e.g. alliances, alignments, 
and security complex). Alliances are usually conceived as directed above a pre-
recognised and commonly-perceived external threat that enjoys a specific orientation. 
Threats can materialize when a state face a real or perceived-as-real probability that 
another state will seek to use military force for political reasons. Threats pertains 
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situations where some actors in the system have the capabilities and willingness to 
harm the security of others. The focus of a collective defence arrangement is often a 
pre-emptive one that (1) aims at protecting the territorial integrity of member states 
from the adverse use of military force, (2) involves efforts to guard states’ autonomy 
against the potential effects of the adversarial use of military force and (3) can 
encompass policies designed to prevent in general the emergence of situations 
damaging one’s territory or vital interests.334  
Alliances are sometimes referred to as “defence-communities” in order to highlight 
that participants de facto establish  a common military front against an outside threat. 
Because they deter and defend against identified threats, alliances are usually 
designed exactly to exclude some other actors, either the ones/e that represent/s the 
threat, either those that would make the alliance weaker (since the objective is the 
one of sending a strong, consistent, and credible signal of resolve (as in classical 
balancing alliances)).  Under this perspective, whereas collective security is a much 
more open-ended commitment which is seen as absolute in character (inward looking 
and inclusive), a military alliance implies a limited and restricted membership covering 
a defined geographical area (outward-looking and exclusive). The exclusive character 
distinguishes collective security from security regimes. Conversely, alliances and the 
so-called “security-management-institutions” affect participants’ security relations by 
mechanisms which are similar to those that are activated by security regimes. 
Collective defence not always take the form of alliance (a major example being NATO), 
but can also result into alignments and security complexes. Unlike alliances, which are 
coalitions characterized by high degree of institutionalization - feature that to some 
extent share with security regimes - alignments are minimally institutionalized (e.g. 
the 1967 Arab coalition against Israel). In Security Complexes members are kept 
together by an “interdependence of rivalry” among participants rather than on an 
interdependence of shared interests, which is instead the typical feature of security 
regimes.  
 
                                                        
334 Security can be defined much broadly than this, with important implications for regime formation, 
attributes, and consequences. 
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Arms control theory, arms race, non-proliferation, and disarmament 
 
A specific type of security regimes is represented by arms control arrangements. The 
relationship between national armament/disarmament policies, arms control 
agreements, and regimes is neither simple nor straightforward.  
Arms Control Theory (ACT) makes reference to a pool of premises and concepts that 
scholars and practitioners developed between 1958 and 1962. Consistently, it is 
clearly recognised in IR literature that “traditional ACT was the product of a unique 
confluence of factors and reflected the assumptions, analysis, and policy priorities of 
defence analysts and policy makers of that era.”335 In Larsen’s view, the 1958 Surprise 
Attack Conference represents the turning point which sanctioned the beginning of a 
this new type of understanding over the management of strategic assets. The vision 
elaborated back then was bound to last and flourish in the following four decades. 
Already in 1955, the Geneva summit, along with Eisenhower’s Open Skies proposal, 
had broadcasted a new concept of military strategy which was not ascribable neither 
to arms race nor disarmament (which have a longer legacy and were common themes 
in IR studies during the 1950s). Irrespective of the precise starting date for this new 
trend to begin, it is unquestioned that the 60s represented an incredibly productive 
and prolific time for the definition and growth of the arms control community with 
the publication, in 1961, of three crucial works on the subject: “Strategy and Arms 
Control” by Schelling and Halperin; “The Control of the Arms Race” by Hedely  Bull; 
and “Arms Control Disarmament and National Security” by Donald Brennan.336 
Since then, IR literature has elaborated complex arms control theories and formulated 
various assessment of arms control strategies. Hedely Bull  defines arms control  as 
the “cooperation between antagonist pairs of states in military affairs”.337 In his recent 
assessment, Larsen have re-defined arms control as “cooperative endeavours 
                                                        
335 Larsen, Arms Control, 6. 
336 Schelling and Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control; Bull, The Control of the Arms Race; Bull, “Arms 
Control and World Order”; Donald G. Brennan, Arms Control Disarmament and National Security. 
337 Bull, “Arms Control and World Order,” 22. 
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between conflicting parties which presuppose joint action among the participants 
regarding their military programs.”338 
Building on the above mentioned contributions and other works, arms control 
arrangements can be reasonably/consensually described as “agreed restrains upon 
armaments (usually towards a reduction of them), exercised by actors in the 
international arena, involving joint-doings of some sort, usually occurring in conditions 
of peace, and dealing with national security strategies (de facto they-themselves 
represent security-strategy options). More specifically, arms control agreements 
attain the military dimension and are aimed at enhancing national (and international) 
security. 339  
Arms control can regulate military capability and potential by intervening on the 
location, amount, readiness, and types of military forces, weapons, and facilities. 
Arms control analysts of the early 1960s were in agreement that arms control had to 
fulfil two main objectives. (1) The first objective was the one of making war (and 
especially nuclear war) less likely or, should war take place, at least mitigate its 
consequences rendering the conflict less catastrophic in terms of death and 
destruction (“reduce the drift of war” and “promotion of international security”); (2) 
The second (indirect) objective of arms control commitments would have been the 
one of  releasing economic resources (“reduce the burden of armament”);  
Besides these two primary objectives, Hedely Bull identifies two additional objectives. 
These include: (3) prompting moral purposes consistently with a logic according to 
which war, or certain kinds of war, is morally wrong (as it is wrong to prepare for 
and/or threaten those types of war) and (4) reducing corruption of liberal and 
democratic institutions due to the fact that “the presence in society of military men, 
                                                        
338 Larsen, Arms Control. 
339 On the positive role of unilateral or small- group actions can have on a regime in formation or 
settled, see Imperfect Unions, p.261. The conditions under which unilateral stabilization efforts are 
successful remains understudied. Of particular relevance to the present discourse have been the non-
proliferation campaigns engaged in the US and UK in the late 50s and 60s both with regard to nuclear, 
biological and chemical disarmament. At the same time, also the reasons behind a unilateral 
renunciation to some armament’s category remains unclear and seem compatible with situations 
where (1) the renunciation doesn’t imply a loss of strategic advance (because other strategic 
equalizer do exist) or (2) when unilateral renunciations come one after the other serially. 
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power and ethic stunts the growth of liberty and stifles the prospects of parliamentary 
and popular rule”. 
The four objectives listed above are quite general in their contents. The first one, in 
particular, translates an extremely comprehensive provision. The maintenance of 
international peace and security has been the flag under which many different 
theories have been purported (hegemony, balance of power, great powers politics), 
and a countless number of diverse international foreign policy actions have been and 
still are justified and undertaken (promotion of development, manipulation of force 
and so on and so forth). Even when the focus of the provision is restricted to the only 
management of material forces (military dimension), the menu of available options 
remain large ranging from complete disarmament, non-proliferation, limited 
proliferation, etc..  
Nonetheless, specific policies and actions sponsored by scholars and policy makers in 
the 60s fuelled the idea of a perfect overlapping between arms control agreements 
and disarmament and non-proliferation intents. Larsen clearly highlights the issue:  
 
“In the early 1960s international security specialists began using the term arms control in place of the 
term disarmament, which they believed lacked precision and smacked of utopianism. The seminal 
books on arms control published in that era referred to this semantic problem. They preferred arms 
control as a more comprehensive term.”340 
 
Additionally, first generation of arms control theorists shared the common 
assumption that in order to reach successful arms control, policy makers should have 
oriented their efforts towards the creation of specific types of agreements: global 
instruments, aimed at curbing the spread of specific categories of weapons (WMD). 
These would have become non-proliferation and disarmament “regimes”, 
characterized by inclusive membership, comprehensive provisions, and verification 
measures, and formalized in terms of international treaties, or other legally-binding 
equivalent. Consistently, the NPT, the BWC, and the CWC became the paradigm for 
                                                        
340 Larsen, Arms Control, 3. 
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and synonym of “arms control”. In parallel, other arms controls and disarmament 
measures (of different kind) did not receive such broad acceptance.341  
 
The identification between arms control and a specific type or arms control (non-
proliferation regimes) laid down the basis for some confusion, in the years to come. It 
should be clear instead that in order to achieve the objectives listed above, arms 
control strategies and their related practices can take many forms, may use diverse 
instruments and address various weapons. Among these alternatives, non-
proliferation and disarmament of WMD are just two, although extremely relevant 
options. Different understandings rely mistakenly on the incorrect idea that an 
inevitable connection exists between armaments and the eruption of war, and indeed 
translates the belief that the link existing between the absence of arms and peace is 
straightforward as well as necessary. This is obviously false since, if it is the case that 
wars are made possible by armaments, the latter do not by themselves produce war. 
Anything that happens in international politics is a matter of will as much as a matter 
of material capacities: the two dimensions may and actually do affect one another (in 
the majority of real world scenarios) but are far from being each the expression and 
inevitable consequence of the other.  In fact, arm-race itself mirrors the belief that a 
mutual persistent increasing of military resources represents the better way to deter 
an adversary to wage wars, finally promoting national and international security.  
Consequently, what characterizes arms control strategies is not the content of its 
provisions (the quantity and quality of armaments they allow), but rather the 
“control” dimension it entails. To be more precise, control is to be understood in terms 
of a “restrain internationally exercised”. In line with this reasoning, disarmament and 
non-proliferation are just two possible mid-level security objectives out of other 
possible outlines that can be brought about. Arms control can and often do intersect 
with both, though not being necessarily equal to one specifically. In other words, we 
can have disarmament, which is not mutually “controlled” (e.g. unilateral 
declarations); and control that does not involve the reduction or rejection of 
armament (disarmament), but for instance envisages just a limitation of their spread 
                                                        
341 Bailes, “The Changing Role of Arms Control in Historical Perspective,” 16. 
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to non-possessor countries (horizontal non-proliferation) or even foresees a  limited 
increase of some assets to reach a condition of parity. In fact, if arms control involves 
setting lower levels of arms than what would be the case under a strict arm race 
competition, it is also true that arms control can lead actors to agree to increase 
certain categories of weapons if such increase would contribute to arms control 
objectives, in primis, international security. An example of this drive is provided by the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talk Treaty (I), under which Soviet Union was acknowledged 
the opportunity to raise the number of ICBM from 1530 to 1618. 
As said, the “internationally/reciprocally exercised” dimension of restrain/control is 
anything but unimportant since it allows us to introduce the concert-like dimension of 
arms control. Because of the security-dilemma, unilateral (complete) disarmament or 
non-proliferation stances like the ones accepted by states in the late ‘60s would be 
hard to understand, without a reciprocal commitment. Unilateral disarmament would 
expose states to an insane amount of national insecurity and this is why unilateral 
renunciations/restrains have traditionally occurred only with regards to some 
category of arms whose absence would have not impaired the overall material 
distribution power of the renouncing state.342 
 
The counterpart of arms control, is considered to be arm race. Arm race is an abiding 
feature of international relations; yet IR scholarship has still to produce one universally 
accepted definition. At the most basic level, scholars agree that arms races are 
“intense armaments competition between two or more rival states,” which can qualify 
either qualitatively (technological advancements) or quantitatively (numerical 
superiority), and which may or may not result in war. Nations’ armament policies 
consistent with arm race-scenarios are such that national efforts to participate into 
the military dimension are theoretically  limited only by actors’ capacity (funding and 
technology) to produce or build some weapons. This description doesn’t shape up in 
practice and a caveat is necessary. Even USA and URRS at the peak of their military 
Cold War competition tired their hands in this venture.  The resources they have 
allocated to the amassing of military force was deliberately limited and, in the case of 
                                                        
342 Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, 30–32. 
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the US, never exceeded one-third the proportion of the gross national product 
assigned to that purpose during WWII. Nonetheless in arms races, political decisions 
over military commitments mainly depend on national material capabilities and 
mirrors self-help strategies (and are of little interest in the study of international 
regimes). 
In conclusion, both unlimited and limited increase in armaments are possible nation’s 
armament policies with the difference that the first is typically pursued outside any 
arms control framework, while the latter often develop under it.  
 
On the other side of the spectrum with respect to arms race, there is disarmament 
which is the reduction or abolition of armaments. Disarmament can be generalised or 
local, comprehensive or partial, drastic or modest, unilateral or multilateral, 
controlled or uncontrolled. I here endorsed the idea that for some disarmament to 
occur, some kind of armaments’ reduction needs to be registered. Under this 
perspective, the upholding of armament at pre-existing level (in quantity and quality) 
or the non-acquisition/non-development of new armaments are described as non-
proliferation (respectively vertical and horizontal)  and not as disarmament. Actions 
falling under the rubric of partial or modest disarmament are abiding features in 
international relations. This kind of disarmament does not impair the capacity of 
actors’ vis-a-vis their competitors in the international arena; these initiatives belong 
to the realm of each nation’s armament policy choices and can be unilateral or 
concerted multilaterally. 
When it comes to drastic disarmament, not to mention comprehensive and complete 
stances, things change drastically. In Bull’s perspective, arguments supporting 
unilateral and unconditional actions of disarmament can only lie on a moral 
upbringing.343 The author maintains that those who support such views fall into two 
categories. On the one side, there are those who want to register a personal note of 
disavowal of responsibility. On the other side, there are those who chain the moral 
case for their position to higher principles, which should inform the conduct of 
governments (including abstention from war and specific types of war) whatever the 
                                                        
343 Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, 32–40. 
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consequences. An accurate analysis of these stances exceeds the scope of this 
chapter. However, the first group de facto positions itself outside of the real-world 
society without any thought to the soundness and feasibility of its uptake while the 
second one acknowledges the existence of some principles that can takes precedence 
over the continued existence of human society. In the author’s view, the second group 
can be equated to the pacifism of Tolstoy or Gandhi. At the core of that perspective is 
the idea that the short-term pursuing of the right means (no weapons) will eventually 
lead to the right ends (no habit to the use of them).  In real world situations, unilateral 
actions of the type described above appear risky at best and hopeless at worst. It is no 
coincidence that we cannot produce any real-world case example for none of them.344 
On the contrary partial/qualified disarmament can occur and a number of cases 
represent valid examples. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Frankland in his review 
article, Bull sees disarmament proposals as inevitably aimed at increasing the relative 
strength of the  promoter and “disarmament, like re-armament, in a world which is 
governed by the system of the balance of power is a strategic manoeuvre.” 
Consistently, the more extended and demanding is the commitment to disarmament, 
the more “incomplete” and/or “concerted” the reduction in actors’ armaments should 
be. Consistently with the above, in the mid 50s and in the late 60s respectively, United 
States and United Kingdom assumed very strong international commitments towards 
disarmament by unilaterally announcing what was referred to as “complete 
renunciation” to an entire class of armament, namely biological and toxins weapons. 
Are these examples of unilateral and complete disarmament? Absolutely not. And the 
answer is “no” because both countries could rely on a sound and autonomous nuclear 
capacity. What I mean is that, although the decision actually implied the full 
abandonment of an entire category of weapons along with their development for 
offensive purpose (defensive research was noticeably left aside), both states could 
have retaliated any attack by means of their nuclear arsenals. The renunciation was 
indeed focused on a specific class of weapons whose absence could have easily been 
                                                        
344 However, if unilateral actions of this type would be taken by all actors playing in the system at the 
same time, results would be impressive because if weapons do not by themselves are responsible to 
war, they are obviously the means by which war is performed in practice. 
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balanced by recurring to the nuclear option. Not only, UK and US were not 
jeopardizing their international position, but it turned out that they were making it 
stronger. At that time, it was believed that biological weapons could represent an 
advantage for developing countries more than it could be for developed ones.  It was 
indeed shared agreement that BW could have served as strategic equalizers where 
nuclear technology was not available, basically becoming the poor men’s atomic 
bomb.  The hope was that that once Britain and US would have given a “moral lead” 
the world would have followed. That was a totally reasonable idea, which in the end 
served its purpose. The Biological and Toxins Weapons Conventions was signed in 
1972 preventing signatories’ states to develop and stockpile biological weapons as 
well as contributing to consolidate the corresponding international norm.  
A second example is the potential renunciation of nuclear weapons that British 
officials sized in the ‘60s. Unlike the case of Biological Weapons, a similar commitment 
would have dramatically impacted on British security and consequently must be 
considered as a drastic move towards disarmament. The argument then made in 
favour of nuclear disarmament was that Britain’s reliance on nuclear power was 
actually increasing her importance as a target and that the security of Great Britain 
could be better served by the renunciation of an independent British strategic nuclear 
force. If such a decision had been made, however, this would have been only 
seemingly “complete.”  The United Kingdom could have had in any case relied on the 
nuclear umbrella offered by NATO and the US bilateral alliance/special relationship. If 
this would have not been the case any nuclear weapons renunciation by UK should 
have been nothing but an act of surrender, positioning UK at the mercy of whatever 
opponent possessing them.  
 
Much has been written on the question of why states should desire less weapons in 
the world: lack of checks and balances, accidents, environmental concerns, risk of pre-
emptive (nuclear), possible acquisition by terrorist (by definition non-deterrable) are 
just some of them.345 The expression “non-proliferation” is no doubt the most 
controversial, problematic and misunderstood within arms control debate.  
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In the field of International Relations, the expression was not developed explicitly as 
an issue-matter until the ‘60s, when the term was coined with reference to the 
spreading of nuclear weapons (with a slinking negative connotation). It is relevant to 
mention here that, in 1962 Lefever doesn’t even include non-proliferation among the 
dedicated sections of his chapter “the new language of arms control” within his “Arms 
and arms control”.346 Once entered into usage, the term was quickly turned in its 
reverse, “non-proliferation” because of the concurrent efforts aimed at limiting the 
spread of nuclear weapons. The term proliferation comes from bioscience, where it is 
associated to the positive growth or propagation of something (cells, in most cases). 
With this in mind, when transferring the concept to describe nuclear issues, it 
becomes pretty obvious to think in terms of “growth” and “propagation” of nuclear 
weapons. Notwithstanding what seems to be a straightforward parallelism, many 
inconsistent and incorrect interpretations have taken the floor over the years among 
experts and practitioners. The most insightful contribution to a discussion of 
definitional and conceptual issues results from the work of  T.C. Robinson.347 In his 
paper on the meaning of non-proliferation, the scholar starts by clarifying what 
proliferation is and what proliferation is not. Building on the etymology of the world 
and its double content of “growth” and “propagation”, organize stances into two 
threads. He understands “propagation” as “weapons’ spread among countries (that is 
actually known as “horizontal proliferation”)” and use “growth” to refer to those 
circumstances where states “breed” their nuclear capacity by increasing the number 
of warheads or by refining the technology behind them (making them somehow more 
sophisticated and efficient). This latter notion corresponds to so-called “vertical 
proliferation”. After clarifying the meaning of the world proliferation, the author 
highlights the specificity of its opposite. In his view, non-proliferation shall describe 
the absence of any increase in the quality and quantity of existing arsenals (vertically) 
and a lack of weapons’ diffusion to the other units composing the system 
(horizontally). An interesting example of action, aimed at impeding vertical 
proliferation is the Limited Test Ban Treaty that was signed and ratified only by USA, 
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UK and URRS when it went into effect (October 1963). The Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (1968) represents an effort to counteract horizontal proliferation.  
Robinson’s definition of non-proliferation remedies many controversial issues and 
solves the problem of drawing a line between non-proliferation and both 
disarmament on the one side, and arms control, on the other side. In fact, it is clear 
that a definition and conception of non-proliferation as the one described above does 
not entail at any point a reduction or abolition of weapons, that would be indeed 
disarmament. Finally, as far as the relationship between non-proliferation and arms 
control is concerned, the same discourse already made in the case of disarmament 
policies at the present case. The cessation of further production of weapons as well 
the limitation of their spread to other countries is desirable for the same reasons that 
a reduction of them (disarmament) is desirable, plus one -  from the only perspective 
of possessor - states.  Considering the double nature (horizontal and vertical) of 
proliferation, hindering the horizontal “component” would contribute to the 
inhibition of the expansion of the possessors’ club without necessarily impairing the 
possessors’ capacity. Like disarmament, non-proliferation is also restricted by the very 
same limitations disarmament suffers; when they are “drastic” and “severe” non-
proliferation measures need to be linked to some form of regulated cooperation to 
mitigate the risks of injury.  Arms control provides the framework within which 
reasonable disarmament and non-proliferation goals can be pursued in practice and 
the “winning” format which international cooperation (aimed at armaments’ dismissal 
or reduction - including the so-called non-proliferation regimes) has de facto adopted 
from the 1960s onwards.  
 
Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation and non-proliferation 
 
The previous paragraphs has described the first generation of arms control 
arrangements as legally-binding treaties (often framework conventions), inclusive in 
membership, comprehensive in scope and aimed at enhancing peace and security by 
implementing disarmament and non-proliferation strategies. 
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A second aspect they share is the type of weapons whose proliferation try to 
constrain. Although prospective limitations concerning the use, possession and 
development of weapons is virtually applicable to all existing armaments, it is nuclear, 
biological and chemical (CBRN) weapons, along with their means of delivery, that have 
dominated arms control theory and practice from its inception. To the point that in 
the second half of the 20th century, the term has been applied almost selectively to 
these specific weapons. 
A similar approach entails a division of warfare into nuclear, biological, and chemical, 
on the one side and conventional, on the other. The difference between nuclear and 
conventional warfare was reflected clearly in the division of the UN disarmament 
negotiations taking place from 1946 to 1952 between the Atomic Energy Commission 
and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. 
Although under many perspectives the separation holds, its implications deserve 
further discussion insofar entails positive and negative externalities.  
On the one side, treating nuclear, biological and chemical weapons altogether is 
beneficial to the analysis of military choices. It is apparent that any unlimited war 
where CBRN were massively developed would be a disaster in every possible way and 
no effective defence (active or passive) or offense strategies exist that would enable 
any actor to achieve victory in a similar context. The failure of URRS and US to achieve 
either disarming capacity or an effective defence (in the nuclear case) facilitated the 
convergence on a common interest towards nuclear war avoidance and an 
international restrain in the field. Likewise, understanding that an effective defence 
from a biological attack would have been extremely complex - if not virtually 
impossible to build - was one of the main drive leading to their disarmament.  
On the other side, the political discourse and public image of nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons as compact group of like-weapons (to be contained and eliminated) 
may be risky. I acknowledge a couple of primary reasons why this is so, plus a series 
of misunderstandings usually derived from former two. 
(1) The first reason is linked to the fact that the division between CBRN and other 
weapons overemphasizes the distance between them (as a group) vis-a-vis 
conventional armament. This understanding is problematical for at least three 
reasons. (1.1) First, a clear-cut division does not take into account the extent to which 
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nuclear weapons have become conventional, nor the fact that continuous innovation 
in science and technology shows that the most revolutionary military developments 
belong as much to conventional that to non-conventional warfare. (1.2) Second, the 
“CBRN” joint approach fuels the idea that the these are uniquely immoral compared 
to conventional weapons, as it will better explained in the following chapter. (1.3) 
Third, in so far as there are two varieties of warfare, CBRN-like (morally not 
acceptable) and conventional (acceptable), the latter becomes something which 
nowadays exists alongside the former and it is shaped by it. Tellingly, the possibility of 
use and development of non-conventional weapons is part of the background against 
which conventional war is now carried, prepared or threatened. This has been the 
case for Iraq (2003) and (theoretically) for Obama’s redline on Assad’s alleged used of 
chemicals in Syria.348 
(2) The second reason why a strict division between CBRN and conventional weapons 
can become troublesome is that it inevitably underestimates the difference existing 
between them. Most of the discourses which consider the three weapons altogether, 
descend from and build on the statement from the Commission on Conventional 
Armaments, mandated by the Security Council to determine what was to be covered 
by its mandate and what shall be more appropriately located within the purview of 
the Atomic Energy Commission;  interalia the answer  made clear that because of their 
destructive power nuclear, biological, and lethal chemical weapons should be defined 
as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Nonetheless, the destructive power the 
three enjoy is still quite dissimilar, if only because biological and chemical hit life and 
not things (with the exception of C/B contamination that is a reality, with important 
public health consequences). Also in terms of casualties, if it is true that 8oz of specific 
strain of botulin toxins may be enough to destroy mankind, the condition for that to 
happen is that mankind queue up one by one for injections.349 Nuclear weapons are 
still the most efficient and effective tools in any warfare theatre mankind can possibly 
imagine (different considerations may be made in the case of crime and terrorism). 
This does not change the fact biological and chemical claims are serious: if more 
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suitable weapons (nuclear) were not available, they would become strategically very 
important. The limited attention paid to the individual features which characterize 
these weapons was committed at the expenses of our understanding of chemical and 
biological proliferation. For example a relevant amount of literature, as it will become 
clear from the next section has been produced on the causes and drivers of nuclear 
proliferation. The same cannot be said of chemical and biological weapons’ 
proliferation. An exception to this dearth of study, is the work of Horowitz who 
investigated specifically BC proliferation drivers. Interestingly enough he finds that 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons generally function as complements at the 
pursuit stage. On the contrary, once states acquire nuclear weapons, also become less 
interested in pursuing biological weapons and are even willing to give them up in some 
cases. Considering the three weapons as a whole, underscores these types of 
analysis.350  
 
Over the past 15 years, the world has witnessed a sort of intellectual renaissance 
within the field of security studies especially with regards to WMD (Weapons of Mass 
Destruction) proliferation.351  If on the one side, the evolving international context, 
marked by the end of the Cold-war and the exhaustion of the extraordinary level of 
stability it did bring through, triggered the impulse; on the other end, emerging real-
world policy concerns have contributed extensively to keeping the interest alive (Iran, 
North Korea, Libya). One way of seeing the intensification of general interest on 
proliferation issues is the expansion of published work on the topic. The launch of a 
very basic research from the database ProQuest Political Science provide clear 
evidence to what claimed above, reflecting the growing attention scholar have 
devoted to nuclear and biological weapons with a number of results (in the decade 
2000-2009) that is many times higher than the one registered during previous years.  
As expected, nuclear weapons undoubtedly ruled the roost when it comes to non-
conventional weapons debates, nevertheless studies on chemical and biological 
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weapons have acquired raising popularity as the threat of international terrorism has 
grown stronger together with the widespread belief that terrorists or “new powers” 
(if equipped with) could use CB weapons void of those ethical concerns “civilised” 
nations seemed to have been constrained by during the last fifty years.352 
The intellectual renaissance of these type of studies has been also motivated by the 
significant investments assigned to the field. In order to give substance to the present 
analysis, some few numbers follow.  
As long as fifteen years ago, the World Bank estimated that an annual investment of 
just US$40–60 billion, or roughly half the amount currently spent on nuclear weapons, 
would have been enough to meet the internationally agreed Millennium Development 
Goals on poverty alleviation by the target date of the past year (2015). Globally, annual 
expenditure on nuclear weapons is estimated at US$105 billion – or $12 million an 
hour. 353 
In 2008, it was estimated that in the nine-year period from FY2010-2018 (for which 
the U.S. Government has provided well-defined cost projections), the United States 
would have spent at least $179 billion to maintain the then-current nuclear triad of 
missiles, bombers, submarines, and associated nuclear weapons, and to begin the 
process of developing their next generation replacements.354 
Regarding biological weapons (that is the case study take into consideration in the 
framework of the present research), an even clear trend can be identified. Since 2001, 
the United States government has spent substantial resources on preparing the nation 
against a bioterrorist attack and the FY2014 federal budget for civilian biodefence 
totals $6.69 billions.355  
This funding is intended not only to cover the production and stockpiling of improved 
defensive weapons (since offensive are outlawed) but also, to support R&D on nuclear 
detection strategies (made necessary among other things by recent events in North 
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Korea and Iran),356 but also to enhance dismantlement operations (required under 
non-proliferation treaties like the New-START),  or as it is in the case of biodefence 
funding, to address concurrent sectors: science, public health, healthcare issues that 
go far beyond the development of purely bio-defensive goals and applications. 
This scholarly renaissance, have affected both historians and political scientists with 
the latter adopting a wide range of different research methodologies and a survived 
and persisting focus on the causes and consequences of proliferation postures.  
As far as qualitative studies are concerned, these have been dominated by the 
contributions of historians fuelled, interalia, by the opening up of new archives. 
Nonetheless some relevant cases from political sciences deserve attention. These 
include studies aimed at examining the domestic political and sociological 
determinants of proliferation. Jacques Hymans’ “Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation” 
brings about interesting findings regarding prospective political and psychological 
determinants of nuclear proliferation. He uses a national identity concept as a base 
model to enhance the role of personality characteristics and emotional perceptions of 
leaders in explaining proliferation choices. Six years later, Hymen while exploring why 
some determined proliferators take so long to build nuclear weapons argues that the 
answer could be found looking at the way programmes are managed cross-nationally. 
In his view, Weberian legal-rational states, supporting a motivated and autonomous 
work-force, are able to get to the weapon better and quicker than neo-patrimonial 
states that are more prone to engage in short-sighted and impractical programs. 
In his “Nuclear Logics”, Etel Solingen argues that when liberalizing coalitions govern a 
country, nuclear weapons’ pursue tends to be sacrificed on the altar of free trade and 
international investments’ commitments.357 On the other hand, states ruled by 
inward-looking nationalistic coalitions, having less to lose when going nuclear, tend to 
travel the road more easily. Picking up on this theoretical starting, the edited volume 
“Sanctions, Statecraft and Nuclear Proliferation,” explores the role economic 
sanctions exercise in dissuading states from pursuing nuclear weapons.358 Some 
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authors have performed complex studies providing innovative normative and 
constructivist analysis of states’ and individuals’ nuclear identity and ethical taboos, 
like Nina Tannenwald “the Nuclear Taboo” and Alastair Ian Johnston, whose work 
“Social States” has been discussed above. Some others have privileged new theoretic 
models of proliferation and preventive war decisions - Debs and Monteiro, “Known 
Unknowns” - and the use of public opinion survey experiments as Sagan with his 
“Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions and the Non-Use of 
nuclear weapons”. 
New nuclear weapons research in political science have also included important 
quantitative studies which include large-N statistical work that have tested prevailing 
scholarly hypothesis.359 
Regarding determinants of nuclear proliferation, although some differences are 
reported in the coefficients’ size, authors have generally found that the capability to 
proliferate (in terms of both latent nuclear production capacity and economic power), 
the presence of a major conventional security threat, “major power” and “regional 
power” status all correlate with a greater pre-disposition towards development of 
nuclear programs.  
Some of these features (economic capacity and conventional threat), seem 
responsible also for driving the passage from a nuclear weapons-program condition 
to a nuclear weapons-possession but some others are not, and are instead replaced 
by other elements, like the absence of a nuclear defender.360 
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Domestic variables produce contrasting result of modest magnitude (under this 
perspective, potential improvements may be offered by the on-going work of Lisa 
Langdon Koch, Arizona State University). 
As far as “norms-driven” effects are concerned, Gartke initial work only tested for 
NPT’s potential role in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons program. He finds, as 
expected, that NPT membership decreases states’ likelihood of having nuclear 
programs, but he could not find any statistical significance for NPT when modelling for 
nuclear weapon status. NPT’s systemic effect also appears not to be statistically 
significant both when modelling for programs and possession. Building on these 
findings, the author derives that the NPT has not influenced proliferation incentives 
since the 1970s and that states might have simply joined the treaty because they 
didn’t plan to acquire nuclear weapons anyway. Furthermore, he suspects that 
nuclear protocols requiring the dissemination of nuclear knowledge and materials 
might have even contributed to the quickening pace of nuclear diffusion (hypothesis 
apparently well formulated, as shown by Brown and Kaplow’s findings).361 
From this generation of quantitative studies onward, a bunch of articles testing 
different hypothesis about the consequences of nuclear proliferation and possession 
flourished in recent years.  Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal contributed much to the 
debate, examining many of key traditional assumptions over these issues. The authors 
substantiate the idea that nuclear weapons do confer observable benefits to their 
possessors (by making them less likely to be targets of violent aggression). 
Nonetheless, they confirm that proliferation intents (programs)  are destabilizing 
move within the international system as nuclear program states tend to be the target 
and source of much hostility. They observe that nuclear program states have some 
heightened tendencies toward aggression, despite the incentives to lie low during the 
development stage.  
Regarding the role of nuclear weapons in influencing crisis outcomes (from 1945 to 
2000), the authors demonstrate that crisis involving nuclear actors are more likely to 
end without violence and, as the number of nuclear actors involved increases, the 
likelihood of war continues to fall. On the same subject, authors’ evidences confirm 
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the idea that nuclear actors are more likely to prevail when facing a nonnuclear state 
and that the duration of crisis in asymmetric directed dyads tend to be substantially 
smaller (in time) than for actors involved in a nonnuclear symmetric confrontation 
(2007, 2019). Matthew Kroenig (2013) gives further evidences that states that enjoy 
nuclear superiority over their opponents are more likely to win nuclear crisis. In the 
same year, Sechser and Fuhrmann give strong support to the idea that compellent 
threats from nuclear states are no more likely to succeed than those coming from non-
nuclear ones. 
In 2014, Brown e Kaplow explain  that receiving “technical cooperation” related to the 
nuclear fuel cycle is a statistically and substantively significant factor in state decisions 
to seek nuclear programs. Matthew Fuhrmann and Benjamin Tkach (2015) finally 
provide preliminary evidence that nuclear latency reduces the likelihood of being 
targeted in militarized disputes, guaranteeing the same deterrence benefits usually 
associated with possessing a nuclear arsenal. 
As far as bio-chemical weapons are concerned, the only “quantitative” assessment, to 
my knowledge, is Horowitz and Narang (2013 and 2014) “Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? 
Exploring the Relationship between Weapons of Mass Destruction”, where the 
authors demonstrate that biological and chemical weapons generally function as 
complements to nuclear weapons at the pursuit stage and as substitutes in the 
following stages (with nuclear being the more desirable option). 
In parallel to this burgeoning literature over the causes that lead to proliferation, 
studies over non-proliferation have also progressed and advanced nonetheless 
displaying three main limitations. 
(1) The first limitation is linked to the fact that, for the reasons already covered in the 
first section of this chapter and consistently with researches on proliferation, also non-
proliferation studies have generally focused on nuclear weapons. Analysis of the 
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons do exist but are limited in number 
and quality (mainly due to the lack of debate and mutual criticism among scholars). 
(2) The second main problem regarding non-proliferation studies is the overwhelming 
emphasis given to core global treaties around which the non-proliferation regimes 
have developed with very little attention to other forms of regulatory cooperation 
aimed at non-proliferation and disarmament. (3) Finally, especially when it comes to 
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the study of non-proliferation efforts effectiveness (beyond mere descriptive 
attempts) analysis are tentative and not conclusive even when performed with 
reference to the NPT where researches abound. 
Despite the enduring debate over whether and how international arms control 
treaties (and the NPT in particular) influence states policies, a full understanding is still 
elusive. The main reason for this, is that research on the NPT cannot determine 
conclusively whether membership in the treaty restrains states from developing 
weapons or simply mirrors existing preferences. The situation reflects indeed some 
methodological problems. On the one side, case-studies although providing 
interesting insights usually explain specific cases without providing generalizable 
conclusions. On the other side, large n-quantitative studies are not designed to infer 
causal connections - interalia because they are not able to account for the factors that 
motivate states to ratify the treaty in the first instance (with two important, but 
tentative exception Kaplow forthcoming,362 and Fuhrmann and Lupu363). As said, 
scholars concerned with the study of NPT effectiveness have reached two divergent 
conclusions. Some have argued that the treaty has substantially curbed the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, while others has suggested that treaties have only 
served as screeners (whether or not a country ratify the treaty it provides others with 
useful information concerning its intentions).  
(1) According to the first group – which include Nye, Sagan, Rublee, Dai, Coe and 
Vaynman NPT ratification reduces the likelihood of nuclear proliferation by means of 
several mechanisms.364 These (rational and social) mechanisms have been widely 
described in the previous chapter and include: increase transparency; reduce 
uncertainty about others (behaviours, capabilities’ and intentions); increase the cost 
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of cheating 365 and the cost of abandoning a non-proliferation policy (cost of exit); 366 
learning; socialization etc.. 
Additionally, verification measures (including allowing AIEA inspectors to visit nuclear 
facilities and verify that no diversion occurred with nuclear material) are expected to 
deter members form retreating their commitments. Perspective punishments 
(reputational of material sanctioning), if a violation is detected, is also believed to 
dissuade states from going down the proliferation path because of the material and 
reputational cost they would face.367 International agreements can empower 
domestic minorities or other groups to pressure leaders to respect the commitment 
so that civilian facilities are not disrupted.368 International treaties also facilitates 
transnational actors activities to persuade governments to refrain from violations and 
impose costs on those who violate international norms.369 
(2) On the other side of the conundrum, there are those scholars who believe that the 
NPT has done little to curb the spread of nuclear weapons.370 According to some of 
them, the NPT is itself a consequence of non-proliferation attitudes and indeed 
reflects pre-existing decisions and choices. In their view, the correlation between non-
proliferation stances and the NPT ratification exists, but the two are not causally 
connected.371 A second argument which builds on the institutional weakness of the 
non-proliferation regime, is the one according to which states would never jeopardize 
what they believe to be in their national security interests if this should collide with 
the commitment undertaken under the NPT. Neither the prospect of detection nor 
the threat of punishment can suffice to deter firm proliferators.372 As it has been the 
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case with Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Romania, South Korea, and possibly other NPT 
members.373 
As it has become clear from the literature review presented above, it is possible to 
confirm that the majority of studies trying to describe and assess the role of the non-
proliferation regime have stopped to its framework convention: The Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. With no doubt, the latter along with the BTWC and CWC and their associated 
international organizations represent crucial instruments in the non-proliferation 
menu. However, they do not anymore comprehend the full spectrum of international 
non-proliferation (cooperative) efforts. A number of other international 
arrangements, organizations, agencies have flourished alongside the core non-
proliferation treaties. The end of Cold War on the one side, and the raise of 
international terrorism on the other side, have created openings for developing other 
and new kind of cooperative arrangements. The idea is that new transnational 
problems have created interests in and for “new responses”. If it is common opinion 
that these responses could develop because existing framework conventions were 
already in place and provided the legal and normative formulation that make these 
solutions possible, the new-generation of non-proliferation efforts actually developed 
outside those treaties as complementary and supplementary tools. Sagan has called 
scholars to devote more attention to non-proliferation efforts beyond the NPT 
especially because these efforts have grown in number and diversity and currently 
incorporate a wide set of initiatives (e.g. the PSI, Res 1540, the Global Partnership).374 
There are no equivalent studies of the origins, development and effectiveness of such 
institutions to the ones produced for the NPT. Recently, some of these new forms of 
non-proliferation efforts have attracted the attention of scholars and there are 
growing  studies which cover one or the other initiative in isolation. Some had made 
the attempt to discuss multiple examples altogether producing a comparative analysis 
and drawing some conclusions concerning the evolution of cooperative disarmament 
and non-proliferation efforts. In Arms Control in the 21st Century, Meier and Daase 
argue that recent initiatives have been more informal and coercive in nature than past 
                                                        
373 Fuhrmann and Berejikian, “Disaggregating Noncompliance.” 
374 Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” June 15, 2011. 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 159 
efforts and interpret the shift as a move away from cooperation.375 This view has been 
challenged by Knopf who, in its interesting and rich comparative analysis of post 9/11 
non-proliferation efforts, gets to the contrary conclusion that new cooperative 
initiatives are instead characterized by an increasing collaborative nature over 
previous coordination-like profiles. His volume, contains case studies for a wide range 
of non-proliferation initiatives which involve interstate cooperation. Each case study 
has been guided by a common analytical framework and common conclusions and 
lessons learnt are drawn from the analysis.376 
Müller and Wunderlich had already emphasized the importance of norms in effective 
multilateral arms control;  in a follow-up work the two scholars compared six 
initiatives with respect to their perceived legitimacy concluding that states are more 
likely to embrace initiatives inclusive in membership and which underscore 
management (persuasion and capacity building) over coercion.377 
 
Biological weapons and biosecurity 
 
Like the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the one aimed at governing the possession, 
development, and proliferation of biological weapons (BW) has evolved tremendously 
in the last fifty-years. As it has been the case for the nuclear counterpart, its evolution 
has encompassed a number of initiatives characterized by diverse degrees of 
institutionalization, inclusiveness, and operational capacity which have 
complemented and supplemented the regime’s core treaty: The Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC/BWC). Nonetheless, research and studies covering 
biological weapons and agents face a peculiar element of complexity with respect to 
other non-proliferation regimes (chemical and nuclear). The complexity is not (or at 
least not only) derived from biological agents’ dual nature – feature which to some 
extent BW share with nuclear and chemical agents and precursors – but mainly results 
from the fact that on biological agents converge distinct regulatory networks attaining 
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extremely diverse issue areas of international relations (global/public health, in 
particular). 
 
Throughout history, diseases had a powerful but overlooked influence on 
international security. Although many cases are recorded form antiquity and well-
known bioweapons state programs have been run by major and middle powers 
throughout the twentieth century, biological weapons (although elevated to the 
status of WMD) never gained a critical or prominent role in military/security affairs 
until end of the XX century. 378 
As weapons, biological agents enjoy very specific characteristics. NATO defines them 
as “microorganisms (or toxin derived from), which causes diseases in men, plants or 
animals, or cause deterioration of material.”379  Today, biotechnology and 
nanotechnology advances have induced a progressive enlargement of the BW menu 
which would require a separate discussion. The Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention doesn’t provide a list of pathogens of concern, since most of them do exist 
in nature and are endemic in some areas of the globe.  The United States, by its 
national law, has identified a group of agents called “Select Agents”, which include 39 
pathogens characterized by having “the potential to pose a severe threat to public 
health and safety.”380 
The list, which served as a basis for following inventories (e.g. the Australia Group one) 
has been revised every 2 years. In 2010 (following an Executive Order issued by the 
Obama administration) a subset of regulated agents that pose “the highest risk for 
misuse with a resultant significant impact” has been identified and titled Tier 1.381 
Biological weapons include bacteria, viruses, fungi and toxins. Toxins are chemical 
compounds produced by the metabolic activities of specific organisms or artificially 
                                                        
378 Prior and during WWII, state programs have been started in France, UK, USSR, Canada, Japan, 
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synthetized in laboratories (as it increasingly often the case). Under this perspective, 
toxins do not include the biological agents from which they are derived, do not 
reproduce (as bacteria, viruses and fungi do), are not transmissible from person to 
person and cause poisoning rather than infection. Because of their hybrid nature, 
toxins are considered as positioned halfway between biological agents and chemical 
agents. 
Some of them are the deadliest substances known to exist, with a toxicity that is 
several orders of magnitude greater than nerve agents.382 Theoretically, less than 1 kg 
of anthrax would, if optimally distributed, be enough to deliver a lethal dose to every 
man, woman, and child in the world.383 
Because they have been determined to have the potential to pose sever threat to both 
humans, animals and plants, a sizeable group of toxins (along with the corresponding 
agents) have been included in Tier 1 Agents within the HHS and USDA Select Agents 
and Toxins List. As said, besides traditional agents, biotechnology and nanotechnology 
discoveries have opened the floor for new agents to raise concern. Consequently, 
alongside traditional agents, emerging ones have acquired growing importance: 
bioengineer microorganisms, biomolecular components, bio-technical hybrids, etc. 
As weapons, biological items display specific characteristics. An attack using biological 
weapons may be more sinister than an attack using conventional, chemical or nuclear 
weapons, whose effects are more immediate and obvious. Effective early detection is 
very difficult for two reasons. First, biological weapons display the same type of 
infection of the naturally spread contagion and insidious symptoms can mimic 
endemic diseases. Second, by the time the first casualty is recognized, the agent may 
have already ingested, inhaled, or absorbed by many other victims and more 
casualties may be inevitable despite the adoption of prompt countermeasures.  
Biological Weapons are also unique in their ability to inflict large numbers of casualties 
over a wide area with minimal logistic requirements and by means that they can be 
virtually untraceable.384 Under this perspective, BWs have been described as “mass 
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casualty weapons … [that] do not destroy buildings, cities or transportation. They 
unfortunately just destroy human lives.”385 The sparing of property and physical 
surroundings (compared with conventional or nuclear weapons) has several 
important implications in warfare. 
The ease and low cost of production of some of these biological agents is a further 
relevant element. The cost advantage of biological weapons was clearly illustrated by 
a 1969 United Nation report that estimated the cost of operations against civilian 
populations at $1.00US /Km2 for biological weapons, versus $600.00/Km2 for 
chemical, $800.00/Km2 for nuclear and $2000.00 for conventional armaments.386 
The ease and low cost of producing an agent, the difficulty in detecting its presence 
and protecting (and treating) its intended victims, and the potential to selectively 
target humans, animals, or plants make defence against these class of weapons 
particularly difficult.  
Another aspect of biological warfare to an enemy is that defensive programs always 
tend to lag behind the current offensive. This is due to three major factors: (1) 
defensive efforts are not initiated until the threat is evident, (2) defensive system 
generally require longer development times in comparison to offensive systems, (3) 
medical defences may be even more problematic and take even longer to field due to 
important regulatory requirements that impose strict guidelines on the development 
of vaccines and prophylactic drug for use in human being. 387 
 
Notwithstanding some attractive features, biological weapons have been considered 
of limited importance in battlefield for practical reasons. The first and foremost 
important drawback of BWs is the concrete danger that biological agents could affect 
the health of the aggressor forces. The possibility that secondary aerosols of the agent 
will be generated as the aggressor moves through an area already attacked is far from 
being remote. The unpredictability of morbidity secondary to a biological attack is 
high, since casualties (including civilians) will be related to the quantity and the 
                                                        
385 Tucker, “Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union,” 1–10. 
386 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive 
Operations. A Med- P6, part 2, Biological, Final Draft, 1992. 
 
 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 163 
manner of exposure. The relatively long incubation period for many agents is a factor 
that drastically limits their tactical usefulness. 
Furthermore, biological agents’ survivability and dissemination tend to be subject to 
weather conditions, temperature, sunlight and effects of temperature. Last, and 
absolutely crucial shortcoming of BWs is the worldwide diffuse public’s aversion to 
the idea of their actual deployment. 
It is clear that the recent advanced in biological sciences (“biotechnology revolution”) 
have already impacted dramatically on the redistribution of advantage and 
disadvantages. 
With the advent of recombinant DNA technology (especially gene drives and CAS-9), 
researchers have developed standard methodologies for altering an organism’s 
genetic makeup. Application of this technology to BW can radically change traditional 
biological warfare. Examples of potential modifications include gain of function 
research antibiotic resistance, increased aerosol stability, heightened pathogenesis, 
selectivity.388 Ultimately, modifications introduced may serve to increase 
effectiveness of traditional BW agents or counteract known aspects of the target 
population’s biomedical defence strategy without manipulating the parental organism 
in a manner that might compromise the natural properties suitable for biological 
warfare use.389 The key implications of certain types of studies is clearly indicated by 
the intense regulation on life science research (as interalia the US Government DURC 
Policies and WHO guidelines). 
 
It would impossible to summarize/review in few paragraphs the history of biological 
warfare and for this reason, the present section summarizes the most revenant 
aspects and  recent developments. For a detailed description see interalia Seth Carus 
in “A short History of Biological Warfare”.390   
In the last century, the use of BW in warfare has been rare: Germany WWI (in 
Argentina), Japan WWII (against the Chinese), allegations have been moved both 
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towards the United States (during the Korean War) and the Soviet Union (in 1984, 
Indochina) accused of having employed mycotoxins. 
In terms of bioterrorism and biocrime in its dataset, Seth Carus acknowledges 27 
ascertained uses and 5 cases of possession (within more than 270 alleged cases).391 
Notwithstanding the few cases, the potential consequences of BW are immense as 
demonstrated by recent epidemics: the cost off SARS has been estimated at about 40-
50 billion, the Foot and Mouth Disease epidemic was also extremely burdensome (30 
billions).  
Based on Horowitz and Narang dataset released in 2014 (which builds and improve on 
Horowitz 2004) we can count in the period 1945-2000 a total of  21 countries pursuing 
in different times and for diverse time-frames biological weapons, only 11 of those 
countries were reportedly able to achieve deployable arsenals. 
Notwithstanding the few cases of use reported and the inevitably loose estimation of 
the risk of incidents or diversion linked to peaceful programs, the potential 
consequences of BW related events remain serious as demonstrated by the material 
and humanitarian cost of epidemics and pandemics in recent times. Oxford Economics 
has suggested that the burden of a global pandemic, including spill-over across 
industry sectors, could be as great as $3.5tn – an impact far greater than the 
magnitude of the financial crisis of 2008.392 
 
The new millennium marked a turning point in the consideration of the threat posed 
by biological agents as a prominent security matter.393 In 2001 a number of worrying 
events – including the anthrax letters’ attacks and a series of high profile experiments 
emphasizing potential misuses of life science advances – abruptly brought biological 
agents into the international security agenda.394 Natural occurring infectious diseases 
(HIV, SARS, H5N1 avian influenza, and more recently Ebola or Marburg) started being 
perceived as linked not only to humanitarian emergencies, but also to actual security 
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crises in the sense that they proved able to threaten, besides individual citizens, the 
very institutions that define and defend the character of modern societies.395  
This re-consideration came along with a new understanding of the scope and sources 
of the threat posed by biological agents.  
A recent and systematic review of literature has identified at least 4 major trends, 
largely outside the control of nation states and international communities, as 
responsible for the increased risks posed by biological threats in our time.396 
(1) The first trend is represented by the changed and changing nature of conflicts. If in 
the past, the possibility of wars among nation-states used to dominate any discourse 
and practice within security studies, current concerns come from very different 
sources: terrorism along with international crime are gaining centre-stage.397 
If making a functional WMD out of a biological agent or a toxin is not an easy task even 
for states - considerable (and mostly “tacit”) knowledge and resources are necessary 
for scaling up, storage and develop suitable dissemination methods - the recourse to 
strains with less than optimal characteristics, through crude delivery methods, under 
imperfect conditions, is a real possibility.398 
Whilst non-proliferation experts share the view that the risk for a sophisticated state-
led and large-scale attack with bio-agents is very small,399 they also believe that the 
risk for the misuse of readily-available agents or, more likely, toxins in a 
small/medium-scale terrorist or a criminal action is very real and very present. Toxins’ 
potential as agents of crime and terrorism lays in their invisibility, delayed effect, 
relatively easy access, and incredibly high lethality. Furthermore, terrorists tend to act 
free from moral constraints, so that the horror associated with the usage of 
unconventional tools (that may have refrained states from their use) make them even 
more appealing and attractive to them.400 Toxins relevant to bioterrorism include 
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ricin, botulinum, Clostridium perfrigens epsilson toxin, conotoxins, shigatoxins, 
saxitoxins, tetrodotoxins, mycotoxins, and nicotine.401 
Quite tellingly, historical evidences give reasons to what argued above. The three 
more renowned realized or attempted “bio-attacks” in the past century happened to 
be operated by sectarian groups (or individuals) and saw the involvement of raw 
toxins: (i) Salmonella, by which members of the Rajaneeshee cult contaminated salad 
bars in local restaurants to sicken potential voters (1984); (ii) Botulinium toxin and 
anthrax, in the case of the attempted use made by Aum Shinrikio in Japan; (iii) and the 
already mentioned anthrax letters sent to the media outlets and US Congress 
members in 2001.402 
The disruptive effect these attacks can entail is huge; beyond casualties, economic and 
social consequences can be massive to the point of endangering not only individual 
citizens but also the institutions that define and defend the actual character of the 
society in its entirety.  
(2) A second trend which characterize biological agents in the 21st century, derives 
from the accelerating pace of innovation in biotechnology, which has resulted in the 
growth of microbial threats to human health and nanotechnology applied to life 
science. For example, as far as toxins are concerned, growing research interest for 
application in medical treatment, pharmaceuticals and agriculture shows that S&T 
advances are changing the way toxins are being produced and used. Synthetic biology 
approaches already exist for biological agents and toxins modification that can make 
them more suitable as large-scale weapons and more selective in terms of their target 
(gain of function (GOF)).403 There is also a mounting discussion on whether new 
technologies will one day enable the cost-effective production of large quantities of 
agents (an example being the increased synthesis and use of botulinum toxin both for 
therapeutic and cosmetic purposes). It comes without saying that performing specific 
type of research, GOF and similar, brings about new risks and challenges even in the 
absence of malicious purposes or intents. Accidental releases of dangerous substance 
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are always possible, especially if safety measures are not observed, as the dramatic 
leak of anthrax spores from military facilities has shown in past times (Gruinard Island, 
Sverdlovsk, etc.).404 
Furthermore, the democratisation effect of synthetic biology and systems biology, 
with easier public access to data, analysis and materials may be a significant factor in 
reducing implicit knowledge and “entry requirements and resources” and enable, in 
the future, laypersons or single actors to get to more effective and dangerous results 
(especially because non-linear progress is to be expected in the field). This 
understanding has amplified the fear that humans might be able to create and 
manipulate life before the achievement of a real capability to prevent such 
technologies from being misused.405 
Implications of cutting-edge researches (in the field of biotechnology and 
nanotechnology) over the regime covering the use and development of toxins for 
malicious purpose remain unclear; the “convergence” between biology and chemistry 
that these researches entail, may have already outpaced the capacity of the normative 
system to adapt and cover all possible externalities. 
(3) The third trend is represented by the constantly enlarging basin of potential threat-
agents emerging due to the natural and unremitting evolution of microorganisms, the 
identification of previously unknown infection disease agents and the return (often in 
drug-resistant forms) of well-known, but quasi-eradicated, strains. Since 1973, more 
than thirty previously unknown infectious disease agents such as HIV, Ebola and SARS 
have been identified. (4) A fourth major trend, not explored in its complexity here, is 
linked to the globalization of the pharmaceutical and biotech industries along with the 
diffusion of information about life sciences. These changing circumstances are also 
making the ingredients to misuse biological products more widely available.  
These changes have come along together with the growing acceptance among the 
international political community of a more comprehensive understanding of bio-
security. The term biosecurity no longer refers exclusively to a traditional “military 
threat” posed by states to enemy-states, but it comprises multiple and varied 
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potential perpetrators (sources of threat) and inevitably new and different “targets” 
(at-risks groups). Taken altogether this new complex of threats and targets provides 
for a new taxonomy for bio-insecurity. As far as the type of actors potentially 
responsible for posing the threat: states; non-states actors including terrorists; 
criminals; scientists and nature are all possible candidates. Traditional state-based 
biological warfare programs go hand in hand with actions carried out by non-state 
actors who have also demonstrated an interest in acquiring and using biological 
agents. On their part, scientists engaged in research on infectious diseases and 
biotechnology are increasingly capable of posing two different types of biological risks: 
through the accidental release of a pathogen outside the laboratory and the 
generation and enforcement of the tacit-knowledge necessary that could be misused 
for malicious purposes. Finally, the natural and human-influenced process of microbial 
evolution is a never-ending source of biological threats. In particular, a subset of 
infectious diseases, called pandemics, have the potential to pose direct threats to 
national and international security through a combination of their prevalence, 
transmissibility, virulence and lethality. With regard to the possible victims of bio 
agents, these can range from individuals to communities to society, and entire states. 
From the taxonomy here accepted it follows that bio-event can assume many different 
forms: biological warfare, terrorism, bio-crimes, laboratory accidents, and pandemic, 
endemic and epidemic diseases.   
In conclusion, it is worth noting that from whoever it comes and whoever is the target 
of bio-agents, bio-attacks (or natural out-breaks) display the dramatic characteristic 
of being abrupt and “offensive” in nature. This makes preventive initiatives extremely 
demanding, expensive and, up to now, incapable to address effectively the problem. 
Early-warning, sound preparedness and a comprehensive response are acknowledged 
as valuable strategies to contain the negative consequences of bio-events 
The analysis of programmatic documents from relevant agencies operating in the field 
(UNODA, UNCTITF, UNICRI, JRC, WHO, OIE interalia) confirm findings well 
documented in open literature.406 Most importantly, the ongoing discussion clearly 
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remarks that faced with international new challenges, a new security culture 
progressively has emerged which is hallmarked by: 
(1) Greater emphasis on a smart preparation and response (across traditional IR issue-
areas - security, health, and environment) by addressing those hazards that are 
feasible to target in order to reduce vulnerabilities and mitigate consequences of 
biological events. 
(2) Deeper involvement of the life sciences community. On the one hand, this 
community (scientists) and its associate infrastructure of high bio-containment 
laboratories (Biosafety Level 3 and 4) represents a key source of expertise, 
information and material that could be misused. At the same time and more 
importantly, life scientists are best positioned to reinforce the norms against the 
misuse of biology, to detect suspicious activities and to identify emerging technologies 
that pose risks to biosecurity. Aside from some naturally occurring infectious diseases, 
these threats are rare and their assessments require great expertise in order to focus 
on real risks. 
(3) comprehensive and integrated approaches. Experts and practitioners believe that, 
in order for cooperation to work in containing the full spectrum of biological threats, 
shared practices need to be established within countries (diverse institutions and 
agents) and among countries (biosecurity goes global). A broad definition of 
biosecurity (like the one here accepted) implies that, within each country, bio-risk 
assessments and response strategies need to be developed throughout 
multidisciplinary approaches. In their view, successful results can be reached only by 
means of a greater cooperation between public health, life sciences, national security 
and law enforcement communities.  Early warning of potential risks and rapid 
identification will depend on tools such as microbial forensics and joint criminal-
epidemiological investigation that rely on close cooperation: social and political 
institutions are believed to become increasingly dependent on experts as a 
consequence of the growing ambivalence and uncertainties that societies face.  
Furthermore, as often repeated in public discourses addressing the topic, diseases 
know no borders, and cooperation (especially within response oriented actions) 
cannot be limited to individual countries’ responses. In today’s interconnected world, 
an outbreak of highly communicable disease anywhere in the globe increases the risk 
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to everyone, particularly if the outbreak is of deliberate origin. Under this perspective, 
there is a strong convincement that efforts, whether for public health or against 
terrorism must be concerted internationally and inter-agency. On the practical level, 
the main challenge lays in the fact that different states tend to respond in diverse ways 
to the same emergency and deploy different actors to implement such response; this 
lack of uniformity makes domestic and international agencies’ communication and 
coordination difficult and demanding.  
 
Health security and the case of the World Health Organization 
 
Over the past decade, the study of global public health and its interconnection with 
security has become a prominent and rapidly growing field of research.407 The nexus 
between biological agents and security has existed since the dawn of civilization, 
mainly in terms of biological warfare, the co-option of microbiologists or medical 
doctors tasked with weaponizing germs, and military medicine. Nonetheless, the 
current formal and persistent link between the two dimensions is a different one 
insofar involves global public health at large (health systems, human resources, 
knowledge, infrastructures). The shift does not only echo a growing tendency to 
articulate international health policies in the language and vocabulary of security, but 
also reflects a substantial drive towards a more and more institutionalized and 
acquainted participation of public health (with its technical expertise) in security 
matters.408 This has finally resulted in a resolute cross contamination between the two 
fields. Since the year 2000, the Global Health Security (GHS) discourse has gained 
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increasing traction and popularity, fed policy decisions,409 and informed an expanding 
literature, which have copiously elaborated on the associations existing between 
these previously separated policy fields, their differing practices, and on effects the 
link itself has produced (progressively accepted by public opinion).  
Two main intertwined drivers for explaining this process (known as “securitization of 
health”) can be identified. One lays in the foundation of a “post-cold war security 
agenda” which stopped being dominated by the spectrum of the thermonuclear war 
between the two superpowers and opened to “new security challenges” posed by 
global/transboundary issues (such as climate change, energy and resource 
availability). The second one was the establishment of human security based 
approaches to world politics, which value “new security objects” (in primis human 
well-being). This in deep contrast with traditional state centric understanding of 
security410 and international relations.411 
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buildup, nuclear stockpiling and foreign intelligence. 
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During the last two decades, the debate about Global Health Security (GHS) has 
structured around three main questions/issues.412 (1) The first one pertains to the 
scope and application of GHS: if health and security are to be linked in a global 
landscape, which is the scope of the connection? What is the content of a Global 
Health Security agenda? Does GHS represent the manner in which diseases may affect 
(efficiently or adversely) military capacity and operations (including weaponization of 
diseases),413 or is it the way public health actions can contribute to the achievement 
of non-health related political objectives (health diplomacy)?414 Is it the way health 
threats (to civilian population) can become security threats as they can jeopardize the 
security profile of a country?415 Or does GHS refer to the provision of medical 
assistance and humanitarian intervention in areas of conflict (e.g. war, civil wars, and 
failing states)?416  Or does GHS refer to the way violent conflict (from wars to 
terrorism) can impact on public health services?417 Or to the fact that the premature 
loss of life caused by diseases “per se” represents one of the greatest threats to people 
around the world (pure human security approaches)?418  
(2) The second theme has explored which (if any) health issues come to constitute 
security threats? And what should be done to address those threats (in other words, 
what should be an efficient GHS the response)? (3) Finally, the latter issue, which is 
                                                        
412 For a comprehensive assessment and analysis see: Rushton and Youde, Routledge Handbook of 
Global Health Security. 
413 Price-Smith and Price-Smith, Contagion and Chaos; Elbe, “HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of 
War in Africa”; Heinecken, “HIV/AIDS, the Military and the Impact on National and International 
Security,” on the way Spanish Influenza and HIV/AIDS have undermined military capacity of 
Austria/Germany (WWI) and southern Africa (present), respectively. 
414 Kamradt-Scott, “WHO’s to Blame?”; Davies, Kamradt-Scott, and Rushton, Disease Diplomacy; 
Fidler, Assessing the Foreign Policy and Global Health Initiative. 
415 In this case the link between health and security is strong and not really contested, in the sense that 
it is commons sense that naturally emerging / re-emerging infectious disease as well as other events 
with dramatic health consequences can be just as damaging as an attack by a foreign power in terms 
of causing significant morbidity, mortality, and economic disruption. This position has largely 
proceeded within a national security paradigm for rapidly spreading infectious diseases represent a 
frank threat to the state-centric conception of security as in the past “tropical diseases” represented a 
threat to the military and commercial interests of imperial powers. 
416 McInnes and Rushton, “Smart Power?” 
417 Iqbal, “Health and Human Security.” 
418 Also this type of link, by generically considering almost any high lethality/morbidity event (including 
non-communicable diseases) as a credible security threat, has courted much less controversy among 
practitioners (because it doesn’t require any specific prioritization) 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 173 
also the more controversial one, has focused on the risks (operational and reputation) 
of uncritically endorsing (or sanctioning) the relationship between health and security. 
 
As the leading agency for global public health, WHO had generously contributed to 
the debate around health and security.419 
The term “security” already appears in the Organization’s Constitution,420 nonetheless 
the momentum for Global Health Security discourse at WHO reached a turning point 
in the year 2000. The shift was facilitated by the longstanding existence inside the 
Organization of an “authorized expertise” accustomed to deal with security since the 
50s.421 That expertise was reinforced by the establishment of a more structured 
“governance and technical apparatus” which was sponsored by the USA (IOM report 
(1992)); Canada (Lac Trembland Declaration (1994)) and other northern allies and 
taken forward by the World Health Organization itself (in a couple of meetings held in 
1994 and 1995) through WHA Res 48.13, the creation of the EMC, and a series of 
operations which did take place from the late 1990s.  
By the end of the century the two fields (health and security) became explicitly 
interconnected at WHO. WHA Resolution 54.14 (May 2001)422 officially designed 
Epidemic Alert and Response as Global Health Security issue. The international 
security mandate linked to the preservation of Global Health Security was further 
extended under resolution 55.16423 which called on member states to “treat any 
deliberate use, including local, of biological, chemical, and radiological attack to cause 
harm also as a global public health threat”. The passage is significant because it 
admitted a traditionally security matter (CBRN) in WHO’s remit, although indirectly 
through the all-risk approach adopted by the resolution. The following IHR revision, 
although confirming the general support to the all-risk approach, opened the floor to 
serious consultations/confrontations among member states and regional groups on 
                                                        
419 Weir, “A Genealogy of Global Health Security.” 
420 “Constitution of the World Health Organization.” 
421 Interalia ICMM-WHO Memorandum of Understanding (1952), engagement with BTWC negotiation 
and RevCon (1968/69); “Public Health Impact of chemical and biological agents” (1972), ICMM MoU, 
Sverdlovsk investigation, earlier collaborations with Pugwash, NATO, etc. 
422 WHA Resolution 54.14 - Global health security: epidemic alert and response, May 21 2001 
423 WHA Resolution 55.16 - Global public health response to natural occurrence, accidental release or 
deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or radio nuclear material that affect health, May 2002 
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the role of WHO should have had in security relevant matters. In particular a southern 
bloc of states (EMRO, SEARO, WPRO) acted vocally against the inclusion of 
international security elements in the text of the treaty in the form of words like 
“threat” (substituted by the wording risk), “CBRN”, and any other language that would 
explicitly grant the WHO the power to undertake suspect treaty violations involving 
weapons of mass destruction (e.g. in the case of Biological Weapons and the BWC).424 
In example, the Global Alert & Response Network (GOARN) was designed as a 
partnership intended to have response capacity for public health responses including 
those attaining accidentally or deliberately caused outbreaks.425 The result was a 
complex compromise which, while stripping all explicit reference to security, retained 
the all-risk scope (in practice encompassing harm from CBRN incidents and the 
provision of technical expertise in case of outbreaks of unknown origin). Furthermore, 
and concerning to potential investigations, if an outbreak was/is suspected to be 
intentionally or unintentionally caused, it was stated that WHO would have been 
required to inform the UN Security Council, which would have , in its turn, decided if 
an investigation was be conducted at all, and in case it was, if it may have involved 
WHO technical assistance (for example in the framework of a UNSGM investigative 
mission “to provide support as far as public health-related aspects are 
concerned”426427 – as per the letter of the Memorandum of Understanding between 
WHO and UNODA formalized in 2011).428 
Since its revision, the International Health Regulations (2005), a legally binding 
agreement designed to build and strengthen national alert and response system, has 
become the key driver to strengthen global public health security.429 
Notwithstanding this substantial connection, focusing on definitional issues, it can be 
said that even within the WHO, the leading UN agency monitoring/supplying global 
                                                        
424 For a detailed description of the IHR, see Chapter 3 
425 Weir, “A Genealogy of Global Health Security.” 
426 Agreement between the United Nations and the World Health Organization, approved by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 November 1947 and by the World Health assembly on 
10 July 1948 
427 Hjalmarsson et al., “Global Watch.” 
428 “Memorandum of Understanding between the World Health Organization and the United Nations 
concerning WHO’s support to the Secretary General’s Mechanism for investigation of the alleged use 
of chemical, biological, or toxin weapons” (31 January 2011) 
429 Rodier et al., “Global Public Health Security.” 
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public health policies, health-security language has been less consistent than one 
would expect.  The 2007 Report issued on the State of Health Security, which describes 
the drivers of international health crisis and the progress made on the implementation 
of IHR, does not provide a one-fits-all definition for GHS.430431 The situation has not 
changed that much since then (see the 2017 report on “Global Health and Foreign 
Policy: Strengthening the Management of International Health Crises”).432 
However, if on the one side, it is clear that promiscuity can bring vagueness and dilute 
debate. On the other end, GHS amorphous character might also be what has given the 
concept its potency and endurance. In fact, non-specific and vague definitions allow 
different groups to work together without full-consensus (providing interpretive 
flexibility and a common language for deliberation).  On the contrary, restrictive uses 
of the term may have provided clarity and focus, but would have inevitably removed 
topics of some potential interest for some parties from the debate with the 
unwelcome result of excluding them from the play (securing health from threats). This 
is a particularly undesirable outcome exactly insofar the threat is one that can only be 
dealt with successful by cooperative initiatives. 
With regard to Health Security, two approaches have prevailed: inclusive and narrow 
approaches. 
1) Inclusive approaches are also known as “Public Health and Security” approaches. 
The WHO Constitution clearly states that the objective of the Organization is the 
“attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health”, with “health” being 
“a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease and infirmity.” The link with security is established in the preamble 
(paragraph 4), which reads: “The health of all peoples is fundamental to the 
attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon the fullest co-operation of 
individuals and States”. From this perspective follows the idea that ‘health’ 
participates to security. This is an inclusive profile insofar the relationship between 
health and security, as all those activities aimed at promoting health at the same time 
                                                        
430 Lancet, “WHO fails to address health security available at 
http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(07)61350-6.pdf 
431 Aldis, “Health Security as a Public Health Concept.” 
432 The report A771/598 pursuant general assembly resolution 70/183 (2016): “Global health and 
foreign policy: strengthening the management of international health crises” 
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contribute to the attainment of security itself (directly or indirectly). This 
understanding recalls what some authors means by “health and security” which is 
traditionally used to describe the positive/negative impact that health can make over 
global security (for example within the framework of the recognised links existing 
between health and policy/economics at country levels).433434 This is the case of those 
situations where weak national health systems impair the security of a state itself 
(being the case of poor population’s health conditions affecting the military capability 
of a state just one example). But this is also the case of those circumstances where 
health is used to achieve non-health specific objectives (health diplomacy) potentially 
raising the security of the acting state.435 
 
2) Narrow approaches (Health Security = secure Health). Later WHO documents have 
linked health and security in a way that holds health as an object/value to be 
securitized in itself and consistently have focused the attention on those specific 
actions that are aimed at “securing health” of communities and individuals from 
threats (of different types and provenance). Logically, with the passage of time, what 
can “threat” health has changed (both in perception and reality) flowing from military 
to communicable diseases, to emergencies, to health crisis (most recently). Under this 
perspective, the approach is less “narrow” than one would think and health security 
has become the umbrella term where to place all activities required to “minimize 
vulnerability to acute public health events that endanger the collective health of 
populations living across geographic regions and international boundaries.”436 
An example of this expanded menu is provided by the list of perceived threats against 
which ‘health’ must be secured which is presented below together with the relevant 
documents. 
                                                        
433 Andoh, S.Y., M. Umezaki, K. Nakamura, M. Kizuki, and T. Takano. Correlation between National 
Income, HIV/AIDS and Political Status and Mortalities in African Countries. Public Health 120, no. 7 (July 
2006): 624–33 
434 Andoh et al., “Correlation between National Income, HIV/AIDS and Political Status and Mortalities 
in African Countries,” 624–33. 
435 Fidler DP. Assessing the foreign policy and global health initiative: the meaning of the Oslo process 
[Internet]. Chatham House London; 2011 
436 World Health Organization, The world health report 2007 - A safer future: global public health 
security in the 21st century. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2007. 
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1. Communicable diseases potentially spreading across national borders [and 
antimicrobial drug resistance] (WHA 54.14).437 
2. Natural occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use of biological and chemical 
agents or radionuclear material that affect health (A 55/20 and WHA 55.16).438  
3. Any public health emergency of international concerns, in line with the all-risks/all-
hazards approach, with a specific focus on those conditions susceptible of 
becoming global emergencies (potentially including chemical agents: “Spread of 
toxic, infectious or otherwise hazardous materials that may be occurring naturally 
or otherwise that has contaminated or has the potential to contaminate a 
population and/or a large geographical area.”)439 
4. Acute threats to health with a focus on specific threats like (a) epidemic-prone 
diseases (b) foodborne diseases; (c) accidental and deliberate outbreaks (including 
toxic chemicals/radionuclear/environmental disasters) and most specifically on 
pandemic influenza; drug resistant tuberculosis; international spread of polio 
versus “traditional health security priorities (plague, cholera, and smallpox.)”440 
5. International health crisis, whose drivers are manifold, and include: (a) Infectious 
Hazards (new and re-emerging diseases, and epidemics); (b) Political instability 
and insecurity; (b) attacks on health care facilities; (c) population displacement 
and migration; (d) urbanization and shifting demographics (urbanized landscapes); 
(e) changing weather patterns and other climate-related risks (WHO 2016)441; (f) 
mass gatherings/high-density crowd places. 
 
In order to explore the relationship between health security as it is practically 
perceived by technical experts in the field a set of interviews and informal 
conversations has been conducted as a spin-off to the present thesis. The general 
                                                        
437 WHA Resolution 54.14 - Global health security: epidemic alert and response, May 2001 
438 WHA Resolution 55.16 - Global public health response to natural occurrence, accidental release or 
deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or radio nuclear material that affect health, May 
2002 
439 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (2005). Third edition. Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2016. 
440 World Health Organization, The world health report 2007 - A safer future: global public health 
security in the 21st century. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2007 
441 Report of the World Health Organization on the State of Health Security. The report A771/598 
pursuant general assembly resolution 70/183, Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2016 
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approach used for coding has followed the framework method. A set of codes (jointly 
developed through preliminary assessments) has been organized into categories to 
manage and organize the data from the interviews. However, in some cases, open 
coding did take place to value all the information received by the experts.442 
Building on the interviews and informal conversations engaged with WHO 
staff/experts, it is possible to refine our understanding that activities at the health and 
security interface are described by practitioners and implementers as “those public 
health activities whose performance involve to some extent the security sector 
broadly understood (law enforcement, police, national armies, ministries of defence, 
military doctors, international and non-governmental organizations with a security 
relevant mandate). These activities encompass inter alia (1) specific areas of work 
(smallpox and other high-risk pathogens, dual R&D and biosecurity, toxic chemical 
agents, HPLN etc.); (2) deliberate events and joint-activities of various degrees of 
overlapping with security-relevant actors (research, operations, training, networks 
and labs); (3) outbreak response operations in non-permissive environments, highly 
politicized contexts, conflicts, and wars (i.e. Syria, Iraq, etc.)”. 
The working definition presented above has resulted and builds on a series of patterns 
which are listed below: 
(1) Health Security Interface (HSI) activities include protection of health from 
traditional and emerging risks/threats.  
These risks/threats are both those to populations (in its entirety), such as emerging 
pandemic-prone communicable diseases, SARS, Ebola, avian influenza, and AIDS, and 
those tackling single individuals.  
Systemic weaknesses to health security that have been identified by the interviewees 
and open literature include:  - Deliberate use of biological agents and toxic chemicals (by a wider range of 
perpetrators). Current security concerns come from non-state actors (terrorism 
along with international crime are gaining centre-stage). The possibility for a well-
                                                        
442 The interviews were semi-structured in the sense that, to solicit inputs on the topics under 
analysis, open-ended questions have been provided to the interviewees before engaging each 
conversation. As well as a common template was prepared and circulated in order to facilitate the 
discussion by providing a common language and background 
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organized and funded “terrorist” group to obtain agents through theft or 
bargaining with a state willing to sell a weapon is considered real and tangible. - Accelerating pace of innovation in technology and dual-use materials. A wide 
range of materials and technologies aimed at peaceful purposes have the potential 
to be used to harm. Many agents with a potential for weaponization are currently 
produced at commercial facilities. - Attacks to health facilities (and staff) and their verification processes. Material 
security measures around relevant facilities and critical infrastructure are of 
possible concern, especially in developing countries (budget constraints, limited 
human resources and capacity etc.) - Fragile normative systems and weak leadership in preparedness and response 
(especially in specific areas/regions). Although many agents are forbidden under 
the international non-proliferation treaties, many states/actors may gain access 
to the precursors and to open source information detailing the process of 
weaponization of agents (especially chemical/bio).  - Frail global preparedness mechanisms which are not yet fully operational and a 
level of investment that remains insufficient in front of the magnitude of global 
public health security issues. Different and poorly integrated preparedness levels 
in diverse countries cause the preparedness level of the weakest de facto 
determining the overall preparedness of the system. - The anti-vaccine movement vs rapid vaccine development (i.e. blue print initiative) - Academic collaborations and partnerships, including nationality-issues for highly 
politicised conflict/countries. - The role of military personnel in crisis management (international versus national 
operators) 
(2) HSI activities include operations aimed at assuring health services in non-permissive 
environments (NPE), highly-politicized contexts/conflicts, and wars. Already 
complicate situations can be exacerbated by the emergence of new global conditions 
for which existing approaches are possibly inadequate (being the Cholera outbreak in 
the Republic of Yemen just the latest example). For example, the provision of medical 
aid and humanitarian intervention in so-called failed states, in which conflicts within 
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rather than between states have replaced previous dynamics; or in countries 
presenting high domestic/civil unrest indexes; or where inclusiveness/permeability 
among different ministries (e.g. public health and defence) is very high with 
information flowing with no constrains from one to the other.  
(3) HSI activities are also those that are performed in collaborations with / or which 
entail the engagement of old and new security actors (including law-enforcement and 
specific categories of the military establishment); Concerns have been raised, that 
there is increased and, in some cases, routine involvement of military units/EMT in 
public health interventions. Some of the interviewees expressed reservations of 
systematic engagement in the field with war fighters, law enforcement and 
intelligence-related agencies. Conversely, they often comfortably operate alongside 
with traditional military medical personnel, when it comes to field operations. An 
example of this joint action is the engagement of foreign militaries in the response to 
the 2005 Asian tsunami disaster (or Ebola, Iraq and others…). While the assistance was 
welcome, low-altitude surveillance flights over areas such as the politically sensitive 
Aceh region of Indonesia by foreign armed forces were a potential source of concern. 
Similar cases have been the Syrian Arab Republic, the Republic of Iraq, Ukraine, and 
the Republic of Yemen. 
 (4) HSI activities have also been described as the product of the incipient linkage of 
health policies to foreign policy interest. There is a growing acceptance that health is 
a legitimate foreign policy concern, and/or a mean to achieve foreign policy goals (e.g. 
health diplomacy). At the same time, both new and traditional health institutions 
recognize that the reverse is also true, and health is affected by the policies of non-
health sectors (the concept of “Health in All Policies”, as the WHO DG recently recalled 
at the margins of AFRO Regional Committee). 
Beyond patterns of activities, a supplementary way to look at the way the health and 
security sectors have intensified their relationship is by analysing the distribution of 
funding awarded transferred from one to the other sector. More specifically, it is 
possible to investigate whether and how the World Health Organization has been 
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receiving funding from “security donors”.443 Under this perspective, two datasets have 
been acquired and scrutinized: WHO Awards General Funding 2006-2016, and WHO 
Annual Expenditure (per awards). This has meant navigating and screening 
throughout about 27000 awards from more than 1000 donors, and implied a detailed 
tracking of a selection of more than 40 security donors across space 
(HQ/WHE/regions) and time (8 years). Dataset is classified, although aggregated data 
are available on the WHO website.444  
 
The WHO biennial budget has more than doubled in the past few decades (from US$ 
1.6 billion in 1998-1999 to > US$ 4 in both 2014/15 and 2016/17). With core budget 
flat (or declining in actualised financial terms), almost all of the growth is attributable 
to the increase in discretionary funding (voluntary contributions (VCs)) that have 
indeed contributed to the total budget for a 48.8% in 2008-2009, to an 85% in 
2016/2017. If at a first glance, this funding appears multilateral, advance 
investigations show that it is essentially controlled by a bilateral donor (multi-bi).445  
In this framework, security-relevant donors have come into play (with an overall 
commitment that doubled between 2009 and 2017). This funding has been delivered 
mainly by a handful of states and shareholders ((United States (DTRA, CDC, Defence, 
Navy, Department of State) which have this way accounted for around half of the 
security budget in 2016, plus DFTAD, UK MOD, EU (DEVCO/ECHO), GAVI Alliance, and 
CERF. In summary, budgets reveal that a significant proportion of the increased 
funding for health come from contributions that are discretionary/multi bi-lateral (so-
called “Trojan” multilateralism) with important consequences (earmarked, board-
dependent, narrow-problem oriented, and short-time constrained). 446  
                                                        
443 By security relevant donors we meant 46 contributors including Member States and local 
governments, NGOs, and philanthropic foundations with a direct/indirect security pertinent mandate 
(e.g. US DOS, DETRA, UK MOF, DFTAD etc.) 
444 http://www.who.int/about/finances-accountability/budget/en/ 
445 The term refers to the practice of donors choosing to route non-core funding, earmarked for 
specific sectors, themes, countries, or regions through multilateral agencies (being an example the 
voluntary contributions within WHO, trust funds within the World Bank, the Global Fund and the 
GAVI alliance 
 
446 Reinsberg, Michaelowa, and Eichenauer, “The Rise of Multi-Bi Aid and the Proliferation of Trust 
Funds.” 
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From the analysis of WHO expenditure per award (2012-2016), it is possible to derive 
additional insights. First of all, it is confirmed that the category (based on FENSA 
framework/taxonomy) where security donors are more relevant is still the one of 
member states (as in most of cases security donors are represented by the ministries 
of foreign affairs and defence) where a growing trend is also observed (from 
approximately US$ 167 million in 2012 to US$ 299 million in 2016). Nonetheless, 
security relevant contribution through “partnerships” and “non-governmental 
organization” is stable and not to be underestimated. Secondly, the analysis reveal 
that HQ represents the first destination for security funding with a total 
US$1,789,307,026.38 of capital which flowed into its budget between 2012 and 2016 
from security donors (mainly CDC USA; GAVI Alliance; CERF; MoFA Canada, Finland, 
and Australia; and ECHO) in the period 2012-2016. More specifically, and with 
reference to WHE in the same period, top-9 ‘security donors’ contribution (CERF, 
ECHO, CDC USA, DTRA, MoFA Japan, Canada, Germany, Finland; GAVI Alliance) have 
accounted for never less than 40% of WHE VCs funding each year.  
Regions are also following the same trend with AFRO and EMRO largely relying on 
security-relevant funding (between 10 and 50% of the total VC - depending on the 
year). In terms of the activity funded by the security budget, a specific 
connection/linkage or necessary association between donors and activities cannot be 
acknowledged, although some trends/priority areas can be identified and include (but 
are not limited to):  
(1) IHR and related actions: (a) state parties’ assistance and capacity building 
(assessment (including JEE), preparedness, response, points of entry, mass gathering 
events (b) improving global and local bio-surveillance through workforce capacity 
development (training and workshops) and event detection/hot spot surveillance/risk 
assessment) and infrastructures (including protection of); (c) laboratories 
(strengthening capacities for detection and reinforcing networks (EDPLN); (d) HPLN. 
(2) international regulatory framework and partnerships/cooperation (tripartite, UN 
family and beyond) 
(3) response to major epidemics or public health events of international concern (all-
risk approach) including GOARN, EOC, REMPAN 
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Finally, and in consideration of the significant contribution security donors from the 
United States provide to WHO, of some relevance is the study of the US federal budget 
on “health security”. 447  
The proposed FY2018 budget, for health security–related programs, represents a 
significant decrease in funding from prior years and previous administrations. In total, 
the President’s proposed FY2018 budget includes $12.45 billion for health security–
related programs, an estimated decrease in funding of $1.25 billion, or 9%, from the 
estimated $13.71 billion in FY2017 and an 11% decrease from the FY2016 actual 
funding level of $13.99 billion. Most FY2018 health security funding ($6.67 billion, 
54%) would go to programs with multiple-hazard and preparedness goals and 
missions, representing a 14% decrease in this funding compared to FY2017. Finally, 
11% of health security funding ($1.39 billion) would be dedicated to pandemic 
influenza and emerging infectious diseases programs, the only category of funding to 
see an increase (3%) above FY2017.448  
 
In summary, Health and Security interface within WHO is a multidimensional issue 
with, at times, unclear boundaries. Mapping against three “clusters” of activities and 
their related funding sources, produces multiple intersections (with donors and 
impact). Furthermore, the scenario is complicated by the fact that in some countries 
institutions which appear as strictly public health related, often draw resources from 
the national security budget. 
1. pure public health activities that have some interaction with security (i.e. 
civil/military in health cluster, some dual-use pathogens, international 
initiatives like GHSI);  
2. ‘pure’ security-relevant activities that have some public health 
component/expertise (i.e. international investigations, chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) events)  
                                                        
447 Boddie, Sell, and Watson, “Federal Funding for Health Security in FY2015”; Boddie, Watson, and 
Sell, “Federal Funding for Health Security in FY2017”; Sell and Watson, “Federal Agency Biodefense 
Funding, FY2013-FY2014.” 
448 Watson, Watson, and Kirk Sell, “Federal Funding for Health Security in FY2018.” 
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3. activities and capacities in between these two poles (i.e. laboratory 
biosecurity, alert/risk assessment and international information sharing, 
smallpox, outbreak response to man-made events), where some reputational 
risks may lie.  
 
Biological agents and environmental security 
 
The previous paragraph has investigated  the relationship existing between health and 
security. A similar linkage, can be appreciated with regard to environment and 
security. The next section provides a better examination of such connection and 
explores the link existing between biological agents, environments and security on a 
theoretical and empirical level. Notwithstanding the fact that the term environmental 
security is comparatively new in high politics agenda (securitization of environment), 
the challenges it responds are not – as it will be soon become clear by the following 
analysis. 
As in the case of health security, suggestions that environmental degradation is or 
should be a security concern is compatible both with (1) traditional approaches to 
security issues and with (2) messages voiced by the new wave of security scholars and 
policy makers who focus on non- (or less-) traditional security concerns (new security, 
transnational security and human security). Under this perspective, it would be 
simplistic to say that the conceptual genesis of environmental security is to be found 
exclusively in the rethinking of security which characterized the end of the Cold War. 
Indeed, the connection between the two fields - environmental destruction (or 
protection), on the one hand, and security, on the other hand – is compatible with a 
very orthodox way of thinking to security concerns.  What has rather changed instead 
- since the human security discoursed has progressed – is the enlarged (and always-
enlarging) pool of environmental relevant issued that have been found as relevant 
also in a security analysis.  This latter one is the viewpoint that have attracted most of 
the reservations and objections from within both (1) purist of security studies who 
want to continue defining security (and defence) in terms of military threats 
exclusively and warfighting responses and who have argued against the inclusion of 
environmental as a security threat and also (2) the environment community, 
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concerned that “securitising the environment” ultimately run the risk of militarizing 
ecology and narrowing policy options. 
Within the framework of two trends, above identified (traditional and non-traditional 
approaches to security), there are several - often overlapping and intertwined – 
patterns in which environmental degradation, resource depletion and ecological crisis 
can become security threat. Building on existing academic and policy literature, the 
present paragraph attempts to systematize such patterns. 
1) Resources and environmental services can become a key instrument of malicious 
acts (warfare, terrorism or crime). In this case environment becomes a victim of the 
war – or other illicit action). This point of view is the expression of the most traditional 
stances towards security matters. The damage to the environment and natural 
processes, in this context, is not incidental or collateral, but is, in fact the purpose of 
the aggressive action. So- called “environmental modification warfare” has a long 
history, although it became extremely popular within the framework of counter-
insurgency warfare techniques. The idea informing the strategy is the one of directly 
altering the physical environment as to make it less conducive to the needs of 
guerrilla’s fighters (depriving enemy forces of the opportunity to establish base areas 
from which to get food and shelter). This was the case with Vietnam War where the 
US made extensive use of cloud seeding techniques, defoliants and “Rome ploughs” 
(heavy tractors equipped with large blades for clearing forests and plants life). A 
second example is provided by Iraqi troops burning of Kuwaiti oil wells during the 1991 
Gulf Conflict which inflicted serious degradation on coral reefs, mangroves, sea-grass 
ecosystems and marine/bird-life. Apart from becoming a warfare target, recent 
studies on terrorism have demonstrated that animal populations and crops represent 
a realistic target for bioterrorists. Under this perspective we can say that the 
environment is not only a target for conventional (pseudo/conventional) methods of 
warfare but it is the protagonist of non-conventional ones (intended as chemical and 
biological). Bioterrorist attacks against livestock do not require access to weaponised 
disease strains or laboratory cultures. Natural diseases that can cause catastrophic 
epizootics are easily acquirable and transportable, and common in many countries 
around the world. No elaborate delivery technology or methods would be necessary 
under a clandestine, economically targeted bioweapons assault scenario. “A willing 
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conspirator, a little careful planning, and access to an appropriate disease agent are 
all that would be required”.449 The consequences of highly virulent (although naturally 
existing) diseases of livestock (triggered by simply introducing infected animals or 
feeds into feedlot operations – even a single infected apple) can have devastating 
consequences especially in countries with industrialized livestock production 
methods.450The threat to biological diversity from bioweapons lies in the spill-over 
effects of weaponised livestock/agricultural diseases into wildlife population.451 
2) Even when environment is nor directly targeted in the framework of warfare or 
other illicit acts, environmental degradation can occur as an “unintended 
consequence” of it. This is the case of collateral damages in actual conflict or 
accidental/incidental release of bio/chemical weapons. The first scenario is easy to 
understand: war, conflict, and the activities of military forces during war time result 
in pollution, contamination of air and water system with important consequences on 
agricultural land, crops and animals.452 Afghanistan represents a clear example of the 
consequences of such unfortunate circumstances. A second, and partially linked 
example of collateral damage is the one represented by the unsustainable exploitation 
of resources by warring parties to finance their campaign (Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, 
the SPDC in Burma, and the Abacha regime in Nigeria).453  
Incidental or accidental releases of dangerous chemical or most probably bioweapons 
from assigned facilities and research centres are real possibilities. The accident can 
involve facilities where legal (defence) or illegal (offensive) researches on bio agents 
are performed. The risk has increased in the last 25 years especially in relation to the 
fact the advances in biotechnology have made techniques and equipment for a small-
scale production of BW agents more accessible (the cost for a smaller-scale 
                                                        
449 “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks,” OTA. 
450 This is the reason why OIE is implementing since the year 2000 new animal disease information 
systems which include an active approach in the search for information on the occurrence of diseases 
and new electronic warning systems for the international community. Along these lines a recent 
growing (and more active) involvement of the Organization in joint exercise with INTERPOL and WHO 
on deliberate disease response can be observed. 
451 Dudley and Woodford, “Bioweapons, Bioterrorism and Biodiversity.” 
452 One of the reports prepared by UNEP on Afghanistan concluded that the “first” conflict has 
degraded the country natural resources so badly that economic reconstruction efforts would be 
severely compromised). Afghanistan: post conflict environmental assessment, Geneva UNEP 2003;  
453 Elliott, “Environment and Security: What’s the Connection?,” 41. 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 187 
bioweapon facility was estimated within the range of 10-100.000 US$ already in 
2002). The escape of agents from facilities where defensive/offensive research is 
performed is more consequential than from the one related to civil labs (which by the 
way is not null) because BW related experiments involve the systematic use of strains 
characterized by higher virulence, pathogenicity etc. – in simple words agents more 
suitable to be used as weapons but extremely dangerous for wildlife population (and 
biodiversity conservation). In other words, intentional release, failures in detection 
and containment of bioweapons (as well as emerging disease outbreaks) among 
indigenous populations in developed and developing countries could result in severe 
erosion of both wild and domestic animals, the extinction of endangered species and 
the extirpation of indigenous agricultural infrastructures. 
3) The environment (its decline and degradation) has been also considered a cause 
(primary or accessory) of conflict. While access to strategic resources is traditionally a 
motive bringing states to war, the menu of o actual or potential scare resources has 
expanded to include water, arable land, and environmental services such as clear air 
or climate system. Within this pattern, the issue of water wars has gained particular 
popularity – also because as a matter of fact over 150 major river systems are share 
by 2 countries, and a further 50 are shared by between 3 or 12 countries.  Under this 
perspective, environmental disputes can become an additional element of tension 
between states against a background of already existing political disagreements or 
within existing and well-established security communities. The ASEAN offers a good 
example of a similar scenario. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Brunei have 
repeatedly lamented recurring haze pollution from Indonesia, that on its turned has 
cited illegal fishing as major reason for seeking to strengthen its naval capabilities (vs. 
Malaysia and Thailand).  
Empirical evidences show that resources or environmental disputes are rarely the 
primary cause of any major inter-state conflict (being more often a corollary aspect). 
In particular, as far as shared water sources are concerned, their management can 
even open the floor for cooperative initiatives for example, by cooperative events as 
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through conflict (with cooperation on water even surviving in the midst of other forms 
of conflict).454 
4) Environmental scarcity can contribute to the breakdown of societal relations. 
Especially in already “fragile” states, environmental issues are more likely to result in 
political violence, eventually leading to civil turmoil and outright violence.455 Under 
this perspective, environmental degradation has as a “threat multiplier effect”. This 
has been the case in Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, South Africa, and 
South Sudan among other places.456 In this regard, the political and strategic impact 
of environmental deprivation has been defined as the perspective “core foreign-policy 
challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate.”457 Environmental 
degradation is bound to change the productive landscape of a country with relevant 
consequences over its population wealth and well-being.  Poor countries are generally 
perceived as more prone collapse and instability, particularly if governments are not 
able to compensate for the maldistribution of resources. Along these lines, domestic 
unrest and relapse of the societal tissue of a country can result from the economic 
insecurity which environmental degradation broadcasts. Finally, when the 
environmental depletion is too deep and diffuse to be addressed, and ecosystems are 
made inadequate for human being survival, the consequential huge and unregulated 
movement of people become another source of internal tension or (when it involves 
multiple neighbouring countries) regional insecurity. Although not formally 
recognised by International Law as a specific category, estimates suggest that up to 
25 million environmental refugees may be displaced as a result of climate change, 
water stress, deforestation and intensified competition for food, water and energy. 
5) Under non-traditional approaches to security (including human-security) the 
potential connections between environmental degradation and security increase. The 
human security model focuses indeed on individuals rather than on states as the 
referent object of security and expands the agenda of security concerns accordingly.  
The list of human security challenges that arise from environmental degradation is 
                                                        
454 Wolf et al., “International River Basins of the World.” 
455 Myers, “Environment and Security.” 
456 Our Global Neighbourhood. 
457 Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy. 
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potentially unlimited. Main aspects include livelihood consequences (migration and 
greater vulnerability to natural disasters); malnutrition and an increased disease 
burden. As far as the latter Is concerned, it has to be observed in fact that the habitat- 
changing imports due to environmental crisis may in fact also influence disease 
vectors, possibly contributing to the kinds of pandemics that represent relevant 
security threats (see previous paragraphs). Ozone depletion results in the suppression 
of immune systems in plants, animals and humans and has been implicated in the 
increased incidence of cancers. 
6) Today, environmental concerns have become interlinked to security also under the 
rubric of so-called “greening the military” phenomena. This practice included two 
categories of initiatives. The first one deals with ensuring that the defence 
establishment meet environment requirements and to the fact that commanders and 
troops are trained to implement “green” guidelines in the field and training exercise. 
The second trend regards deployment of military capacity in support of broader 
environmental goals. This has included the use of military forces to respond to 
environmental disasters (floods or extreme whether events) or even to contribute to 
environmental data gathering. Especially because an increased pressure in that 
direction is registered by social movements and the governments of developing 
countries.  
7) Finally, the relationship between environment and security exists in terms of the 
relationship between issue-specific international laws and institutional agencies that 
have developed since the 1970s. In so far, the first category of responses that have 
attempted to deal with the problem of modification or destruction of the environment 
was precisely elaborated within security-relevant arrangements: The Protocol I to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any 
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD). Since then 
(and especially after the 1987),458 the environmental regime expanded independently 
from arms control and has privileged a focus on biodiversity although significant 
intersection has maintained between the two issue areas (concerning patent 
                                                        
458 1987 report of the Brundtland Commission and the Ad-Hoc-Working Group of Experts on 
Biological Diversity convened by UNPEP in 1988 
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protection and technology transfer (TRIPS), biodiversity conservation (CBD), biosafety 
(Cartagena Protocol), and trade (as it will be explained hereinafter)). Beyond these 
potentially universal institutional framework, most recent examples of the practical 
cooperation between defence forces and environmental issues include restricted-
group agreements interalia the Trilateral Environment Security Cooperation 
established by Canada, the US and Australia, the Chinese proposal to include defence 
environmental cooperation under the ASEAN regional Forum, OSCE’s one on “green 
helmets” and so forth. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The second chapter has started by reviewing those features (relative gains, security 
dilemma, and high-stakes at play) that make cooperation in security-relevant domain 
more difficult than it is in other issue-areas. Nonetheless, the reasons why security 
institutions can be finally realized (states resilience, relaxation of PD assumptions, 
alternative strategic interactions) are addressed with a  focus on the rational/social 
factors that impact on security regimes formation and demise (strategic context, 
offense-defence balance, ideas and identities). The analysis has focused on those 
scholarly and empirical contributions to security studies which have incorporated 
social facts in their assessments; these are factors that rational literature on security 
regimes had acknowledged only obliquely or in a manner that subordinates their 
causal force to a materialist view of the world. Finally, the first section of chapter two 
concludes by compiling a typology of security cooperation arrangements aimed at 
separating the specific characteristics of security regimes versus other forms of 
cooperation befalling “under the security dilemma” (security communities, alliances, 
collective security). Case studies and comparative analysis among security institutions 
show that security regimes (vs. other forms of cooperation) tend to be characterized 
by issue-association; focus on risks (not threat); relatively high level of formality; high 
degree of commonality, functional differentiation, and inclusiveness; diverse grades 
of specificity (usually medium-high), and a major role ascribed to compliant 
behaviours. Nonetheless, the analysis suggests the an excessive reliance to a strict 
taxonomy can be of limited utility with regard to real-world case situations (many 
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features are common to all the categories in question (especially when a category is 
seen as an intermediate step towards another); states often display overlapping 
membership; practitioners often use the terms interchangeably). 
 
The second section of the chapter addresses the relationship that security regimes 
entertain with arms control agreements, disarmament and non-proliferation policies. 
The discourse makes the point that arms control (which surely goes under the rubric 
of cooperative security) represent but one of a series of alternative approaches to 
achieve national and international security through the manipulation of material 
forces (in other words a mean to achieve a larger goal). The manipulation of force may 
or may not realize through disarmament (and non-proliferation)  as it may or may not 
be structured in terms of formal modes of cooperation (treaty-law). Likewise non-
proliferation and disarmament represent alternative military strategies usually (and 
rationally) but not necessarily pursued within a framework of mutual internationally 
exercised control (arms control). 
While it has been shown that arms control should be distinguished from disarmament 
(and non-proliferation) and that the latter does not necessarily require an established 
negotiating procedure, it has also been discussed how the three practices (arms 
control, disarmament efforts and formal treaties) have often intersected in the 
framework of  disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. However, because the link 
among those categories is fluid, large room exists to accommodate new objectives 
and approaches for national security agendas (qualified versus complete 
disarmament, priority of horizontal over vertical non-proliferation objectives; 
reciprocal declarations versus treaty-law; informal versus formal documents; 
increasingly operational focus; data sharing versus verification; implementation 
strategies versus punishment). The analysis has also highlighted how early non-
proliferation regimes have been crafted with reference to a specific category of 
weapons (WMD) and the negative implications of treating CBRN altogether (increased 
the separation between them as a group versus conventional weapons on the one 
side, and reduced importance given to their individual characteristics). This section of 
chapter two concludes by offering a concise review of most recent scholarly 
contribution to the study of WMD proliferation (qualitative and quantitative) and has 
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underlined its main limitations (a disproportionate focus on nuclear proliferation and 
on non-proliferation framework conventions; and the production of still tentative 
results about their actual impact). 
 
The last section of chapter two focuses on biological weapons. The section starts by 
analysing those peculiar features which define biological agents as weapons: an 
intrinsically dual-use nature; the fact that are virtually undetectable (implying a late 
identification); highly consequential; characterized by a significant potential for 
disruption but spare of properties; a strong linkage with the biotechnology fast-
moving industry (CRISP Cas-9); relatively easy access - ease and low cost of production 
(DIY Bio); and a clear-cut offensive-drive (in the framework of the offence-defence 
balance theory).  
The extensive review of relevant literature has allowed to recognise the year 2001 as 
a turning point in the consideration of biological agents as a prominent security 
matter, process which has finally resulted in a new taxonomy of bio-insecurity. The 
investigation has shown that the change, made apparent by a number of worrying 
events (anthrax letters, highly risky experiments, SARS) has to be framed within a 
larger pattern, hallmarked, in the main, by four major trends: (1) the changing nature 
of conflict, (2) the accelerating pace of innovation in biotechnology (synthetic biology, 
nanotechnology applied to life science, convergence between chemistry and biology), 
(3) the natural and unremitting evolution of microorganisms and the re-emergence of 
quasi-eradicated strains (due to globalization); (4) globalization of the pharmaceutical 
and biotech industries. 
 
The last part of chapter two represents a thorough assessment of the links and 
intersections established between health, environment, and security with a focus on 
biological agents related issues. The analysis conducted with reference to health 
security, heavily relies - beyond IOs  programmatic documents and published 
literature - on private conversations entertained with practitioners and key experts 
from the field. Results are impressive in showing that, while within technical and legal 
writings definitional and conceptual flaws persist over key notions and understandings 
- in primis, over the notion of health security - a strong and well-articulated interface 
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already exists between the two issue-areas. Such health-security interface seems to 
involve at least the following dimensions: protection of health from traditional threat 
and risks; health activities conducted in non-permissive environments or in 
collaboration with old and new security actors (military establishment and law 
enforcement); health diplomacy;  network of regulatory frameworks; and most 
importantly resource allocation (multi bi funding from the security to the health 
sectors). Consistent outcomes are derived from the analysis of the environmental-
security  interface. 
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Chapter 3: Key institutions and networks 
 
An evolving regime  
 
In the past 20 years, the non-proliferation regime covering biological and chemical 
agents has evolved well beyond the core disarmament treaties that regulate the 
subject, namely the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). A number of problems have raised that could 
not be efficiently addressed by broad and general undertakings and declaration of 
principles like the ones incorporated in those broad framework conventions. In order 
to fill this vacuum a series of additional initiatives have sprung up alongside the BTWC 
(and the CWC) creating new patterns for action across the traditional high-low political 
divides. The intuition informing this chapter is that those initiatives seem to relate not 
only to “security” (strictu sensu), but touch upon diverse spheres of international 
relations and apply among and between state and non-state actors. 
It is precisely within this new cross-sectoral dimension that novel “security interfaces” 
have emerged (with health and the environment) emphasizing the need for scholars 
to address and better understand the regime as a complex of nested institutions 
including non-proliferation agreements, public health regulatory frameworks and 
environmental protection conventions and organizations. See Figure 3.1 
Consistently  with the working definition proposed in Chapter 1 and building on a more 
“grounded” approach to the subject, an inventory of institutions considered of 
relevance in the analysis of the BW international regime has been compiled. The list 
so derived include 24 institutions among treaties and formal/informal 
intergovernmental organizations (FIGO and IIGOs) (see table 1); two mechanisms, 
namely the United Nation Secretary General Investigation Mechanism (UNSGM) and 
the ad-hoc Joint Investigation Mechanisms (UNSC-JIM); several agencies where quasi 
ad-hoc mandate have been envisaged within UN (UNODA, UNOG, UNICRI, UNCTITF) 
and beyond (INTERPOL, OIE, and FAO), several NGOs (ICRC, VERTIC, etc.). Although 
acknowledging the important contribution of regional institutions, the present 
analysis has focused on global instruments. See Table 3.1 
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A comprehensive comparative analysis of the respective features, mandates and 
activities of each of the institutions listed above would exceed the space constrains of 
the present document. Nonetheless, this chapter addresses, in a chronological order, 
some the major institutions which reportedly impact (or have impacted) on the 
international management of biological agents. The present analysis, as it is the 
selection of the institutions described, is heavily informed by the many conversations 
engaged formally and informally with members and representatives from the 
institutions under scrutiny, reports and reviews issued by the Organizations’ 
committees where existing, open literature and specialized  journals articles, review 
and commentaries, se apostille for further details on methodological aspects.  For 
each institution, the present analysis has investigated the process of regime 
formation, assessed regime’s attributes and explored their individual performance (in 
terms of implementation, compliance, and effectiveness). As far as regime’s formation 
is concerned the analysis has been guided by the following issues: (1) origin, 
establishment and evolution over time (who first proposed the institution and why? 
how the institution has come to be a functioning arrangement? which key actors 
joined the institution at first and how participation developed); In term of regime’s 
attributes,  the study has scrutinised (2) the main norms subsidised/circulated by the 
institution (disarmament; non-armament; arms control; non-proliferation; counter-
proliferation; security; communication; development (civil technologies support 
and/or knowledge transfer for peaceful uses; environment protection and 
conservation) and the main targets (states vs. terrorists) (3) the regime’s legal profile 
(e.g. legally binding vs. political pledge; collaboration vs. coordination); (4) its 
organizational structure, if existent (how the institution was made operational in 
practice? which tools for compliance have been elaborated and when); Finally, with 
the objective of looking at the consequences broadcasted by the regime the research 
has tried to understand – where possible – the degree of implementation and 
compliance reached and attempted some provisional conclusions about the regime 
overall effectiveness (degree of cooperation achieved, the extent to which the specific 
cooperative effort has generated the intended result, the degree to which that result 
contributed to the success of the overall objective of preventing the use, 
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development, possession proliferation, and circulation of chemical and  biological 
agents for malicious purposes). 
Any reasoning over the effectiveness of these institutions (and institutions in general) 
is complicated by a series of factors (already explained din the previous chapters) that 
span from: data and time limitation; hypothetical and biased counterfactuals (failure 
may be easier to identify than success); spill-over effects (among institutions with 
overlapping mandates or through working-level and technical partnerships among 
agencies with different mandates across disciplines and fields); multiple objectives of 
the institutions (which open the possibility for some of them to perform very well or 
very poorly based on the objective whose measure is taken).  
Apostille  
As shown in the first two chapter of the present work, notwithstanding several 
contributions and some improvement with respect to original definitions and 
operationalization procedures, the general empirical understanding of “regimes” has 
remained worryingly vague and unstable. In order to escape conceptual tangles, most 
empirical investigations has sought to solve the issue by devising tighter definitions, 
drawn from the extremely abstract theoretical literature, or have simply focused on 
formal institutions. In most cases, this has meant the use of stipulative taxonomy and 
working approaches which still fail to broadcast social reality of regimes and unveil  
important limitations: inadequate attention devoted to soft law, informal  
Intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and networks, and non-state actors; 
marginalization of nested regimes and contested multilateralism; downgrading of 
international practices and  inter-paradigmatic matters. Under this perspective, the 
present research opted for a more grounded standpoint, firmly  committed to the 
social reality of practitioners’ intersubjective understandings and experience (in 
sociological parlance, to the “participants’ viewpoint”). The analysis (preliminary 
discussion and interviews) has made the case for a “grounded theory” of international 
regimes inspired by the Chicago School of  Sociology (which has indeed informed the 
inclusion criteria for the regime’s individual components). A qualitative research 
method, first developed in Sociology and whose affinity with the English School of 
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International relations was noted by Navari.459 Building on Navari’s work, Wilson has 
convincingly explored the potential for using this method in IR research over a wide 
variety of subject matters (as the role of international law and the place of institutions 
in international society). What makes GT more interesting than traditional 
ethnography (with which share the desire to obtain a non-judgmental, dense, 
textured, “insider” understanding of the phenomena under investigation), is that it is 
not concerned with recording every dimension of that phenomenon, but only those 
aspects which have pertinence to the emerging theory. In Wilson’s words: “while the 
approach of GT is empirical and non-positivist, its object is eminently theoretical.”460 
In order to grasp the reality of the BW non-proliferation regime, the approach has 
been the following: (1) Data gathering and analysis.461 Under this perspective, a 
variety of data collection methods has been used including participant 
observations,462 structured and semi-structured interviews with experts in key 
positions,463 informal conversations with insiders, and textual analysis of records and 
reports. Unlike ethnography, there is no separation between data collection and 
analysis because the object is not description but theoretical interpretation; (2) 
Coding (in vivo and ex vivo codes), the process of  giving segments of data a label; (3) 
Clustering by which a leap is taken from the specific and concrete to the general and 
abstract categories; (4) The purpose of theoretical sampling – the fourth state of 
research – is to increase the strength and  consistency of categories with interviewees’ 
opinions. (5) flexibility of the presentation. 
 
                                                        
459 Theorizing International Society - English School Methods | C. Navari | Palgrave Macmillan. 
460 Wilson, “The English School Meets the Chicago School,” 581. 
461 In order to start the process the researcher needs some “background interests” or “sensitizing concepts”  in 
order to begin the process of thinking analytically to the data” (Charmaz 1995; 32) 
462 BWC state party meetings (including the 2016 RevCon), BWC meetings of experts, 2016 UN General Assembly 
1st Committee on Disarmament and International Security, Consultancy employment within the framework of the 
CBRN CoE Programme (Project 3 and 6) and WHO Health-Security Interface Unit 
463 Interalia, the Director of the BWC Implementation Unit, The Director of the World Health Emergency 
Programme (WHO) and many consultants in relevant positions, two former experts from the UN 1540 
Committee, The Director of the CBRN CoE programme at the United Nation Interregional Crime and Justice 
Research Institute and several project managers in significant roles, the Head of the UNSGM mission to Syria 
2013, The OPCW Team Leader (UNSGM 2013, Syria),  a Senior Chief of Training at UNMOVIC, The Director of a 
European BSL4 deeply involved in the international implementation of biosafety and biosecurity projects in the 
South East Asia Region. Several academics from pertinent field. 
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Biological weapons: taboo, deterrence, and norms 
 
The moral reservation over the possible exploitation of chemical and biological agents 
in warfare is reflected in a long-established practice and generally explained in terms 
of an ancient and cross-cultural taboo. Albeit such an historical and shared legacy, a 
true understanding of the logic behind the visceral taboo banning chemical and 
biological weapons (and their subsequent limited employment in warfare) is not an 
easy endeavour.464 Deterrence has been besought as the primary explanation for both 
the taboo and the limited use of chemical weapons (an argument that could be in 
theory applied to biological weapons as well).465 Such an explanation 
(realist/functionalist in principle) draws on the “rational” idea that states that want to 
avoid suffering the consequences of certain weapons attacks, reasonably refrain from 
resorting to those weapons in the first place so to stave off retaliation-in-kind 
behaviours.466 In other words, the taboo, and the perceived-as-resulting from the 
taboo self-restrain rule, would “per-se” be in the best “interest” of states acting in the 
international system. However, the explanatory power of such an argumentation 
shows relevant limitations especially when applied to chemical and biological 
weapons: (1) To start with, the explanation has been blamed as incomplete and 
partial, in that it doesn’t account for what makes a choice “rational” and “functional” 
in the first place (like any other theory which take interests as given/granted).467(2) 
Secondly, the fear of retaliation in kind reasoning alone (which inform the deterrence 
                                                        
464 Zanders, “International Norms Against Chemical and Biological Warfare.” 
465 Deterrence theory builds on the realist assumptions of unitary state actors and exogenously given 
interests and acknowledges the use of retaliatory threats of force to deter attacks. The theory 
postulates three requirements for deterring an adversary: (1) credible capability; (2) a clearly 
communicated threat; (3) and a credible willingness to carry out the threat Kaufmann, “The 
Requirements of Deterrence”; Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence”; Charles Glaser, “Why Do 
Strategists Disagree?”; Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States; Achen and Snidal, 
“Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies”; Little, Varieties of Social Explanation; 
Morgan, Deterrence. 
466 For a complete analysis see Price and Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and 
Chemical Weapons Taboos,” 117–20; Brown, Chemical Warfare; a Study in Restraints; Institute, The 
Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare; Adelman Kenneth, “Chemical Weapons: Restoring the 
Taboo”; Wright, “The Military and the New Biology,” May 1, 1985; Jefferson, “Origins of the Norm 
against Chemical Weapons”; Moon, John Ellis van Courtland, “Chemical Warfare: A Forgotten 
Lesson.” 
467 For a wider review of constructive arguments see Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure 
Debate?,” 1989; Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It, 1992. 
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logic) doesn’t uphold historical examination and according to Price and Tannenwald is 
not empirically sustainable neither for nuclear nor for chemical weapons.468 There is 
no reason to think that the same logic would not apply to biological weapons, which 
share characteristics with both nuclear and chemical weapons. In their chapter, the 
two authors argue that in most cases, states have not used CW against adversaries 
who did not possess such weapons (and could have not retaliate in kind anyhow) and 
vice versa made use of CW against possessor states/actors.469 (3) Third, as far as 
chemical and biological weapons are concerned, their status of deterrent weapons 
needs to be problematized if only because deterrence is often understood as to be 
confined to those situations involving “unacceptable consequences/assured 
destruction”. Chemical weapons as well as most biological agents definitely do not 
have, even remotely, the destructive/disruptive power of a nuclear warhead and it is 
unclear why the fear of retaliatory of CW attacks would be still any more dramatic 
than the one from other horrible and more destructive methods. It is true that specific 
categories of biological weapons have been assimilated, and rightly so, to nuclear ones 
in their potential disruptive power, however BW display serious limitations as 
deterrent tools, interalia because of the possible spread of the agent/disease back to 
the aggressor/first-user’s army or population.470 Furthermore, even if we fully accept 
that BW can work as deterrent weapons, the assessment of an adversary military BW 
capability has proven and remain extremely difficult and thus challenges/undermines 
the “credible capability” requirement implied in most deterrence accounts. 
Just as an exclusively rationalist account for the non-use is not fully satisfactory, 
ancillary functionalist explanations do not work for explaining the emergence of the 
norm prohibiting the use. Explanations that build on the intrinsic characteristics of C/B 
                                                        
468 Price and Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos.” 
469 A relevant example is Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) where the CW weapons were used 
notwithstanding the fact that each country was aware of the enemy CW arsenal. In parallel, 
prominent examples of CW non-use when there was no threat of retaliation in kind include the 
Spanish Civil War, the Korean War, the French in Indochina and Algeria, the Vietnam War and the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.  
470 Recent advances in biological science (recombinant technology, gene drives etc.) has the potential 
to increase the specificity of the agents used and the effectiveness of specific vaccines to immunize 
each country militaries and civilians. However, the possibility of a secondary and unpredicted 
mutation after the agent has been released cannot be excluded so far. For a critique to the common’s 
understanding of Biological Weapons as “the poor’s men atomic bomb”, Koblentz, Living Weapons, 
2009, 9–52. 
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weapons, have proven fragile. For example, the often-used argument that CW and BW 
are of limited utility in warfare and consequently have not been resorted because 
dysfunctional (or less functional compared to others) does not apply to CW471 and is 
at least inaccurate/simplistic when it comes to BW (especially in consideration of most 
recent technologies).472 Likewise, the idea that a visceral/neurological reaction to 
toxicity and infection (including a genetic aversion rooted in chromosomes) would 
make CW and BW particularly odious, pernicious, and more abhorrent than all other 
weapons, has also been contested.473 
Price and Tannenwald contend indeed that a significant normative element must be 
taken into consideration in order to fully explain the C/B weapons taboo and why 
these weapons have remained relatively unused. In their view, the patterns of non-
use/limited use of C/B weapons can only be understood by the complementary 
development of a prohibitionary norm shaping those weapons as unacceptable 
“weapons of mass destruction”; the taboo itself should be seen as the product of a 
normative construction (also due by contingencies and a series of fortuitous events) 
and not as the result of purely rational/functionalist explanation. In their view, the 
socio-political context cannot be discharged as accessor. On the contrary, it is 
precisely the element that consented the norm to develop and enabled its content to 
consolidate progressively by providing the belief, among states and their 
representatives (each time a new ban was negotiated), that such a prohibition was 
just a supplementary endorsement of a practice already in place: “neither nothing 
new nor anything terribly important but merely the reaffirming of previous bans” 
(gradually providing the elements necessary for international law to see the light: 
diuturnitas and opinion iuris sive necessitatis). 
The history of the regime banning the use (first) and the development (later) of 
biological weapons seems to confirm this insight. To this growing complex of norms 
                                                        
471 Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 234. 
472 Koblentz, Living Weapons, 2009; Koblentz, “Biosecurity Reconsidered”; Koblentz, “Predicting Peril 
or the Peril of Prediction?”; Koblentz, “From Biodefence to Biosecurity”; Koblentz, “Regime Security.” 
473 Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution, 39–48; Jones, Roberts, and Greenberg, “Peer-Group Risk 
Assessment”; Jones, Palmer, and Wessely, “Enduring Beliefs about Effects of Gassing in War,” 1313–
15; Jones et al., “Psychological Effects of Chemical Weapons.” 
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(regime) and its individual components (institutions/treaties/organizations), the next 
paragraphs are dedicated. 
 
Conventions, declarations and codes (1863 – 1949) 
 
Earliest examples of the normative constraint on “poisonous” weapons can be 
dated back to the Indian Code of Manu, the Western European medieval Christian 
doctrine, the standards of chivalry, and the military manuals drafted after the end of 
the Napoleonic wars.474 The first international agreement which codified the 
prohibition is the Strasbourg Agreement, which prohibited the use of a specific 
poisonous weapons, namely “poisoned bullets” at the end of the seventieth century 
(1675). The ban was limited by the fact that it only applied for the duration of a 
potential war between the signatory states, France and Germany.475 
In fact, these early prohibitions on the use of CB weapons cannot be compared 
to the modern (and extensive) legal framework covering biological and chemical 
agents, which actually started building during the second half of the 19th century. This 
more coherent and consistent corpus of principles and codes that outlawed CB use in 
warfare at large (and subsequently was stretched to interdict their development and 
proliferation) have established in parallel to the advent of so-called “jus in bello” 
doctrine and was strictly related to an emerging humanitarian concern (later on 
formalized as “International Humanitarian Law”).  In turn, that humanitarian 
awareness came along with the development of large national arms industries and the 
creation of a dynamic and prolific military-industrial apparatus where science and 
technology innovations could constantly flow into. When major worlds powers 
dramatically confronted the human destruction that technological processes (more 
efficient rifles, mobile heavy artillery, and the invention of machine guns) could cause, 
peace societies and proto-human rights movements started to flourish.476 The 
                                                        
474 Catherine Jefferson, “The Taboo of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Nature, Norms and 
International Law”; Jefferson, “Origins of the Norm against Chemical Weapons”; Jefferson, Lentzos, 
and Marris, “Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity,” 2015. 
475 Strasbourg Agreement 1675, art. 57; Zanders, “International Norms Against Chemical and 
Biological Warfare.” 
476 Best, “Peace Conferences and the Century Of Total War.” 
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battlefield massacre in the Crimean War (1853-56) and the American Civil War (1861-
1965) showed the need to protect civilians in war zones and safeguard wounded 
soldiers and those taken captives in an effort to “humanize” war. 
The humanitarian awareness, fuelled by the fear for the cost that an indiscriminate 
arm race would have implied, was soon translated into a new institutional setting, 
which developed both at the national and international levels. 
In 1862, the injured soldiers in the battle of Solferino were widely publicized. 
The episode led interalia to the creation by Henry Dunant of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross which saw the light in 1863. The same year 12 
governments adopted the “First Geneva Convention, Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.”477 Concurrently, on the other 
side of the Atlantic Ocean, the Lieber Code, by Francis Lieber, a professor of law 
Columbia, represented the first national draft of laws of land warfare that laid out the 
morally acceptable rules for treating prisoners and civilians.478 The code was signed 
and issued by the US President Abraham Lincoln to the Union Forces during the 
American Civil War and was the first official, comprehensive, and codified national 
text that set out regulations for behaviours in times of martial law.479 Most 
importantly, the document provided to the international community with a significant 
theoretical contribution by formulating the notion of “military necessity” as a general 
principle to minimize suffering of combatants. In the document, poisonous weapons 
(chemical substances and poisonous) were mentioned in the following terms: “The 
use of poison in any manner, be it poison wells or food, or arms, is wholly excluded 
from modern warfare” (Article LXX/70). It seems reasonable to think that at this stage, 
a broad understanding (covering both chemical and biological agents) should be 
accepted for the terms “poison” and “poisonous”, which would make the document 
relevant for the analysis of biological weapon regime’s as well.480  
                                                        
477 Full text available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/120?OpenDocument 
478 “Instruction for the government of armies of the United States in the field” (Lieber Code), 24 April 
1863, available from ICRC https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/110  
479 Carnahan, “Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War.” 
480 It is only with the research of Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch that a better understanding of 
disease causation and the role of microorganism was acquired. 
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Less than a decade later Henry Dunant’s warning about the possible 
humanitarian consequences of weapons’ development, the topic had again resonance 
when the St. Petersburg Declaration was discussed and approved, becoming the first 
multilateral agreement prohibiting the use of certain weapons in war, and the first 
attempt to ban the use of an entire class of weapons.481 Interestingly enough, the 
declaration had its origin from the Russian Government after the Russian military 
authorities have invented exploding bullets in 1863. Conceived to blow up 
ammunition wagons, the projectile was later modified to explode on contact with soft 
substances (human bodies) and for this reason soon recognised as an inhuman 
instrument of war. The declaration was signed in 1968 by 17 European powers. The 
spirit of the declaration went beyond the explicit legal prohibition (on exploding 
bullets weighing more than 400 grams) because the text served the consolidation of 
the principle of “military necessity” by establishing (among others) the norm that the 
use of arms that uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled men, or render their 
death inevitable, was unjustified. 
In 1874, on the initiative of the Czar Alexander II of Russia, the delegates of 15 
European States met again in Brussels to examine the draft of an international 
agreement concerning the laws and customs of war that was submitted to them by 
the Russian Government itself.482 Although the convention was not ratified, since not 
all the governments were willing to accept it as a biding instrument, the declaration 
represented an important addendum towards the limitation on the instruments of 
war and a meaningful step in the crusade for the codification of the laws of war; the 
document also contained a ban on “poison or poisoned weapons” (art. 13 (a)). The 
provision was apparently uncontested during negotiations, suggesting, as some critics 
have argued, that the prohibition on the use of poisons was, by the time, becoming a 
well-established part of the laws of war.483 The convention laid also the foundations 
                                                        
481 “Declaration renouncing the use, in time of war, of explosive projectiles under 400 grams of 
weight”, St Petersburg, 29 Nov. - 11 Dec. 1868; from ICRC: https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/130?OpenDocument 
482 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 27 
August 1874, from ICRC: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/135 
483 Catherine Jefferson, “The Taboo of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Nature, Norms and 
International Law,” 650. 
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for the rules of the Manual of the Laws and Customs of War adopted by the Institute 
of International Law at Oxford (art. 8) and by the Institute of International Law in 1880. 
The establishment of the International Red Cross Committee, the Lieber Code and the 
Manual of the Laws of War, along with the St. Petersburg and Brussels declarations 
served the purpose of reinforcing the concept that the “rights of belligerents to adopt 
means of injuring the enemy [was] not unlimited”.  
The Hague Conference in 1899, was set in motion by a proposal advanced once 
again by Russia (by Tsar Nicholas II). Interestingly enough, the Tsar’s desire to reduce 
military spending, in a period of economic crisis, seemed to have stimulated the 
disarmament proposal within the Russian government.484 
The conference produced one document consisting of four main conventions, two 
declarations and a final act. The Convention II titled “Laws and Customs of War on 
Land”485 was signed by 23 nations, including the United States and Japan, and 
repeated the traditional prohibition against “the use of poison or poisoned arms” 
(art.23(a) and 23(e)). No reservations were made.  According to some authors,486 the 
prohibition was accepted by delegates to the conference largely because it was not 
believed to represent nothing new or bound to have much impact. Indeed, the records 
of the conference suggest that the provision was directly lifted from art 13(a) of the 
Brussels Conference. The Convention entered into force on September 4th, 1900 and 
it now counts 51 state parties. The Conference envisaged an additional and special 
declaration (“Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion 
of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases”)487 intended to deal with the potential use of 
new weapons (gas projectile weapons) - made possible by the nineteenth century 
advances in chemistry. This was signed by 25 nations excluding the US and the UK 
(with the UK subsequently agreeing to adhere to the special convention). It is 
important to clarify that gas projectile weapons had not yet been developed, at that 
                                                        
484 Ford, “The Genesis of the First Hague Peace Conference,” 354–82; Best, “Peace Conferences and 
the Century Of Total War,” 623. 
485 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899; from ICRC https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/150?OpenDocument  
486 Price and Tannenwald, 1996; and Jefferson, 2009 
487 Declaration (IV,2) concerning Asphyxiating Gases. The Hague, 29 July 1899; from ICRC https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/165?OpenDocument 
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time. Consequently, the letter of Convention IV was anticipating a possible 
development in science and technology that could have had military applications.488 
Therefore, the declaration not only gave expression, with regard to a particular 
instrument of warfare, to the customary rules prohibiting the use of poisons and of 
material causing unnecessary suffering in general,489 but must be seen as an attempt 
to limit the military (or any other hostile use) of emerging technologies (e.g. setting 
the standard for subsequent treaties).490 After the WWI, and the extensive resort to 
gas warfare which characterized many battles, the distinction made in the text 
between poison gas on the one hand and gas projectiles on the other was, for many, 
blurred and gas became a standard. Today the declaration counts 33 state parties. 
Both the Convention (II) and the Declaration (IV) are only binding among the 
contracting parties in case of a war between two or more of them. 
The 1907 the prohibition was repeated in identical language (incorporating 
only few major advancements) in a similar convention, The Convention respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land (IV).491 This time, the related conference was called 
by the US President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904. The gathering was postponed 
because of the ongoing war between China and Russia and took place in 1905. The 
treaties, declarations, and the final act pouring from the Second Hague Conference 
were signed on 1907 and confirmed with minor modifications the provisions of 1899 
Convention (II) and all major powers ratified it. Evenly, contracting parties forbid to 
employ “poison or poisoned weapons” as a mean of injuring the enemy. Seventeen of 
the States which ratified the 1899 Convention did not ratify the 1907 version 
(Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Korea, Montenegro, 
                                                        
488 International Peace Conference. (2nd : 1907 : Hague and Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague 
Peace Conferences; Translation of the Official Texts. The Conference of 1907, 365; Catherine Jefferson, 
“The Taboo of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Nature, Norms and International Law,” 651–52. 
489 Oppenheim, International Law, 342. 
490 In other words, at that point in time the relationship between the customary norm against poison 
and the ban on gas was neither obvious not assume and in a way the record of the Conference 
reveals the codification of two distinct norms that only in retrospect came to be viewed as connected, 
as explained by Jefferson (Jefferson, 2009). 
491 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907; from ICRC 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195 
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Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Serbia, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela). These States or 
their successor states remain formally bound by the 1899 Convention in their relations 
with the other parties thereto. Among the parties to the 1907 Convention instead, the 
latter has replaced the 1899 Convention (in accordance with Article 4 of the 1907 
Convention).  
The provisions of the two Conventions on land warfare, like most of the substantive 
provisions of The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, are considered as embodying 
rules of customary international law. As such they are today binding also on states 
which are not formally parties to them. 
Despite the banning on poisons in April 1915, at Ypres in Belgium, the Germans 
introduced chemical weapons on the battlefield to break the stalemate of trench 
warfare. Director of the German program was the scientist Fritz Haber. The surprised 
attacks his researches made possible, marked the beginning of an CW arm race among 
all nations involved to the conflict, including France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and the 
United States and showed all the limitations of the up to then established fragile 
regime.  
In summary, we can conclude that all these initial attempts to govern biological 
and chemical weapons placed the emphasis on the prohibition of C/B use on 
battlefield, basically they banned the use of these weapons and not the weapons 
themselves.492 No proscription against the research and development into the field 
was elaborated and no mention was made to the use of such weapons in conflict 
between states that had not ratified the treaties. Even among parties, the resulting 
norm was basically a no-first use proscription. Key states proposed the initiatives493 
and all the other major European powers joined smoothly (usually with unanimous 
agreement). Self-interests seem to have moved proponents as well as follower 
participant states to support the initiative (inter alia the need to reduce military 
spending and the willingness to gain the population’s sustenance by supporting a 
nascent proto-human rights movement). At the same time, the analysis of the 
                                                        
492 there is no reason to think that the same would apply to biological agents, especially in 
consideration of the fact that the difference between the two was not completely understood at the 
time the negotiations took place 
493 Russia in the case of St Petersburg Declaration, Brussels Declaration and 1899 Convention II; USA 
in the case of the 1907 Convention IV 
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negotiations transcripts reveal that ideational factors also played a role (for example 
among the militaries where many felt that the use of gas or toxins would undermine 
their professional code of honour and threatened to harm non-combatants). The 
documents displayed a strictly contractual profile assuming the form of traditional 
international legally binding treaties just enhancing the coordination of states as far 
as the recourse to CB weapons was concerned (no reciprocal use). All conventions 
increasingly grew in membership with more and more states joining them, although 
no organization to oversight their implementation and enhance their effectiveness 
was established. For sure the conventions, served the purpose of reinforcing the 
message delivered, raising the profile of the norm to customary law and opening the 
floor to the negotiation of additional tools. Possibly the conventions also played some 
role in limiting and curbing states’ investments in warfare technologies relating 
chemical and biological agents, that on the other hand would have developed anyhow 
within the boundaries of civil research (fertilizers, medicine, biology, etc..). In terms of 
how much states complied with the provisions, as mentioned, the extensive use of gas 
during the WWI is a powerful indicator of the failure of these agreements to really 
prevent the use of such weapons even among state parties.  
 
The 1925 Geneva Protocol  
 
Inevitably, the question of Germany’s chemical arsenal and capabilities was 
debated during the Versailles peace conference. An agreement was reached that the 
country should be forbidden to manufacture chemical weapons.494 However, the 
British proposal for including an article, in the Peace Treaty, which would have 
obligated Germany to disclose details concerning the manufacturing processes of its 
strong organic industry, was rejected by President Wilson, and never passed.495 The 
topic was brought into public domain and entered the agenda of the League of Nations 
(in particular the Permanent Advisory Commission on Military, Naval, and Air 
Questions (PAC) and the ad hoc Temporary Mixed Commission on the Reduction of 
                                                        
494 The Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919, art. 171; from 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/versailles_menu.asp 
495 Mirimanoff, “The Red Cross and Biological and Chemical Weapons,” 302. 
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the Armaments (TMC)496 with its special sub-committee to investigate the issue of 
chemical warfare. The use of CB weapons (mostly chemical) was further discussed 
elsewhere (e.g. ICRC, US Chemical Warfare Department), always providing conflicting 
conclusions.  If one the one side, there was a widespread agreement that the 
employment of these weapons against non-combatants, should have been banned in 
the strongest way, others contended that the use of gas, was no crueller than any 
other methods of warfare, as the PAC analysists concluded in a report issued on 
October 1920.497 The same divergences characterized the Washington Conference, 
convened by the United States in an effort to reach a total prohibition on chemical 
weapons in contrast with the positions of an ad-hoc subcommittee that 
recommended instead to retain the possibility of their use at least against the armed 
force. 
 On 6 February 1922, the Washington Naval Treaty was signed by 5 of the world 
major powers (US, UK, Italy, France, and Japan)498 including a norm banning the use 
of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or 
devices”. The treaty never entered into effect.499 
The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was developed within the League 
of Nation500. More specifically, the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nation supported 
a draft convention elaborated upon the work of the Temporary Mixed Commission on 
the Reduction of Armaments (TMC).  
                                                        
496 The TMC was set up in in 1921 by the league of nation to investigate what new methods of 
warfare (including biological and chemical weapons) weapons use would mean to combatants and 
civilian population. The debate was boosted by the growing fear of CB agents’ delivery from aircraft.  
497 Catherine Jefferson, “The Taboo of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Nature, Norms and 
International Law,” 653–54; Richter, Chemical Soldiers; Haber, The Poisonous Cloud; Brown, Chemical 
Warfare; a Study in Restraints; March, The Nation at War; Vedder and Walton, The Medical Aspects of 
Chemical Warfare; Haldane, Callinicus; a Defence of Chemical Warfare. 
498 Treaty relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare. Washington, 6 February 
1922; https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/270 
499 Because France did not ratify the document (on the basis of a submarine related clause) which 
French strategist did not find satisfactory.  
500 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, available at https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/280?OpenDocument  
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Interestingly enough, the protocol was the result of the “Conference for the 
Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of 
War” that met in Geneva on 4 May 1925.  In fact, the original objective of the 
conference, convened under a resolution of the League of Nation Council, was to place 
restrictions in trade of chemicals with potential weapons’ application.501 The position 
of the US favouring a complete interdiction was challenged by the Brazilian 
representative who argued that such an approach would have discriminated against 
non-producing countries especially in that chemical weapons could have represented 
an effective mean of defence for weak countries.   The Italian representative also 
contested the US proposal on the basis that controlling trade materials would have 
been impossible due to the legitimate peace applications of most of the substances 
under discussion. It was finally agreed to sign a protocol appended to a final resolution 
of the Conference which would have outlawed the use of chemical and bacteriological 
(biological) weapons.502 
Some legal experts have argued that the use of BW was de facto prohibited 
under customary international law already prior to the year 1925, contending that a 
ban on BW was already broadcasted by the prohibition against the use of poisons 
included in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, and this is reasonably the case (in 
line with the interpretation given in the previous paragraph). However, it is 
appropriate to say that it is with the Geneva Protocol that a first explicit mention to 
biological agents (classified as separate from chemical agents) was made, in the 
attempt to prevent their specific use in warfare. The proscription against the then-
called “bacteriological” methods of warfare was introduced at the request of the 
Polish Government due to their concerns that Russia/Soviet Union had initiated a BW 
program.  The Conference adopted the Convention on the supervision of the 
International Trade in Arms, Munitions and Implements of War, which never entered 
                                                        
501 For a complete account of the negotiation process see Goldblat, The Problem of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons, vol. 4 p.58-59; Rodney McElroy in M. Krepon and D. Caldwell 1991, Robinson 
1971, all quoted in Jefferson, 2009. 
502 The term bacteriological is imprecise in that it would refer only to bacteria, without including 
viruses, fungi and other biological agents responsible to cause diseases in humans, animals, and 
plants. The term biological is indeed preferable and more correct in mirroring the real intent of the 
drafters already at that time. 
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into force and, as a separate document, a protocol on the use of gases and 
bacteriological methods of warfare which entered into force and is now known as the 
Geneva Protocol. 
The discussion over a Treaty/Protocol prohibiting the use of chemicals was 
undoubtedly a consequence of the massive use of gas in Europe during WWI. The 
prohibition over bacteriological weapons is instead to be seen as a precautionary 
measure, in consideration of the fact that no major power had attempted to 
systematically wage germ warfare (apart from sporadic cases of sabotages) before 
that time. The Geneva Protocol was embraced with enthusiasm and in the interwar 
period 43 nations became parties, with the British, French, the Soviet Union, Italy, and 
Germany leading the way.  
Today the treaty counts 140 state parties and is still the only document where the ban 
on use is found explicitly in the text letter. 
Nonetheless, the scope of the protocol in itself was (and remains) very limited: 
ü The protocol only covers the use (it does not cover the possession, development, 
and the proliferation) of biological and chemical weapons and no provision for 
enforcing the norm against chemical and biological agents was put in place.  
ü It only applies to conflicts between states and among countries adhering to the 
agreement (no binding constrains on employment in internal conflicts or for the 
use against countries that were not signatories are envisaged). 
ü It basically represents a “no-first-use” engagement especially because of the fact 
that many nations added reservations to their adherence and continued asserting 
the right to retaliate in kind, should they be attacked by chemical or biological 
agents (today the number of reservation appears diluted by the increased 
membership but still involves 23 over 140 state parties). 
ü the difference between defensive and offensive capability is left undefined (which 
remains one of the major issue linked to BW research nowadays) 
ü it was not and is still not universally supported (e.g. China did not become a party 
until 1952, Japan until 1970, and the US until 1975). 
ü Although the letter of the Protocol banned the use of Biological and Chemical 
Agents, no specific investigation system to ascertain the use was envisaged (and 
States were supposed to appeal to the League of Nations and its institutions). 
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As for most of the late nineteenth century conventions, the main focus of the Protocol 
was the one relating to the use of biological and chemical weapons in conflicts 
between states with the prohibition only applying between state parties (and in most 
case only if the adversary upholds the commitment in the first place, since the use for 
in-kind retaliation is admitted by most of the reservations attached to the Protocol). 
In this case, it seems that elements other than provisional states self-interest played 
a role in the Protocol’s adoption. First of all, the existence of an apparatus where 
states were called to discuss disarmament’s issues, namely the League of Nation, 
facilitated the dialogue among nations and provided a forum where different stand 
points could be presented (including those of International Organizations lobbying for 
a complete international ban on those weapons as the ICRC, the British Association 
for the Advancement of Science) and new solutions/reflections forwarded. Second, 
the existence of an existing legal framework of reference seemed to have helped the 
assembly to get to some results when the discussion stagnated over trade, by 
providing an exit strategy. 503 In other words, if arriving to a suitable prohibition in 
trade proved problematic, the general feeling that chemical and biological weapons 
had to be controlled was there and found its way to light: the recourse to a pre-
existent and already approved normative framework, made it possible to agree to a 
formal condemnation on their use at least.504  
It is hard to draw conclusions on the utility/effectiveness of the protocol in preventing 
the use of C/B weapons. For sure, it represented a moral and legal condemnation to 
the use by reaffirming and codifying an earlier norm against the use of poisons in 
warfare, the basis for several UN resolutions in the aftermath of the WWII,505 and a 
sound grounding for the adoption of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 
1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993.  Still, it has to be noticed that 
                                                        
503 Glodblat, 1971 
504 The earlier treaties prohibiting the use of gases to which the protocol refers are in particular the 
Hague Declaration concerning asphyxiating gases of 29 July 1899 and the Treaty of Versailles of 28 
June 1919 as well as the other peace treaties of 1919. See also Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington 
of 6 February 1922 and the note introducing The Hague Declaration (IV,2) of 1899. 
505 Inter alia resolutions 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966, 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2603 
B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, and 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970) 
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just a couple of years after the Protocol was signed, the idea of a total war (where 
targeting of civil population, enemy urbans, and manufacturing centres) gained 
traction. Under this framework, Giulio Douhet assigned biological and chemical 
warfare center stage: “air power makes it possible not only to make high explosive 
bombing raids over any sector of the enemy’s territory, but also to ravage his whole 
country by chemical and bacteriological warfare.”506 
Additionally, individuating the net effect of the Protocol (independently from other 
factors – fear of retaliation, moral repugnance, and technical drawbacks compared to 
other munitions) contributed to the non-use is even harder. 
The Italians used chemical weapons in Ethiopia in 1935 (they in fact used phosgene 
and mustard gases) although Italy was a party to the Protocol. This event suggests that 
the reason why they did not use biological agents may not reside in the treaty’s 
obligation but in the limitations biological warfare presented at that time. Whether 
chemical or biological weapons were used, with regards to this episode is the fact that 
there was virtually the international community issued basically no sanctions to 
condemn these actions - notwithstanding the fact that Ethiopia was itself a member 
of the League of Nations and a signatory of the Geneva Protocol since 1925 
(ratification came later, tellingly in 1935). However, such very unfortunate event and 
the related lack of punishment/reactions by the international community, has been 
rarely associated to the inefficiency of the Protocol.  The use has been rather  
explained by commentators in terms of a twin-track approach to the application of 
the prohibitory norm between advanced nations (among which the use of CB weapons 
would have been unacceptable) and “uncivilized” ones. Under this perspective, the 
prohibition to the use of CB weapons would have been transposed among Great 
Powers as a norm applying the ban only in conflicts among civilised/perceived-as-
similar nations.  In fact, the discourse of civilisation seems to have played a role during 
the two most significant violations of the norm after WWI: Italy-Ethiopia and Iraq-Iran. 
Apart from the two cases mentioned ahead, the very modest use of chemical weapons 
(by the signatories of the protocols) which characterized the WWII especially if 
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compared with larger use during WWI, tend to return a favourable verdict over the 
Treaty’s effectiveness in preventing the use. 
Consistently, the extensive employment of biological agents in China by Japan (1910-
1943) would be coherent with the country’s decision not to sign the protocol (Japan 
will join the protocol only in 1970) and with the poor consideration the Japanese 
establishment reserved to the Chinese population.507 
It is reasonable to think that all the legal restrictions coded before WWII – 
albeit mirroring underlying tendencies that militated against the employment of 
chemical and biological agents (moral opprobrium, suspicious about their utility, and 
fear of enemy retaliation) - played a major role in (1) granting a full and complete 
articulation of the norm against biological and chemical weapons use – a means of 
warfare; (2) providing the normative substratum to the non-use taboo; (3) creating an 
enforceable legal position based on international law strictu sensu; (4) at least 
presumably, by imposing a ban to the use of such weapons in warfare (or at least 
among “civilised nations”), these documents have probably curbed a widespread and 
massive investments into CB weapons research and development for a certain period 
of time (for a summary of these “first generation” agreements, see table 3.2) 
After the ending of WWII, chemical and biological weapons came to be included in the 
UN definition of Weapons of Mass Destruction and, starting in the 50s, repeated calls 
were made for their elimination by the civil societies of many countries (USA and UK, 
in particular). Contrary to these auspices, programs to develop such weapons 
continued to grow in number and size.  
The Cuban missile crisis created the momentum for the United States and the 
Soviet Union to negotiate and agree on a number of measures for limiting chemical 
and biological weapons. Most of the initiatives that were put forward during the 1960s 
were general and complete disarmament treaties falling into two main categories: (1) 
covering specific geographical areas (e.g. the Antarctic treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, 
and the Seabed Treaty, followed – later on - by Nuclear Weapons Free Zones related 
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J. in Lentzos Filippa, Biological Threats In The 21st Century, Chapter 2. 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 214 
treaties); (2) specific categories of weapons (nuclear in 1968 (TNP), missiles (SALT 
1969-1972), biological (1969-1972) and chemical (1993 CWC).  
 
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 508 
 
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, was signed 
on 10th April 1972 and entered into force on March 26th of 1975. It has represented 
the first international treaty banning an entire category of weapons. 
With its comprehensive scope, which prohibits the development, production, 
acquisition, transfer, retention, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons, the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC/BWC) is the cornerstone and 
framework agreement of the related regime . 
As of September 2017, the BTWC counts 179 state parties. In the period between the 
Seventh Review Conference (2011) and Eight Review Conference (8RC) which took 
place in December 2016, eight states have joined the convention increasing the total 
numbers of state parties from 165 to 173. Since December 2016, 5 additional states 
have acceded to the Convention: Cote d’Ivoire (174th), Angola (175th), Liberia (176th), 
Nepal (177th), and Guinea (178th) all in 2016. When Samoa has deposited its 
instrument of accession on the 21st September 2017, the Country has become the 179 
state party. However, although the years since the Seventh Review Conference have 
witnessed a slow increase in the number of state parties, with only 179 members 
reaching universalization still remains a priority for the Conference (and for the BWC 
Implementation Support Unit (ISU), that is the Organization supporting the 
implementation of the Convention, as it will be explained below. The BWC 
Convention’s membership still falls behind major multilateral arms control, 
disarmament and non-proliferation treaties (both the TNP and the CWC count more 
than 190 state parties). A ISU publication on the status of the universalization of the 
                                                        
508 This section mainly relies on the information gathered during the author’s participation to BTWC 
relevant meetings (State Parties and Meeting of Experts, including the 8 Review Conference) and on 
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convention contends that in many cases the reasons for not joining the Convention 
must be found not in a lack of political will, but in resources or capacity constraints 
(including financial and reporting obligations that are required or expected under the 
Convention), as it will better explain below. 509 
 
The Convention was the result of a negotiating process that started in 1968, when the 
United Kingdom submitted a working paper to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament 
Committee (ENDC). The British proposal had the peculiarity of proposing  a ban on 
biological weapons only (so that the topic could be discussed separately from the one 
for chemical weapons).510 Joint bans for both chemical and biological agents had been 
proposed by both the US and URSS already in 1962, but did not produce any conclusive 
result.  
It would be impossible to provide in few paragraphs a complete assessment of the 
geopolitical origins of the Convention. However, understanding the reasons behind 
the United Kingdom’s interest in proposing a ban on biological weapons, and the 
conditions that constrained those interests, is important to comprehend the resulting 
text, its key features and limitations.511 As far as the British proposal is concerned, at 
least 4 reasons can be identified that must have informed the decision of the English 
establishment to propose and sponsor a Convention banning Biological Weapons. A 
first reason relates to motived of national politics. Harold Wilson’s government was 
very much influenced by the wave of public criticisms against chemical and biological 
weapons’ use and development which was raging in the UK (which mostly came from 
within the ranks of the Prime Minister’s own party).512 Public critical actions spanned 
                                                        
509https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/47D2764AC659D6FAC1257FDE003940FD
/$file/Background+paper+on+status+of+universalization+(AV).pdf 
510 Bernstein, “The Birth of the US Biological-Warfare Program”; Wright, “The Military and the New 
Biology,” May 1, 1985; Wright, Preventing a Biological Arms Race; Wright, Biological Warfare and 
Disarmament; Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs; Miller, “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation 
Sanctions”; Walker, Britain and Disarmament.. 
511 For more details see Francesca Cerutti, “The Special Relationship at stake: The negotiation of the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1966-1972)”; Transatlantic Studies Association, 15th Annual 
Conference – University of Plymouth, 5-7 July 2016 and Francesca Cerutti and Daniela Vignati: The 
Special Relationship meets Détente: United Kingdom, United States, and the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention”; Transatlantic Studies Association, 17th Annual Conference – University of North 
Georgia, Dahlonega, Georgia, USA; 9-11 July 2018 
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a range from petitions to protests against the use of defoliants in Vietnam and the 
continuation of programs for chemical and biological weapons’ development in the 
country (like those conducted jointly with the US including the field tests in the Pacific 
Ocean).513 A second reason is linked to the position of the epistemic communities 
active in the propaganda:  academia, the scientific establishment, and television 
programs were also supporting the movement. 514  
What is more is that, in the United Kingdom, part of the criticism came from  within 
the lines of the military establishment and in the army. After acquiring an independent 
nuclear capacity (in 1952), the UK government had downsized its BW activities 
focusing on defensive rather than offensive BW research. As a consequence of such 
disengagement, which is very much consistent with complementary relationship 
existing between nuclear and biological weapons described by Horowitz,515 by the 
mid-sixties the country ended up for being free from biological (and chemical) 
stockpiles. Nonetheless, the information was kept secret, even to its NATO allies. A 
great proportion of the military establishment and arms-control analysts considered 
biological weapons poor candidates for deterrence and of limited use in warfare 
(chemicals were also considered of no relevance for deterrence, but possibly more 
practical and efficient on the field). Consistently, a report of the Chief of Staff written 
in 1965 stated: “chemicals weapons would be more effective” and “escalation would 
likely proceed to nuclear weapons. After such an event, attack with [biological 
weapons] would be irrelevant”.  Furthermore, those who believed that the biological 
weapons could have become cheap substitutes for nuclear weapons, also thought that 
this would have been at the advantage of developing countries and that, vice versa, 
the wealthiest nations should be keen of keeping the war expensive. 
A final reason which seems reasonably involved in the decision of the UK to start the 
negotiation process is one of international prestige. The UK was hoping to acquire a 
prominent role in the disarmament discourse and possibly take the lead of the 
movement. Under this perspective, the BWC seemed an easy move because of its 
                                                        
513 Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare. 
514 The situation exploded in particular after the 1968 Skull Valley incident in Utah were divulgated by 
the press. 
515 Horowitz and Narang, “Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb?” 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 217 
relatively uncontroversial content: hampering the proliferation of a category of 
weapons whose use was prohibited since the beginning of the century and that was 
perceived of limited utility in battlefield. The initiative which could gain widespread 
support insofar it was not threatening military and commercial interests – as a ban on 
chemicals would have happened to do and possibly reach a successful outcome. 
In the permissive environment created by the Cuban crisis, and after the positive 
results achieved with the Non-proliferation treaty, the US, theretofore reticent, 
became available to consider the British proposal. Even more, in 1969 President Nixon 
took the dramatic step of unilaterally renouncing the possession and use of lethal 
biological agents and weapons, and all other means of biological warfare. He declared 
that all biological research in the future would have been, in the US, confined to 
defensive measures such as immunization and safety-related activities. 
Scholars (mainly historians) have investigated at large the reasons behind President 
Nixon’s decision to move toward the ban and they appear to be manifolds.516  Most 
of them are distinct but not distant from the ones informing the British counterpart. 
First of all, the successful Non-proliferation Treaty’s negotiation (which represented 
the US top priority) materialized the need to control what could have become nuclear 
weapons’ substitutes. Serving as strategic equalizers, biological weapons, would have 
been more beneficial for developing countries than for advanced nations (as the 
secret trials in the Pacific had demonstrated). Because BW posed a potential “mass 
casualty threat” to US cities it was in the American interest to keep other nations from 
acquiring them as early as possible; These stances were supported by the growing 
conviction from within the ranks of the military forces, informed by an increasing 
number of scientific reports, that on the one side nuclear weapons were a way better 
deterrent than BW could have ever and that chemical weapons were of higher tactical 
utility. 
Reputational considerations operating both at the domestic and international level 
seemed to be crucial in determining the President decisions with respect to the issue. 
Nixon wished to appear in front of  his electors a man of peace -  at a time when the 
war in Vietnam was raising strong opposition both at home and abroad. Similarly, it is 
                                                        
516 Wright, Preventing a Biological Arms Race. 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 218 
reasonable to think that the President wanted to provide an injection of confidence 
regarding the American commitments and engagement towards arms control 
agreements especially to the Russian counterparts, with regards to the Arms Strategic 
Limitations talks (on ICBM and ABM). Finally, after the British it was vital for the US 
entering full title in the negotiation process in order to avoid defeating outcomes (as 
a joint BW-CW ban would have been). By banning only BW, the country could have 
bought time for maintaining the use of tear gas and herbicides in Vietnam and its 
President would have given a sign towards disarmament. 
In August 1970 the Soviets, who for a long time had struggled for a joint ban on both 
BW and CW, dropped their initial objections to what in the meanwhile had become 
the US/UK proposal and accepted the idea for a ban only applying exclusively to 
biological agents. Within a year the Americans, the British, and the Soviets were able 
to agree on a final draft text. The negotiations process, was nonetheless, plane and 
the United Kingdom had to accept to step back under many respects to survive the 
discussion which rapidly became a US-Soviet dialogue.517 
The reasons behind the Soviet position are more difficult to faithfully reconstruct 
(compared to the ones of the US and UK) for the scarce sources available. However, 
the Politburo seems to have changed its position after having realized that the new 
treaty would have not contained any verification system or other mandatory 
transparency measure whatsoever (that was not a concept the USSR would have been 
available to take into consideration until 1987/88 and the negotiation of the INF 
treaty). Also, the Soviets succeeded in introducing a formulation that would have 
made it clearly impossible to draw any line between permissible and impermissible 
BW research, or permissible and impermissible development and production.518 
The final text approved for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was indeed 
a compromise among different pressures and calls (only partially elucidated above) 
which include: the developed countries’ need to preserve a military advantage, the 
reliance of powerful Western states on superpowers nuclear umbrella, the 
                                                        
517 Francesca Cerutti and Daniela Vignati  
518 For a complete description of the ongoing  and following Soviet BW programme, see Leitenberg, 
“Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century”; Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and 
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preservation of commercial interests of the biotechnology emerging industry, the 
secrecy around military activities paired with the fundamental ambiguity between 
offensive and defensive research (and between research and development). 
The normative structure resulting from the negotiation has incorporated the following 
provisions (see Table 3.3):519 
ü Article I establishes the non-proliferation norm. It describes the scope of the 
Convention in terms of four prohibited activities: development, production, 
stockpiling and acquisition. The prohibition takes the form of a so-called “general 
purpose” (no list of forbidden agents is provided) and served the purpose of 
making immediately clear that peaceful uses of biosciences were legitimate 
undertakings as legitimate would have been “biodefence” – related efforts. The 
final document of the Second Review Conference gave further specification to the 
scope by clarifying that the provisions of the Convention  would have covered all 
relevant current and future scientific and technological developments as well as 
apply to all international, national, and non-state actors (bringing officially 
bioterrorism in the scope of the Convention). 
ü The disarmament norm is conveyed in Art. II and requires sate parties to either 
destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents and toxins equipment and means 
of delivery related to their BWC holdings (within nine months after the entry into 
force of the Convention). 
ü The non-transfer norm is transmitted by Art. III. State parties forswear to “transfer 
to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not anyway to assist 
encourage or induce any actor to acquire any of the items [specified in Article I of 
the BTWC]”. As it will be explained in the next paragraph, a group of states have 
tried to harmonize their national export control activities and have complemented 
this article with an implementing formal institution (using article III and IV as the 
legal basis for their activities). 
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ü The national implementation/harmonization norm is contained in Art. IV which 
tasks states parties to implement the proscriptions of the Convention on the 
domestic level. 
ü Art. V enhances a consultation commitment, in which state parties agree to 
consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problem which may arise in 
relation to the object and in the application of the provisions of the Convention. 
ü An investigation norm (although rudimentary) is provided by Art. VI which is in 
effect limited to BWC state parties bringing cases of noncompliance before the UN 
Security Council to investigate. This norm constituted the basis on which the 
UNSGM was developed as it will be explained in the inherent paragraph. 
ü The assistance norm, which applies to states suffering the consequences of a 
violation of the Convention operated by another member state is detailed by Art. 
VII. 
ü Art. X contains the cooperative norm, which - from the point of view of some BWC 
member states (Non-Aligned-Movement and Global South) - has to be closely 
related to the non-acquisition and non-transfer norms. Analogous to the one 
incorporated into the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the idea informing the 
article is the one according to which states that commit not to acquire BW are 
granted the opportunity to develop relevant technology for civilian purposes and 
are almost entitled to receive transfers supporting such development (biosciences 
and biotechnologies in this case). Some member states from the NAM have vocally 
accused others of violating this norm with their export control practices (e.g. by 
creating sub-regime into the regime, namely the Australia Group). 
ü Last, the continuing link between BW and CW disarmament is acknowledged 
through the normative requirements put in place by Art. IX of the convention to 
continue negotiating a CW treaty.  
The remaining sections are rules and procedures: Art. XI contains the procedure for 
amending the convention, Art. XII spells out the initial review procedure (including a 
conference of state parties to be held within the 5-year from the Convention’s entry 
in to force. The withdrawal procedure is set out in art. XIII, and art. XIV contains the 
stipulation for ratification of accession to and entry into force of the BWC. 
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Although article XII envisaged only one Review Conference to be held in 1980, parties 
have chosen not only to meet regularly for further review conferences, but also - 
during the Third Review Conference in 1996 - it was decided that they would have met 
once a year in so-called “Intersessional Meeting of State Parties” (MPS) to support the 
development of intersessional programs of action. During the Fifth Review 
Conference, State Parties adopted a final report that included a decision to hold, in 
additional to the traditional MSP, a second annual appointment, namely the “Meeting 
of Experts” (MX) - usually taking place in August - where technical aspects related to 
the Convention could be covered.520The BWC provided for Review Conferences to 
occur every five years, and these have taken place in 1980, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1996, 
2002, 2006, 2011, and 2016 (see Table 3.4). 
The Second Review Conference saw the beginning of pressure to see some kind of 
verification procedures to be elaborated for the BWC. As briefly mentioned above, 
during the negotiating phase, both the Soviet Union and the United states expressed 
their resistance to the inclusion of a verification system into the scope of the 
Convention. Five years later, the debate was re-opened and lead to an agreement on 
a politically (and not legally) binding tool, the so-called Confidence Building Measures 
(CBM) document. A preliminary agreement about its general content was also reached 
back then. For further details see on this informal “political” tool of compliance see 
Chapter 4.  
At the 1991 Third Review conference a group of nations (including the US, Canada, 
and UK) sought to establish a more rigorous and intrusive on-site inspection regime 
for assessing compliance with the BTWC (more or less analogous to the one under 
elaboration for the CWC that was negotiated in the very same years). Tasked with this 
scope, a group of governmental experts was established by the BTWC Conference: the 
VEREX Committee. Its activities occupied the biennium 1992-93 and produced a series 
of measures that could have been utilized and implemented as a verification protocol. 
At a Special Conference of State Parties held on September 1994 and, on the basis of 
the VEREX’s findings, an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) was designated to hold 24 working 
sessions over the next seven years mandated, interalia, to complete the development 
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of a verification protocol.521 The ad Hoc Group conducted several meetings since 1995 
and entered a negotiating mode by the year 1997. However, as the summer of 2001 
approached, there was substantial doubt whether a protocol would have been 
decided upon before the following Review Conference in November. Notwithstanding 
the existence of several problematic nations (US, Russia, and Iran),522 at the very end, 
the US provided the major stunning block. The main “official” reason used to justify 
the liquidation of the protocol initiative was the idea that any effective verification 
would have been intrinsically impossible to achieve. De facto the newly elected US 
administration  had no interest in supporting prior policies in favour of the Verification 
Protocol. The US destructive position undermined the entire project and the effort 
collapsed definitively following the US rejection of the AHG chairmen’s provisional 
text.523 In the Geneva AHG’s negotiation, the US position has been opposed by all its 
Western allies. Nonetheless, it has to be said that - although the US are usually 
charged with the responsibility for the failure of the initiative, during the final stages 
of the negotiations, other nine states led by Iran let know to the chair that the text 
was considered as unacceptable.  
A part from the absence of a verification or other oversight system, that is typical for 
a non-proliferation treaty of this type (see in contrast the TNP and the CWC), in deep 
contrast to other International Organizations with similar mandate, the BTWC also 
was not provided with a dedicated international organization to oversee the treaty’s 
implementation or to accomplish any another specific function. To fill this lacuna, 
following the debacle of the verification protocol and in an attempt to grant a broader 
implementation to the Convention, State Parties decided to establish a specific 
operational body which was called Implementation Support Unit (ISU). The idea was 
to provide administrative support to the meetings and other gatherings as agreed by 
                                                        
521 For a detailed account of the work and accomplishments of the VEREX group, see Nicholas Sims 
(SIPRI), 2001 
522 For a critical analysis Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat, 2005. 
523 According to some authors, the US department of Defence wanted to protect the explosion of 
biodefence activities which have started in the aftermath of the anthrax letter case, nor in favour was 
the Joint Chief of Staff. Plus, the biotechnology industry fuelled the opposition fearing commercial 
repercussions for such a protocol.  
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the Review Conferences.524 The Unit should have also been devoted to grant a better 
implementation and universalization of the Convention and broadcast CBM-related 
activities. The Seventh Review Conference decided to renew the BTWC-ISU mandate 
mutatis mutandis for the period 2012-2016. The Conference also decided that, in 
addition to the task mandated by the Sixth Review Conference, the ISU would have 
also implemented the decision to establish and administer a database for assistance 
advertising requests and offers facilitating the associated exchange of information 
among state parties as appropriate. Currently, the ISU has three fixed term staff 
positions, a very limited number compared to AIEA or OPCW (2560 and 460, 
respectively). In accordance with the decision on its establishment taken by the Sixth 
Review Conference the ISU is funded by the states parties to the convention per a 
total annual budget cost of about 760 000 $ (e.g. year 2016) which is, again, very 
modest if compared to the one of similar agencies ($ 68 million for the OPCW; and $ 
507 million budget for IAEA). 
The database for cooperation and assistance is an additional example of the types of 
informal tools established by the RevCon(s) process. As decided by the “Meetings of 
State Parties” (MSP), the offers of assistance are made publicly available on the 
website while the requests are available to state parties in restricted areas of the 
website. The sponsorship program as well as efforts towards universalization 
represent the other major commitments of the ISU. 
 
The Eight Review Conference, which did take place in December 2017, has been 
defined as one of the best prepared of the Review Conferences with two enhanced 
and extended Preparatory Committees (Spring and Summer 2016).525 A substantial 
number of Working Papers have been submitted to the Preparatory Committee (39) 
and to the Revie Conference itself (44), many of which were co-authored by state 
parties in the form of joint proposal, indicating a higher degree of integration of 
perspectives among member states. The NGOs coalition also proved very active in 
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525 For a complete and detailed analysis of the Review Conference outcome see Report from Geneva: 
The BTWC Eighth Review Conference: A Disappointing Outcome by Graham S. Pearson in association 
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assisting the Implementation Support Unit with preparatory works and by means of 
papers and statements of utility for member countries. Notwithstanding expectations 
running high before the meeting, the outcome was meagre. The Conference failed to 
agree strengthening language or new extended understandings on all but three of the 
Articles, even when the draft text was conveniently made available. The 
Implementation Support Unit saw its mandate renovated for another five years, but 
remains understaffed and underfunded. If annual Meetings of State Parties (MSP) 
were allowed to continue, the Meetings of Experts (MX) - which had characterized the 
previous three intersessional programs - were cancelled without any alternative on 
how a new intersessional program could work (open-ended working groups? Meeting 
of Experts “revisited”?) 
Among the reasons advanced to explain the modest results achieved, the followings: 
(1) personalities and politics 526 (2) structural deficiencies and insufficient collective 
machinery; (3) poor integration between informal discussion and formal processes in 
train.  
 
The Australia Group 
The Australia Group (AG) defines itself as an “informal forum of countries which, 
through the harmonization of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not 
contribute to the development of chemical and biological weapons.”527  
The AG acts upon the so-called “supply-side” of the non-proliferation curve: its goal is 
the one of making it harder for weapons’ developers to succeed in their aim by 
restricting access to items necessary for CB weapons production (including dual-use 
equipment).528 Together with the Nuclear Supplier Group, the Wassenaar Agreement 
and the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Groups constitutes the so-
called Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECR). 
                                                        
526 In particular reference may be made to the fact that a single State Party – Iran was able to block 
consensus on a broadly acceptable compromise text (as it happened for the US in 2001) 
527 http://www.australiagroup.net/en/ 
528 Conversely, contrary demand-side measures are those that seek to reduce the incentives (or 
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First attempts to govern the trade of chemical and biological agents date back to the 
“Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition 
and in Implements of War” that met in Geneva on May 1925 which led to the Geneva 
Protocol on Chemical and Biological Weapons. As explained, the project of a 
restriction in trade was explored, but soon abandoned for the hostility of some 
countries, notably Italy and Brazil, which saw a limitation on trade of those agents as 
discriminatory against importers (and developing) countries and possibly leading to a 
unacceptable restrain over civil technologies. 
The geopolitical reasons leading to the formation of the Australia Group are to be 
found in the reports from the UN Team called to investigate over the use of chemical 
and biological agents in the conflict between Iraq and Iran. The Belgian Laboratory to 
where the material was sent, found two types of chemical agents in the samples taken 
from Iranian patients (mustard gases and “yellow-rain mycotoxin)”. In 1984, the team 
also proved that the chemical precursors serving the CW employed in the war sourced 
through legitimate channels. Shortly before such results were delivered, the Soviet 
Union had also been accused of using “yellow rain” in Afghanistan, Laos, and 
Cambodia.529 Several countries reacted by introducing individual export controls on 
certain chemicals which were considered functional to CW manufacture.530  
Understanding the risks that a not-uniform system would have created, Australia 
proposed a meeting of countries with the aim of conjointly restricting the flow of dual-
use equipment, materials and technologies where it represents a risk for peace and 
security. The first meeting of what would have become the Australia Group took place 
in Brussels in June 1985, when 15 participating countries and the European 
Commission agreed that the need was there to reinforce export controls for chemical 
weapons. At the same time, the Group would have also sought to ensure that the 
legitimate trade would not be inhibited, anticipating what would have been the 
obvious reactions of developing countries (as main importers).531 Interestingly 
enough, notwithstanding the fact that the BTWC has been operating for 10 years and 
                                                        
529 For a complete roadmap to Iran-Iraq War, see the Wilson Center Timeline at UN Investigation 
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its scope already covered at least one categories among those involved in the 
investigations (mycotoxins), the decision was taken to address the problem outside 
the Convention itself. The arrangement was modelled on analogous predecessors: the 
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Control (COCOM),532 the Zangger 
Committee and the Nuclear Supplier Group. 
The Australia Group initial activities comprised the production and drafting of (1) 
guidelines about the circumstances which require a restraint in trade and transfer; 
and (2) lists of items to which control measure should apply (public goods, technology, 
equipment, materials related to BW and CW, biological and chemical agents). The idea 
was to induce a joint/mutual adjustment of exports policies through a voluntary 
process of coordination. In order to limit the prospect for free-riding and avoid related 
transaction costs by complying members, a “no undercut provision” was in practice 
established on the model of the COCOM itself.533 In terms of structure, the typical 
feature characterizing the AG is its informality, consultative nature and a light 
arrangement.  
At the outset, the AG was committed to chemical weapons. However, at the AG 
meeting held in June 1991, which occurred a few months after the Gulf conflict, 
parties agreed to convene a series of BW expert meetings to explore possible/further 
developments related to BW. Developing the list was not a simple task because there 
was no mention to specific agents in the BTWC’s letter. Under this perspective, the 
experts could not only apply any existing framework and had to elaborate a consistent 
logic and correspondent model. In order to decide whether an agent should have been 
included in the control lists they wondered: (1) whether the agent had ever been 
developed for or used in warfare before; (2) whether the agent had ever been sought 
by a country of proliferation concern, (3) whether the agent was posing (or was 
expected to pose)  great public health consequences and could be mass produced and 
(4) whether it was infective in aerosol form and able to damage plants and create 
serious socio-economic consequences. The 1993 AG meeting marked an interesting 
                                                        
532 The Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Control was formed by the United States and 
a number of allies in the first five years after the end of WWII with the intention of impeding that the 
URSS could get access to military relevant technologies by trade with the Western bloc. 
533 Under the “no-undercut” requirement, members pledged not to approve a particular export to a 
specific country that another member had previously denied without first consulting that members. 
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development in the regime, because for the first time the world witnessed the 
adoption of a full range  list covering BW relevant items (four lists). The lists have been 
regularly reviewed since that time (including the 1995 revision where vaccines and 
immunotoxins got the exemption). The inclusion of a specific list of biological agents 
and related materials represented a significant step further in consideration of the 
fact that, as said, the BTWC did and still does not provide any indication in that 
direction (like it is the case with the CWC, see the “Annex of Chemicals” schedule 1; 2; 
3 of the Chemical Weapons Convention)534. Aware of the fact that it would not be 
possible to control every type of pathogen and toxin or dual-use item that could be 
misused for a BW programme for bioterrorism purposes, AG participants also 
introduced a “catch-all provision” -  whereby AG participants will be able to not supply 
an unlisted item when the transfer is of particular concern because of the potential 
diversion of the item upon its delivery. 
In the awake of 9/11 anthrax letters, an adjustment of the various control lists was 
performed. In particular, the AG members decided to add several new biological 
agents and new toxins to existing lists as well as to support a refinement to the list of 
dual-use biological equipment occurred. Two years later, in 2003, a manual 
summarizing the new guidelines and inputs was also issued. It provided a list of factors 
to be considered before approving the export of sensitive items.  
Today, the number of participating countries has raised to 43535  plus the European 
Union (last access being India in 2018). Very few other states (outside the AG) have 
adopted similar export controls, which nonetheless would have been deemed  on the 
basis of the active owe to oversight proscribed under the BTWC. Today (in particular 
1540 UNSC Resolution was issued) many other states have adopted or are in the 
process of adopting national exports control for dual-use biological materials and 
equipment using the Australia Group lists as a benchmark. Participation to the AG is 
achieved by an application process initiated by the country willing to become member 
and adhere to the AG Guidelines and Control Lists. The perspective member forwards 
a third person note with an expression of interest to the Australia Group Chair who 
                                                        
534 https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/annexes/annex-on-chemicals/ 
535 The last session, at the moment of writing, of the Australia Group plenary (32nd) took place in Paris on 30 
June 2017, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/2017-ag-plenary-statement.html 
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will consult with other members. If the AG participants agree to consider the 
application, the Chair liaises with the candidate for provision of a formal application 
with detailed information concerning the country’s legislation and policy of exports 
controls, relevant to the purpose of the AG. AG participants will then scrutinize the 
application (they can ask questions to the candidate bilaterally or through the chair) 
and finally a decision is made by consensus.  
Participants in the AG do not take any legally binding obligation, although criteria for 
participation are explicitly enounced and part of the AG’s long-standing policy on 
membership (although relatively general in their content). So that the effectiveness of 
their cooperation only builds on their reciprocal commitments. 
AG adherents only notify their political commitment to the AG Chairs by means of a 
unilateral document which is not subject to any acceptance decision by the AG 
membership. Currently Kazakhstan is the only “adherent” country, that has not 
proceeded by completing the membership process. 
Originally developed as informal mechanism within a restricted group of like-minded 
states (most of them with a supplier profile), the AG (similarly to the other WMD 
export controls tools) has evolved in an organization with enlarged commitments, an 
expanded and expanding membership, and a semiformal organizational structure 
(annual meetings, participations to relevant fora, and engagement with non-member 
states, industry and academia). Plenaries take place every year and the governance 
system is granted by a Secretariat (point of contact) located Canberra (Australia). 
Technical meetings can meet on request when a need materialize (e.g. the Technical 
Advisory Group or the Synthetic Biology Advisory Board). More recently, AG members 
have agreed to further invest on a regional-based outreach. Notwithstanding this 
evolving structure, the group has maintained its informal character.  
Upon its formation, AG (as other MECR) was/were regarded as potentially limiting the 
core structure of the related non-proliferation regime, and not a way to reinforce it 
for several reasons: informality, consensus decision-making rules, lack of enforcement 
capabilities, vague membership criteria, and inadequate transparency measures.536 
                                                        
536 Jones, “The Multilateral Export Control Regimes: Informality Begets Collaboration,” 28. 
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The group has been criticized also for its lobby-profile. Countries of the Non-Aligned 
Movement have vocally repeated that the rules of the groups stand in deep contrast 
with the BTWC X article provision for the “fullest possible exchange for the 
advancement of peaceful scientific endeavours” raising doubts on its ultimate 
legitimacy. A second critique to the AG operation has been its scarce capacity of 
information gathering and sharing and for the disparate levels of export control 
capabilities which differentiate its members.  
Notwithstanding critiques, the Group was able to adapt the passage of time and 
survived significant geopolitical changes (end of the Cold War and 9/11) as well as 
quickly moving technical innovations (biotechnology, nanotechnology, and synthetic 
biology). 
Measuring the individual impact of this specific informal agreement is essentially 
unfeasible on the basis of the data available. However, it is possible to enlighten the 
mechanisms potentially at work (1) To begin with, the arrangement – despite its 
informal nature -  realistically served the reinforcement of the international norms 
against the spread of biological (and chemical) agents. (2) The group has surely 
contributed the consolidation of the consensus among experts and the 
institutionalization of scientific advice as it demonstrated by the fact  the guidelines 
and control lists developed has not only complemented the letter of the BTWC (art 
III), but, more importantly, have  much of the practical content also found in UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540 -  thus bridging the various individual components of 
the BW non-proliferation regime. Since then, as clearly remarked in the Statement of 
the Chair which followed the 2017 Australia Group Plenary, today the restrictions of 
the transfer of chemical and biological weapons related items, materials, equipment 
can be found reaffirmed in many UNSC Resolutions addressing specific countries 
including North Korea and Syria.537 (3) Consistently, the AG consensual decision-
making, matched with the frequent revisions and update of lists and guidelines, has 
most probably contributed to fuel iterative learning within and among countries 
(producing internalization and persuasion in a sociological parlance). The enlarged 
membership (which now also includes Russia and China) have reasonably  raised the 
                                                        
537 http://www.australiagroup.net/en/2017-ag-plenary-statement.html 
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rational costs of getting the weapons, by reducing the number of available exporters 
and by increasing the chance of being detected and from a constructive standpoint 
the international opprobrium that would derive from such detection. The fact that, 
due to the high technicality of the subject, many representatives sitting in this forum 
also sit in other non-proliferation organizations may have induced additional and 
indirect linkages of the type of those described by Lupu in his work on networked 
peace.538 
 
United Nation Secretary General Mechanism (UNSGM)539 
investigations of alleged use of biological and chemical weapons 
 
The letter of article VI of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention provides that 
state parties to the Convention that suspect another state party of acting in breach of 
obligations from the provisions of the BTWC may submit a complaint to the Security 
Council (SC) of the United Nations. All state parties are then obliged to cooperate fully 
with any investigation that the Security Council may initiate.  
Article VI has never been invoked vis-a-vis allegations of non-compliance to the BWC 
rules and norms, possibly in consideration of the intensively political nature of the 
Security Council decisions and the veto power that can be exercised by its permanent 
members.540 It is also true that since the entry into force of the BWC, the world have 
faced relatively few allegations of violations. In many case, especially when the 
suspects dealt with development, production and transfer of biological 
agents/technology prohibited under the letter of the Convention, very little joint 
action has been taken by member states apart from verbal expression of concern 
during plenaries and intersessional meetings. 
                                                        
538 Lupu and Greenhill, “The Networked Peace.” 
539 This chapter builds on the author’s conversations with former members of investigation team and 
inspectors Nikita Smidovich, (United Nation Office for Disarmament Affairs), Ake Sellstrom (Chief 
Inspector in UNSCOM, Senior adviser for  UNMOVIC, and Head of the UN Investigation Team for Syria 
in 2013), Maurizio Barbeschi (WHO Technical Expert in UN/OPCW FFM 2013-2018). 
540 Kadlec, Zelicoff, and Vrtis, “Biological Weapons Control. Prospects and Implications for the 
Future.” 
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In the case of suspect of use, mechanisms other than the BWC (or the Security Council) 
have been activated to conduct the investigations in the absence of an operational 
agency linked to the Biological and Weapons Convention. 
Among these mechanisms, the United Nation Secretary General Mechanism (UNSGM) 
is one of the most relevant. The UNSGM deserves special attention insofar it has been 
described as a valuable and legitimate complement to provision conveyed by article 
VI of the BTWC. The outcome documents of both the 2006 and 2011 BWC Review 
Conferences defined the UNSGM “an international institutional mechanism for 
investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons.” Most notably today 
some member states regard the mechanism as “the only realistic tool for an 
investigation of alleged biological weapons’ use.”541 
Especially in recent times, the UNSGM has attracted considerable attention with 
regards to the investigations conducted in the Syrian Arab Republic following the 
then-suspected (and afterward confirmed) use of chemical weapons (2013). At that 
time, the UNSGM was called into action because Syria was not yet a party to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, which the Country only joined in 2015, and 
consequently the OPCW and its specific bodies had no right to conduct investigations.  
 
The United Nation Secretary General Mechanism has its origin in an ad-hoc activity 
sustained by the UN Secretary General (SG) in response to the alleged use of chemical 
weapons and toxins in Indochina and Afghanistan which was ascribed to the Soviet 
Union (late 70s).542 The events, if attested, would have been in violation of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol (Yellow Rain allegations) and of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, which the Soviets had signed in 1973 and ratified in 1975.543   
In 1980, the General Assembly (GA) adopted a first resolution sponsored by a group 
of Western States that called on the Secretary-General “to carry out an impartial 
investigation to ascertain the facts pertaining to the reports regarding the alleged use 
                                                        
541 United States Compliance Statement to the 2016 BWC Review Conference  
542 One of the best account of the history of the Mechanism is: Littlewood “Investigating Allegations 
of CB use,” on which this section largely relies. 
543 Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs; Littlewood, “Investigating Allegations of CBW Use: Reviving 
the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism,” 10; Miller, “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation 
Sanctions.” 
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of chemical weapons [..] with the assistance of qualified medical and technical 
experts.”544 Notwithstanding the obvious opposition of the Soviet Union, the 
Resolution was adopted with 78 votes in favour and 17 against (including Afghanistan, 
Cuba Syria the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact allies). The Secretary General appointed 
four experts (respectively from Egypt, Kenya, the Philippines and Peru). The 
investigators proved unable to complete the mission they have been tasked with 
within the proper deadline (one year) and saw their mandate extended through 1982. 
The group conducted a range of activities including collating background information 
(from member states – particularly those reporting the Yellow Rain incidents – and 
from other sources –  such as UN agencies and IOs with relevant skills). Investigations 
both in Indochina and Afghanistan were strongly hindered by practical obstacles: 
scarce collaboration from states of suspicion, poor interpretation during interviews, 
incomplete access to refugee camps of neighbouring countries, pitiable sample 
management, questionable chain of custody lines, limited access to relevant locations, 
and the inability to conduct proper on-site investigations. Each and every one of these 
facts prevented the group of experts from providing definitive conclusions on the 
alleged use of B/C weapons’ use (although some circumstantial evidences of 
significant value were provided). On-site activities, in particular, revealed especially 
troublesome so that the Group of Experts was forced to rely heavily on the 
investigations made by others,545 cross-checking those results as best as they could.546 
No consistency was found among the investigations’ results and this nurtured an 
increased scepticism about the methodology adopted and the credibility of the 
evidences used to support allegations. Although these early experiences de facto 
already represented international investigations over alleged C/B used by experts 
appointed by the Secretary General, the UNSGM as it exists today arose from a 
subsequent Resolution issued in 1982 (UNGA 37/98D) aimed at providing the Geneva 
Protocol “with procedures for investigating reports concerning activities prohibited by 
                                                        
544 UNGA Res. 35/144C, 12 Dec. 1980 extended for a second year by UNGA A736/96C 
545 Several states conducted independent investigations, as did also three independent analysts in 
their personal capacities. 
546 Robinson, “What Do We Mean by Nuclear Proliferation?,” January 2, 2015; Guillemin, Biological 
Weapons; Littlewood, “Investigating Allegations of CBW Use: Reviving the UN Secretary-General’s 
Mechanism,” 12. 
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the Protocol.”547 Once again, it was far from achieving consensus. Although 70 states 
supported the Resolution, 31 voted against it, including Afghanistan, Cuba, Syria, the 
Soviet Union and many of its Warsaw Pact allies; Vietnam, and other 18 states 
abstained. The resolution asked the Secretary General: 1) to compile lists of qualified 
experts (whose service could be made available at short notice to undertake 
investigations) and inventories of approved laboratories where the samples could 
have been sent to; 2) to appoint Group of Experts to conduct urgent investigations; 3) 
to devise, with the assistance of consultant experts, procedures for the timely and 
efficient investigation of activities that may violate the Geneva Protocol or other 
relevant rules of International Law. To fulfil this request, the Secretary General duly 
appointed a Group of Consultant experts which convened in May and September 
1983, the experts released a 46 –page report (October 1984) including a series of 
recommendations for setting up what would have become the real UNSGM. 
Additionally, indications about several practical issues and details were collected in 
technical annexes (timing, expertise required, handling and testing of samples’, 
logistics, security, transportation and laboratory support). In the meanwhile, 
increasing evidence of the employment of chemical weapons in Iran were reported 
during the ongoing conflict with Iraq. When Iran placed a formal request for 
investigation, the Secretary General (Perez de Cuellar) launched an investigation. 
Legally speaking he did not operate under the Resolution 37/98D but on the basis of 
the duty “given by the humanitarian principles embodied in the charter and the moral 
responsibility vested in the Secretary General’s office.”548 The action was taken 
notwithstanding the “strong political pressure” not to proceed (especially because of 
the Soviet and US oppositions).549  
                                                        
547 Interestingly enough reference was made to the Geneva protocol and NOT to the BTWC in order 
to establish such a mechanism. 
548 United Nation Security Council “Report of the specialists appointed by the secretary-General to 
investigate allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the use of Chemical Weapons” 
S/16433, 26 March 1984, p.2 in Littlewood. 
549 The Soviet Union was reportedly worried about the fact that the UNSGM could impinge on the 
prerogatives of the Council itself to act at its discretion (decide if, when, where and how to conduct 
investigations) and the United States, who hopes that Iraq would prevail, seemed to be prepared to 
resize the Iraqi alleged transgressions. Littlewood, “Investigating Allegations of CBW Use: Reviving the 
UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism,” 14. 
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The mission to Iran took place between the 13th and 19th March 1984 and saw again 
the displacement of 4 experts (this time from Australia, Sweden, Spain, and 
Switzerland) whose unanimous conclusion was that both mustard gas and the nerve 
agent Tabun have been deployed.550 In 1985, the UN Secretary General also approved 
a medical investigation to Europe to collect information on injured soldiers treated in 
UK, Belgium and FDR.551 Only after the second request from Iran, the UNSC finally 
adopted the Resolution 582 which deplored the carnage and the persisting violations 
in Iran/Iraq of the Protocol and immediately after, welcomed the idea of further on-
site investigations.552 
The Secretary General met with the USNGM and suggested to instantly instruct a 
second team to travel. The investigation team visited Iran between the 26th of 
February and the 3rd of March 1986 and acknowledged the extensive use of chemical 
weapons - including nerve agents - by Iraq towards Iran. On November 1987, the 
UNGA adopted an additional resolution (UNGA 42/37/C) supporting supplementary 
prompt and impartial investigations. A series of additional missions (a total of 4+3 in 
1988) were dispatched and a medical investigation (along the lines of the one 
authorized in 1985) took place. It is clear that these investigations benefited from the 
agreed-upon technical guidelines and procedures for investigation that had been 
issued in 1983.  All the findings - intended to inform the UN Security Council and the 
Assembly - confirmed the use of chemical agents in both Iran and Iraq, also against 
civilians. Although successful in getting to a concrete and final judgment and able to 
ascertain many facts, the teams experienced once again the many limitations of the 
existing procedures. Iraq’s use of CW was condemned (both in national statements 
and multiple UNSC resolutions (e.g. UNSC Res. 512 of 1986) and few actions were 
taken to stop the export of relevant chemicals’ precursors and equipment to Iraq (for 
example by the Brussels group). Nonetheless, no serious penalization against Iraq 
occurred. To fulfil the request over the enhancement of the Mechanism established 
                                                        
550 UNSC S/16433 pp.11-12 
551 ibid. 
552 Iraq refused the team offer to travel also to Baghdad, in order to investigate the allegations about 
a possible use of chemical agents against Iraq, by Iran – so the trip could only involve the territory of 
Iran. 
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by Res 42/37/C, a group of 6 consultant experts was created. They produced a 
comprehensive report including a series of recommendations for investigations 
mandated by the Secretary General in a report (A/44/561, August 1989) submitted to 
the UNGA and considered at the latter’s 45th session in 1990. (1) First of all it was 
reaffirmed the authority of the Secretary General to initiate and conduct the 
investigation: “The Secretary General should promptly open analysis into reports 
brought to his attention by any member state when concerning the possible use of 
CBW in violation of the Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary 
international law.” 553 A decision to conduct a mission, if taken, should happen in the 
shortest possible time (no later than 24 hours after the receipt of the request) and 
member states should be called on not to refuse a request from the SG for a fact-
finding mission – although it would remain impossible for the SG to force on site 
activities on a not willing state.  (2) Secondly, the Report recommended 
implementations of the guidelines and procedures for carrying out the investigations.  
(3) Finally the need was expressed to grant the follow-up of the activities necessary to 
maintain the effectiveness of the Mechanism in terms of periodic update of its 
guidelines and procedures (including cooperation with OPCW on the forthcoming 
entry into force of the CWC). 554   
The role of the UNSGM in investigations of alleged use was shortly after confirmed by 
the letter of the UNSC Res. 620 (1988) and the Final Declaration, by the Conference of 
state parties of the Geneva Protocol, adopted on 11 January 1989. 
In its resolution of 1990, the UN General Assembly endorsed the Group of Experts 
proposal without qualification, but noted “the continued significance of the United 
Nation Security Council’s decision to take appropriate action in the event of future 
chemical weapons use”.555 Today the roster of experts and laboratories provided by 
Member States and the Guidelines and Procedures for the conduct of investigations 
                                                        
553 The experts avoided using the word verification which would imply that the investigation team or 
the SG would make a judgment as to who was responsible for any confirmed use of chemical 
biological or toxin weapons (sovereignty issue would come into play at that point) – so the SG would 
be expected to only engage in “Fact Finding Missions”. 
554 UN A/44/561 p.11 
555 UNGA Res 45/57 C, 4 December 1990 
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constitute the key elements of the Mechanism. 
 
In 1992, at the request of Mozambique and Armenia, the Secretary General launched 
two additional investigations. The first one was the product of a state/non-state actor 
conflict (Mozambique vs Mozambican National Resistance) and the second one is to 
be framed in a state-to-state dispute (Armenia vs. Azerbaijan). Both were considered 
successful in asserting facts linked to the supposed allegations. Apart from these two 
episodes, however, the 90s saw a downsizing of the mechanisms which remained 
unused since 1992. The modest recourse to the Mechanism was also due to the 
competing/complementary mandate of the OPCW (which got operational in 1997) 
and the creation of specific bodies, the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, to address the 
problem of Iraqi proliferation.556 Specifically, the parties to the Geneva Convention, 
UN, and the Security Council were waiting for the CWC to be signed and enter into 
force as a crucial tool to reinforce the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons.557 
On the other side, the discussion over a verification protocol for the BWC (which failed 
in 2001) may have opened a specific mechanisms also for Biological Weapons. 
Nonetheless, according to Littlewood, at that time the authority of the Secretary 
General to initiate investigations was widely acknowledged and kept alive with no one  
questioning its role. After its creation, the Mechanism was never envisaged as 
temporary. No UNGA, nor UNSC resolution ever included a sunset close and the 
UNSGM’s authority remains today.  
After the 9/11, a series of other UN and international reports have acknowledged the 
importance of UNSG Mechanism (interalia “A more secure world”, “In Larger 
Freedom”, “Uniting Against Terrorism”, etc.). In 2006 The Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Commission suggested that the Mechanism needed an update, at least in 
respect to the “biological weapons” component. Along these lines, the UN General 
Assembly adopted a Global Counterterrorism Strategy that encouraged the UNSGM 
                                                        
556 S/RES/687 (3 April 1991); S/RES/1284 (17 Dec 1999) established UNSCOM and UNMOVIC 
respectively to ensure Iraq compliance with production and use of WMD 
557 Littlewood, “Investigating Allegations of CBW Use: Reviving the UN Secretary-General’s 
Mechanism,” 18. 
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to update its roster of experts and laboratories.558 Unlike the CWC, the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) has no equivalent investigating authority of alleged use. 
It seemed therefore particularly important to ensure that the SGM maintained 
effective operational capacity in the biological area. 
Following this wave of renovated interest and demand for updating, the roster of 
experts, the technical appendices and guidelines were actually updated in 2007. The 
list of experts (already revised over the years) was re-organized and new trainings 
were encouraged and funded. 
The cooperation with IOs with relevant mandate has also expanded in recent years. 
The United Nation Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) – that is the custodian of 
the Mechanism - monitored the proper development of the network and its well-
being.559 
In consideration of the possible involvement of public health/medical experts in Fact-
Finding Mission (FFM), in 2011 The UNODA and the WHO signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) titled “WHO’s support to the Secretary General Mechanism for 
Investigation of the Alleged Use of Chemical, Biological or Toxin Weapons.” Previous 
documents governing the legal relationship between the UN and the WHO had been 
signed in 1948 (UN-WHO), and 2009 (UNODA-WHO). According to the content of 
those documents the participation of WHO (in practice managed by and operated 
through the secondment of qualified personnel) would be restricted at addressing the 
public health impact and consequences of the alleged use of chemical and biological 
agents, in order to ensure inter alia the appropriate scientific level required for the 
missions’ findings to be independently scrutinized, without any political implication.  
In September 2012, the UN and the OPCW also concluded an agreement that set out 
the modalities of cooperation between the two Organizations for conducting an 
investigation in case of alleged uses of chemical weapons and related circumstances 
(complementing the existing 2001 UN-OPCW agreement). A Supplementary 
Arrangement Concerning the Implementation of Article II (2) (C) of the Agreement 
                                                        
558 Both the experts and the laboratories included in the lists are to be nominated by member states). 
 
559 Author’s conversation with Fiona Simpson, UN Political Affair Officer, WMD branch UNODA 
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Concerning the Relationship Between the United Nations and the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was concluded in September 2012. UNODA has 
cooperative relations and agreements with other International Organizations with 
pertinent technical expertise (such as the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)) 
in order to grant support to the UNSGM FFM. Interpol and FAO have also extensive 
collaboration in place with the UNODA for the time being. 
Recent Developments [Syria] 
The Mechanism has been crucial in opening the investigation over the alleged use of 
chemical agents in the Syrian Arab Republic before the nation ratified the CWC in 
2014. The Mechanism was activated in 2013 after Syria (a state party to the Geneva 
Protocol) reported allegations of CW use in Khan al-Asal area of Aleppo Governorate. 
Syria’s government and the opposition blamed each other of recurring to CW against 
civilian populations. The Secretary General assembled a team of experts including 
members from the WHO and the OPCW who were deployed in their personal capacity 
of experts. Their role in the mission were defined by their respective Terms of 
References that were drafted “ad-hoc” and in the case of WHO developed consistently 
with the Memorandum of Understandings already in place between the two 
Organizations - where existing (e.g. UNODA-WHO).  The team members including the 
head of the mission (in the person of Ake Sellstrom, expert from Sweden), remained 
in standby until an additional term of reference (this time between the UN and Syria) 
was agreed on.560 The SGM team was dispatched to Syria only in August to investigate 
over Khal al-Asal and two other incidents (Sheik Maqsood and Saraqueb). Three days 
after the team’s arrival in Damascus, allegations of CW use (Sarin) in the Ghouta area 
of Damascus led to prioritize the most recent events. In its first report - issued on 16 
September 2016 - the team concluded that chemical weapons, specifically Sarin were 
used on a relatively large-scale. The international response and pressure lead to 
Syria’s accession to the CWC and implied the handover to OPCW of perspective 
alleged cases of CW uses in line with OPCW mandate. The OPCW was also tasked with 
the supervising the destruction of national chemical stockpiles as required by the CWC 
                                                        
560 The hold-up was a difference of opinion on the scope of the investigation: the UN wanted that all 
credible claims of CW use should be examined while Syria argued that only the 19 March Khan al. Asal 
should be placed within the scope of the mission.  
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 239 
letter. Within 13 months from the Ghouta attacks, 96% of Syria’s declared stockpile 
was reported destroyed. In April 2014, new allegations of CW use (this time Chlorine) 
emerged. Unlike previous allegations, Syria was at that point a State Party to the CWC. 
A Fact-Finding-Mission involving among others, one WHO personnel seconded to the 
OPCW, was established (most members of the new team included experts already 
involved in previous investigations under the UNSGM). The FFM issued three reports 
concluding with high degree of confidence that chlorine has had been used as weapon 
against the villages of Talmenres (21 April 2014); AL Tamanh (29.-30 April and 25-26 
May 2014) and Kafr Zita (11 and 18 April 2014). 
Although both the SGM and the FFM concluded that chemical weapons had been use 
in Syria, no further mission was mandated to investigate blame and assess 
responsibility until 2015. 
In March of that year the UN Security Council Resolution 2209 stressed that those 
responsible should be held accountable,561 and five months later the UNSC called 
unanimously for an official inquiry to identify responsibility. Resolution 2235 gave a 1 
year mandate to an OPCW-UN Joint Investigation Mechanisms (JIM) to identify those 
involved in the cases “where OPCW-FFM determines or has determined that a specific 
incident in Syria involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons”.562 The 
JIM has already produced several reports whose results have been discussed at great 
length interalia during the UN First Committee in 2016 and 2017 triggering tensions 
and debate.   
As of today an additional Fact-Finding mission has already been deployed by OPCW to 
Syria and have confirmed the use of nerve agents in Khan Shaykhun in April 2017. The 
mission has counted on the assistance of the UN-OPCW-JIM system as stated by 
paragraph 6 of resolution 2319 (2016) so the Organization had leveraged  previous 
experiences. In this latter case, like in the previous ones the involvement of experts 
from WHO for technical contribution has been approved (governed by OPCW-WHO 
exchange of letters – Spring 2017). 
                                                        
561 UNSC Res S RES 2118 27 Sept. 2013 and S RES2209 March 2015 
562 Paragraph 5 S/RES/2235 7 August 2015 
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Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction 
 
In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks of September 2001 the anthrax 
letter episodes, although unrelated, contributed to spreading the idea that terrorists 
might gain access to biological (and chemical) weapons and use them against civilians 
anywhere in the world. As shown many initiatives were bound to see the light in those 
years with the scope of counteract terrorists who wanted to use WMD to harm. Few 
days after the amerithrax (the name assigned to the episode of anthrax letters), 
American and Canadian officials began working to establish a new multilateral 
initiative to address vulnerable CBRN materials, along the lines of the US Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The Bush administration provided the essentials for 
the negotiation to start and launched the inherent proposal at the meeting of the G8 
meeting (the eight major industrial countries), in 2002. Canada, that was at that time 
ruling the presidency of the Global Partnership became a key character in the process. 
According to the then-US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security John Bolton, the role of Canada was essential to consent the full development 
of the initiative and paved the way for what would have become the “Global 
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (GP).”563 The 
American and Canadians officials used the first G8 summit taking place after 9/11 
(June 2002) in Kananaskis (Canada) to outline the characteristics for the actuation and 
implementation of the GP. The GP was broad in scope and was established as a 
mechanism to “support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address 
non-proliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism and nuclear safety issues.” The 
idea was to the one of collecting wider resources than those that individual states 
would have been able to mobilize.  Under this perspective, the GP was designed to be 
an informal and flexible mechanism drawing on financial contributions and technical 
project management expertise from participant states. It was initially envisaged a 
commitment of 10 years for the initiative and a funding of 20-billion US$ (10$ provided 
by the US and the remaining to come from the other G8 partners). This was an 
unprecedented material commitment of resources for a multilateral initiative 
                                                        
563 Oral testimony by John Bolton in Bowen and Hayes, “The G8 Global Partnership” 
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designed to counter terrorism, which in the view of several analysts revealed other 
countries, beyond the United States, shared a sense of urgency over CBRN materials 
and their management.  
In order to gain a larger pool of resources from states other than the G8 members, 
participants and welcomed “other countries that [were] prepared to adopt [GP-WMD] 
common principles and guidelines to enter into discussions with us on participating in 
and contributing to this initiative”.564 
The G8 was indeed expanded from the original membership to 22 countries, already 
by 2011. Today thirty countries and several international organizations, both 
governmental and non-governmental are involved in the initiative. It has been 
reported that some of the motives for new participants to contribute funding GP 
projects have been very specific national interests (Kazakhstan and Ukraine), revealing 
in some cases opportunistic stances more than a general commitment to a universal 
cause. Indeed, the support might have signalled a grown awareness of the 
international dimension of the terrorist threat. As noticed by officials from some GP 
countries in 2009, their government would probably not have been in a position to 
supply threat reduction work - beyond their own countries’ borders - in the absence 
of the GP.565  
No formalized bureaucracy was established to run the GP, but a Working Group (WG) 
consisting of senior diplomats, officials, and contractors providing technical expertise 
was designated to implement the initiative. A rotating chair was decided for the 
Working Group and drawn from the country each year hosting the G8 Presidency. The 
strategic vision and the overall capacity of the WG has been severely limited by its 
consensus approach to decision making. No legal framework was set up to oversee 
the implementation of the mechanism and the Working Group remained the only tool 
to provide guidance and to serve as a coordinating body. Notwithstanding such 
institutional constrains, the GP-WMD proved able to fulfil two main functions. On the 
one side, the GP-WMD acted (and still does) as a coordination mechanism among 
potential donors and implementers on non-proliferation relevant projects, de facto 
                                                        
564 statement by G8 leaders 
565 Heyes, Bowen, and Chalmers, The Global Partnership Against WMD, 99. 
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behaving as a clearing house. On the other side, the Working Group has granted 
technical assistance to member states in the enactment of such projects. Throughout 
the years, the Institution’s priorities have changed throughout time in terms of both 
their subject matter and geographical scope. 
Global Partnership’s original focus was assigned to threat reduction projects in Russia 
with 4 priority areas identified: (1) the destruction of chemical weapons; (2) the 
dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines; (3) the disposition of fissile 
materials; (4) and the employment of former weapons scientist (especially physics). 
During the first decade of its life the GP was able to achieve significant results. Key 
accomplishments have included submarine dismantlement, chemical weapons 
destruction, the establishment of an implementation network of technical projects 
management experts, the development of piggybacking options for financing and 
implementing projects (to enable funding from smaller donors to be applied to larger 
projects managed by other GP states), the provision of support to establish 
international organizations active in the field, plus a series of spin off benefits 
(reportedly between 2005 and 2010 a boarder détente in the relationship between 
US and Russia resulted from the technical interactions between the two during the 
implementation of the GP projects). Both submarine dismantlement and chemical 
weapons destruction have been described as major accomplishments within the 
Collaborative GP Threat Reduction programs and projects (CTR). The success was of 
little surprise since both projects were largely prioritized by Russia itself. 
Notwithstanding the above the initiative also encountered some few limitations. 
First of all, It should also be borne in mind that many G8 countries did not meet their 
original financial pledges with France and Italy spending only 15-20% of their pledges 
and many other barely reaching the 50% (Canada, Germany Japan and the UK + UE) 
limiting the initiative outreach capacity. In additional to budget shortfalls, the first 
decade of GP-WMD Working Group developed a modest monitor and evaluation 
capacity of its own work and the work of its affiliated agencies so that resources were 
not effectively distributed among priorities and beyond. 
Both fissile material disposition and scientific redirection, further two priorities 
identified in Kananaskis, have been described as modest accomplishments. Despite 
the fact that they both pose a significant security threat, they were de-emphasized by 
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the Russian government after 2002 and for this reason, according to many reviewers, 
more difficult to fully accomplish. Up until 2012, the Initiative have also left behind 
other important key aspects of WMD non-proliferation, such as enhancing the security 
of CBRN materials, biosecurity, and those pressing challenges resulting from 
geographical areas other than Russia overlooked.  
It is only since the year 2010 that biological weapons and bioterrorism gained traction 
within the initiative. According to Trevor Smith, Senior Project Manager for the WMD 
Threat Reduction Program (Canada), and key figure for the work of the GP Biosecurity 
Working Group (BSWG) since its inception in 2012 (see below), the lack of a 
destruction option for the bio-area (compared to nuclear or chemical) is the main 
limitation the Partnership showed – with regard to the “B” component – in the first 
decade of its life. This would also reasonably be the main motive why there was no 
much subscription on the bio-side as there was in other areas. The fact that it would 
have not been possible to “quantify” and “measure” results as directly as it would be 
(and de facto have been) done for chemical substances like nerve agents, or fissile 
warheads represented a major concern.566  
Biological weapons gained centre stage at the G8 summit in Canada (2010). 
Participants outlined a new agenda which included greater efforts in four areas of (1) 
nuclear and radiological security (topic boosted by the then-recent Fukushima nuclear 
accident), (2) biosecurity, (3) scientific redirection and (4) support for the UNSCR 
1540.567 It is then when the Canadians came up with a strategy for strengthening 
biological security by means of a “deliberately very broad framework” which would 
have included working at the “health and security interface”. 
The following year, during the Deauville Summit (2011), it was decided to extend the 
GP indefinitely.568 Participants endorsed the “four-areas emphasis” proposed in 2010, 
called for new members to join the initiative (although no specific countries were 
mentioned as potential candidates), and strove for improving coordination with 
                                                        
566 Interview with Filippa Lentzos, 2016 
567 Dauville G8 Declaration 
568 Hakan Akbulut, The G8 Global Partnership: From Kananaskis to Deauville and Beyond, Working 
Paper 67/ March 2013; Austrian Institute for International Affairs 
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international organizations with relevant mandates.569 While broadening the scope of 
the G8, the Summit declaration adopted a supporting study document called for 
completing existing projects in Russia. New pledges for collecting $20 billion in the 
next decade was made by G8 partners. In order to promote the priorities adopted one 
year before, the GP under the US Presidency (2012) established 5 sub-working groups 
dealing with (1) biosecurity (the Global Partnership’s biological Security Working 
Group BSWG); (2) membership expansion; (3) nuclear and radiological security; (4) 
chemical security.570 On April 2013, the G8 Foreign Ministers met in London and 
discussed many topics, in particular they confirmed the broader scope the initiative 
finally have reached in covering disarmament issues at large and beyond the borders 
of the former Soviet Union (including the situation in Syria, Iran and DPRK, the 
establishment of a WMD free zone in the Middle East, outer space security, the Arms 
Trade Treaty’s adoption). That was the last meeting the eight held together. Due to 
the Russian annexation of Crimea, the leaders of the G-8 collectively decided to expel 
Russia from the Group of 8 as a punitive measure (The Hague meeting, March 2014). 
In parallel to nuclear issues (nuclear safety, Iran nuclear deal negotiation, and North 
Korea) discussed at the G7 summit held in Schloss Elmau, Germany, in 2015 health 
security gained additional traction. In the awake of the Ebola Crisis, the importance of 
strengthening capacity to prevent, protect against, detect, report, and response to 
public health emergencies was underscored and definitely brought into a BW agenda. 
As well, the G7 countries expressed their support to the “ongoing process to reform 
the WHO’s capacity to prepare for and respond to Global Health Crisis” while 
reaffirming the central role of WHO for International Health Security. On 25-26 June, 
Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins led a US interagency delegation to Ukraine to discuss the 
G7 efforts in bio-security, bio-safety and nuclear/radiological security in Ukraine.571 
This engagement was championed by Germany and included several other GP 
                                                        
569 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction: President’s 
Report for 2013, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
269504/UK_2013_GP_Report.pdf  
570 Heyes, Bowen, and Chalmers, The Global Partnership Against WMD, 88. 
571 Media Notes, Ambassador Jenkins Travel to Ukraine, France, and Lithuania for G7 Global 
Partnership, Global Health Security Agenda, and 2016 Nuclear Security Summit Meetings; 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/244367.htm 
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members. What seems to have happened since the Canadian Presidency in 2010 - and 
reinforced by real world-case scenarios like Ebola, is not only the confirmation of the 
relative importance of health and  biological agents within the WMD discourse but 
also a change in the strategy for strengthening global biological security from 
prevention only, to preparedness and response. In the words of Trevor Smith, from 
securing former biological weapons’ production and facilities, the approach has 
changed to encompass also other activities in countries which do not share a past of 
BW proliferation, but whose health systems show vulnerability should a bioterrorist 
attack occur. 572 
On 26-27 May 2016, the G7 summit was held in Ise-Shima, Japan. The preparation 
stages of the meeting saw a reinforcement of the growing interest and consideration 
with regards to human security and health security.573 In the final declaration, G7 
listed the broad range of issues ranging from world economy, migration and refugees. 
Trade, infrastructure, health, women, cyber climate, and energy deserving attention. 
Health was described as the foundation of economic prosperity and security “not only 
for the individuals but also for nations” with GP member states endorsing without 
reserve the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development (human security framework). 
The declaration focused on the need to reinforce “Global Health Architecture” and 
strengthen the response to public health emergencies. Under this perspective, the 
declaration reaffirmed the central role of WHO to enable and support more swift, 
effective, and coordinated responses to public health emergencies shifting a 
theoretical elaboration on the practical level of technical cooperation. In this light, G7 
Countries condemned the WHO for accelerating efforts among relevant partners 
large-scale outbreaks and public health emergencies and underscored the imperative 
to improve prevention of, detection of, and response to public health emergencies, 
“whether naturally occurring, deliberate or accidental”. Under this perspective, 
concern was expressed over the OPCW findings in Syria which was bound to 
monopolize the GP agenda in the years to come. 
                                                        
572 See for example the actions taken by GP’s in 2009 to protect and secure the anti-plague station in 
Osh in Southern Kirgiz Republic which de facto preventing the facility to be occupied during the civil 
unrest of 2010 
573 “Protecting Human Security.” 
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The Italian Presidency (2017) has decided to focus on Africa highlighting the need for 
assistance activities in the Continent. Nonetheless, or just because of that, Biological 
Weapons and Health Security remained key topics in the ongoing debate. The Group 
explored new possible threats, such as the ones linked to the (hostile uses of) the 
convergence of chemical and biological technologies, and at the same time revisited 
traditional threats which could now fully included under the Group mandate. The way 
the discourse around infective diseases and biosecurity has developed through the 
meetings made health and security goals closer than one could think of. In practical 
terms the evolution described in the GP activities concerning biological agents has 
meant a commitment that cover, beyond bioterrorism, many areas of relevance in 
biological threat reduction and response, be it intentional, accidental or natural. As it 
has been noticed, countries in need of assistance to enhance capacity over 
tuberculosis or HIV (often the primary concerns of many African countries) would have 
been automatically excluded by the BSWG radar (funding and activities) before 2012, 
insofar void of any military or terrorist application. However, in a logic of preparation 
and response, if countries’ health systems are not capable of complying with known 
infectious disease, as well they would not be able to respond diseases of unknown 
origin and potentially used by terrorists. The scope has become the one of building an 
indigenous capacity to respond before the first hours are crucial. “It is possible and 
probable - as Trevor Smith has made very clear in his interviews- that 99.9 percent of 
the time, beneficiaries countries will not use GP funded biological capacity for 
counter-terrorism purpose, but that 0.1 percent of the time will repay investments in 
spades.”574 Under this perspective it is interesting to remember here that the clean-
up cost of the anthrax letters was about $700 million, just to decontaminate the post-
office. That is nearly equivalent to what Canada’s entire Global Partnership budget for 
the its first 10 years and totally out of reach to many countries in the Global South. 
 
The Proliferation Security Initiative 
 
                                                        
574 Lentzos Filippa, Biological Threats In The 21st Century, 412–13. 
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The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a multilateral non-binding political initiative 
through which states voluntarily commit, by means of a formal pledge, to working 
cooperatively with the aim of curtailing the trafficking of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, to and from states and non-states actors.  
The major obligations that participants to the PSI are asked to abide are represented 
by the so-called “Interdiction Principles”, these include the following.575 
1) Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for 
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related 
materials to and from states and non- state actors of proliferation concern. 576 
2) Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information 
concerning suspected proliferation activity. 
3) Review and work to strengthen relevant national legal authorities where necessary 
to accomplish these objectives.  
4) Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, 
their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal 
authorities permit.  
The initiative was launched in the aftermath of So San incident. The case highlighted 
a gap in international law when it came to interdict and seize the shipment of WMD 
and WMD-related materials. A brief summary of the episode follows. US officials, who 
had reason to believe that a Cambodian unflagged merchant ship named So San was 
carrying WMD precursors from DPRK to Yemen (allegation which actually proved 
true), requested some Spanish authorities - operating nearby - to interdict the So San 
in the Arabian Sea (international waters). The suspect although well founded, did not 
per se represented a legal grounding for stopping and searching the vessel. It became 
immediately apparent to the international community, confronting that specific 
situation, that transhipment of WMD-related material for illicit purposes was not 
                                                        
575 http://www.psi-online.info 
576 Interdiction: PSI partners define interdiction broadly as any action based on sufficient information 
and consistent with national authorities and international legal frameworks that results in the denial, 
delay or disruption of a shipment of proliferation concern. To achieve that objective any appropriate 
level of national power may be employed including diplomatic (demarche) operational or military 
(hail and query to verify shipment, ship boarding) and/or law enforcement/customs (port 
inspections). 
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properly criminalized under international law and that only a very limited legal 
grounding existed in general for seizure of suspicious vessels. The authorities could 
eventually proceed (as they did) only because the ship incidentally was not displaying 
a flag – contravening indeed to the general Law of High Seas. The interdiction, and the 
subsequent search of the vessel, revealed that the boat was actually transporting Scud 
missiles, warheads, and missiles’ components from North Korea to Yemen. The 
Spanish and United States authorities ultimately allowed the shipment to continue 
reportedly because of the value the US assigned to Yemen as a counterterrorist 
partner (and also because the country gave assurance that the missiles would have 
not been used for WMD purposes).577 The case showed that international legal tools 
- from Maritime International Law to the Non-proliferation tripartite (NPT, BTWC; 
CWC)-  did not provide, in cases like the one under scrutiny, functional and efficient 
response networks. On the one side, Maritime International Law (UNCLOS) does not 
pose WMD transfer’s suspicion as a “special” condition not sufficient in itself to allow 
seizure in high seas (which is the case, for example, with suspicion of piracy or 
“stateless”). Also, even in the latter cases, where the situation allows/supports for 
lawfully boarding and searching a vessel – like the So San case – there is not always 
legal ground for prosecution as the vessel conduct may be illegal.   
On the other side, the Non-Proliferation Treaties (NPT, CWC, BTWC) while not 
allowing for illicit transfer of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, do not cover 
precursors when those materials also have legitimate use (most of the times) with 
important consequences (or in the case of the BTWC agents that are in type and 
quantity compatible with peaceful uses). In conclusion – barring the UN Resolutions, 
which explicit ban the transfer of such materials to certain states (e.g. North Korea) – 
seizure and prosecution of vessels rely on domestic law (criminal codes, penal laws, 
enforcement procedures). As far as the Security Council is concerned, although in 
theory capable of intervening in situations like the So San incident, past experiences 
have demonstrated the limited capacity of the UN Security Council – in practice - to 
meet the challenges posed by new threats to international security. 
                                                        
577 Belcher, “The Proliferation Security Initiative Lessons for Using Nonbinding Agreements,” 3. 
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In response to the So San case, as pointed out by Emma Belcher, the US 
administration, keen to fill the gap, could have implemented to very different 
measures: (1) a direct challenge to the system, by unilaterally interdicting suspected 
vessels in high seas (fostering a practice that could have become a new custom over 
time), or (2) to open and support a process of formal revision of the treaties (UNCLOS, 
NPT, BWC, CWC) – if not the drafting of a new one. 578 As made clear by the scholar, 
both option showed important limitations in terms of legitimacy/reputation (the first), 
and time consumption and little indication for success (the latter).  Time was 
reasonably an important element in the decision-making of the US administration, 
especially in consideration of the post 9/11 international context, and consistently 
with the content of the 2002 US National Security Strategy supported by the President 
George W. Bush.  
A third option was then elaborated: The Proliferation Security Initiative. the PSI was 
announced on 31 May 2003, just few months after the So San incident, during a 
speech in Poland, in advance of the G-8 summit.579 US officials approached the United 
Kingdom and Australia first. Starting from the two most traditional allies, the US put 
together a group of like-minded states, that would have become the so-called PSI Core 
Group (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain). 
According to Belcher, the reasons why US officials left outside China and Russia - 
notwithstanding their importance within the non-proliferation discourse - was exactly 
the need to proceed quickly and avoid those state that would “stymie agreement or 
shirk their commitments.” 
As of today (December 2017) the PSI boasted the participation of 105 states.580 
Onderco and Van Hoft have explained the different views vis a vis PSI participation on 
the basis of their positions on American hegemony and find that security interests are 
predominantly decisive among hegemonic and supporter states and nuclear capable 
                                                        
578 Under this perspective, it is worthwhile to point out that UNCLOS took decades to negotiate and 
the US has not yet ratified making the its credibility in proposing amendments to that framework very 
modest. Likewise, the NPT, BTWC and CWC have long revision process and basically no relevant 
change to their text has been introduced since their signatures. 
579 White House 2003 a in Davis p. 150 
580 https://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 250 
states. Vice versa they argue that counter-hegemonic motivation are largely decisive 
among states that reject the PSI.581  
What made the initiative peculiar, beyond its non-binding nature, is its technical drive. 
Bush’s announcement only enounced the principles which should have informed the 
action (interdiction principle), without detailing the rules of the interdiction which 
were left to working-level officials. Even on the website the letter reads: “We look 
forward to working with all concerned states on measures they are able and willing to 
take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the following set of ‘Interdiction 
Principles.’"582 
If, on the one side, a non-legally binding agreement have consented to overcome 
many of the limits of a formal treaty (easier to negotiate, faster to implement, strong 
in its commitments), this has also raised the traditional concerns in terms of (1) 
Legitimacy; Some countries, including China, Indonesia, India and Malaysia, 
questioned the legality of the initiative and specifically the fact that it could have been 
easily used against the DRPK (Russia and China)). (2) Actual compliance and 
effectiveness; because of the absence of binding commitments that could encourage 
free riding. Indeed, also analysts and scholars have initially casted doubts over the PSI 
because of its non-legally binding status. (3) Potential damaging effect on the 
traditional non-proliferation system made of almost universal binding treaties.  
About 15 years after its birth and notwithstanding these potential shortcomings, the 
PSI is usually acknowledged as a relatively successful initiative.583 In terms of the 
reasons for its success the following aspects are often mentioned: (1) The initiative 
has mobilized cooperative non-proliferation activities (e.g. the most publicized 
success of the BBC China), (2) led to international legal developments in the field of 
non-proliferation/anti-proliferation including the so called bilateral ship boarding 
agreements between the United States and open registry states, 584 the Res. 1540, the 
                                                        
581 Onderco and Hooft, “Why Is the Proliferation Security Initiative a Problematic Solution?” 
582 http://www.psi-online.info/Vertretung/psi/en/07-statement/Interdiction-Principes.html 
583 The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Record of Success 
584 which include Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, Mongolia, Marshalls Islands, 
Panama, Saint Vincent and the Grenadine. Although these agreements are not formally attached to 
the PSI, they are based on the PSI’s principles. Together with the PSI on which they are built, these 
agreements represent a hybrid regime. 
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SUA protocol 2005, the Beijing Convention and some UN Resolutions imparting 
Sanctions (to the DPRK and Iran), and (3) has been adopted to promote new non-
proliferation initiatives (e.g. the GICNT in April 2010). 
In terms of its structure and operational development, the PSI can be defined as a 
political commitment or a flexible agreement with no decision-making mechanism, no 
central body, and no secretariat. The Initiative avails itself of an Operational Expert 
Groups consisting of officials from certain participant states (twenty-one) with legal 
operational and intelligence background to clarify the procedures for carrying out the 
overarching policy (most of them were member of the Core Group).   
Activities under the initiative include joint interdiction exercises, establishments of 
operational networks (point of contacts among relevant agencies) and 
identification/drafting of best practices. Joint exercise under the PSI have also been 
intended to have deterrent effect. Not surprisingly, the first one was designed to send 
a strong signal to the DPRK and was indeed performed off the coast of Australia. 
Today reservations still persist on this specific institution: 1) “WMD- related materials” 
and the “actors of proliferation concern” were left unspecified. At first, it was decided 
that the PSI would have made reference to existing lists; MTCR, NSG, and the Australia 
Group as far as the materials supposedly covered by the statements were concerned. 
This would have reinforced, in the case of the Australia Group a complementary 
regime that, if on the one side is the only shared list covering biological agents, on the 
other side has been widely contested by NAM and still spark criticism in certain 
contexts (e.g. the BTWC Review Conferences). Discussion became particularly 
laborious and politically difficult when touched upon which states and non-state 
actors should be on the list of proliferation concern. In the end, the participants 
decided against identifying specific materials and actors, referring to them only in a 
generic sense. 2) Contrary to the initial perception, the initiative did not manage to 
change the law and existing tools (international and domestic). 
3) Although Russia, has finally joined the PSI in May 2004, many other important states 
have not. These include China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Egypt. 
4) Finally, because of the absence of a governing body to coordinate activities and the 
lack of formal information sharing mechanisms, some analysts have challenged even 
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it capacity to improve and boos communication and have criticised the initiative for 
its modest transparency. 
 
United Nation Security Council Resolution 1540 (and 1673; 1801; 2055; 2118)585 
 
It is now well documented in doctrine that the last two decades have witnessed the 
surge of non-proliferation binding and non-binding arrangements with a specific focus 
over non-state actors as potential proliferators. In this scenario, the role  played by 
informal arrangements and networks have been described, in some cases (verification 
and enforcement), even more consequential than  the one of binding norms.  
Notwithstanding this crucial occurrence , legally binding international obligations still 
represent the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime (even with regard to non-
state actors) in that their scope is generally broader and they require states to 
immediately implement their provisions within their domestic legal orders (which 
might not be the case with soft-law) on pain of being in violation of international law. 
Nonetheless, “Modern” legally binding norms covering the proliferation of WMD 
however enjoy brand new features. Traditionally issued within International 
Conventions (Treaties), since 2004 legally binding norms have started taking shape in 
the framework of a Security Council law-making activity. It is in the aforementioned 
framework that the Resolution 1540 (2004) needs to be located.  
The involvement of the Security Council in WMD-related issues has its first grounding 
in a statement issued by the President of the UN Security Council in 1992. The 
statement marked a turning point in the determination of the Council to address the 
topic of WMD non-proliferation.586 In that occasion, the Council asserted for the first 
time that: “the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat 
to international peace and security” and that the Council members would have 
                                                        
585 Including a summary of the status of implementation of the biological component as of 9 
December 2016 (Comprehensive Review 2016; http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/comprehensive-and-
annual-reviews/2016-comprehensive-review) 
586 As a matter of fact, before 1992 the Council had adopted some resolutions connected in some 
ways to the issue of non-proliferation, but without making the topic its central focus. 
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worked “to prevent the spread of technology related to the research and production 
of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end”.587  
In the aftermath of 9/11, the fight against WMD non-proliferation became linked with 
the fight to another extraordinary threat to international peace and security, the one 
of international terrorism.588 The nexus between international terrorism and WMD 
proliferation was established by Resolution 1373 (September 2001). Adopted 
unanimously on 12 September 2001, that was also the first time when the “Security 
Council acted as a legislator imposing on states obligations, unrelated to a specific 
context”.589 After recognising the link between the two threats, the Council enlighten 
the need for a coordination of efforts “to strengthen a global response”. Interalia, 
Resolution 1373 established a Counter Terrorism Committee. 
Along these lines, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004. Res. 
1540 went a step further with respect to Res. 1373 in that it broadcasted a series of 
binding measures for UN member states to implement. Agreed under Chapter VII (Art. 
41) of the UN Charter, the resolution imposes legally binding obligations on all states 
to adopt legislation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
(CBN) weapons and their means of delivery, to establish appropriate domestic 
controls over CBN and related materials, and to prevent their illicit trafficking. 590  
The Resolution is conceived to close some perceived-as-dangerous loopholes in the 
non-proliferation regime, especially those related to the potential for non-state actors 
to access Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Indeed, although relevant provisions 
of the three framework conventions (NPT; BWC; CWC) already apply to non-state 
actors, in the aftermath of 9/11, the belief was that the domain needed to be 
reinforced through additional and more specific measures. Nonetheless, the link with 
the framework conventions is clear and safeguarded in the letter of the Resolution, 
                                                        
587 UNSC President of 31 January 1992 (S/23500), 
588 Resolution 1368, 12/09/2001 is the one acknowledging international terrorism as a threat to 
international peace and security 
589 Caracciolo, Pedrazzi, and Dachenhausen, Nuclear Weapons. 
590 Related materials are those materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral 
treaties and arrangements or included in national control lists, which could be used for the design, 
development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of 
delivery (Dana Perkins, 1540 Committee Expert, Regional Workshop on National Implementation of 
the BTWC for Central America and the Caribbean, 13-14 November 2013 Mexico City, Mexico). 
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which calls upon all states “to renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral 
cooperation, in particular with the framework of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their 
common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and promoting international 
cooperation for peaceful purposes.”591   
The relevance and prominence of the above-mentioned treaties is reinforced by 
paragraph 8 of the Resolution, which recommends the universalization of those 
multilateral treaties whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons. It has to be noticed, however, that even if states had adopted 
legislation to implement all the above conventions, in many instances not all the 
obligations of the 1540 (especially in relation to OP par. 2 would  have been satisfied). 
This is to say that the Resolution actually added to the existing regimes (both the non-
proliferation and the counter-terrorism one assuming it exists). With regard to 
counter-terrorism instruments, for instance, previous tools usually display a 
requirement for which a “terrorist intent” is be demonstrated for the tool to be 
applicable, whereas there is no such requirement under Resolution 1540. 
Furthermore, not all UN members (for whom the 1540 measures became legally 
binding) were in 2004 also part to the three non-proliferation framework conventions 
(which are treaty law and can’t be in full assimilated to international customary 
law).592 
On their part, and making reference to the bio-domain, BWC State Parties have 
explicitly acknowledged the harmonising role the Resolution have with regards to the 
BTWC by noting that “information provided to the United Nations by States in 
accordance with Resolution 1540 may provide a useful resource for State Parties in 
fulfilling their obligation under this article [4] obligations.”593 The statement officially 
                                                        
591 S/RES/1540(2004) p.4 
592 As of April 2016, almost all Member States have become parties to at least one international or 
multilateral instrument of particular relevance to resolution 1540 (this reflects an increase with 
respect to 2011) 
593 On its side, the 1540 Committee notes that State Parties to the biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention are required to adopt prohibition with respect to non-state actors that overlap with a 
number of the obligation under Resolution 1540. 
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sanctioned the potential integrative and complementary nature of the two 
arrangements. 
 The origin of the 1540 Resolution lies in a joint US/UK effort to rise WMD 
related international standards and criminalize WMD proliferation in the awake of the 
9/11. In September 2003, during the 58th General Session of the UN General Assembly, 
George W. Bush and, two days later, the British foreign secretary Jack Straw called for 
a new anti-proliferation resolution, which would have focussed on the 
upgrading/reinforcement of individual states sensitive materials’ export controls to 
secure them within national borders.594  In the following weeks, a draft text, 
sponsored by the two countries started circulating among the P-5.595 The original text 
underwent several revisions which came along with consultations involving the 
broader membership of the UN. Although obtaining an unanimous vote of the Council, 
the adoption was accompanied by the expressions of concerns from a number of 
states. The concerns have been specifically expressed in consideration of the 
unprecedented legislative power that the Council was about to exercise, and what’s 
more on a file, the regulation of strategic assets, traditionally left to the direct control 
of sovereign states. Specific arguments were also on the table, for instance China was 
especially determined to ensure that the Resolution would not become a justification 
for the Proliferation Security Initiative (which was indeed the intention of the US).596 
The Resolution’s mandate was initially settled for 2 years, then extended for a two-
years period (UNSC Res 1673, 2006), then for another three years in 2008 (UNSC Res 
1810, 2008), and in April 2011, the unanimous decision was taken by the Security 
Council to extend the mandate for ten years (UNSC Res 1977, 2011). The Council also 
decided to take additional measures to strengthen the Resolution’s mandate. Finally, 
Resolution 2118 (2013) mainly concerned with the use of chemical weapons in Syria 
stated that: “the Member States shall inform immediately the Security Council of any 
violation of Res. 1540.” 
                                                        
594 Address by George W. Bush and speech by Jack Straw respectively delivered on 23 and 25 
September, 2003; UN General Assembly (58th General Session); 
www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements  
595 Datan, “Security Council Resolution 1540: WMD and Non-State Trafficking”; Ogilvie-White, “UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540: Origins, Status, and Future Prospects.” 
596 Ogilvie-White, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Origins, Status, and Future Prospects,” 141. 
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 The scope of the resolution is comprehensive. It is indeed the first legal 
instrument that covers all three major categories of WMD altogether (nuclear 
biological and chemical weapons), their means of delivery and their related material 
in an integrated manner and beyond geographical limitations. 
The Resolution, which adopts a unified approach to nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons and related materials, requires state to criminalize the proliferation of WMD 
to non-state actors and to implement and enforce measures to prevent WMD 
terrorism (expressing a clear focus on the “horizontal” side of non-proliferation). 
Paragraph 1 of the Resolution claims that all states must refrain from providing any 
form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire manufacture, 
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of 
delivery. The main requirements of the resolution are expressed in operative 
paragraphs 2, 3(a), 3(c) and (d) respectively: 
 
Operative paragraph 2 obliges states to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit 
any non-state actors to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport transfer or use nuclear 
chemical or biological weapons their means of delivery 
Operative paragraph 3(a) and (b) require states to develop and maintain appropriate effective 
measures to account and secure WMD items in production, use, storage or transport and to develop 
and maintain effective physical protection measures 
Operative paragraph 3 (c) and (d) obligate states to develop and maintain appropriate effective 
border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect deter prevent and combat, including through 
international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in [WMD] and 
establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export control and trans-
shipment controls over [WMD] items 
 
The resolution also provided for the establishment of a Security Council 1540 
Committee to oversee the Resolution’s actual implementation. The Committee works 
as “subsidiary body” for of the Security Council and is composed of the fifteen current 
members of the Council (five permanent members plus ten non-permanent 
members.)597 In 2009 the Committee established four Working Groups which 
                                                        
597 The Committee’s mandate has been renovated by Res 1673, 1801, 1977, 2055 
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represent the four key areas of work for the Committee: (I) Monitoring and National 
Implementation; (II) Assistance; (III) Cooperation with International Organization, 
including the 1267598 and 1373 Committees; (IV) Transparency and Media Outreach. 
Since 2011 (Res. 1977), the 1540 Committee is assisted by a small group of eight 
independent experts, increased to nine by Resolution 2055 (2012). The mandate and 
the scope of the 1540 Committee (and its experts’) activities is the one established by 
UNSC 1540 and its follow-up Resolutions.  The current 1540 Committee mandate ends 
in 2021. The Committee is tasked with the evaluation and completion of national 
reports and matrices so to assess overall progresses in the implementation of the 
Resolution.  Although performing statistical analysis on the data acquired, the 
Committee does not exercise any action nor investigate and prosecute alleged 
violations of non-proliferation obligations. 
Additional actions are performed by the remaining three working groups of the 
Committee and these include: a) awareness raising around the overall goals of the 
resolution through outreach and dialogue; b) cooperation with IOs; and c) assistance, 
including some work in the countries, if invited to do so. Visits can be used to discuss 
any matter related to the implementation of Resolution 1540, such as national efforts, 
assistance needs, reports, national action plans, effective practices etc. 
One of the perceived-as-very useful role that the 1540 Committee undertakes - with 
the support of its group of experts - is the coordination and facilitation of technical 
assistance to member states aimed at building national capacity. Along these lines, 
the Committee also created a specific dataset that matches offers and requests of help 
through assistance templates, voluntary action plans, and country visits.  
As far as the coordination role is concerned, the Committee engages and maintain 
communication flows with all the International Organizations (IOs) involved in 
implementation of actions relevant to the Resolution at the country level (IAEA; 
OPCW, ISU; WHO; WCO). The Resolution itself encourages the IOs to enhance 
cooperation and information sharing with the 1540 Committee at the technical level 
(including by designating points of contact or a coordinator for the implementation of 
                                                        
598 Security Council Resolution 1267 in 1999 placed sanctions on al-Qaeda and associated entities and 
individuals, the 1267 Committee monitor its implementation. 
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the resolution).599 Whether this communication be bilateral or unidirectional is not 
really clear. Technical experts from other Organizations have sometime lamented a 
not entirely balanced relationship with 1540 experts to the benefit of the latter. 
Financial sustenance for the activities of the working groups come from governmental 
and non-governmental resources, including major assistance providers such as the 
European Union and the Group of Eight. 
Activities related to the 1540 also receive financial support from the United Nations 
Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament, which is funded through voluntary 
contribution from member states. 
 
The 1540 National Implementation Reports of the Security Council Committee 
pursuant to Resolution 1540 offers an in-depth assessment of the degree of 
implementation and compliance states have been able to reach. 
In line with 1540 Resolution’s obligations, member states were supposed to report to 
the Security Council, no later than 6 months after the Resolution’s adoption, about 
the steps they have taken or have planned to take to implement its provisions. 
In basically all cases, after submitting their first National Report, states have been then 
encouraged to provide additional information, including voluntary documents, on 
effective practices. As of June 2017, 16 states have not yet reported to the Committee. 
All the others UN members have submitted at least one National Report. 
Since its adoption, specific Matrices have been developed to organize the information 
contained in the National Reports about UNSC 1540 implementation. 
A Matrix for each member state has been prepared by the Group of Experts (even for 
the 16 non-reporting states). Indeed, Matrices are drafted merging information 
included in the National Reports (as the primary source), the additional information 
shared by states complemented by official governmental information, plus potential 
evidences made available by International Organizations (UN Agencies and similar). 
When National Reports do not contain all the necessary information about relevant 
existing and adopted measures, experts need to find the information by themselves 
and add it into the matrix (e.g. a legislative act introducing a measure required by the 
                                                        
599 Genneday Lutay, 5-7 September 2016, Wuxi China 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 259 
Resolution). Consistently, the Experts have compiled the matrices also for the 
remaining 16 non-reporting states. When draft matrices are ready, the Committee 
approved them and send them back to the corresponding state for review, feedback 
and approval. After that, the matrices are published on line. Matrices are updated for 
each Resolution Comprehensive Review. 600 Comprehensive Reviews usually take 
every five years, and prior to the renewal of the Resolution’s mandate.601 At least 1 
year and 6 months is on average needed to revise 193 matrices. The original idea was 
to have updated matrices every 3 years but some discussion is taking the floor that 
they should be done in batches.602  The last update of the Matrices took place in 2013 
and was concluded before 2015 for the Comprehensive Review of 2016. Next revision 
of matrices should be completed in March 2020 for the Comprehensive Review 
scheduled in 2021. On the open-to-public website, former matrices are constantly 
substituted by the latest versions and raw data for analysis belong to the Committee 
and cannot be shared with general public nor with scholars for research purposes.603 
This aspect become problematic for those who want to perform any time dependant 
analysis of the Resolution’s implementation (in the sense that the previous benchmark 
is each time cleaned off). 
In parallel with the update of the content of the matrices, in 2013, the Matrix template 
has also been updated. It now has a reduced number of pages and reflects the 
structure of the Resolution rather than an alphabetical order.  Some explanatory notes 
have been added to certain fields to assists States in completing the corresponding 
sections, just in case they would decide to use the matrix directly as a reporting tool. 
Matrices were originally conceived as a tool of the Committee and its Group of Experts 
                                                        
600 By paragraph 3 of resolution 1977 (2011), the Security Council decided that the Committee would 
conduct a comprehensive review on the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), both 
after five years and prior to the renewal of its mandate, including, if necessary, recommendations on 
adjustments to the mandate, and would submit to the Security Council a report on the conclusions of 
those reviews, and decided that the first review should be held before December 2016. 
601 “The Security Council [..] decides that the 1540 Committee will conduct a comprehensive review 
on the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), both after five years and prior to the 
renewal of its mandate, including, if necessary, recommendations on adjustments to the mandate, 
and will submit to the Security Council a report on the conclusions of those reviews, and decides that, 
accordingly, the first review should be held before December 2016” (Operative Paragraph, Security 
Council Resolution 1977) 
602 Author’s discussion with Dana Perkins, former 1540 Expert for 2012-2015. 
603 Author’s exchange of e-mail with Gennady Lutay (June 2017) 
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and states were not required to use that template, although many of them find it 
useful to enter information directly into them, basically transforming the Matrices into 
their returns tool, assuming that they provide the information requested by the 
Committee. 
Although it was made clear, in the 1540 website and elsewhere, that the Matrices are 
not a tool of compliance, many relevant information concerning states’ WMD 
proliferation profiles are there. Specifically, as far as biological agents’ legislation and 
management, a great deal of details otherwise not accessible or very hard to find are 
conveyed through the Matrices. 
The analysis that follows builds on the information included in the December 2016 
Comprehensive Review Report integrated with the two previous reports made 
available and covered by Olgive-White in her chapter “UN Security Council Resolution 
1540: Origin, Status, and Future Prospects.”604 
Concerning the status of implementation of the Resolution 1540, the most recent 
report (as of this writing), was published on the 1540 Committee website in December 
2016. It reveals that, although progress has been made, there remains more to be 
done to accomplish the objective of full implementation of the Resolution. 
 
The Security Council recognized in his resolution 1540 that some states may require 
assistance in its implementation and invited states in a position to do so to offer 
assistance in response to requests by States lacking the legal and regulatory 
infrastructure implementation expertise and or resources to fulfil the provision of the 
resolution. Since 2011, additional 15 states have requested assistance. The Committee 
has noticed that fulfilling its matchmaking role in a comprehensive and timely manner 
is one of its most challenging functions. International Organizations have been the 
main respondents to these requests (among the 16 IO registered as assistance 
providers, 8 have officially responded to specific requests. Notwithstanding its 
mandate being restricted to matchmaking and lack of resources, the Committee and 
its experts have been able to directly respond to some assistance requests. 
                                                        
604 Knopf, International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation, 140–62. 
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Finally, by Resolution 1540 the Security Council calls upon all states to renew and fulfil 
their commitment to multilateral cooperation in particular within the framework of 
IAEA, the OPCW and the BTWC. During the period under review, The Committee and 
its group of experts participated in 343 outreach events. About 49% of the events were 
organized, co-organized by, or involved International Organizations. An increased 
number of visits and consultations have been supported to enhance dialogue and 
information sharing. 
As anticipated, Resolution 1977 expanded the Committee mandate and took further 
measures to reinforce it. In paragraph 8 of the Resolution, the Council encouraged all 
states to prepare on a voluntary basis, National Implementation Action Plans with the 
assistance of the Committee as appropriate. The idea was to make possible for the 
countries to express out their priorities and plans for implanting the key provisions of 
resolution 1540. As of December 2017, 24 countries had submitted their National 
Action Plans. 
In paragraph 11 of the same Resolution (1977) the Council encouraged the Committee 
to engage in dialogue with states on the implementation of Resolution 1540, upon 
countries’ invitation. Since the first visit took place in 2011 (in the United States), the 
number of visits has shown a noteworthy increase, up to 21 missions performed. 
Review of implementation’s data indicates that there would be a positive correlation 
between States’ participation to events related to Resolution 1540 and their 
implementation of the Resolution itself.605 
In Paragraph 12, the Security Council requested the Committee (with the support of 
its Group of Experts) to identify effective practices, templates and guidance with a 
view to develop a compilation and a technical reference guide about Res. 1540 to be 
used by states on a voluntary basis to get to implementing the Resolution. In this 
framework, the Chair of the Committee requested member states and relevant 
International Organizations, by a letter, to provide information on its effective 
experience, lessons learnt and practice in the areas covered by Res 1540. Various 
feedback has been gathered from UN member states (Australia and Germany, 
Colombia, Croatia and Poland, Iraq, UAE, UK, US, ASEAN etc..).  
                                                        
605 1540 2016 Comprehensive Review Document 
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The International Health Regulations 
 
The first serious international cooperation effort on cross-borders infectious diseases 
originated in the mid-nineteenth century. What moved states in that direction was 
the growing awareness the international spread of diseases could no longer be 
addressed efficiently by individual national strategies.  The collaboration advanced 
under the aegis of a series of meetings known as “International Sanitary Conferences”. 
The complex of norms which originated from the consultations has been referred to 
as the “classical regime.”606 That first health-related international legal regime 
encompassed two obligations for state parties: (1) notification (states should have 
notified to the others in case outbreaks of specific diseases should occur in their 
territories - only certain diseases would have required states to notify the others; and 
(2) safeguard international trade, by allowing –in the framework of those specific 
disease outbreaks - restrictive measures only if based on scientific evidence and health 
principles. The regime was conceived to minimize public health interference with 
international trade. With very little modification, the “classical regime” remained 
basically untouched in its substantive objectives until the World Health Organization 
(WHO) came into existence.  The first International Sanitary Conference was held in 
Paris in 1851. It was the result of the First International Sanitary Convention and 
addressed Cholera. The Convention was ratified and came into force in Venice 1892. 
Two additional Conferences (and their related Conventions) followed in 1893 
(Dresden), and 1894 (Paris), both addressing again Cholera. An additional convention 
was adopted in 1897 (Venice), its focus was on Plague.607 Cholera, Plague and Yellow 
Fever were considered the regime’s “big three”. Interestingly enough, none of them 
was endemic in Europe and North America (vice versa those diseases that actually 
were endemic there – Typhus and Smallpox - were not addressed by the list until 
1926), betraying a view that aimed at lessening the burden on developed nations with 
                                                        
606 Fidler, “Emerging Trends in International Law Concerning Global Infectious Disease Control.” 
607 Origin and development of health cooperation, WHO 
http://www.who.int/global_health_histories/background/en/ 
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regards to imports from developing ones.608 In 1903 the 4 Conventions were reunited 
under a single treaty and gained a permanent body which could function as a 
secretariat/committee. Made of Public Health Officials from member states, the body 
was named “Office International d’Hygiène Publique” (OIHP). After the ending of the 
First World War, the Office remained outside the League of Nations which par contre, 
created its own specialized agency: the “Health Organization of the League of 
Nations.”609 
Between 1890 and 1945, the world witnessed a proliferation of treaties on infectious 
diseases under the umbrella established by the Sanitary Conventions. 
After the Second World War, the new-born World Health Organization, adopted the 
International Sanitary Regulations (ISR) which replaced 12 pre-existing international 
agreements and was settled to cover six diseases (Plague, Cholera, Yellow Fever, 
Smallpox, Typhus, Relapsing Fever)610. The ISR showed at least two substantial 
improvements with respect to previous Conventions which both contributed to the 
expansion and consolidation of the regime. First of all, the WHO had the authority – 
provided by its Constitution – to adopt regulations that would have become (and de 
facto did become) binding on all parties, unless they would expressively reject 
them.611 This “opt-out” approach was in direct contrast with respect to the traditional 
“opt-in” strategy of international treaties which had applied to the previously signed 
Sanitary Conventions. Second (and pouring from the first point), by collating all the 
provisions dispersed in the existing agreements, the ISR was able to better harmonize 
international behaviours and (most importantly) expectations. Notwithstanding great 
hopes, the period between 1951 and 1981 was characterized by 3 major drives, which 
contributed to the marginalization of the “classical regimes”. (1) The World Health 
Organization matured as an autonomous organization which could hardly remain the 
mere reproduction of the most powerful countries’ interests (because they de facto 
represented a minority of its membership) as it has been the case in the early years. 
                                                        
608 Fidler, “From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security,” 331. 
609 The US, which were a member of the OHIP but not of the League, vetoed the fusion. 
610 International Sanitary Regulations, adopted by the World Health Assembly on 22 May, 1995; Part 
V “Special Provisions relating to each of the quarantinable diseases” 
611 WHO Constitution, Art.21(a) 
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On the contrary, the Agency started to voice the interests of developing countries in 
the Global South (combating infectious disease at their local sources) instead of 
safeguarding the only needs of developed one (balancing health and economic 
interests). (2) Second, technological innovations (sanitation devices and clean water 
systems) and scientific discoveries (including the development of vaccines) downsized 
the prominence of infectious disease as a common concern vis-à-vis nationally-based 
demands. As a consequence countries’ priorities started diverging even more: “Health 
for all”, in the case of developing countries, and medical innovation technologies 
(including safeguard of property rights linked to) by developed nations. With such 
issues gaining center stage, it also soon became clear that the Organization did not 
have per se the resources to support neither one nor the other objective. (3) Third, 
International Law was growing explosively inevitably intersecting with the 
Health/Sanitary Regulations. Human Right Law (with the “right to health”), 
Environmental Law (Stockholm Convention), Trade Law (GATT) and Non-proliferation 
law (the BTWC) helped generating viable alternatives to the norms and rules in the 
ISR. 
In 1969 the World Health Assembly (WHA) revised the ISR and turned its name in 
International Health Regulations, IHR (1969). The Assembly did not bring about any 
substantial change to the Regulations’ normative content. In 1981 instead, the WHA 
amended the IHR (1969) to remove smallpox from the list of diseases subject to the 
Regulations. As it is known, smallpox is an agent of major concern in the field of 
biosecurity. It is not by coincidence that, after its official eradication, the 2 “surviving” 
strains of smallpox were placed in two laboratories respectively in the US and Soviet 
Union for custody. At that point in time, there were serious doubts that a health-
regime of some sort was still in existence and the reported compliance registered with 
regards to its requirement was extremely low.612 The crisis was bound to become even 
more intense in the incoming two decades. Notwithstanding the fact that the IHR had 
little or any applicability to most emerging (and re-emerging) infectious diseases (like 
HIV, Tuberculosis and Malaria), the World Health Assembly proved not able to add 
                                                        
612 Velimirovic, “Do We Still Need the International Health Regulations,” in Fidler, From International 
Sanitary Conventions. 
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any to its list. As well, WHO contribution to the new born BTWC, was also limited. In 
the mid-90s, none of the existing tools dealing with biological agents and diseases 
(IHR, CBD, and the BTWC) provided any coverage in the field of: (1) Active 
international surveillance of infectious disease outbreaks (beyond notification); (2) 
Response to international outbreaks; (3) Non-state actors’ perspective deployment of 
biological agents. 
In 1995, after the major travel disruption which followed the outbreak of Plague in 
Surat (1994) and the poor performance of WHO first global coordinated response to 
an Ebola outbreak in Kikwit (1995), the World Health Assembly instructed the WHO 
Director-General to begin a process of revision and update of the International Health 
Regulations (1969) in order to address its main deficiencies (narrow scope, scarce 
compliance, and little capacity to adapt to changing priorities, and zero operative 
might). 
The revision resulted in a first “Provisional Draft” issued in 1998. If on the one side, 
the document maintained the same focus on the objective of “ensuring the maximum 
security against the international spread of diseases with a minimum interference 
with world traffic”, on the other hand, it introduced some relevant changes with 
respect to the previous arrangement. The 1998 draft (1) increased the number of 
diseases potentially falling under the rubric of the Regulation – shifting from specific 
diseases to syndromes judged as having an urgent public health importance. Because 
a syndrome could have multiple aetiology, by this new formulation, the Regulations 
would have applied to a wider array of known and unknown infectious disease threats. 
(2) In order to tackle the modest participation, in terms of notification rates of 
member states, the draft also allowed the Agency to use information derived from 
sources other than the official communication by the country of suspected outbreak 
(even including non-governmental sources). Under 1969 IHR, the WHO could have 
only acted based on surveillance information that were provided by the government 
of the state in question, and refrain from any action otherwise. (3) Finally, the draft 
envisaged a more proactive role for the Agency which would have been charged with 
the responsibility of drafting and delivering health-relevant recommendations to 
member states (e.g. about surveillance and response standards). As we have 
anticipated in the previous chapter – it is in this framework that the Global Alert and 
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Response Network (GOARN) saw the light. First established in 1997, it became 
formalized as a “network” in 2000 and was linked to the creation – in 2001 – of the 
WHO’s Office for National Epidemic Preparedness and Response. GOARN has 
represented a significant step towards a positive/active health governance and a 
central asset in the WHO new strategy of “pursuing global health security.” GOARN is 
a surveillance tool with a broad scope - which encompasses not only naturally 
occurring infectious diseases but also “intentionally caused outbreaks” – in other 
words biowarfare, bioterrorism, and biocrimes if (and only if) they are deemed to have 
public health consequences. Pending the 1998 draft for a new IHR treaty, a series of 
events highlighted the need to speed the process (mainly the SARS outbreak in 2003). 
In 2004 – following a series of consultations, the WHO issued a revised proposed text 
for submission to a first round of international negotiations (November 2004). Before 
the final text was approved and adopted during the 58th WHA General Assembly, a 
second round of negotiation took place in February 2005. The new IHR (2005) contains 
at least 4 major substantive changes with respect to the prior regime.  
(1) The IHR 2005 Revision brought about a dramatic expansion of the scope of the 
Regulations. The new IHR applies to Public Health Threats (Public Health Emergencies 
of International Concern) notwithstanding they origin (communicable or not; of any 
source (natural, accidentally or intentionally caused) as long as these can be classified 
as Public Health Emergencies, an algorithm for decision making is attached to the 
Resolution). With regard to the expansion of the scope, one of the most delicate 
involved in the discussion was the potential application of the Regulations’ provisions 
to WMD-related emergencies because of its political salience. In fact, the language of 
the Regulations has been depurated by any specific reference to Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. An example is the removal from  the final version of the document of a 
draft article - which was directly addressing the issue of “information-sharing” in cases 
of suspect use of a biological (or other WMD) agent. In the main, the Regulations deal 
the matter of public health impact of CBRN malicious uses awkwardly with many 
aspects left undefined intruding important consequences at the practical level 
(information sharing, response to events of unknown origin, public health vs. security 
investigations, etc.)   
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(2) The new Regulations (2005) also demands a major commitment from member 
states insofar it incorporates broader “human rights principles”, makes notification 
more probable, and envisages higher level of members’ participations in terms of 
capacity assessment, surveillance, preparedness and response (including increasing 
national standards (if deemed necessary). Consistently, the new IHR imposes limits on 
the number and quality of reservations that members can introduce.  
(3) On its part, the IHR (2005) definitively assigns WHO the capacity of gathering 
information not only from official governmental sources but potentially from any 
reliable channel would be detected. This implies a substantial burden in terms of 
vigilance and validation of the information received.   
Under this perspective, the heightened authorities and responsibilities have created 
the need for the creation of new WHO institutional bodies or reorganization of 
existing ones (e.g. the Emergency Departments – which went a second profound 
restructuration after Ebola (2014)).  
(4) Until 2005 the health regime reflected a classical use of international treaty law 
that oriented at solving contingent issues which negatively affected the relationship 
between states (spread of diseases across borders). The new Regulations (2005) 
instead, departs from a different standpoint which aims at involving multiple actors, 
threats and policy objectives in a governance effort closer to the one which 
characterize constitutional law (versus IL). 
If on the one side the IHR represents an improved version of previous attempt to 
govern the subject, on the other side it must be recognised that the Revision has also 
raised a series of issues connected to the sovereignty of parties, consistency with 
other treaties (environment, trade etc.) and regimes, and to the possible operational 
involvement of WHO in situations (security-related) the might compromise the 
Agency’s political neutrality. 
The Regulations is to all intents and purposes an international treaty and compliance 
with its provisions mandatory.  
As anticipated above, WHO members are requested (art. 5) to “develop certain 
minimum core public health capacities” which include: (1) detection, assessment, 
notification and reporting of events (2) surveillance and response (annex 1A); (3) 
introduction of requirements for designated airports, ports and ground crossings 
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(annex 1B). The same article 5 together with art. 54 and WHA Resolution 61.2, require 
states to provide WHO with self-compiled “State Party Annual Reporting” (SPARs) 
named National Reports (for the biennium 2009-2010) and National Questionnaires 
(between 2010 and 2016). These self-assessment instruments of compliance are 
published on the WHO website – “Global Health Observatory (GHO)”. However, in 
2012 the WHA Assembly went further (WHA 65.23) by urging State Parties to take the 
necessary steps to prepare and carry out appropriate national implementation plans 
in order to ensure the required strengthening, developing and/or maintenance of the 
core public health capacities as provided for in the IHR. The IHR Review Committee 
also suggested that the Secretariat should have developed options to move from an 
exclusive self-evaluation approach to an “external evaluation" model that combines 
self-evaluation, peer-review and voluntary external evaluations involving a 
combination of domestic and independent experts (WHA 68.5). In 2015 a tool was 
developed with this scope: The Joint External Evaluation Mechanism (which has been 
assigned a Secretariat (the JEES)). The JEE and related activities are currently 
performed under the WHE/CPI – “Core Capacity Monitoring and Evaluation” branch 
of WHO (and often jointly with the Global Health Security Initiative). The JEE tool 
combines the GHSA Action packages and IHR capacities.613 The JEE Process includes: 
1. Country request; 2. Self-assessment; 3. Five-days mission with plenary sessions (all 
relevant ministries sit in); 4. Report finalization (review by all team members and 
approval by host country). Compliance with such instruments will be better addressed 
in the following chapter 
 
ENMOD Convention, CBD, and Cartagena Protocol 
 
In the previous chapter, I have offered a theoretical background to the claims about 
environmental impacts on security. This paragraph aims at providing some basic 
information concerning the current institutional framework existing for the 
management of environmental assets relevant in the study of biological weapons and 
agents.  
                                                        
613 JEE core capacities are organized in terms of “prevent”; “detect”; “respond”; “other IHR-related 
hazards and PoE” 
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The UN charter does not specifically mention the environment, however under Article 
39, chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council can take decisions on any 
conflict (including of the ones that might have an environmental cause) which 
represents a threat to peace and security. In principle, the UN Secretary General 
(UNSGM) could also bring to the Council’s attention any matter (also environment 
related) which he/she believes to constitute a threat to peace and security. 
Theoretically the threat of force - authorized by the Security Council (or performed on 
a unilateral basis) can be activated against environmental threats (as a legitimate 
component of the jus ad bellum) or to compel compliance with international 
environmental agreements on the grounds of “self-defence”. Under this perspective, 
however, precedents are small (e.g.: The Security Council Resolution 687 confirmed 
that Iraq was liable from any loss and depletion of natural resources following the 
invasion of Kuwait; The Council was also involved in a debate on climate change upon 
British Government request, but the action was not consequential since countries 
from the G77 and NAM representatives though that the UNSC was not the appropriate 
forum where for such a debate).  
As anticipated in the previous chapter, the first category of responses which builds on 
a connection between environment and security is the one aimed at limiting 
environmental damage during conflict. The 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, which relates to the protection of the victims of armed conflict, also 
requires combatants to limit environmental destruction (art 35 and art 55)614 and 
prohibits attacks to environment as a mean of reprisal. The Rome Statute of the 
International Court, which entered into force in 2002 include in its definition of war 
crimes those attacks that will cause “long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment which would clearly be excessive to the military advantage 
anticipated.”615 Although expressed in relative terms, the statement admits the 
                                                        
614 Art 35 prohibits methods of warfare that are intended to cause – or could be expected to cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. Article 55 links this to issue of 
health and survival. 
615 Rome Statute – article 882)(b)(iv) 
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possibility that in specific circumstances environmental modifications can be judged 
as war crimes.616 
On 5 October 1978, the Convention on The Prohibition of Military and Any Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (known as ENMOD 
Convention) entered into force, two years after its text was adopted by Resolution 
31/72 of the United Nation General Assembly. The Convention really represents a 
bridging tool between environment and security. Not for nothing the proposal was 
originally made to the UNGA (and only later on discussed with the CCD) and – in 
departure from past practices about arms control treaties –  the UN Secretary General 
was nominated as the depository for the Convention (and not the main military 
powers sponsoring the initiative). 
The Conventions consists of 10 articles and an Annex concerning the Consultative 
Committee of Experts. Article I contains a disarmament clause – in the sense that it 
prevents State Parties from engaging “military or any other hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques (EMT) having widespread, long-lasting and 
severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury of any other State Party”. 
The Convention was the result of Soviet proposal. In late August 1974, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister Gromyko urged prompted action in order to outlaw the influencing 
of environment for military purposes in a letter to the UN Secretary General Waldheim 
617 and shortly after introduced before the General assembly a treaty text. As it has 
been the case with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention the initiative came 
as a surprise to the US – especially because US President Nixon had started to discuss 
the problem with Brezhnev bilaterally in the summer of July ’74, probably hoping to 
deal with it without the involvement of the overall UN Assembly. It is possible that by 
acting this way, the Soviet Politburo simply just wanted to maintain a proactive role 
in the disarmament fora and by putting it on the table, served the annual need for a 
dramatic initiative in front of the General Assembly. A second potential explanation 
given to justify the Soviet proposal, is the one according to which the Soviet wanted 
                                                        
616 This was not the case with 1977 Protocol Formulation according to which environmental 
modifications were not included in the list of “grave breaches” of either the Protocol or the Geneva 
Conventions and for this reason could not be in any case classified as war crimes. 
617 Lawrence Juda: “negotiating a treaty 977 
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to embarrass the US over its protracted behaviour in Indochina. Finally, the Soviet 
Union might have merely been disappointed with the waning bilateral negotiations 
with the US. These had started a couple of years before, when the US Senator 
Claiborne Pell was able to broadcast a controversial and contested resolution calling 
upon the US government exactly to negotiate a convention prohibiting the use of 
environmental or geophysical modification activities as weapons of war. 
In fact, during the Vietnam war, environmental modification had become a reality. 
When reports about the ongoing attempts to use and improve on EMT techniques 
became public, they prompted strong reaction including the one championed by 
Senator Pell.  
After receiving the Soviet proposal, the General Assembly decided that the subject 
deserved more attention,618 nonetheless it decided to turn it over to the Conference 
of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The US and the Soviet Union proved able to 
come to terms with one another on the an ENMOD treaty text rapidly 
(notwithstanding the initial reservations of American officials, especially concerning 
the formulation of the letter “peacefully oriented research”). On the contrary, the 
other members of the CCD showed less enthusiastic and voiced several criticisms to 
the text including: (1) the limited nature of the prohibition implied in the threshold 
stipulation of article I;619(2) the absence of a provision for a review conference; (3) the 
nature of the complaint machinery centred in the UNSC; (4) the apparent and 
perceived-as-sneaky way through which the superpowers seemed to control the 
debate over international armament and disarmament. Despite the opposition and 
the reservations to the text, it became clear, during the negotiation process that the 
US would have not changed its position over the threshold stipulation included in 
article I.620 Once again, for many members from the CCD the choice was to accept a 
                                                        
618 Note that the US abstained 
619 The use of the modifying phrase in article I, “widespread, long-lasting or severe effects” and the 
employment of the term “hostile use” came under strong attack in the CCD and in the United Nation 
General Assembly on the grounds that it undercut the ostensible purpose of the convention and 
introduce a significant degree of indeterminacy in the provision. In other words what exactly would 
be prohibited were the treaty adopted? How is “hostile” intended to be established? 
620 In the US view, the “threshold” proposition was necessary both to prevent complaints of trivial 
nature from being made which could not be subject to verification, and to accommodate various 
bureaucratic differences (on the topic) existing within the US Government itself, the Department of 
Defence, and the Arms Control and Disarmament agency 
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treaty whose text exposed serious limitations in terms of its perspective performance 
or to inaugurate a new negotiation process – which would have been devoted to 
removing the threshold provision probably at the cost of losing the US participation. 
Most states choose the first alternative and, in November 1976, several states 
cosponsored a draft Resolution in the first Committee which, if adopted, would have 
returned the ENMOD Convention to the CCD for eventual modification. If they could 
not achieve anything over the threshold principle, developing countries were, 
however, able to score few points. What developing countries could obtain (in line 
with article X of the BWC) was the specification that the ENOMD activities for peaceful 
purposes should continued even supported by a vague provision calling for “the fullest 
possible exchange” of scientific and technical information on peaceful environmental 
modification. Secondly, the demand for including review conferences was satisfied by 
the final wording of Article VIII where it is stated that “a review conference was to 
meet five years after the entry into force of the Convention.” Another area of 
confrontation, where developing countries were able to get some points, was the one 
regarding the complaint machinery (article V), which was of Soviet particular interest. 
The Soviet view was that the Council should be the sole responsible for examining 
alleged treaty violations insofar the establishment of an additional/intermediary body 
would have produced legal and political complications. Finally, as it was approved by 
the CCD and the United Nations General Assembly, article V and the annex appear a 
compromise in the sense the Convention’s letter authorizes the UNSG, upon the 
request of any state party, to convene a fact-finding consultative committee of experts 
(which was going to be chaired by the Secretary General or his representative - 
without any power to adopt any decision on the substance of the problem). States’ 
right to lodge an immediate complaint to the Security Council was preserved. Judging 
the effects of this convention in halting environment warfare or its role in limiting 
security-related environment degradation is hard. Because of the Convention’s 
wording, the injunction is in fact only a limited prohibition.621 However, the principle 
                                                        
621 (especially because the introduction of the threshold clause) according to some scholarship there 
is some validity in the argument that says the Convention even supports the legitimacy of ENMOD 
warfare below the threshold)  
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broadcasted by the Convention surely benefited from the expansion of international 
law as well it did the one banning biological weapons use and development – being 
biological agents’ potential key tools in conduction EM warfare. 
 
Another important link between the environmental regime (strictly taken) and the BW 
non-proliferation one was developed in connection with article III and article X of the 
BTWC. The provisions respectively prohibit the transfer of any agents, toxins or 
weapons covered by article I of the Convention (article III), and establish the right of 
all state parties to benefit from the peaceful use of biological agent and toxin agents’ 
development including the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and 
scientific and technological information (article X). 
Central to these provisions are the Intellectual Property Regime (with specific 
reference to the TRIPS agreement) and the Convention on Biological Diversity.  
As already anticipated in the specific paragraph, the importance of Article X was 
brought out quite cogently during the BTWC Third Review Conference whose final 
declaration included the need to reinforce and promote promotion technology 
transfer in emerging fields of biotechnology such as genetic engineering as an 
important purpose of art X. The fourth Review Conference strengthened this mandate 
by specifically noting that the need was there to promote scientific and technological 
transfer with two objectives: (1) to promote, on the one hand, international 
cooperation in peaceful activities (medicine, public health, and agriculture) and (2) 
enhance the exchange of scientific and technical information in the biological science. 
If there was substantial agreement of the first dimension (the one linked to the 
promotion of scientific and tech development in terms of international cooperation), 
the sharing of sensitive information (many of which developed from within the private 
sector or defence) was and still is extremely problematic especially in consideration of 
the global patent and trade regime as it was formalized at the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round Negotiations in 1992 (GATT and TRIPS). The changes that the Uruguay 
negotiations introduced in the patent regime were bound to have several cross 
sectoral implications, including the implementation of article X in two ways: (1) the 
new patent system had been expanded to include biotechnological inventions; (2) and 
had given substance to the argument that inadequate standards of IP protection 
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would have encouraged unauthorized use of technologies, counterfeit and pirate 
goods making explicit the need for increased control to the owners of technology, as 
an effective solution to these problems. In other words, the transfer of biotechnology 
between advanced developed countries and developing would resulted downsized by 
the new patent regime (in contrast with BTWC art. X proscription). What is more, 
according to article 27.3 of the TRIPS agreement microorganisms were acknowledged 
as patentable (in line with historical US Supreme Court decision on Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty in 1980.)622  Extending patenting provisions to living things, brought to 
the floor a series of issues: the final scope of patent expansion, the definition of 
microorganism under the patent regime, how to safeguard the dissemination of 
biotechnology capacity. The latter depends on the nature of control that the owner of 
technology can exercise in the market as they strengthen their IPR. In order to 
facilitate technology transfer, pre-GATT system included provisions for “working the 
patent” in the country of grant and later on of “compulsory working provisions”. An 
additional evolution of such an approach is represented by the Paris Convention 
acknowledged that a patent law should not only protect the patent holder but also 
ensure that that society at large could benefit from the invention if the patent holder 
is unable (or unwilling) to exploit it commercially. To ensure the “working” of a patent, 
the Convention introduced the mechanism of compulsory licensing. In contrast with 
these attempts, elaborated to ensure that dissemination of technology took place, the 
TRIPS agreement abandoned the requirements linked to working the patent almost 
completely (by defining a series of exceptions) and envisaged a substantial dilution of 
the compulsory licencing provisions. 
In summary, the Agreement on TRIPs had introduced many changes in the global 
patent regime, all going in the direction of a restriction of the scope of Article X of the 
BTWC in the sense that were undermining the ability of developing countries to gain 
access to new technologies. The problem became even more compelling because of 
the growing dominance of the private sector in biotechnology which is likely to make 
                                                        
622 The Supreme Court ruled (very narrowly 5 to 4) that a patent could be obtained for a laboratory 
created genetically engineered bacterium. Prior to this decision, all that could have been obtained 
was a patent for the process that used the microorganism, but not for the organism itself – the 
established norm at that time was that life was not patentable. 
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the IPR regime all the more strict and compelling – much against the spirit of the 
BTWC. 
Contrary to the GATT, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) implied some 
degree of support for developing biological sciences and technology in low- income 
countries (especially article 16). In fact, the Convention represented a dramatic step 
towards (1) the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic 
resources; (2) conservation of biological diversity; (3) the sustainable use of its 
components. The CBD was the product of the work of an Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Biological Diversity which the UNEP established in May 1988. The Convention was 
opened for signature in 1992 at the Rio Hearth Summit and, by June 1993, had already 
received 168 signatures. The CBD addresses the issue of access to and transfer of 
biotechnology resources with a specific attention to developing countries based on 
the principle that they are the main suppliers. In essence, article 15 provides that 
states have sovereign rights over their natural resources and the authority to 
determine access to them. Paragraph 6 of article 15 introduces a binding commitment 
for parties to undertake collaborative research ventures in the area of biotechnology 
so that to ensure that developing countries can become able to participate in the 
process of technology generation when such technologies utilize their genetic 
resources. Art 19 goes on even further since it does not only specify the requirements 
for the handling of biotechnology and the distribution of its benefits, but it also 
emphasizes that the implied research centres should be established in the developing 
countries from where the genetic resource come from. The same article at paragraph 
2 clearly provides for equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of 
biotechnologies between the country which provides for the technology and the one 
that make the genetic material available insofar recognising the economic value of the 
genetic resources held by countries.623  
Article 16 requires state parties to “provide and /or facilitate transfer to contracting 
parties of technologies that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity or make use of genetic resources and do not cause significant 
                                                        
623 For an evolution of the principle see U.N. Biodiversity Summit Yields Welcome and Unexpected 
Progress, News of the week, 5 November 2010, Vol 339 Science. 
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damage to the environment.” The article also requires that developing countries have 
access to such technologies on “fair and most favourable terms.” In fact, article 16 of 
the CBD addresses the issue of technology transfer quite comprehensively and, 
theoretically, in favour of low-income participants. Under this perspective, its content 
seems to well complement the letter of the BTWC article X. However, the second 
paragraph of article 16 makes clear that, in situations where a clear conflict between 
the CBD and the TRIP Agreement should arise, priority must be assigned to the TRIP 
Agreement since “in the case of technology subject to patents and other intellectual 
property rights, such access and transfer shall be provided on terms which recognize 
the and are consistent with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual 
property rights.” Furthermore, it is reasonable to think that countries would behave 
accordingly since if they do not comply with their obligations under the TRIPs 
Agreement will face trade sanctions authorized by the WTO. 
If the CBD does not apply to Living Modified Organisms, the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity does. Pursuant to Article 19.3 of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Conference of the Parties convened an 
Open-ended Working Group to develop a draft protocol on biosafety which would 
have sought to protect biological diversity by a specific risk: the one posed by 
genetically modified microorganisms. The discussion of the Group revolved around 6 
meetings between July 1966 and February 1999, produced a draft text which did not 
have an easy life. Some countries were of the opinion, and rightly so, that 
Biotechnology was going to become the technology of the future and thought that 
overregulating it would have endangered competitiveness in the world market to their 
disadvantage (Miami Group and the Biotechnology Industry Organization). The 
required number of 50 instruments of ratification was, by the way, reached in 2003 
and the protocol entered into force on September of the same year. The Biosafety 
Protocol specifically focuses on transboundary transfers, transit, handling, and use of 
LMOs and other products from new technology in accordance with a “precautionary 
principle”. Such an approach aims at ensuring an adequate level of protection in the 
field of state transfer when they may have adverse effects on conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health. 
The letter of the Protocol let countries ban imports of genetically modified organisms 
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(GMOs) if they feel that there is no scientific evidence that the product is safe. It also 
requires exporters to label shipments. If on the one hand these provisions show a 
certain degree of overlapping with both the BTWC (art III/X) and the Australia Group 
requirements, it is important to underline that also in this case the Protocol assigns a 
certain prominence to existing previous agreements (including the TRIPS) by the 
wording: “the Protocol is not interpreted as implying a change in the rights and 
obligations under any existing agreements.”624 As I already clarified, the TRIP 
Agreement contain provisions that are relevant to the Protocol itself. It is evident that 
there are overlapping areas of concern between the BTWC and the CBD and 
International Law on Intellectual Property Rights and Trade. 
On the one side efforts to implement article X of the BWC appear to be 
complementary to the ones included in the CBD (article 15 and 16.1), on the other 
hand they are on a collision course with respect to the extended and enhanced global 
intellectual property regime broadcasted by the Agreement on TRIPS. 
 
Findings 
 
Chapter 3 has taken into consideration the cooperation effort which the international 
community has developed to prevent and reverse the spread of biological agents for 
malicious purposes, mainly focusing on its evolution over time.  The analysis has 
shown that the global treaties at the core of the regime, namely the Geneva Protocol 
and the BTWC, do not exhaust the range of cooperative endeavours currently at work 
to mitigate BW use and manufacture, insofar states have promoted a far richer and 
more complex array of cooperative initiatives that altogether account for a 
disarmament and non-proliferation “toolkit”. 
Under this perspective, the chapter has already fulfilled one of the goal of the overall 
project, the one of drawing the attention on how extensive and extended is the range 
of activities which directly (or indirectly) hamper the proliferation, circulation and 
possession of biological weapons. The cases under investigation paint a picture of 
burgeoning enterprises which include initiatives that are both formal and in formal, 
                                                        
624 Cartagena Protocol Preamble. 
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coordinative and collaborative, within and across issue-areas, and born in different 
period of time (during the Cold War, after its demise, and in the aftermath of 9/11). 
Alongside an increased number of joinable nested and overlapping institutions, an 
increased participation is also registered in almost all cases: notwithstanding 
participation is not uniform across initiatives and far from being universal, most 
institutions (more or less rapidly) have grown their membership at great length (as it 
will be better investigated in Chapter 4).  
Finally, the present analysis has clearly indicated that cooperation is also developing 
in a second way, a one that imply a much deeper pro-active engagement by 
participating states in activities that are collaborative versus more traditional and 
“coordination”-driven pledges. 
 
In summary, this section has allowed to make three key remarks concerning the 
current stage of development of the BW regime. 
 (1) The biological weapons non-proliferation regime has evolved in a complex 
network of institutions which complement and supplement the core treaties.   
It is clear that the Geneva Protocol and the BTWC are the most inclusive document 
insofar they (a) delineate the overall regime’s scope by enunciating the three 
principles underlying the BTWC control regime [(a.ì) the use of biological and toxin 
agents constitutes an abhorrent act of warfare and is therefore prohibited; (a.ìì) the 
peaceful uses of biosciences are legitimate undertakings, (a.ììì) as well as it is defensive 
research]; (b) provide a catalogue of norms that derive from those principles (non-
use; non-acquisition; non-transfer; cooperation; assistance; consultation, 
investigation) and (c) detail few rules and procedures. Nonetheless, additional 
institutions – in most cases characterized by a more specific mandate - have 
developed alongside the BTWC with supplementary and complementary functions 
with respect to non-proliferation objectives, bio-safety and biosecurity, trade and 
transfer of agents and precursors, research and testing (especially within dual-use 
research of concern), alert and response (for a preliminary assessment of intersections 
(see table 2). Under this perspective, the Australia Group (AG) represents a typical 
“complementary” effort conceived to address the so-called supply-side of the non-
proliferation curve, insofar it tries to make it harder for weapons’ development efforts 
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to succeed by restricting access to items necessary for their production (including 
dual-use equipment).625 To this aim, the AG has established a sound list of strategic 
biological goods (the AG Common Control List) which is today a reference guide for 
many states (even beyond the 43 AG members)626. Interestingly enough, as clarified 
in the chapter, the adoption of a commonly accepted list was not possible in the early 
years of the regime, nor during the BTWC negotiation (or during later Review 
Conferences) - notwithstanding the fact that the need was always been there. Under 
this perspective, the achievement signals a step ahead in the BW governance, 
although a one shaped outside the BTWC. 
As far as investigations of alleged uses are concerned, the United Nation Secretary 
General Mechanisms, is another example of a mechanism which well complements 
(although it is not the only one) the letter of BTWC Article VI. Along these lines, the 
Proliferations Security Initiative is a multilateral non-binding political initiative 
through which states voluntarily commit, by means of a formal pledge, to working 
cooperatively with the aim of curtailing the trafficking of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, to and from states and non-states actors contributing to the effectiveness 
of BTWC Article 3. The Res 1540 OP.2 also reinforces the BTWC in stressing states’ 
positive obligation to “adopt and enforce” appropriate measures with regards to non-
state actors. 
Also the implementation of the Convention’s proscriptions (article IV) has been and is 
today still facilitated, in many countries, by supplementary agencies and funding 
(interalia VERTIC, UNICRI CBRN CoE Initiative).  
Under this perspective, the chapter has demonstrated that overlapping institutions 
within the same issue area seems to be potentially (and reasonably) able to increase 
the regime outreach in the specific case of BW.  
A caveat is needed because complexity can bring in negative externalities. It has been 
noted that overlapping formal and informal institutions can be costly to states “when 
competition among organizations leads them to work at cross-purposes (and states 
                                                        
625 Conversely, contrary demand-side measures are those that seek to reduce the incentives (or motivation) that 
states mature towards WMD. 
626 By Joining the Australia Group on 19 January 2018, India became the 43rd participants of the Group 
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might engage in forum-shopping) and interorganizational politics.”627 This specific 
drawback does not seem to apply to this case of the BW regime although overlapping 
and redundancies in the action of institutions have been noted and reported (see 
Table 3.3) and much more coordination would be needed. 
 
Together with the increased density of the cooperation, its nature has also changed 
over time. With more and more dimensions of BW management covered by the 
regime (from non-use to biosafety to development and cooperation), a number of 
positive rights (that oblige action) were added on negative ones (that only require 
abstention/inaction). Early conventions (The Hague Convention, the Geneva Protocol, 
even the BTWC) manly involved “coordination” efforts. Under them, by accepting 
mutual self-restrains (non-use, transfer, etc.), states just had to “coordinate” their 
policies. In Chapter 2 it has been recalled that “coordination” is required when states 
want to avoid a particular bad outcome. Collaboration, in contrast, is desirable when 
concrete actions need to be entertain to ensure a particular outcome to materialize 
(mutual cooperation payoff in a PD game) and encompasses a “working jointly” 
dimension.628 Under this perspective the present analysis has pointed out that more 
recent initiatives are “collaborative” insofar require that states work together to 
implement programs and operations (requests and offers of assistance, joint external 
evaluation missions, national action plans, etc.). This obviously tell us something 
about how states see the problem they are facing. 
 
(2) The number of institutions described in the chapter also enlightens a second 
important key feature of the current bioweapons regime complex which is the fact 
that it operates across diverse issue-areas. An extensive review of relevant literature 
has allowed to recognise the year 2001 as a turning point in the consideration of 
biological agents as a prominent security matter, process which has finally resulted in 
a new taxonomy of bio-insecurity across health, security and environmental 
protection domains. The investigation has shown that the change, made apparent by 
                                                        
627 for a useful representation of the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements, see Vabulas and Snidal, 
“Organization without Delegation,” June 2013, 200. 
628 Knopf, International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation, 9. 
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a number of worrying events (anthrax letters, success of highly risky experiments, and 
emerging/re-emerging disease - NvCJD, Nipah, SARS) has to be framed within a larger 
pattern, hallmarked, in the main, by four major trends: (1) the changing nature of 
conflict (civil unrest and terrorism) (2) the accelerating pace of innovation in 
biotechnology (synthetic biology, nanotechnology applied to life science, convergence 
between chemistry and biology), (3) the natural and unremitting evolution of 
microorganisms (including drug resistant strains) and the re-emergence of quasi-
eradicated agents (attributable to globalization, travels, and migration); (4) 
globalization of the pharmaceutical and biotech industries.629  
 
With regards to the two above reported aspects, some few additional remarks need 
to be mentioned. From the analysis here performed, and the conversations 
entertained with key experts and practitioners, emerge clearly the idea that the 
evolution of the regime has a functional explanation: new problems, new solutions. 
Events have revealed new (transnational) needs which have led to the creation of new 
counteracting tools (that was the case with the investigation mechanism of UNSGM 
or the Res. 1540). Under this perspective, the analysis of individual cases has shown 
that it is virtually always possible to identify a “shock” or “crisis” which has facilitated 
at least “some” convergence of interests (given that states are pulled from conflicting 
interests which they have to balance one another). The chapter has described in 
details many of the shocks that has potentially smoothed the contractual bargaining 
preceding international agreements to be endorsed. The repeated use of herbicides 
in Vietnam, the revelations of the USA/UK joint experiments in the pacific (1968), the 
Skull Valley Incident (1968) are acknowledged as critical factors in explaining the origin 
of the BTWC. The 1984 release of the UN Investigation Team over Iraq and the 
simultaneous allegations against the Soviet Union (“yellow rain” in Lao ad Cambodia) 
prompted the establishment of the UNSGM Mechanism. Additional instances are the 
So-San incident with regards to the PSI, the SARS epidemic for the IHR 2005 Revision, 
                                                        
629 Koblentz, “Biosecurity Reconsidered”; Rodier et al., “Global Public Health Security.”; Fidler and Gostin, 
Biosecurity in the Global Age; Davies et al., “Global Health in International Relations”; Kelle, “Securitization of 
International Public Health.” 
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not to quote the obvious anthrax letter episode informing the GPWG against WMD 
and Res. 1540. 
Nonetheless, the chapter has also highlighted that states – in this field – still perceive 
their interests differently and assign profoundly diverse priorities to their needs 
(security versus right to development and research). Such a distinct look over the issue 
is very consequential for regime analysis insofar betray a diverse vision over the type 
of situation and/or conflict (over absolutely ore relatively assessed goods, means, or 
values) which is at stake. 
It is not surprising though that, on the one side, the most recent security initiatives 
have seen the general reinforcement of the cooperation branch (beyond purely non-
proliferation goals) of their bargaining. Under this perspective, they have reinforced 
the safeguard of the right to “research and development” over biological agents for 
peaceful purposes in the Global South (GP, GHSI, GHSA). On the other side the 
typically health or environmental related institutions, like the International Health 
Regulations, have been revised and interpreted by some countries (the US, Canada, 
the UK interalia) to also apply to security-related situations (securitization of the 
problem and securitization of the institution). Interalia, this outcome opens the floor 
for conflicting norms to establish and flourish. 
However, this is only part of the story insofar many problematic aspects are not new. 
On the contrary they were already perceived and identified during the negotiation 
phases of the core treaties when no agreement could be reach on a common solution 
(list of agents,  verification measures, etc.) and left open for future revisions. Later 
Review Conferences could neither score a point, to the extent that joint actions 
became, in those sectors, became possible within the framework of smaller groupings, 
a case in point being the AG Common Control List. In those cases it seems more 
profitable to trace the source of cooperation in the determination of key actors to 
implement a certain strategy (“coalition of the willing” and Core Groups)  than in the 
realization of a totally “equitable solution”. Other key examples are to be found in the 
geopolitical origin of the BTWC, the GP, the PSI and even the UNSC 1540 where the 
duo US/UK started by circulating a petition among the P5 and only afterwards involved 
the larger membership in the initiative. 
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All the above confirm the relevance, which also emerges from the case studies, of 
transnational networks in shaping the debate. Because of the highly technicalities of 
the problem at stake, both epistemic communities and working-level relationship 
among scientists and technical experts have been fully integrated in the decision 
making process of the political bodies (UNSC 1540 Committee, BWC Meeting of 
Experts, GPBSWG, etc.). Nonetheless, the analysis has also pointed out that the impact 
of the working-level relationships and social constituencies cannot be overestimated 
as demonstrated by the disappointing outcome of the BTWC 8th Review Conference. 
 
(3) A final consideration regarding the BW regime complex concerns the institutional 
design of its individual components. If institutional design is deliberate (and stemming 
from the problem underneath), the way a regime institutional framework evolves tells 
us something about how the actors in the systems see the problem changing.  In a 
formal-informal continuum as the one described by Snidal, bio-agents relevant 
institutions can be found in many diverse categories.630 The prohibition of the 
Biological Weapons use is today understood as customary international law and thus 
representative of a “decentralized form of cooperation” based on tacitly shared 
expectations. Nonetheless, with the passage of time those “shared expectations” have 
been also formalized and incorporated in early “formal Intergovernmental 
Organizations” (FIGOs) as the Hague Conventions and reiterated in the Geneva 
Protocol. The BTWC is obviously the par-excellence example of a “formal” component 
of the regime along with the other quasi-universal treaties in the list (e.g.  the Antarctic 
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons, the Convention on Biological Diversity), although all 
of them lack implementation bodies. The regime also encompasses several cases of 
“IIGOs within FIGO,” always in Snidal lexicon: the WHO Groups or the 1540 UNSC 
Committee. These are sub-group of FIGO members which share a focus on a 
specialized issue and participate into ad-hoc meetings but are still not legalized. The 
Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Global Partnership against the Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Biological Weapons Working Group) are classical 
instances of Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) with explicitly 
                                                        
630 Vabulas and Snidal, “Organization without Delegation,” June 2013, 201. 
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associated members, regular meetings although no independent secretariat. The 
Global Health Security Agenda and the Global Health Security Initiative can be 
described in terms of “explicit agreements consultations” and are based on 
communiqué and non-ratified treaty dialogue with limited meetings. As detailed in 
the chapter, the diverse institutional profile of the individual components of the 
regime imply that across components a high degree of variation is registered 
concerning their legal profile (Obligation, Precision, and Delegation), centralization of 
information, control, voting system, flexibility to changes (escape clauses, 
renegotiation, and sunset provisions). 
The chapter has shown that a trend towards more informal intergovernmental 
arrangements is clearly observable.  
The reasons behind the tendency towards more informal tools observed after 2001 
seems, in the case of the biological weapons regime complex, compatible with 
prevailing doctrinal analysis (maintain greater flexibility versus binding commitment 
and manage uncertainty linked to tech development, maintain closer control of 
sensitive information, and lower costs and shorten time of transactions). Contrary to 
prevailing assumptions, it seems that the propensity towards institutional informality 
have applied, in the case of biological agents, across issue areas affecting the security 
dimension as well as the health-side of the governance system. 
 
Evaluating the effectiveness of cooperative non-proliferation individual efforts proved 
the most challenging aspect of the project, for the reasons already explored in Chapter 
1. With consideration to their specific objectives, nearby all accounts have included 
judgment of partial success. In most cases success has been attributed to raising 
awareness, promotion of norms, and increased transparency. Whether or not it is 
possible do document specific achievements, it is reasonable to believe that the 
proliferation of tools and initiatives per se account for some degree of effectiveness, 
at least in the fact that the increased number of high-level meetings must have 
produced greater awareness, in the countries, of the dangers associated with 
biological agents misuse. This outcome would be consistent with the persistent (stable 
or increasing but never declining) funding devoted to biorisk management programs 
and activities by both the health sector and defence commitment of the last 18 years. 
Attributes, compliance and effectiveness of nested regimes 
The Biological Weapons Regime Complex 
 
 285 
Consistently, the regime seems to have reinforced existing original norms over BW 
use and development, and at least, to have oriented its evolution in the direction of a 
progressive expansion of its scope. A couple of examples among the many discussed 
in the chapter, are worth recalling. The first concerns biological agents circulation. 
Interestingly enough, the work for the  Geneva Protocol  started with the aim of 
governing BW transfer (and not use). At that time, no agreement could be reached 
because of the opposition of few states, motivated by the fear of falling behind with 
regards to related R&D  (interalia Italy). Italy is now a supportive member of the 
Australia Group, an organization that – as shown - not only acknowledges the need to 
govern the traffic of such weapons or their precursors, but also issue specific and very 
detailed guidelines. The same way, the many “additional understandings” in the 
framework of the BTWC on the application of the BTWC to non-state actors have 
reasonably injected legitimacy into the approval of Res 1540 (specifically directed 
against state actors), as it is shown in the preamble to the Resolution itself. Finally, 
the number of joint projects and missions, the multiplication of reporting tools to be 
return to the various secretariats and committees have substantially increased the 
possibility of states to get information over other states’ BW profiles. A case in point 
is the Biological Weapons Prevention Project Monitor, a global network of civil society 
actors dedicated to the permanent elimination of biological weapons.631 The project 
culminated in the delivery of a database containing information of relevance for the 
implementation of the BTWC. What is important here it is to underline that the 
dataset is entirely built on open-source information and follows the rule of moderated 
access (WHO reports, OPCW reports, cooperative activities, unusual disease 
outbreaks, tweets, panoramio/imagery). The Monitor provides information - for each 
states in the system (not only BTWC parties) – concerning their BW military defence 
programs, civil biotech research facilities, military biological labs, past BW programs, 
interalia which would be simply out of reach few years ago much increasing 
international transparency on the subject. 
 
  
                                                        
631 http://www.bwpp.org  
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Chapter 4: The BW Regime Complex considerations over regime consequences  
 
The virtue of complexity 
 
The previous chapter has described the evolution of the BW regime complex by 
analysing and comparing the main institutions constituting the current framework. 
Although each section has offered some insights regarding the degree of participation,  
compliance and effectiveness of the institution under exam, an overall account is still 
elusive. 
In addition to the reasons which make effectiveness inherently difficult to grasp (and 
that have been covered in Chapter 1), the previous analysis has revealed an additional 
difficulty linked to the fact that is simply not always possible to obtain clear 
information or information at all. This chapter focuses exactly on this clue and tries to 
supplement the analysis with quantitative findings, where possible. Under a purely 
methodological perspective, a complex-based approach, which takes into account the 
entire set of nested and overlapping institutions involved, provides three interlinked 
advantages.  
(1) First of all, regime complexity offers the possibility for a sounder empirical analysis. 
If there is often little variation in the membership of individual treaties (particularly in 
the case of almost universal framework conventions), substantial variation can exist 
in the membership of a composite regime. This is exactly the case of the regime 
covering biological agents. (2) Secondly, regime complexity seems able to shed new 
light over policy preferences and screening strategies. A state participation to a single 
arrangement over a specific subject tells us something about the willingness to 
sign/ratify that specific agreement and thus broadcasts a binary information. This 
could easily lead to a selection bias: a given state’s support for a single treaty 
(especially if its legal content is diluted) may or may not be representative of its 
support for the overall objective that inform that treaty or the regime to which the 
regime belongs - being the fruit of a contingent situation (“treaties are policy 
outcomes as well as legal agreements”).632 Vice versa the degree of participation of 
states to multiple agreements that overlap in the same policy space (even across 
                                                        
632 Brewster, “Reputation in International Relations and International Law Theory,” 524–43. 
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traditional issue-areas) can help us distinguishing among states’ diverse attitudes on 
the subject and eventually communicate something more general and less situational 
about their preference. If, as the IO literature has recognized, membership in 
international institutions record credible information about states’ desire to 
commit/comply (at least in principle) with that institution’s rules (because of ex-ante 
costs), 633 the participation’s pattern to multiple institutions may be more revelatory 
about the degree of international governance states are ready to accept in that given 
domain, the direction of that preferences (both in term of content and 
implementation), and the effectiveness itself of the regime. This approach can be even 
more telling when an object (as it is the case with biological agents) is governed by 
arrangements which cross issue-areas boundaries (or display much diverse 
institutional features) in the sense that policy makers (and scholars interested in 
regime development and design) can learn something about states’ preferences by 
observing how many and which states join which components of the regime. (3) If on 
the one hand, participation’s patterns tell us about states “placement” (= preferences) 
over the specific issue governed by the regime complex, that very same “preference 
profile” is - in its turn – shaped by a variety of factors which characterize states that 
decide to commit to a specific kind of international cooperation model (or 
international cooperation in general). Notwithstanding the fact that preferences are 
key elements in the analysis of many aspects of an International Relations agenda,634 
few studies have systematically analysed states’ preferences with respect to 
international institutions or tested conventional model over the determinants of 
states preferences vis-à-vis international cooperation.  
Traditional scholarship suggests that such preferences should vary systematically on 
the basis of systemic features as well as national intrinsic characteristics. Those factors 
are both domestic and relational (pre-existing linkages among states and between 
each state and the area of concern - including the way the perspective agreement is 
designed). A variety of factors that determine states’ willingness to support 
international treaties both domestically and not will be considered in the following 
                                                        
633 Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. Kaplow  
634 States create institutions on the basis of their preferences about solving international cooperation problems 
(Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?”; 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions.”) 
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section as control values. These include power and independence,635 domestic 
politics,636 legal systems,637 regime type,638 reputation,639 normative benefits,640 
international diffusion mechanisms (overall adherence, political and economic 
integration),641 and treaty design.642   
 
As already made clear in Chapter 1, this work embraces a “graded” approach to regime 
consequences and explores the three dimensions of output, outcomes and impact 
with regard to the bioweapons non-proliferation regime complex (see figure 1.10). 
The first part of the chapter  focusses on implementation and compliance and builds 
on the assumption, derived from the theoretical argumentation in Chapters 1 and 2 
and the empirical evidence in Chapter 3, that an increased participation to the regime 
(both in terms of outputs and outcomes) is both a signal of regime’s success and a 
trigger to allow its further development. In other words, if more and more states 
express their consent (by ratification - or other types of participation – and obedience) 
to  an increasing number of institutions (whether formal or informal) which embody 
the principles expressed in the core treaties of the regime, this tells us something 
about the health and success of the overall regime itself. At the same time, the 
increased density of  the regime (both components and members) can further 
enhance the regime objectives through mechanisms as (issue/time) linkages (which 
supposed to mitigate the distribution problems) and social influence (backpatting and 
opprobrium). These two mechanisms are reasonably thought to be key in the bio-
weapons non-proliferation regime (where real a system of inspection has never been 
approved and would be in any case virtually unfeasible). 
The second section of the chapter addresses the matter of regime impact in terms of 
states’ proliferation choices (BW pursuit and possession), enlighten the main 
                                                        
635 Milewicz and Snidal, “Cooperation by Treaty.” 
636 Haftel and Thompson, “Delayed Ratification.” 
637 Goodliffe and Hawkins, “Explaining Commitment.” 
638 Vreeland, Institutional Determinants of IMF Agreements; Vreeland, “IMF Program Compliance”; Neumayer, 
“Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?” 
639 Simmons, “Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance.” 
640 Kelley, “Who Keeps International Commitments and Why?” 
641 Bernauer et al., “A Comparison of International and Domestic Sources of Global Governance Dynamics.” 
642 von Stein, “The International Law and Politics of Climate Change.” 
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limitations regarding such an investigation, and show some preliminary results and 
way forward. 
 
Research Design 
 
The Dataset 
Under this perspective, this work tests its arguments on a newly created dataset which 
merges existing data about states attributes (relevant to WMD proliferation and IOs 
membership) and their specific degree of participation to the biological weapons 
regime. In particular, this project has developed 2 new variables to account for any 
state consent to the BW regime complex (embeddedness and embeddedness index – 
which give reason of states’ ratification rates between 1899 and 2014).643   
The dataset processes country-year as units of analysis and include information 
concerning any state’s participation to the biological agents’ regime (signature, 
ratification or other signal of consent when ratification is not an option). 
Contrary to common literature (especially quantitative oriented) and in line with the 
rest of this work, the regime is not considered limited to the biological weapons core 
treaties (the Geneva Protocol and the BTWC), but incorporates all those international 
arrangements relevant to the biological weapons’ government, including softer forms 
of international law (if multilateral in nature and of substantial relevance for the 
governance of biological agents). Moreover, in consideration of the intrinsically dual-
use nature of biological agents, the recent “securitization” scholarship (see Chapter 
2), the practical turn which overtook the discipline, additional arrangements have 
been included if having a consistent mandate and if considered critical by experts in 
leading positions within the BWC ISU and UNODA (notwithstanding the fact that they 
precisely belong to issue areas other than security, namely environment and health). 
In other words, all the institutions selected do have some impact on biological agents 
and do have biological agents’ relevant mandates although they would be traditionally 
traced back to policy spaces other than security and arms control. The approach of 
                                                        
643 From 2000 onwards, except from participation/ratification data are not available and for this reason most 
statistics are drawn on the period 1945-2000. 
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providing the broader list as possible, also gives the opportunity to other scholars to 
conduct narrower or more specific analysis (by singling out only certain information). 
Nonetheless, although comprehensive, the list only includes arrangements which 
provide substantive additions to existing governance (and go beyond simple 
adjustments, reaffirmation/prorogation of intents, and amendments of previous 
treaties).  
Finally, the present analysis focuses on arrangements that (1) have a universal reach: 
participation is open (or soon have become open) to the majority of recognized states 
(all states, UN members or WHO members); (2) do not have a regional focus. A second 
restriction applied to the list resulting from the interviews and subject to the 
qualitative assessment performed in Chapter 3, stems from the need to produce some 
indicator/measure of participation (although not necessarily in the form of a formal 
accession). 
The resulting sample include 24 arrangements, 15 of which directly deal with security 
concerns, 3 of which are connected to environmental protection issues and 6 attain 
to the global health domain (see table 3.1). 
For each of these institutions, the following information have been collected: 
eligibility,644 signature, ratification, accession, exit, re-entry, general status.  Each 
treaty is also categorized on the basis of the area it belongs. The classification is made 
in consideration of the main objective and purpose of each initiative, although most 
treaties (especially the ones that fall under the security group) include provisions 
related to more than one category and would require a secondary treaty type variable.  
To start with, as it will be explained in the next section, the dataset has been functional 
to the elaboration of an “embeddedness measure” and an “embeddedness index” 
which account for the type of participation the biological agents’ regime display.  
 
The dependent variables 
 
                                                        
644 Not all states are considered eligible to join all agreements. Treaties can be bilateral, some can be limited by 
geography, or by membership in another treaty or institution (see GP and PSI). In the specific of the present 
analysis, with the exception of the Global Partnership (2002) and The Proliferation Security Initiative (2003) that 
were initially open to a limited set of countries, the other were characterized by open access. 
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The first and immediate regime consequence is represented by any state expressed 
consent to be bound to the international commitment under consideration 
(output).645 This consent can be expressed in various ways. With reference to treaty 
law, consent takes a clear manifestation in the signature and, especially, ratification 
of the treaty convention. Where the institutions under analysis are not formal treaties 
or binding international agreements and do not envisage formal signature/ratification 
procedures, other measures have been used as proxy for consent (e.g. as acceptance 
to invites or participation to the opening meetings/conference – this is the case with 
the Global Partnership for WMD and PSI, or in terms of “permanence” in an 
organization whose bodies have voted for the constitution of the arrangements itself 
as in the case of the International Health Regulations, 2005).  
Ratification is clearly not the unavoidable consequence of a negotiation neither the 
only option for states that are exposed to a raising arrangement. Obviously states can 
just avoid signing or ratifying the treaty, 646 or proceed to ratification only after having 
included a series of reservations (which in most cases weaken the commitment they 
accept). Becoming able to account for reservations, although positing methodological 
problems, definitely represent a way of improvement to the present analysis. In fact, 
the decision to adopt reservations can lead to juxtaposed interpretations. On the one 
side, they can signal states’ willingness to undertake only the commitments that 
conform with their domestic constitutions (in a way this would be a sign of support to 
the rule of law), especially in consideration of the fact that a similar approach is 
perfectly consistent with a positivist systems. On the other side, especially when 
diffused and reiterated, reservations can be interpreted as a refusal to fully commit to 
the regime’s proposed ruling.647 The case of 1925 Geneva Protocol is exemplary. By 
juxtaposing reservations, many states affirmed their right to retaliate in kind basically 
                                                        
645 Another and potentially preliminary form of regime support is leadership (the willingness of a state to take an 
active role in the creation of a new law settlement). Although extremely relevant and harbinger of interesting 
insights in the case of biological agents’ regime, such analysis has been covered in chapter 3. Indeed, while 
leadership can be crucial in the development of international law (or in signalling a state’s effort to shape the 
content of arising international law) is clearly not required for a state to be considered supportive of a regime. 
646 Under this perspective, examples from the US case are manifolds cutting across diverse issue areas. With 
reference to arms control agreements best known examples include the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (II) and 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
647 Not without reason, one of the few comparative studies of reservations to human rights treaties, suggest that 
democratic countries with the strongest commitment to the rule of law are the most frequent reservations-
adopters (Neumayer, “Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?”) 
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adulterating the scope of the agreement from a “non-use” to a “no-first-use” (today 
the number of reservations appear diluted by the increased membership, although 
still amounts to 23 over 140 state parties). 
That said, in consideration of the fact that, in the present investigation the objective 
is the assessment of states embeddedness in the broad regime (regime-complex), the 
simple analysis of each institution’s independent ratification rate doesn’t serve the 
purpose. For this reason, two complex indexes have been developed (embeddedness 
and embeddedness index). To evaluate the extent to which states are “embedded” 
within the regime, for each country-year the dataset provide for the absolute numbers 
of agreements joined (embeddedness) and the share of agreements for which each 
state is eligible that is actually joined (embeddedness index = that is the number of 
individual institutions of which a state is member divided by the number of treaties 
the state is eligible to join). This second  measure, unlike a raw count of treaty 
membership, does not advantage states that are eligible for a greater number of 
agreements. 
 
A second type of regime consequence is represented by compliance.648 This is also the 
most intuitive measure of states participation to international institutions although, 
as thoroughly explained in Chapter 1, as such compliance cannot be reduced to a 
dichotomous variable and its assessment is generally far from being straightforward. 
First, a complex-regime (but also a single institution) broadcasts several rules (and 
compliance can be high for some of them and low for others). Second, the 
determination of compliance presupposes agreement on the interpretation and 
application of often vague international norms. Finally, and with regards to regimes’ 
                                                        
648 An intermediate form of regime participation/support (between consent/ratification and compliance) is 
represented by implementation or internalization. With no doubts, this is the most demanding for states which 
participate into a regime complex or ratifying a specific institution. The process whereby international legal norms 
and rules are incorporated into the domestic legal order can be expensive and time consuming. For those (often 
monist) states that automatically incorporate all treaty law into domestic legal order, ratification can be considered 
a proxy of implementation – although as explained in detail in Chapter 3, in most cases adaptation of national 
legislation and enforcement measures is needed. In any case, assessing implementation require an itemised 
approach (rule by rule, regulation by regulation) that is not compatible with analysis which follows. Some insights 
concerning the degree of implementation/internalization of the regime can be retraced cross-referencing data 
from specific sections of some compliance tools (BWC return, 1540 reports and WHO questionnaires). 
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broader effects, formal compliance with international law does not necessary 
translates into problem solving.649 
This work captures states’ compliance with three main institutions within the bio-
agents’ regime (BTWC, 1540, and IHR) in terms of their willingness to produce and 
deliver – according to the respective institutional commandments – specific reporting 
tools. These comprise the BWC Confidence Building Measures Returns, the 1540 
National Reports, and the WHO International Health Regulation 
Questionnaires/Country Reports.  
In compiling these tools, states are required to account for the status of 
implementation and compliance they have reached under that specific arrangement.  
 
Finally regime consequences can be described in terms of overall impact. Traditionally, 
in terms of dependent variables, this has meant considering the number of countries 
that have supported in a given time some type of offensive proliferation activity (BW 
pursuit) or have maintained stockpiles (BW possession). 
 
The independent variables 
 
External factors 
(1) Interdependence.  
Liberal institutionalism posits that, under conditions of interdependence, uncertainty 
about other states preference and high transaction costs of interaction can be 
mitigated by the establishment of international institution that facilitate cooperation. 
Already-in-place institutions (by increasing transparency) also facilitate negotiations 
over new arrangements or the revision of the existing ones and are assumed to 
prevent them from uniquely pursuing short-term relative gains. On the contrary, 
institutions move them towards positive-sum outcomes, the promotion of shared 
interest, and help them to overcome collective action problems. Furthermore, failure 
to participate in a treaty (even when benefits of membership do not outpace those 
accruing to states when implement unilateral efforts) could lead to reciprocal negative 
                                                        
649 RAUSTIALA and SLAUGHTER, “International Law, International Relations and Compliance”; Lisa Martin, “The 
Rational State Choice of Multilateralism,".” 
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actions by other state that would undermine the advantages of unilateral strategies 
(issue-linkages). The “entanglement” argument relies both on contractualism and 
knowledge-based (weak and strong) theories of international regimes and postulates 
that greater involvement in international organizations and world economy enhance 
states propensity to sign and ratify additional treaties.  
 (1.1) Involvement in other international organizations 
Membership in international organizations (IOmb) is here operationalized simply by 
the number of IOs of which a country is a member in a given year.650 The data are 
derived from the Correlates of War Project (COW), Form-2, 651 which provides for a 
dataset organized by country-year (for each state in the system the dataset clarifies 
its IGO memberships in any given year).652  
(1.2) Integration in world economy. Integration in world economy is measured by two 
variables: 
(1.2.1) The first one (openness) is taken from Horowitz and Narang (2014) and 
accounts from trade openness in terms of exports and imports as a share of GDP 
(whether/how much a country is considered to be open to trade each year). 653 
(1.2.2) The second one (EXP) is taken from the trade dataset of the Correlates of War 
project. This is the result of the effort to code trade flows between states for the 
period 1870-2014. The data include information on both bilateral trade flows and total 
national imports and exports. The National (Monadic) Trade dataset contains 
information on individual states import and export levels in current U.S. dollars. 654 
Relevance/hypothesis: Countries that display higher degree of interdependence with 
other countries in the system (with higher membership score and that trade more 
intensively) are also expected to show higher degree of participation in the framework 
of the BW non-proliferation regime.  
                                                        
650 Diplomatic exchange (from COW) could be an alternative operationalization for this measure 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/diplomatic-exchange 
651 Pevehouse, Jon C., Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke. 2004. "The COW-2 International 
Organizations Dataset Version 2.0," Conflict Management and Peace Science 21:101-119.  
652 The project also differentiates on the basis three distinct variables according to whether a state has full, 
associated or observer membership. In the present dataset, the most inclusive criterion has been privileged – the 
one that include any type of membership. 
653 Horowitz and Narang, “Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb?” 
654 Barbieri, Katherine and Omar M. G. Omar Keshk. 2016. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, 
Version 4.0. Online: http://correlatesofwar.org.  
 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/bilateral-trade/international-trade-1870-2009-v3-0  
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(2) Capacity  
With respect to the international political sphere, the distribution of state interests 
(framed in terms of legal and economic integration) are not the only elements to be 
reflected in international legal outcomes. According to a realist perspective, the 
distribution of power/capacity is the most consequential factor in the equation, with 
great powers and particularly hegemonic actors more likely to prevail in distributive 
bargaining. Neoliberals – championed by Ikenberry who makes reference to the 
United States - posits that hegemonic and multilateral power might generally be more 
supportive of strong international law (having a leading role in their creation, they are 
also expected to be more prone to compliance with rules that disproportionally reflect 
their own interests.)655 In line with these consideration are Neumayer’s findings 
concerning environmental regimes. He shows how powerful states would more likely 
participate in multilateral agreements in order to demonstrate their importance in 
world politics, of which environment represents one part.656 It is also true that, after 
the 1970s and concurrent decolonization process, a G-77 group of newly independent 
and less developed countries gained fully-fledged access to several international 
institutions from where they could sponsor a common cause. Under this perspective, 
we could have expected great powers to progressively become less supportive to 
international constraints that may have come to reflect the preference of the global 
south (the issue and its implication has been widely discussed with reference to 
International Health Regulations in Chapter 3). In order to operationalize and measure 
national capacities, the following variables have been used:  
(2.1) Income: to control for the effect of power it is possible to rely a country’s wealth. 
A country’s wealth is usually measured by the log value of GDP per capita.657 Since 
income may also have a non-linear effect on the likelihood of ratifying international 
treaties, the squared value of the log of GDP per capita is also included. 
Under this perspective, it has to be said that most of the recent literature on 
international cooperation (especially in the environmental field) has viewed income 
                                                        
655 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan. 
656 Neumayer, “Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?” 
657 These data are from Horowitz and Narang, 2014 
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per se as a factor that promote cooperation (even when detached from power status 
– supposing it were possible). More specifically it has been show that economics (and 
in particular trade) is the clearest and most consistent predictor of treaty commitment 
preferences including with respect to non-economic policy areas.658  
(2.2) Power: to control for the effect of power, a second variable is the “Composite 
Indicator of National Capability (CINC)” which accounts for six categories: military 
expenditures, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, 
urban population, total population.659 
Relevance/hypothesis: As anticipated economic power has been consistently 
associated with regime participation, so we expect the same trend to apply to the BW 
regime complex. As far as material capability (CINC) is concerned, we would expect 
that countries displaying lower military investments are more prone to participate in 
regimes that support a reduction of armament. Nonetheless, states with lower 
military capacity could be willing to start a BW program to access some WMD (for 
prestige etc.) In relation to the proliferation of BW (pursuit and possession), the effect 
of CINC would be dubious. On the one side states with modest military capacity could 
chase biological weapons as strategic equalizer, on the other side (especially in recent 
time), the high investments required to achieve advanced (versus rough) and effective 
programs may discourage such endeavours. 
 
(3) Policy diffusion effect/contingent behaviour  
Decisions by countries to join international institutions are most probably influenced 
by other countries decisions to participate (and comply). This reciprocity is key in arms 
control commitments, as widely discussed and proved by institutionalist literature on 
international cooperation and game theory. Recently large N-empirical research have 
devoted the due attention to this factor as a determinant of institutional participation 
under the rubric of “international policy diffusion”. Simmons   defines policy diffusion 
as occurring when government policy decisions in a given country are systematically 
conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries (sometimes mediated by 
                                                        
658 Horowitz and Narang, “Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb?” 
659 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities  
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the behaviour of international organizations or even private actors).660 Along these 
lines, normative theories argue that formal agreements can have transformative 
effects on the behaviour of participants states not only by changing the strategic 
environment but also through socialization mechanisms (macro and 
microprocesses).661 
In order to account for policy diffusion, I have used framework convention system 
effects (BWC and CWC) measured as the proportion of BWC joiners to the total 
number of states in the world. 
Relevance/hypothesis: We expect that higher system effects relates to higher degree 
of participation to the upcoming components of the regime complex and with lower 
level of BW pursue and possession.  
 
Domestic factors 
(1) Democracy/polity 
Many reasons have been formulated to account for the fact that democratic countries 
are more likely to participate to international institutions making credible 
commitments than non-democracies: democratic institutions are supposed to be 
stronger than non-democracies, democratic decision-makers more accountable to 
their electorates, audience costs and transparency are higher in democracies.662 
Although all the above applies mainly within democratic dyads and conclusions cannot 
be directly deduced that also hold in a monadic sense, it is worth to check for this 
measure (also because domestic political regime type is thought to affect a wide range 
of other international outcomes).663 Indeed, democratic political systems offer much 
higher degree of civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press and 
association which have proven very relevant in pushing for the creation and the 
expansion of the regime on biological weapons (see the geopolitical origin of the 
                                                        
660 Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, “Introduction.” 
661 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; Wendt, “Constructing 
International Politics.” 
662 Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” 
663 Including the ability of states to win wars Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War; Lipson, “Performance under 
Ambiguity.” 
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BTWC outlined in Chapter 3). Democracy is also a key determinant of treaty 
compliance.664 
So-called “supply-side” features of democracy are measured with an index capturing 
the extent of democratic participation in government. The present analysis makes use 
of the “Polity Score” index  included in the Horowitz e Narang dataset that accounts 
for the following elements: presence of competitive political participation, guarantees 
of openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and existence of 
institutionalized constraints on the exercise of the executive power. Polity Score 
ranges from +10 (most) to -10 (least democratic). 
Relevance/hypothesis: Democracies are expected to be associated with higher level of 
participation to regimes in general and to the BW non-proliferation in particular 
insofar the latter supports a well-established principle of humanitarian law (non-use) 
and  has evolved as a proper taboo for democracies. 
 
(2) Civil Unrest 
The measure for domestic unrest is taken by Jo, Gartke (2007), who in their turn have 
constructed the index based on Banks 1999 dataset. They have weight the number of 
reported domestic conflicts in three categories (including anti-governmental 
demonstrations, strikes and riots) by the size of a state’s population. 
Relevance/hypothesis: Countries have utilized CBWs in the past to quell domestic 
protests and defeat violent opponent to the regime which should have pushed 
governments away from institutions that ban those weapons. Toxins (like Sarin) have 
also been repeatedly used during the ongoing conflict in Syria. Such outcome is 
dubious however because the government may fear that non-conventional arsenals 
may fall into the hands of rebels of militant minorities. 
 
(3) Civilization and Region  
Another key factor that may affect treaty participation to the BW regime is states’ 
civilisations.665 The argument posits that both international conflict and cooperation 
are shaped by cultural factors, independently of concerns over power and economics. 
                                                        
664 Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior.” 
665 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. 
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In this view, the world would be composed in civilisations (eight, in the case of 
Huntington’s description) which display diverse patterns of similarities and 
dissimilarities. 
As a proxy for civilizations, the current dataset has included a categorical variable for 
world regions to control for specific features of the bio-agents’ regime. The regions 
are: North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, South-Est Asia, Australia and 
Pacific 
 
(8) Prestige/Status 
States’ ability to influence the terms of the treaties and their acceptance increases 
their incentives for participation (in terms of treaty ratification). In particular it has 
been shown that a states’ support for and influence on multilateral treaties is 
contingent on both might and independence. 
(8.1) As a measure of “major power status” (Majopw) for the period 1945-1975, this 
work adopts Jo, Gartke (2007) classification which builds on the standard COW 
classification and acknowledges as major powers (from 1939 onwards): The United 
States (1939-1975), United Kingdom (1939-1975), Soviet Union/Russia (1939-75); 
France (1939-1940 and 1945-1975); Germany (1939-1945); Italy (1939-1943). For the 
period from 1975 to present we consider major power status the G8 countries (G7 + 
Russia after 2014) that means: USA, Canada, UK, France, Italy, URSS/Russia, Japan, 
Germany. 
(8.2) The measure of Regional Power (Regpow) status is constructed (in line with Jo, 
Gartke 2007) using Shewller’s definition of “pole”, a “state with at least half of the 
resources of the most powerful state in the [regional] system”.666 
Relevance/hypothesis 
Because States’ ability to influence the terms of treaties and their acceptance 
increases their incentives for treaty ratification, we expect multilateral powers—
states that are powerful and independent from the United States—support 
multilateral legal cooperation because this would offer them an opportunity to shape 
treaty content (higher participation).667 
                                                        
666 Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, 46. 
667 Milewicz and Snidal, “Cooperation by Treaty.” 
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(9) National Security  
The security environment is an obvious motive that can change states’ preference vis-
à-vis regime participation. International security push states to look for institutional 
participation when their own defence mechanisms are weak, so to enjoy other 
countries protection. The presence of a nuclear umbrella may be for example 
sufficient for the protégés to dampen concerns about security risks and represent an 
incentive for joining the BW non-proliferation regime. On the other hand, in order to 
increase its own security a low-income state could in theory decide to acquire some 
substitute weapon (like the BW) which would provide status without necessarily 
burdening the national budget too much (as a nuclear program would do). 
Under this perspective, the dataset includes 5 variables to account for the role of 
security in regime’s participation decisions: 
As a proxy for nuclear umbrella, we control for (9.1) whether a country has or not a 
nuclear-armed ally, since that it potentially influences a whole range of national 
choices about weapons acquisition.  
We also control for (9.2) whether a country is in an enduring rivalry 668 and for (9.3) 
the degree of participation to militarized interstate disputes (MID) and for (9.4) 
whether a country face a nuclear threat. Finally, we control for (9.5) the numbers of 
borders (land and sea) a state share with other states. 669 
Relevance/hypothesis 
We expect states suffering a condition of perceived or real national insecurity may 
decide to maintain the possibility to use strategic equalizers (BW) to threatening their 
use during crisis bargaining and avoid binding commitments of non-proliferation 
 
Preliminary results 
 
Consequences: outputs 
 
                                                        
668 The variable is taken from Horowitz and Narang 
669  From 10 to 13 - the variable is taken from Horowitz and Narang 
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Participation in the regime covering biological agents is extremely broad: all 
recognized states with no exception are currently part of at least one agreement 
within the regime complex.  
Figure 4.1 uses this measure to trail the average level of state membership in the 
regime. The grey line tracks the annual mean for the share of eligible treaties joined 
(right axis). The blue line shows the numbers of agreements for which states are 
eligible every year, while the orange line is the mean number of agreements joined, 
both scaled on the left axis. 
As the figure shows, the share of agreements (within the regime complex) to which 
states are a party has remained relatively stable since the 80s even as the total number 
of agreements has increased (doubled in the last 40 years). This finding is consistent 
with results from investigation performed with reference to the nuclear non-
proliferation regime where the trend is found stable starting from 70s, when the 
number of agreements began its rapid rise.670 The rate of joining has largely kept pace 
with the rate at which new agreements are created. From the 60s indeed, the index 
has moved from 20% to 60%. This way of thinking about regime embeddedness  
(found in Kaplow forthcoming book) captures an important relationship between 
treaty membership and policy preferences. More treaties joined roughly equates to 
stronger support to the overall regime goals.671  
Figure 4.1, however obscures significant variation in membership among regions and 
states. 
The embeddedness index introduces indeed a substantial variation in the depth of 
states participation for geographical regions and single states (impairing its outcome 
and potential effectiveness).  
                                                        
670 JM Kaplow, the “Nuclear Regime Complex: A new dataset”; 12 
http://dl.jkaplow.net/CGGK_Nuclear_Regime_Dataset.pdf 
671 However, as a proxy of underlying regime preferences of member states this simple additive measure has 
some limitations: this measure assumes for example that the same amount of information is provided by each 
decision to join which does not fully mirrors reality. If not all treaties provide the same level/type of information 
(as it is actually the case), then a simple additive measureof regime embeddedness will overstate the importance 
of some agreeements (of minor significance).  Secondly, such a measure is censored at 0/1 in a way that makes it 
difficult to distinguish between states that merely lak the opportunity to join treaties, and those that would 
prefer to abstein. Under this perspective, consider a state that has not ratified any agreements and is eligible for 
a single treaty and a second state that has not ratified any agreements being aligible to, let’s say, 10. The two 
states have the same share of eligible agreements but these circumstances raise the possibility that there are 
differences in their underlying preferences. This second shortcoming has very limited implications in the case of 
the BA regime because all but two agreeemnts are open to all countries. 
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Figure 4.2  shows regional data for 9 regions ((1)North America; (2) South America; (3) 
Western Europe; (4) Central and Eastern Europe; (5) Sub-Saharan Africa; (6) Middle 
East and North Africa; (7) South East Asia; (8) Far Eastern states; (9) Oceania. 
Europe and the Americas (North and South) show higher level of embeddedness with 
a media index of 0,52 compared to Asia and Africa that display a media index of 0,4. 
Oceania lags behind this value displaying a media which never overtakes 0,38. When 
looking at single states participation to the regime, significant variation can also be 
appreciated. The United Kingdom, for example, is on average member of more than 
90 percent of the treaties for which it is eligible; US 64%; Russia/URRS 74%; China 71%; 
and India 47%, while Cote d’Ivoire, Somalia, Cambodia, Brunei, Eritrea, Somalia, 
Namibia, Micronesia, Vanatu and St. Kitts have each joined less than 20% of possible 
arrangements. The top ten “ratifiers” include UK, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Bulgaria, Romania and Japan. Looking more broadly at the 
ratification behaviours of states since the end of the Cold War (vis-à-vis 76 multilateral 
treaties spanning a wide range of issue areas), Elsig et al. have found the top nine 
ratifiers are all European, as are sixteen of the top twenty, on the contrary US, India, 
China and URRS/Russia ranked respectively 67th, 71st, 69th, and 97th in their ratification 
rate.672673 
Figures from 4.3 to 4.6  provide a snapshot of regime membership – measured against 
the share of eligible agreements that a state has joined – for all states across 4 years: 
1965; 1980; 1995; 2010. 
 
The largely expected result that a substantial variation exist among regional areas, in 
no way detracts its value. First of all, the regime density distribution seem to confirm 
managerial explanation to treaty participation which identify in the lack of capacity 
the modest participation (or compliance) to international law requirements and not 
necessarily to a lack of willingness. The lack of capacity can in its turn relate both to a 
lack of resources or the absence of a domestic regime able to support the initiative. 
Under this perspective, the potential link between some specific state features (GDP, 
democracy, etc.) and a state’s propensity to join international agreements including 
                                                        
672 Elsig et al “Who is in love with multilateralism”, 2011 
673 Elsig, Milewicz, and Stürchler, “Who Is in Love with Multilateralism?” 
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the ones listed the framework of BW regime complex. Figure 4.7 breaks down regime 
membership based on a states’ polity score.674 The blue line plots the average regime 
membership (embeddedness index) of democracies (states with Polity score greater 
than or equal to 6), the orange line represents anocracies (Polity score between -6 and 
+6), the grey line represent autocracies (states with Polity score less than or equal to 
6). These results are consistent with what found with reference to the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. 
This potential connections are further investigated by means of statistical regressions 
(OLS panel data) which take embeddedness and the embeddedness index  as 
dependent variables (see tables 4 and 5).  
A second reason why a variation between geographical areas is interesting lays in the 
fact that several countries in the Global South enjoy very low degree of participation, 
which may indicate a modest trust in the disarmament pledge by major powers or a 
lack of confidence in the implementation of the “cooperation and development” side 
of the regime (whereof they would largely benefit). 
Figure 4.8 and 4.9 provide snapshots of regime participations - measured in terms of 
numbers of agreements joined  – organized per issue area and tested both in absolute 
terms and corrected per states system membership. 
 
Output determinants 
 
The model makes use of OLS Panel Data (fixed effects) to estimate the correlation 
between international and domestic variables (independent variables) on 
embeddedness and the embeddedness index. The models adopts a standard cross-
section time series data structure for the period 1961-2000. While there are reasons 
to treat goodness-of-fit statistics with caution, the R2  indicates that the findings open 
the floor to further discussion possibly accounting for many determinants of regime 
embeddedness (participation). At the present stage of analysis model 1 seems the 
most interesting one (see Table 4.1). The results reported in the two model reveal that 
most of the “external variables” identified behave as expected. As far 
                                                        
674 Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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interdependence is concerned, countries that display high overall International 
Organization memberships (and trade more intensively in model 1) also show higher 
degree of participation in the framework of the BW non-proliferation regime. 
Although the results over GDP are not clear (in the two models g2 differ in the 
direction and size of the statistical significance of their coefficients), the Composite 
Index of National Capabilities (CINC) is negatively and significantly correlated with 
embeddedness and embeddedness index confirming the idea that the countries 
displaying lower military investments are more prone to participate in regimes that 
support a reduction of armaments. This would also apply to BW programs in 
consideration of the fact  that high investments (time and resources) are today 
required to achieve advanced (versus rough) and effective BW programs and may 
discourage such endeavours. 
Regional power status is positively associated with regime’s participation – this is also 
in line with the idea that regional powers support multilateral legal cooperation 
because it offers the opportunity to shape treaty content/adaptation. 
Results confirm that higher BTWC (framework convention) system effects relates to 
higher degree of participation to the other components of the regime complex.  
With reference to model 1, as far as domestic factors are concerned both national 
regime (democracies vs. autocracies) and civil unrest are statistically significant. 
Democratic countries show higher regimes participation rate and vice-versa countries 
suffering internal instability tend to display lower degree of participation to the 
regime. Among the remaining variables the more promising in relating with regime’s 
participation are the presence of a nuclear ally (negatively and statistically significant 
association) and nuclear thereat (positively and statistical significant association). 
 
Consequences: outcomes  
 
International institutions vary widely in their overall levels of compliance. As explained 
the debate about compliance has revolved around questions such as: why do states 
choose to comply with institutions and why do they choose to comply more with some 
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of them and less with others maybe within the same regime framework? What factors 
drive changes in compliance behaviour over time?  
Figures 4.10 and following describe the different level of compliance displayed vis-à-
vis three critical individual elements of the regime for which measurable tools for 
compliance exist (BTWC; 1540; IHR) across time and space (plus regional sub-setting 
mode).  The documents under scrutiny are  the Confidence Building Measure (CBM), 
for the BTWC; the National Reports, in the case of Res. 1540; and WHO 
questionnaires/reports with regards to the International Health Regulations.  By 
completing and delivering such documents (whether it is a CBM, a 1540 Report or a 
WHO questionnaire), states give a double contribution to compliance analysis. On the 
one hand, the regime requires  states to produce these documents (under a legal or 
political binding command). In this respect the delivery rate would signal compliance 
with regards to that specific commitment. On the other hand, these documents – 
despite are not sold as verification tools in themselves, for obvious political reasons – 
de facto collect precious information concerning the state of the overall 
implementation of the regime’s rules (see Table 4.3) 
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 refers to BTWC and its Confidence Building Measure (and also 
show the number of states that have made their CBM public available in the 
conference website); Figure 4.13 refers to Res. 1540 and show the delivery of reports, 
reports’ addenda, implementation plans, requests for assistance and visits performed; 
finally figure 4.14 refers to WHO-IHR questionnaires.  
 
Considerations concerning BTWC Confidence Building Measures 
 
The Second Review Conference saw the beginning of international pressure to 
introduce within the framework of the BTWC some kind of verification procedures. 
The resulting discussion led the Assembly to agree on a politically (and not legally) 
binding tool, the so-called Confidence Building Measures (CBM). In general terms, the 
document would have granted the exchange of information around each member (1) 
bio defence activities, (2) suspect outbreaks (whose epidemiology seemed to deviate 
from a normal pattern), (3) encouragement of publication of results related to the 
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Convention, and the active promotion of contacts among scientists. The Confidence 
Building Measures shall not be considered a tool of compliance in legal terms, 
although, if filled in good faith and read by trained experts, can provide a very relevant 
and comprehensive pool of information over the status of the Convention’s 
implementation and the BW profiles of delivering states.  
Back in 1986, the Conference did not specify the modalities for CBM submission but 
established for this purpose an “Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical experts 
from state parties to finalize the modalities for Exchange of Information Data” that in 
1987 produced a report detailing the modalities for the CBMs’ submission making 
explicit the fact that information should have also been made available to WHO.675 
The Third and the Sixth review conference re-examined the CBMs and agreed to 
modify and expand them, more precisely the sixth review conference issued 
recommendations to make the instrument more user friendly (e.g. by adopting 
revised reporting forms) and considered how to enable fuller participation in the CBM 
during the intersessional programme. The Seventh Review Conference saw the 
removal of the CBM D section on “active promotion of contacts” (former CBM part D) 
and focus on the need to increase the number of submissions (by a study to be 
conducted during the following intersessional programme including the examination 
of options for electronic means of submissions). 
Today the CBM structure envisages that state parties would share information (open 
access or by means of a governments restricted access system) on the following: 
research centres and laboratories (CBM part A.1); national defence research centres 
and development programs (declaration, description, facilities) (part A.2); outbreaks 
(part B); on publication of scientific results (part C); legislature, regulations, and other 
measures (part E); past activities in offensive and or defensive biological research (part 
F); vaccine production facilities (part G), see table 3. 
While there has been over the course of the years a slow, but steady increase in the 
submission by state parties the overall level of participation remains low with less than 
half of all state parties having regularly exchanged information and data and ten State 
                                                        
675 Representative from 39 state parties participated in the meeting, and an expert from WHO was on hand to 
provide with a technical contribution. 
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Parties having submitted CBMs for the first time during the last 5 years and one State 
Party for the first time ever as an independent State.  
During the Seventh Review Conference (2011), it was decided to further support the 
fuller participation in the CBMs during the intersessional programme in 2012 and 
2013. Notwithstanding the activities undertaken, participation in the CBM has barely 
increased in the years since then. The majority of state parties which return their 
CBMs, do so on a regular basis. However, there is a significant number of states that 
participate irregularly and over half of them that do not participate at all. Between 65 
and 72 submissions were received annually between 2012 and 2016 with 33-44 % of 
them made publicly available on the BWC website. It is relevant to notice a peak in 
submission in the years between 2003-2015 with the 2015 witnessing the highest-
ever participation rate in the CBM process with 72 states submitting declarations, 
which nonetheless only amounts to less than a half of the state parties, (possibly in 
the view of the then-upcoming 8th RevCon in 2016) (see figures 4.11 and 4.12). It is 
also worth recalling here that the Eight Review Conference has indeed registered a 
record in national participation with 124 state parties joining the meeting and 83 
Working Paper submitted (see figure 4.12). 
It is though unclear why states do not participate in the CBM process. The 
Implementation Support Unit (the sort of Conference Secretariat created in 2006) has 
received little information on the reasons why this is so. (1) Technical difficulties in the 
completion of the annual submissions seem to represent a major reason for the low 
submission rates in the Global South (see figure 4.12).  This explanation would be in 
line with a “managerial” model of compliance (see Chapter 1). Consistently, with the 
aim of providing technical assistance and support to those States requesting it, as of 
May 2016, offers have been placed by Canada, Cuba, UK, and the US on the 
Cooperation and Assistance Database on the BWC website.  (2) A second reason that 
could explain the modest number of CBM returns is that many states do not see any 
benefit providing the information if cannot benefit from other contributions (if they 
don’t have the resources to extrapolate valuable data from other states returns, 
because of language constraints and the technicality of the issue under investigation). 
Under this perspective, it has to be mentioned that the Implementation Support Unit 
(ISU) is not mandated to carry out any aggregated or specific analysis of the content 
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of CBM returns, and - due to the variation in the format and language of submissions 
- can only compile the most basic statistics.  Consequently, the effort to drain 
information from such a tool still lays in the individual capacity of states or in the 
capacity of the International Organizations that have granted access to their content 
(e.g. the WHO). Because most of the CBMs are not public, not even non-governmental 
research centres (or NGOs) have the opportunity to derive any information from them 
(except in few circumstances and in the framework of governmental sponsored 
projects – this has been the case in the UK and Switzerland). (3) Finally, states could 
simply be motivated by the decision to hide illicit activities or simply avoid making 
public a modest engagement to implement the positive obligations the Convention 
conveys. The Implementation Support Unit had made the expansion of CBM returns 
one of its warhorse. 
However, even if the Convention would largely benefit from an increased number of 
CBMs return, surviving limitations, linked to the present format of the CBMs, have 
been identified in the following aspects: (1) Although information is provided about 
material capabilities and facilities owned by reporting states, much less knowledge is 
broadcasted concerning how biological capabilities are used; (2) While addressing 
national legislation to implement the BTWC, they do not explicitly cover the laws, 
regulations, institutions, policies and enforcement  mechanisms relevant to laboratory 
biosafety and dual-use research. Likewise, no information is transferred concerning 
member states participations to other relevant international agreements (IHR, UNSC 
1540, etc.) neither the tool has been integrated (formally or informally) with other 
international instruments which convey supplementary or complementary 
information; (3) The CBMs’ focus is on state programs when emerging challenges 
include non-state actors’ BW acquisition, incidental and accidental release; (4) finally, 
as said, the mechanism do not produce aggregate data (lack of an institution through 
which parties can elaborate on information shared, compare activities, review and 
analyse information) which could also work as a sort of accountability framework. 
 
Considerations concerning the 1540 Reports and Matrices (Bio) 
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Resolution 1540 interalia provides for the establishment of the  Security Council 1540 
Committee to oversee the Resolution’s actual implementation. The Committee works 
as “subsidiary body” and is composed of the fifteen current members of the Security 
Council (five permanent members plus ten non-permanent members).676 The 
Committee has 4 main areas of work: implementation; assistance; cooperation with 
relevant IOs; and transparency and media outreach. With regards to the first area 
(implementation), the Committee is tasked with the evaluation and completion of 
national reports so as to produce “Matrices” which indeed account for the  overall 
progresses in the implementation of the Resolution.677  Although performing 
statistical analysis on the data acquired, the Committee does not exercise any action 
nor investigate and prosecute alleged violations of non-proliferation obligations. 
Consistently, it is made clear, in the 1540 website and elsewhere, that the Matrices 
are not a tool of compliance, nonetheless many relevant information concerning 
states’ WMD proliferation profiles are there. This is especially true with regards to 
biological agents: a great deal of details otherwise not accessible or very hard to find 
are conveyed through the matrices. 
Concerning the status of implementation of the Resolution 1540, the most recent 
report (as of this writing), was published on the 1540 Committee website in December 
2016. It reveals that, although little progress was made, much remains to be done to 
accomplish the objective of full implementation of the Resolution. The analysis that 
follows build on the information included in the December 2016 Review integrated 
with the two previous comprehensive reviews (2008 and 2011) covered by Olgive-
White in her chapter “UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Origins, Status, and Future 
Prospects.”678 
Since the adoption of the Resolution in 2004, 176 states have submitted national 
reports. Between 2016 and the previous reporting period (ended in 2011), 8 additional 
countries have contributed with their first national report (Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda, 
                                                        
676 The Committee’s mandate has been renovated by Res 1673, 1801, 1977, 2055 
677 In line with 1540 Resolution obligations, member states were supposed to report to the Security Council, no 
later than 6 months after the resolution’s adoption, about the steps they have taken or plan to take to 
implement its provisions. The 1540 National Implementation Reports of the Security Council Committee pursuant 
to Resolution 1540 offer an in-depth assessment of the degree of implementation and compliance states have 
been able to reach. 
678 Knopf, International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation, 140–62. 
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Congo, Liberia, Malawi, Capo Verde, Sao Tome, Zambia and Haiti).679 Haiti became the 
177th state to have delivered its first report (in December 2016) dropping the number 
of non-reporting states to 16 (13 of which are from Africa and 3 from Asia-Pacific).680 
As of December 2017, the number of Additional Reports also have increased since the 
2011 Comprehensive Report, with 64countries having submitted at least one 
“Addendum” at the request of the 1540 committee. 681  Of those states that submitted 
Additional Reports, 13 states have provided for more than one report, and the total 
number of additional documents/reports produced since 2011 count for a total of 80 
additional files - in the form of addenda, notes, etc.). 682 As anticipated, information 
included in National Reports and additional documents drain into the Matrices. In the 
2016 Comprehensive Review document, it has been observed an overall increase of 
about 7% in the measures recorded in the matrices. Of a total of 64,075 possible 
measures to be adopted, the measures recorded in the 2016 matrices scored 30,632 
(48%). Of this overall total, the percentage of the possible measures recorded for 
biological weapons is 42% (versus 51% for the nuclear category and 50% for chemical). 
On a regional basis, Africa accounted for 28% of the total possible measures recorded 
(vs. 39% Latina America and the Caribbean; 41% Asia-Pacific; 80% Eastern Europe; 85% 
other states). Africa and Eastern Europe are described as registering the higher 
increase with respect to the previous reporting period. This patter seems to be 
associated with enhanced and substantive engagement of the Regional Organizations 
in supporting the implementation of the Resolution. 
Concerning Paragraph 1,683 the data from the matrices show that 139 states have now 
explicitly expressed their commitment to the “non-provision of support to non-state 
actors for the activities described” (vs. 129 in 2011).   
Concerning Operative Paragraph 2,684 the Committee observes that there has been a 
significant increase in measures recorded since 2011 (confirming the trend already in 
                                                        
679 the previous Comprehensive Review was release in 2011 
680 Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, DPRK, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Solomon Island, Somalia, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Zimbabwe. 
681 63 until April 2016 and 64 with Pakistan submitting in 2017 (after the closure of the Comprehensive Review 
Reporting period and for this reason excluded by the document S/2016/1038) 
682 Including India submitting its second additional document in 2017, same as above 
683 Legally binding instruments, organizations, codes of conduct, arrangements, statements and other issues 
684 Operative paragraph 2 obliges states to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-
state actors to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport transfer or sue nuclear chemical or biological 
weapons their means of delivery 
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place since 2008). States have implemented those provisions in various ways, 
including by means of constitutions that make obligations under international treaties 
self- executing in domestic laws, penal codes, specific legislation to implement 
national implementing measures derived by non-proliferation framework 
conventions. The Committee has noted that the most significant increase in measures 
is recorded for the implementation of the legal proscriptions (vs. enforcement 
measures) on non-state actors gaining access to nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons and their means of delivery with an overall increase of 15% in measures 
recorded by comparison with those recorded in 2011. Specifically, as far as BW are 
concerned, there has been an absolute increase of 13% in recorded measures covering 
biological agents. Of the overall total (15% increase), measures related to nuclear 
weapons represented 61%, those related to chemical weapons 74%, and those related 
to biological weapons 62%.  
A cross-comparison of information provided in 2008-2011 and 2016 also shows that, 
in general, the number of states with a legal framework in place to prohibit non-state 
actors WMD activities is higher than the one of those states, which have enforcement 
measures in place to punish violators. Focusing on biological weapons, table shows 
that there has been (between 2011 and 2016) a noteworthy increase in the absolute 
numbers of states having adopted legal frameworks (down side of figure 3.8) to 
prohibit biological weapons especially in the areas covering: “use” (>37); “transport” 
(>45); “possession” (>44); “accomplice” (>40) and “financing” (>40) denoting 
insufficient/inadequate pre-existing relevant measures in those area. Although 
“financing” (>57) and “accomplice” (>42) were already areas of significant increase for 
the period 2008-2011 the areas interested by major increase in states adopting 
measures were: use (>50), assistance (+40); acquisition and manufacturing (+29 and 
+26). In complex, the areas where major increases (since 2008) are registered are 
“use” and “financing” (>87 and >97). Such financial controls are mainly related to the 
legislation on counter-terrorism financing and money laundering and to the 
establishment of financial intelligence centres. If we still look at the absolute numbers 
concerning the legal framework (down-side; table 6), we see that manufacture, 
acquisition, use accomplice, assist and financing are the areas where a higher number 
of states have measure in place. Instead low implementation areas are transport and 
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means of delivery (105 and 97), which only represent half of UN membership. In 
addition, as observed for the remaining categories (nuclear and chemical), the 
absolute numbers related to enforcement (upper-side of table 6) are lower than those 
concerning the legal framework. Moreover, if a general increase in the number of 
states that implemented enforcement measures is observed, the total number of 
states remain very low in relation with particularly worrisome areas (stockpile, 
develop, means of delivery) where only around 80 states have issued enforcement 
measure. 
What is also quite striking is that notwithstanding the fact that state parties to the 
BTWC are required to adopt provisions that overlap with a number of the those 
included in the 1540- Paragraph 2, the raw numbers concerning the BW area were still 
extremely low in 2008 (when the BTWC was already close to universality). 
In general, the Committee has noticed that overall increase in measures recorded for 
the accounting and security obligations contained in paragraph 3 (a) and (b) was 5 % 
by comparison with the increase registered between 2008 and 2011. For biological 
materials, for example the number of states having in place a legal framework related 
to border controls is 176 (versus 167 in 2011 and 120 in 2008). Of this overall total, 
the biological area contributed only for 27%. With regard to accounting for and 
securing “materials related to” biological weapons the overall rate of implementation 
measures linger, indeed, far behind in comparison to the outcomes registered for 
materials related to nuclear and chemical weapons. In addition, there has been little 
or no increase in measures compared to those registered in 2011 (with the exception 
of accounting for transport and physical protection measures which showed a slight 
increase – responsible for that 27% contribution). The data suggest that a very limited 
number of states have implemented measures in these areas with absolute numbers 
ranging from 45 and 69 (1/3 of UN membership). 
Interestingly enough, the number of states having measures in place (with regards to 
op. para 3(a) and (b)) increased between 2008 and 2011 (both with reference to legal 
framework and enforcement), but in some cases, those decrease in 2016, which is a 
rather paradoxical outcome (figure (2)). The Committee has attributed the drop to a 
more rigorous interpretation by members of the laws related to biological weapons (or 
a better understanding of what they are all about). In any case, and because of the 
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modest scoring under this paragraph, the Committee expressed in 2016 the view that 
states “should take urgent action to adopt measures to account for and secure 
materials related to biological weapons”. 
What above seem to confirm, once again, that a lack of capacity contributes to non-
compliance outcomes. 
Under the issue (border control) also enforcement measures increased since 2011. 
These increases concern all the sub-areas of border controls: brokering, transport 
services and financial services for trade transaction/illicit trafficking. Nonetheless, 
especially as far as this latter category is concerned, the number of states having taken 
related measures remain low.  With regard to technical support, an increase was also 
registered, both under the legislative and enforcement profile, from 71 and 75 states 
in 2011, to 85 and 112 in 2016. However, the Committee has noted that such support 
must mainly be related to detection equipment (which may not correspond to an 
increase in capacity). As far as export controls are concerned, a reduction in the 
number of states that have adopted measures related to biological agents support 
broadcasts again the idea that either a more rigorous approach in coding for the norms 
either an initial misunderstanding on its substantial contents must have taken place.  
In summary, the implementation statistics (both legal framework and enforcement 
measures) imply more modest performance in the biological weapons’ field than in 
the nuclear or chemical weapon ones. Although more and more states have 
introduced provisions for criminal or administrative penalties to enforce measures 
related to biological weapons, those states that have done so, still represent a 
minority of the entire system, exposing a serious gap in the regime. This gap is most 
noticeable when the numbers are compared with those related to the accounting of 
nuclear weapons, which are relatively well covered, at least in legislative terms.  
Areas of BW control exist where the number of states having legislation/enforcement 
in place show a drop from 2011 to 2016 (this is often the case under operative 
paragraph 3a and b). As said, this apparently inconsistent outcome may signal a lack 
of rigorous interpretation of the laws related to biological weapons or a modest 
understanding and their contents.  
Scholars seem to have an increasing number of indicators to measure states’ degree 
of participation to Res. 1540, including the addition of letters of experience, additional 
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information to reports, action plans (since res 1977), requests and offers of assistance 
matchmaking, and country visits. It is indeed clear that the 1540 Committee is 
performing a relevant amount of work, and the results, where measurable, are 
significant. Nonetheless, in the words of the Committee itself, the burden of fighting 
non-state actors WMD acquisition ultimately rely on states and can only be effective 
“if all states, irrespective of whether they possess a potential associated with WMD 
and their means of delivery, implement fully the requirements laid down in the 
Resolution.”  
 
Considerations concerning the State Party Annual Reporting (WHO-IHR) 
 
The International Health Regulations (2005) has raised a series of debates linked to 
the potential violation of state sovereignty, its consistency with other treaties 
(environment, trade etc.), and to the operational involvement of WHO in situations 
(security-related) the might compromise the Agency’s political neutrality. Under this 
perspective the document accepts the idea the Organization mandate covers Public 
Health Emergencies (including Public Health Emergencies of International Concerns 
PHEIC) irrespectively of their origin (natural, deliberate, accidental).685 
The IHR is to all intents and purposes an international “regulation,” thus compliance 
with its provisions is mandatory for WHO members unless they opt out. 
Under IHR (2005), WHO members are requested (art. 5) to “develop certain minimum 
core public health capacities” which include: (1) detection, assessment, notification 
and reporting of events (2) surveillance and response (annex 1A); (3) introduction of 
requirements for designated airports, ports and ground crossings (annex 1B).  
                                                        
685 See also Res. 54.14 (2001) and 55.16 (2002) which called on member states to “treat any deliberate use, 
including local, of biological, chemical, and radiological attack to cause harm also as a global public health 
threat”. The passage is significant because it admitted a traditionally security matter (CBRN) in WHO’s remit, 
although indirectly - through the all-risk approach adopted by the resolution. The following IHR revision, 
although confirming the general support to the all-risk approach, opened the floor to serious 
consultations/confrontations among member states and regional groups on the role of WHO should have had in 
security relevant matters. In particular a southern bloc of states (EMRO, SEARO, WPRO) acted vocally against the 
inclusion of international security elements in the text of the treaty in the form of words like “threat” 
(substituted by the wording risk), “CBRN”, and any other language that would explicitly grant the WHO the power 
to undertake suspect treaty violations involving weapons of mass destruction (e.g. in the case of Biological 
Weapons and the BWC). See Weir, “A Genealogy of Global Health Security.” 
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The same article 5 together with art. 54 and WHA 61.2, require states to provide WHO 
with self-compiled “State Party Annual Reporting” (SPARs) named National Reports 
(for the biennium 2009-2010) and National Questionnaires (between 2010 and 2016). 
These self-assessment instruments of compliance are published on the WHO website 
– “Global Health Observatory (GHO)”. The trend of IHR-WHO questionnaires returns 
is described in figure 15 (regions corresponds to WHO regions).686 In 2012, the WHA 
Assembly went further (WHA 65.23) by urging State Parties to take the necessary 
steps to prepare and carry out appropriate national implementation plans in order to 
ensure the required strengthening, developing and/or maintenance of the core public 
health capacities as provided for in the IHR. The IHR Review Committee also suggested 
that the Secretariat should have developed options to move from an exclusive self-
evaluation approach to an “external evaluation" model that combines self-evaluation, 
peer-review and voluntary external evaluations involving a combination of domestic 
and independent experts (WHA 68.5). In 2015 a tool was developed with this scope: 
The Joint External Evaluation Mechanism (which has been assigned a Secretariat (the 
JEES)). The JEE and related activities are currently performed under the WHE/CPI – 
“Core Capacity Monitoring and Evaluation” branch of WHO (and often jointly with the 
Global Health Security Initiative). The JEE tool combines the GHSA Action packages 
and IHR capacities.687 The JEE Process includes: 1. Country request; 2. Self-assessment; 
3. Five-days mission with plenary sessions (all relevant ministries sit in); 4. Report 
finalization (review by all team members and approval by host country). The 
consequences of these decisions and processes over the compliance and compliance 
oversight of regime implementation are apparent. 
 
Consequences: impact 
 
As said, effectiveness attains to the degree to which a regime solves the problem that 
motivated its formation. In this case the regime was raised to outlaw the use of 
                                                        
686 http://www.who.int 
687 JEE core capacities are organized in terms of “prevent”; “detect”; “respond”; “other IHR-related hazards and 
PoE” 
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biological weapons and evolved in a way that included the ban on possession, 
development and circulation of biological agents that could be used as weapons by 
states and non-states actors. The scope is obviously extremely broad. Traditionally the 
two typical dependent variables used to account for non-proliferation treaties’ impact 
are programs and possession of the weapons under governance.688   
 
In order to give reason for time changes in proliferation attitudes (potentially linked 
to biological agents’ regime), states’ proliferation postures (pursuit and possession) 
should studied with respect to overall participation into the BW regime-complex 
(embeddedness  and BWC system effect) and controlled for several traditional 
determinants of WMD proliferation adjusted for BWC features (see “qualifications”, 
below). As we have explained in the previous chapters, proliferation is usually linked 
to the capacity to develop a weapon and the desire (willingness) to do so.  
 
Dependent variables 
Proliferation activities are usually classified in terms of pursuit and possession. The 
pursuit variable has been created for countries pursuing biological weapons in a given 
year. BW pursuit codes 1 if a country pursues a biological weapon in that year and 0 
otherwise. Pursuit is defined as a country that is reportedly an active seeker trying to 
acquire the capability to produce, weaponized and stockpile a biological agent. 
Consequently, pursuit states have some background capacity, nor sponsor or fund 
duals use research of concern, but they are actively attempting to get some kind of 
weapons capability.689 Biological weapons possession codes 1 if a country possesses a 
BW weapon/arsenal in that year and 0 otherwise.  
 
Qualifications (concerning the model for the study of BW regime effectiveness) 
Biological Weapons “Capacity” 
The production of a few weaponized biological agents or chemicals do not require 
intrinsic capabilities that a state, however small and under-developed it might be, may 
                                                        
688 Jo and Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation”; Horowitz and Narang, “Poor Man’s Atomic 
Bomb?” 
689 Author’s conversation with Horowitz, February 2016 
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not possess: biological weapons have been used on the battlefield since the dawn of 
civilisation and chemical weapons were already undisputed protagonists during WWI. 
On the contrary, it must be said that the development of full-spectrum of biological 
programs and deployable arsenal, meant to be deployed for systematic military 
actions, represents a very different challenge.  
Satisfactory accounts for states’ capability to pursue biological weapons remain 
intangible, as the growing literature in the field of STS proves.690 Likewise, to the best 
of my knowledge, ready to use indicator of biological weapons latent capabilities are 
not available as it is in the case of nuclear weapons. 
A few efforts have been made to develop such indicators: the Scientific American 
Worldview has been evaluating countries according to their biotechnology capacity 
since 2009 and in its current 2014 version ranks 54 countries;691 Ernst & Young have 
produced a biotechnology industry report for the last 5 years, which is unfortunately 
geographically limited to Australia, Canada, the US and Europe (692); the Bioweapons 
Monitor also produced its own ranking in 2011, which can be found at the end of the 
2011 Issue.693  
Theoretically, assessments should incorporate several information concerning each 
country national life-science and the global biotechnology industry’s landscape. 
A country’s capacity for working with bio-agents of particular concern or conducting 
activities with high misuse potential would probably account for overall (1) economic 
capacity; (2) number and types of facilities (GDP; BSL3 and BSL4 Labs; Vaccine 
Production Facilities); (3) country scientific know-how.694  A composite index serving 
this scope should probably include “research and development expenditure % of 
GDP”; number of researchers in R&D per million people and number of technicians in 
R&D (World Bank DATA); scientific and technical journal articles published on specific 
                                                        
690 Vogel, “Expert Knowledge in Intelligence Assessments,” 39–71; Vogel, “Necessary Interventions”; Ouagrham-
Gormley, “Barriers to Bioweapons,” 80–114; K. Vogel, “Bioweapons Proliferation.” 
691 See http://www.saworldview.com/scorecard/2014-scientific-american-worldview-overall-scores/  
692 See http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Industries/Life-Sciences/Beyond-borders-Matters-of-evidence-biotechnology- 
industry-report-2013---Point-of-view-matters-of-evidence  
693 See http://www.bwpp.org/publications.html  
694 Knowledge of how to construct nuclear weapons has spread with the passage of time. Researchers in the 
Manhattan Project in the United States and elsewhere had no idea at first whether the device they were building 
would actually function. Subsequent proliferators often benefited from equipment and expertise developed 
elsewhere. Diffusion equals the log transformation of the number of years since 1938. The diffusion of nuclear 
technology and knowledge probably does not occur monotonically. Log transformation of the time trend allows 
us to discount differences in later periods much more than those in the earliest periods. 
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subjects (e.g. mentioning CRISPR, in the case of bio), patents’ requests mentioning 
specific words (CAS9, CRISPR); national funding of projects involving dual-use research 
of concern; (4) global facilitators (growth of GenBank 695; worldwide number of papers 
mentioning specific topics (CRISPR, since 2007); overall number of patent application 
that mention specific words (Gene-drives,CAS9, CRISPR; commercially available kits. 
 
Such an assessment reflects the so-called biotech-revolution’s interpretation of bio 
weapons’ development (as opposed to social/evolutionary model). Nonetheless, the 
drawbacks of revolution-models approaches are  well explained by the work of 
Kathleen Vogel and Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormely. The two scholars’ understanding 
of bio weapons proliferation is precisely the one of a “socio-technical endeavour” that 
requires incidental capacities and procedures, transmission and diffusion of so-called 
tacit-knowledge and implicit skills, and the presence of circumstantial social 
circumstances. Unfortunately, a large-scale assessment of these conditions although 
desirable would be not feasible on the large scale (multi-year, multinational studies). 
An alternative and probably most viable option to produce a valuable CB “capability 
index” is reasoning in relative terms, taking as threshold values few specific values 
displayed by countries that have actually initiated programs and developed weapons 
in the past (properly adjusted for the growing dimension of the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnological industry).  
 
Biological Weapons desire (“Willingness”) 
As far as “willingness” - related  factors are concerned, things are somewhat easier to 
grasp. Horowitz and Narang have observed that the same factors responsible for 
nuclear proliferation also play a role in explaining under which conditions states may 
want to pursue bio and chemical programs (Biological Weapons seem to work as 
complement of nuclear weapons at the pursuit stage and as substitute at the 
possession stage). The United Kingdom dismantlement of its offensive biological 
weapons program in 1956 is a case in point. More in general, Horowitz and Narang 
have observed that after acquiring nuclear arsenals, states are much less likely to 
                                                        
695 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/statistics 
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initiate or maintain biological and chemical programs. Under this perspective, 
becomes necessary to take into account those findings in the effectiveness model of 
BW by including within control values each country’s nuclear profile. The authors have 
investigated the combined pursue of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in 
concert by making use of “survival curves” of pursue and possession of one weapon 
vis-à-vis the acquisition of pursue of the other two. They have demonstrated that 
states that possess both bio or chemical weapons, pursue nuclear weapons sooner 
than countries with either bio or chemical weapons, and that both groups pursue 
nuclear weapons much sooner than countries without any CBW. This suggests that 
countries view CBW not only as insufficient to provide for their security, but that they 
increasingly seek nuclear weapons once they acquire chemical or biological weapons. 
On the contrary, countries possessing nuclear weapons are at essentially zero risk of 
initiating pursuit of chemical or biological weapons over time (these two survivor 
functions appear as one overlapping line). Countries pursuing biological weapons, on 
the other hand, still have a large desire for chemical weapons. They “fail” and pursue 
chemical weapons at a significantly higher rate. Controls are not statistically 
significant. Finally, when turning to estimating the effect of both nuclear and chemical 
weapons pursuit and acquisition on the risk of initiating biological weapons, scholars’ 
results provide support for the notion that biological weapons (in addition to chemical 
weapons) can also be appropriately considered a “poor man’s nuclear bomb”. Two 
additional findings are reported: 
First, countries have generally pursued chemical weapons at a much higher rate in 
general than biological weapons. This potentially suggests biological weapons are 
much harder to acquire. Second, after adding an extra curve that depicts how the joint 
pursuit of chemical weapons and nuclear weapons influences the probability that a 
country pursues biological weapon, the two scholars note that the probabilities of 
pursuit are extremely similar across three conditions: chemical weapons pursuit, 
nuclear and chemical weapons pursuit, and chemical weapons possession. This would 
suggest that biological weapons are perceived as “superior” weapons, in many ways, 
to chemical weapons. If chemical weapons were a plausible substitute for biological 
weapons, we would expect the probability of biological weapons pursuit to decline 
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significantly as a country shifted from pursuing chemical weapons to acquiring 
chemical weapons. 
 
All that considered it is interesting to observe that regression models (logit) which 
correlate BW possession and pursuit on the one side and “embeddedness” or “BWC 
System Effect” on the other are not always statistical significant and weak. 
On the one side there is a strong evidence (see Horvitz and Narang) that membership 
in the BWC (measured by BWC system effects) is associated with a lower risk of 
biological weapons pursuit which would obviously clearly indicate that a growing 
norm against the proliferation of biological agents (offensive programs) had a power 
effect on the pursuit of such agents. 696 On the other side the same results cannot be 
confirmed when controlled for BWC ratification only or embeddedness for absence of 
statistical significance. As far as possession is concerned, when decent R2 measures 
are obtained, results are still hard to explain (contrary to expectations but in line with 
some findings in the nuclear domain) insofar higher participation to the regime 
appears positively associated with BW possession (see table 3.5). This result would 
suggest that, at least in the period under analysis (up to 2000), while participating in 
the regime states have violated its basic provision, namely BW disarmament. 
If statistics seem to indicate that the regime may have had some role in curbing 
proliferation, it did not impact on possession. This result although apparently counter-
intuitive fits historical examination (with major possessors countries interrupting their 
programs before or much later the signature of the BWC). It is worth recalling here, 
however, that empirical analysis of these types, as explained in Chapter 2, must be 
regarded with cautions for several reasons (extremely limited number of cases and 
modest variation, poor measures of proliferation and possession, weak accounts for 
temporal dependencies, autocorrelation, etc.) 
 
Nonetheless, it is still possible to offer a general picture of the BW proliferation 
scenario (in the period 1945 – 2000). Always building on Horowitz and Narang 2014 
dataset (which builds and improves on Horowitz 2004) for both possession and pursuit 
                                                        
696 Horowitz and Narang, “Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb?,” 530. 
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measures, it is possible to account for a number of 21 countries have pursued, at 
different times and for diverse timeframes, biological weapons (see figure 4.15).  
As a consequence of this alternation, the number of states being simultaneously active 
in the bio-weapons’ field has never exceeded the threshold of 10% of states in the 
system.697 Among these countries, 9 have supported BW illicit activities after ratifying 
the BTWC. While two of them credibly possessed effective stockpiles, Russia and 
China, the remaining seven only reached pursuit stage (Laos, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, 
Libya, Vietnam, and Cuba).  Generally, a positive trend in the number of countries 
pursuing biological weapons is observed from the sixties up to the end of the Cold War 
and a steadiness afterwards with only 4 programs states reported in the year 2000 
(although assessments are limited by the lack of reliable data).698  
According to the Biological Weapons Prevention Project, today 25 states have today 
defence programmes (that are indeed legitimate under the BTWC). Ten of them have 
been past proliferators, the remaining are countries that had never performed 
offensive research before initiating a defensive programme. All of the 25 countries 
have military labs, but only 10 countries have civil labs dealing with dual-use 
pathogens aside military facilities. 
 
It is indeed the above described scenario that allows for a more generous account of 
the present effectiveness at least in curbing BW proliferation drive. Indeed several 
factors should have led to an increased number of pursuers: (1) more states have 
reasonably become “capable” to set up BW offensive programs (because of economic 
growth, more accessible and cheap technology (2) increasing reliability of such 
weapons (due to genome editing techniques, see Chapter 2); (3) more states may have 
wanted to recur to strategic equalizer insofar bound by the NPT not to seek nuclear 
                                                        
697 The numbers of states simultaneously pursuing or possessing nuclear weapons reach the peak value of 16 
countries in 1987, but it settles at 8 countries to the turn of the century. 
698 States’ behaviours vis-à-vis chemical weapons is very similar to the one just described for bio-weapons, although 
the size of chemical active states is larger, with a total of 49 pursuers or possessors (variously distributed in the 
time period under consideration).  
It’s quite apparent that, if on the one side the number of states pursuing chemical weapons has drastically 
diminished in the second half of the 1990s, the number of chemical weapons possessors experienced a 
considerable and constant growth from 2% up to 9% of total states in the system. 
Interestingly enough the CWC (framework convention for the chemical weapons) was signed in 1993 and entered 
into force in 1997. 
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weapons (with nuclear weapons acquisition being one of the most effective trigger of 
BW abandonment).  
 
Conclusions 
 
Existing quantitative research struggles to define and operationalise the increasingly 
complex variety of actors and issue areas encompassed by non-proliferation regimes 
and none of them has focused exclusively on the ones covering biological weapons. 
Under this perspective, the present chapter has tried to take advantage of this 
complexity and of the depth of variation that exists in the BW regime. 
 
Sure, regime complexity, as the one described in the case  of the bio-weapons regime, 
can open the floor to negative externalities. Scholars and practitioners have blamed  
the multiplication of international laws, rules, and obligations for introducing 
ambiguity into international commitments (diminishing legal clarity and the power of 
the restrictions imposed); for making it easier for states to shrink on international 
obligations and to avoid punishments for doing so; for opening the floor to forum 
shopping; for complicating precedent-setting and making compliance with 
international institutions harder also for those states that would be willing to abide.699 
Along these lines, regime complexity, would force states to disperse resources and 
foreign policy decisions across organizations and can forecast instability (throughout 
contested multilateralism).700 Additional undesirable effects that have been linked to 
the regime complexity include: cross-institutional strategizing, the asymmetrical 
distribution of legal and technical expertise, and the fragmentation of reputation, 
altogether able to erode the significance of institutions in multifaceted 
environments.701 Under this perspective complexity would show the potential to 
make the overall regime content indifferent at best, if not inefficient. 
                                                        
699 Alter and Meunier, “The Politics of International Regime Complexity”; Hafner-Burton, von Stein, and Gartzke, 
“International Organizations Count”; Raustiala and Victor, “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources”; 
Barnett and Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations”; Kelley, “Who 
Keeps International Commitments and Why?” 
700 Morse and Keohane, “Contested Multilateralism.” 
701 Drezner, “The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity.” 
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Nonetheless, the analysis offered in the present chapter has highlighted the potential 
benefits of regime complexity for both policy-makers and researchers.702 As shown in 
the previous Chapter 3, the BW regime complex has indeed proved able to (1) 
accommodate multiple interests creating a common ground for states (with 
potentially very different characteristics and priorities) to cooperate (including  by 
linkages that enlarge the scope for deal-making); (2) has offered a cooperation’s 
structure easier to manage. But more importantly the regime has given birth to a 
mutually reinforcing system of compliance measures and “in-kind” oversight 
mechanisms as the Confidence Building Measures, 1540 reports, and WHO/IHR 
Questionnaires, whose performance has been analysed in details in the present 
chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 had already reported a general increase in the membership with regards to 
the BW regime complex individual institutions. The findings of the present chapter 
point in the same direction. With respect to the overall BW regime participation, the 
analysis has shown that states’ joining rate (measured as ratification or other type of 
consent) has largely kept pace with (when not exceeded) the rate at which new 
agreements have been created revealing a still strong support for the regime main 
principles. Nonetheless, significant variation in membership among and within regions 
is equally clear. With Europe and the Americas leading the way, the Global South lags 
behind when it comes to ratifying international commitments over biological agents. 
The latter finding, matched with additional controls (for national economic capacities 
and national regimes), seems to suggest that modest participation, where existing, is 
attributable to a lack of capacity more than a lack of willingness. Participation is also 
largely influenced by other countries decision to participate - as shown by the 
significant and positive association with BWC System Effect (proportion of BWC 
joiners to the total number of states in the world).  Always with regards to 
participation (= embeddedness) determinants, an interesting finding is the one which, 
in line with general wisdom, highlights how countries with lower military investments 
are more prone to participate to the BW non-proliferation regime. 
                                                        
702 Hafner-Burton, von Stein, and Gartzke, “International Organizations Count”; Keohane and Victor, “The Regime 
Complex for Climate Change.” 
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The chapter has also scrutinized, with reference to the three main agreements 
constituting the regime complex, reporting rates. In general the regime registers 
decent level of compliance with such requirements - with politically binding measures 
(CBM) marking lower returns than legally binding ones (1540 National Reports and 
WHO Reports). The latter two also register higher marks in terms of both promptness 
of response (modest lag since the injunction became effective) and in terms of overall 
number of documents delivered to the reporting authority. The diverse degree of 
performance can be attributed to diverse factors (beyond their legal profile) which 
include the issue area at stake, the friendliness of the tools in itself (and the capacity 
of the state to enter answers into the document format), the openness/secrecy 
assigned to the information collected, and the assistance that is offered to states in 
performing the task.  
 
As anticipated, effectiveness (broadly indented) is hard to grasp and the 
establishment of a binary relation between the regime and specific proliferation 
outcomes is virtually impossible. The size and features of such effectiveness has been 
already discussed in the findings of the previous Chapter and is not repeated here. 
However, the quantitative analysis in the present chapter has suggested that some 
additional indicators of success are present. Not only states have sponsored more 
(and more demanding) initiative, and have progressively ratified or consented to the 
existing ones, but it seems that they have also ameliorated the quality of their 
participation (e.g. more participants at BWC Review Conference and more Working 
Paper presented). A growing number of states have shared information on their 
ongoing programs dealing with DURC or Select Agents and opened their laboratories 
in the framework of assistance and external evaluation missions. This background 
suggests that, when not already at work, room exists in the framework of the present 
regime for social mechanisms to operate (learning, mimicking, persuasion and social 
influence) eventually empowering regime effectiveness. Nonetheless, the present 
section has served the purpose or revealing how states still struggle to adapt their 
national legislation to the regime’s requirements (with disappointing statistics in 
comparison with both the nuclear and chemical field). Especially, with regards to non-
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state actors, legal and, in particular, enforcement measures, the states which have 
introduced appropriate provisions are still a minority. Similar feedbacks come from 
the SPARs (WHO) with regard to preparedness and response in cases of emergencies. 
These are clearly areas were the regime still has a long way ahead. 
In terms of the number of BW proliferators and possessors that would be registered 
if the regime were not in place, the present investigation has shown that a conclusive 
assessment is not credible at the present stage of research for many reasons including 
data limitations. The analysis has nonetheless reasonably suggest that the flee of BW 
offensive activities would be far more crowded and lively in the absence of the BW 
regime-complex. 
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